On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 115-128

  Martínez, Ruth ^a   Massó, Jordi ^b   Neme, Alejandro ^a   Oviedo, Jorge ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE SAN LUIS   (Argentina)

^b UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Matching; Stability; Strategy proofness

Indexed keywords

EID: 12144253267     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820400189     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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