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Volumn 83, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 209-223

The risk and incentives trade-off in the presence of heterogeneous managers

Author keywords

Incentives; Risk

Indexed keywords


EID: 11944250210     PISSN: 09318658     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00712-004-0085-7     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (27)

References (18)
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  • 2
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    • The Other Side of the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation
    • Aggarwal, R. K., and Samwick, A. A. (1999): "The Other Side of the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation." Journal of Political Economy 107: 65-105.
    • (1999) Journal of Political Economy , vol.107 , pp. 65-105
    • Aggarwal, R.K.1    Samwick, A.A.2
  • 4
    • 0001466875 scopus 로고
    • A Theory of Marriage: Part 1
    • Becker, G. S. (1973): "A Theory of Marriage: Part 1." Journal of Political Economy 81: 813-846.
    • (1973) Journal of Political Economy , vol.81 , pp. 813-846
    • Becker, G.S.1
  • 5
    • 0001245231 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The Use of Equity to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive Levels
    • Core, J., and Guay, W. (1999): "The Use of Equity to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive Levels." Journal of Accounting and Economics 28: 151-184.
    • (1999) Journal of Accounting and Economics , vol.28 , pp. 151-184
    • Core, J.1    Guay, W.2
  • 7
    • 84937312959 scopus 로고
    • Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory
    • Garen, J. E. (1994): "Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory." Journal of Political Economy 102: 1175-1199.
    • (1994) Journal of Political Economy , vol.102 , pp. 1175-1199
    • Garen, J.E.1
  • 9
    • 0000638668 scopus 로고
    • An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
    • Grossman, S. J., and Hart, O. D. (1983): "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem." Econometrica 51: 7-45.
    • (1983) Econometrica , vol.51 , pp. 7-45
    • Grossman, S.J.1    Hart, O.D.2
  • 10
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    • Moral Hazard and Observability
    • Holmstrom, B. (1979): "Moral Hazard and Observability." Bell Journal of Economics 10: 74-91.
    • (1979) Bell Journal of Economics , vol.10 , pp. 74-91
    • Holmstrom, B.1
  • 11
    • 0000871877 scopus 로고
    • Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
    • Holmstrom, B., and Milgrom, P. (1987): "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives." Econometrica 55: 303-328.
    • (1987) Econometrica , vol.55 , pp. 303-328
    • Holmstrom, B.1    Milgrom, P.2
  • 12
    • 0036804610 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The Tenuous Trade-off between Risk and Incentives
    • Prendergast, C. (2002a): "The Tenuous Trade-off between Risk and Incentives." Journal of Political Economy 110: 1071-1102.
    • (2002) Journal of Political Economy , vol.110 , pp. 1071-1102
    • Prendergast, C.1
  • 18
    • 84867928970 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Managerial Incentives and Firm Efficiency in the Presence of Competition for Managers
    • Wright, D. J. (2003): "Managerial Incentives and Firm Efficiency in the Presence of Competition for Managers." International Journal of Industrial Organization 21: 419-437.
    • (2003) International Journal of Industrial Organization , vol.21 , pp. 419-437
    • Wright, D.J.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.