British scientists and the Cold War: The Defence Research Policy Committee and information networks, 1947-1963

Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 209-252

  Agar, Jon ^a   Balmer, Brian ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 11544348112     PISSN: 08909997     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/27757795     Document Type: Article

References (154)

1. PRO DEFE 10/40. Minutes, DRPC, DRP/M(55)4, 1 Mar 1955.
2. The DRPC's terms of reference: "to advise the Minister of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff on matters connected with the formulation of scientific policy." PRO DEFE 10/36. Minutes, DRP(47)2nd meeting, 28 Jan 1947.
3. Michael Dockrill, British defence since 1945 (Oxford, 1988), 51.
4. Philip Gummett, Scientists in Whitehall (Manchester, 1980), 32.
5. John Krige, "Scientists as policymakers: British physicists 'advice' to their government on membership of CERN (1951-1952)," in Tore Frängsmyr, ed., Solomon's house revisited: The organisation and institutionalization of science (Canton, MA, 1990), 270-291.
6. Margaret Gowing, Independence and deterrence: Britain and atomic energy, 1945-52, Vol. 1 (2 vols., London, 1974).
7. PRO DEFE 10/40. Minutes, DRPC, DRP/M(55)7, 24 May 1955. Our emphasis.
8. Franklyn Johnson, Defence by ministry: The British Ministry of Defence, 1944-1974 (London, 1980); W.P. Snyder, The politics of British defence policy, 1945-1962 (Columbus, 1964).
9. Franklyn Johnson, Defence by ministry: The British Ministry of Defence, 1944-1974 (London, 1980); W.P. Snyder, The politics of British defence policy, 1945-1962 (Columbus, 1964).
10. Dockrill (ref. 3).
11. Gummett (ref. 4), 31.
12. Ronald W. Clark, Tizard (London, 1965), 375. See also Julian Lewis, Changing direction: British military planning for post-war strategic defence, 1942-1947 (London, 1988), 239.
13. Ronald W. Clark, Tizard (London, 1965), 375. See also Julian Lewis, Changing direction: British military planning for post-war strategic defence, 1942-1947 (London, 1988), 239.
14. PRO DEFE 7/269. Memorandum, "COS. Central direction of scientific effort," COS(45)611(0), by Tizard, 12 Oct 1945.
15. PRO DEFE 7/269. Memorandum, "COS. Central direction of scientific effort," COS(45)668(0), 20 Nov 1945.
16. In their memorandum recommending the formation of the DRPC to the Cabinet Defence Committee, the Chiefs of Staff state that "we have considered what machinery should be set up to achieve this and had the advantage of Sir Henry lizard's advice." PRO AVIA 54/952. Memorandum, "Cabinet. Defence Committee. Central direction of scientific effort. Report by the Chiefs of Staff," DO(46)82, by R.R. McGrigor and F.E.W. Simpson, 2 Jul 1946.
17. Clark (ref. 11), 378. As we discuss later, the outcome was the setting up of a Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defence Science and a DRPC Working Party to serve it.
18. Gummett (ref. 4), 220, records that the insistence of the Ministry of Defence that the DRPC needed its own secretariat (not Treasury opposition) was responsible for the ́rather smalĺ secretariat support of both ACSP and DRPC. The lack of staff for government civil science bodies is often cited as a cause of their weakness. Alternatively, it might explain the DRPC's strengths.
19. Opposition came from the Air Division of the Ministry of Supply at least. However the Chiefs of Staff insisted on a secretariat. PRO AVIA 54/952.
20. PRO AVIA 54/952. DO(46)82.
21. Lewis (ref. 11), 181.
22. Gowing (ref. 6),1, 32-37.
23. PRO DEFE 10/36. Minutes, DRPC, DRP(47), 5th Meeting, 1947.
24. PRO DEFE 10/19. Memorandum, "DRPC. Future defence research policy. Report to the Minister of Defence," DRP(47)98, 30 Jul 1947.
25. PRO DEFE 10/18. Memorandum, "Future defence policy," 1 May 1947. Our emphasis, i.e., atomic and Gaverford, but not BW or CW. For a full account of biological weapons police in this period, see B. Balmer, "The drift of biological weapons policy in the UK 1945-65," Journal of strategic studies (forthcoming).
26. PRO DEFE 10/18. Memorandum, DRP(47)35, 7 Mar 1947.
27. PRO DEFE 10/19. Memorandum, "DRPC. Future Defence Policy. Report to the Minister of Defence," DRP(47)98, 30 Jul 1947.
28. B. ter Haar, The future of biological weapons, London, 1991), chapt. 1.
29. Ref. 25.
30. PRO DEFE 10/37. Minutes, DRP(49)10th meeting, 20 Jun 1949.
31. Gowing (ref. 6), 1, 32-37.
32. PRO DEFE 10/23. Memorandum, DRP(48)147, 19 Oct 1948.
33. PRO DEFE 10/37. Minutes, DRP(50)2nd meeting, 24 Jan 1950.
34. PRO DEFE 10/38. Minutes, DRP/M(51)9, 22 May 1951. The DRPC also considered a report on the use of atomic bombs to defend river lines in 1950. Tizard thought this report "important...because for the first time it concentrated attention on the tactical use of the atomic weapon." PRO DEFE 10/37. Minutes, DRP(50)23rd meeting, 17 Oct 1950.
35. PRO DEFE 10/32. Memorandum, "Atomic weapons trials," DRP/P(53)25, 20 May 1953.
36. PRO DEFE 10/39. Minutes, DRP/M(54)3, 2 Mar 1954. A "special" DRPC sub-committee proposed subsequently included, alongside the deputy chiefs of staff and scientific advisers, the Controller of Atomic Weapons, William Penney (the director of Aldermaston), and Sir Richard Powell. This body may well have been a reformed DRP(AES).
37. PRO DEFE 10/18. DRP(47)35, 1947.
38. PRO DEFE 10/36. Minutes, DRP(47)21st meeting, 16 Dec 1947. Carter puts the final cost of the new facilities closer to 2.5m; see Gradon B. Carter, "Biological warfare and biological defence in the United Kingdom 1940-1979," RUSI, Journal, 137:6 (1992), 67-74, and Porton Down: 75 years of chemical and biological research (London, 1992); and Robert Bud, The uses of life (Cambridge, 1993), 111-116.
39. PRO DEFE 10/36. Minutes, DRP(47)21st meeting, 16 Dec 1947. Carter puts the final cost of the new facilities closer to 2.5m; see Gradon B. Carter, "Biological warfare and biological defence in the United Kingdom 1940-1979," RUSI, Journal, 137:6 (1992), 67-74, and Porton Down: 75 years of chemical and biological research (London, 1992); and Robert Bud, The uses of life (Cambridge, 1993), 111-116.
40. PRO DEFE 10/36. Minutes, DRP(47)21st meeting, 16 Dec 1947. Carter puts the final cost of the new facilities closer to 2.5m; see Gradon B. Carter, "Biological warfare and biological defence in the United Kingdom 1940-1979," RUSI, Journal, 137:6 (1992), 67-74, and Porton Down: 75 years of chemical and biological research (London, 1992); and Robert Bud, The uses of life (Cambridge, 1993), 111-116.
41. PRO DEFE 10/36. Minutes, DRP(48)17th meeting, 16 Nov 1948.
42. PRO DEFE 10/26. Memorandum, "BW Policy. Note by the Chairman, BW Sub-Committee," DRP(50)53, 11 May 1950.
43. Arguments in favor of abandoning the development of offensive BW were: (i) need for financial cuts; (ii) "the difficulty of finding staff;" (iii) the uncertainty of BW as a weapon (iv) "the difficulty of assessing the results of BW" (v) "theoretically, an antidote could be found by all the agents;" (vi) restrictions of Geneva Convention. Arguments in favor of carrying through the present policy and program were: (i) ignorance of details on Soviet threat - "We are on the firmest ground if we base our appreciation on deduction from our own work;" (ii) defensive research was imperative; (iii) expert advice recommended continuance; (iv) considerations of "defensive measures in isolation" lead to "dangerous misconceptions;" (v) deterrence; (vi) moretent strains possible through "further research;" (vii) BW attacks on atomic plants etc. render them "out of action for long periods" (via) commitments to collaboration with U.S. and Canada"
44. See PRO WO188/668, AC11950/BRBM26, BRAB 26th Meeting, 12 Jul 1952. PRO DEFE 10/33, Memorandum, "Review of Defence R&D," 10 Mar 1954.
45. See PRO WO188/668, AC11950/BRBM26, BRAB 26th Meeting, 12 Jul 1952. PRO DEFE 10/33, Memorandum, "Review of Defence R&D," 10 Mar 1954.
46. PRO DEFE 10/25. Memorandum, "R&D policy in relation to intelligence on Russian development," DRP(49)133, 14 Nov 1949.
47. PRO DEFE 10/37. Minutes, DRP(49)6th meeting, 12 Apr 1949, and DRP(49)17th meeting, 22 Nov 1949.
48. PRO DEFE 10/38. Minutes, DRP/M(51)15, 4 Sep 1951.
49. PRO DEFE 10/38. Minutes, DRP/M(52)5, 4 Mar 1952.
50. PRO DEFE 10/34. Memorandum, DRP/P(55)16, 4 Apr 1955.
51. PRO AVIA 54/1749. Draft report, "DRPC Review," DRP/P(54)10, 10 Mar 1954.
52. PROCAB 131/17. Minutes, DC(56)6, 10 Jul 1956.
53. PRO DEFE 10/278. Memorandum, "Report on BW and CW by the Committee's Working Party," DRP/P(58)29, 15 Apr 1958.
54. PRO DEFE 10/282. Memorandum, "Defence Research Policy Staff. Working Party on BW and CW. Note by the Secretary," DRP STAFF/P(57)19, 6 Feb 1957.
55. PRO DEFE 41/156. Memorandum, "Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Planning Staff. Biological and Chemical Warfare. Report by the Joint Planning Staff," JP(58)65(Final), 30 Jul 1958. The report is cited as DRP/P(58)29.
56. PRO DEFE 41/156. JP(58)65(Final).
57. PRO DEFE 10/382. Memorandum, DRP/P(60)61, 20 Jul 1960. Regarding hallucinogens the DRP Staff noted, "while there are no agents that can yet be recommended for use in this class, there is a certain attraction in being able to achieve military objectives by affecting the mind of the enemy."
58. PRO WO195/15287. SAC362/M51. BRAB 51st Meeting, 6 Dec 1961.
59. PRO DEFE 10/417. Minutes, DRP/M(62)11. 3 Jul 1962.
60. PRO DEFE 10/490. Memorandum, "Chemical and biological warfare," DRP/P(62)33, 10 May 1962.
61. PRO DEFE 13/440. "Chemical and biological warfare policy," note to the Minister, SZ/1177/62, 20 Dec 1962. PRO CAB 131/28. Minutes, D(63)3, 3 May 1963.
62. David Edgerton, "Whatever happened to the British warfare state? The Ministry of Supply, 1945-1951," in H. Mercer, N. Rollings and J.D. Tomlinson, eds., Labour governments and private industry (Edinburgh, 1992), 91-116.
63. David Cassidy, "Controlling German science, I. US and Allied forces in Germany, 1945-1947," HSPS, 24:2 (1994), 197-235, and "II. Bizonal occupation and the struggle over West German science policy, 1946-1949," HSPS, 26:2 (1996), 197-239.
64. David Cassidy, "Controlling German science, I. US and Allied forces in Germany, 1945-1947," HSPS, 24:2 (1994), 197-235, and "II. Bizonal occupation and the struggle over West German science policy, 1946-1949," HSPS, 26:2 (1996), 197-239.
65. PRO DEFE 10/26. Memorandum, "Employment of German scientists (final)," DRP(50)45, 27 Apr 1950. PRO DEFE 10/37. Minutes, DRP(50)9th meeting, 18 Apr 1950.
66. Rarely large-scale equipment was transferred, although the DRPC approved the (unimplemented) move of IG Farben's Central Rubber Research Laboratory at Leverkusen to Britain. PRO DEFE 10/19. Memorandum, "High polymer plant, Leverkusen," DRP(47)66, 16 May 1947.
67. PRO DEFE 7/1982. Gaertner to Tizard, 28 Dec 1946.
68. PRO DEFE 10/36. Minutes, DRP(48)18th Meeting, 30 Nov 1948.
69. PRO DEFE 10/38. Minutes, DRP(51l)5th Meeting, 29 Mar 1951.
70. There was a significant difference in attitude of the British Ministry of Defence toward the largely white dominions and the newly independent colonies: India, Pakistan, and Ceylon were admitted to CACDS in 1949 but discussion was limited to non-secret material, concentrating on "broad questions and on the need to strengthen the member countries scientifically." PRO DEFE 10/37. Minutes, DRP(49)7th Meeting, 3 May 1949.
71. PRO DEFE 10/19. Memorandum, "CACDS 1947 Meeting," DRP(47)97, 31 Jul 1947.
72. DEFE 10/23. Tizard to Minister of Defence, Oct 1947.
73. DEFE 10/37. Minutes, DRP(48)7th Meeting, 3 May 1949. A threefold classification of information according to sensitivity was considered.
74. Gowing (ref. 6), 1, 337; Lorna Arnold, A very special relationship: British atomic weapon trials in Australia (London, 1987).
75. Richard J. Aldrich, "British intelligence and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' during the Cold War," Review of international studies, forthcoming [AUTHOR???]. [AU???] Gradon Carter and Graham S. Pearson, "North Atlantic chemical and biological research collaboration: 1916-1995," Journal of strategic studies 19 (1996), 74-103.
76. Richard J. Aldrich, "British intelligence and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' during the Cold War," Review of international studies, forthcoming [AUTHOR???]. [AU???] Gradon Carter and Graham S. Pearson, "North Atlantic chemical and biological research collaboration: 1916-1995," Journal of strategic studies 19 (1996), 74-103.
77. PRO DEFE 10/30. Memorandum, "Research on foot and mouth disease," DRP/P(51)62, 23 Aug 1951.
78. PRO DEFE 10/37. Minutes, DRP(50)3rd Meeting, 7 Feb 1950.
79. Ibid.
80. PRO DEFE 10/356. Memorandum, "Biological and chemical weapons," DRP/P(59)6, 28 Jan 1959.
81. PRO DEFE 10/37. Minutes, DRP(50)3rd Meeting, 7 Feb 1950.
82. PRO DEFE 10/38. Minutes, DRP/M(51)12, Jul 1951.
83. PRO DEFE 10/40. Minutes, DRP/M(56)5, 27 Mar 1956. This attitude relates to the two groups' being rival scientific policy-shapers.
84. PRO DEFE 10/417. Minutes, DRP/M(61)8, 28 Jun 1961.
85. PRO DEFE 10/356. Memorandum, "Biological and chemical weapons," DRP/P(59)6, 28 Jan 1959.
86. PRO DEFE 10/382. Memorandum, "Proposlas for MWDP aid," DRP/P(60)96, 7 Dec 1960. MWDP supported Ministry of Aviation R&D at around 6m per annum in 1959/60.
87. PRO DEFE 7/1756. Memorandum, "Record of a meeting held at the Pentagon on Monday, 28 January," 5 Feb 1957.
88. PRO DEFE 7/1756. Denny to Powell, 3 Sep 1957.
89. PRO DEFE 7/1756. Sandys to Powell, Brundrett, and Chiefs of Staff, 8 Oct 1957.
90. PRO DEFE 7/1756. Caccia to Foreign Office, 18 Oct 1957.
91. PRO DEFE 7/1756. Declaration of Common Purpose, Oct 1957.
92. PRO DEFE 10/277. Minutes, DRP/M(58)10, 9 Sep 1958.
93. PRO DEFE 10/277. Minutes, DRP/M(58)14, 1958.
94. PRO DEFE 10/277. Minutes, DRP/M(58)1, 14 Jan 1958.
95. PRO DEFE 10/278. Memorandum, "Collaboration with foreign countries on defence research and development," DRP/P(58)9, 21 Jan 1958.
96. PRO 10/417. Minutes, DRP/M(61)4, 12 Apr 1961.
97. Intelligence work was also becoming far more dependent on new technology, and during this period the DRPC received several pleas from the Joint Intelligence Committee for more effort on intelligence R&D. The DRPC contributed three members to a committee from 1953 to review and encourage this effort. PRO DEFE 10/39. Minutes, DRP/M(53)6, 21 Apr 1953. [AUTHOR?] PRO DEFE 10/37. Minutes, DRP(49)18th meeting, 6 Dec 1949.
98. PRO DEFE 10/37. Minutes, DRP(49)18th meeting, 6 Dec 1949.
99. PRO DEFE 10/39. Minutes, DRP/M(54)6, 27 Apr 1954.
100. Snyder (ref. 8), 164.
101. Chiefs of Staff strategic aims were: "(1) An effective bomber force (2) Strong and up-to-date defences against air attack for the United Kingdom and our bases overseas (3) Control of sea communications (4) Land forces adequately equipped for the defence of the United Kingdom against invasion and for retaining a firm hold in the Middle East." PRO DEFE 10 19. DRP(47)98.
102. PRO DEFE 10/18. Memorandum, DRP(47)35, 7 Mar 1947.
103. PRO DEFE 10 18. DRP(47)53.
104. Many of the Ministry of Supply's defence projects received color and word codenames drawn from a master list held by the secretary to the Joint Intelligence Committee. Some choices reflected the device, for example the missile Blue Streak. Some choices seem deliberately whimsical, such as Green Cheese and Blue Bunny (a kiloton land mine).
105. Stephen Twigge, The early development of guided weapons in the United Kingdom, 1940-1960 (Reading, 1993).
106. PRO DEFE 10/21. DRP(48)47, 19 Oct 1948. See also Twigge (ref. 96), 117.
107. The DRPC took two meetings to re-examine their report of 1950 in light of the Chiefs of Staff "Defence policy and global strategy" paper, DO(50)34. PRO DEFE 10/26. Memorandum, "Review of defence R&D policy," DRP(50)29, is the first report.
108. PRO DEFE 10/29. Memorandum, "Ministry of Defence. DRPC. Research and development effort for the Army. Draft report by the DRPC," 18 Jan 1951.
109. PRO DEFE 10/29. Memorandum, "Ministry of Defence. DRPC. Scientists for defence research and development. Note by Chairman," DRP(51)28, 9 Apr 1951.
110. PRO DEFE 10 29. Memorandum, "Ministry of Defence. DRPC. Supply of scientists for research and development. Note by Chairman," DRP/P(51)41, 1 Jun 1951.
111. PRO DEFE 11 15.[AU: STYLE?] Memorandum, "ACSP. Review of civil research programs. Note by Chairman," SP(S 1)22, 26 Jul 1951
112. PRO DEFE 11 15. Memorandum, "Ministry of Defence. DRPC. Transfer of civil scientific effort to defence," DRP/P(52)20, 17 Mar 1952. The Committee consisted of Lockspeiser (chair, now at DSIR), Brundrett (Ministry of Defence), Bullard (National Physical Laboratory), Cockcroft (Atomic Energy Research Establishment), W.R. Cook (Admiralty), Sir Harry Garner (Ministry of Supply), E.W. Playfair (Treasury).
113. Snyder (ref. 8), 215.
114. Clark (ref. 11), 399.
115. Guy Hartcup and T.E. Allibone, Cockcroft and the atom (Bristol, 1984), 170. Oliphant wrote to Cockcroft: "Don't let it crack you as it has H.T."
116. Cowing (ref. 6), 229.
117. PRO DEFE 10/29. Memorandum, "Future research and development policy. Note by the Chairman," DRP(51)32, 27 Apr 1951.
118. Although as Cockcroft sat on the ACSP as director of Harwell, he was in contact with the civil committee's work.
119. Hartcup and Allibone (ref. 107), 173-174, 179.
120. Ibid., 169.
121. PRO DEFE 10/39. Minutes, DRP/M(53)1, 8 Jan 1953.
122. PRO DEFE 10/39. Minutes, DRP/M(53)6, 21 Apr 1953.
123. The Working Party seems to have become a permanent Programmes Sub-Committee to review R&D.
124. An extra 437 to make a new total of 4287 scientific staff.
125. PRO DEFE 7/300. Minutes, SCI/M(54)1, 5 Jan 1954. Carroll, Cook, Sargeaunt, Cockburn, and Wansbrough-Jones attended the meeting chaired by Brundrett.
126. The Ministry of Supply's survey of its research program was the first it had made "since [it] existed as a whole."
127. PRO DEFE 10/39. Minutes, DRP/M(54)10, 12 Oct 1954. The knock-on effect on the R&D budget was to place a ceiling of 150 million.
128. PRO AVIA 54/1922. Report, "MoD. DRPC. Review of defence research and development. Report to the Minister of Defence," DRP/P(55)50, 23 Jan 1956.
129. The Minister also indicated that more research on vertical lift should be done and that the DRPC should be guided by imminent reports on CW and on supersonic and tactical reconnaissance aircraft.
130. See Baylis for a discussion.
131. PRO DEFE 10/40. Minutes, DRP/M(55)4, 1 Mar 1955.
132. PRO DEFE 10/40. Minutes, DRP/M(55)10, 19 Jul 1955.
133. Dockrill (ref. 3), 66.
134. Simon J. Ball, "Harold Macmillan and the politics of defence: the market for strategic ideas during the Sandys Era revisited," Twentieth century British history, 6(1), 1995, 78-100.
135. Not only deterrence, but also tactical nuclear weapons: "it will be possible to achieve many major military purposes more economically with nuclear explosives than any form of chemical explosive."
136. PRO DEFE 10/276. "MoD. DRPC. Review of research and development," DRP/P(57)30, 31 Jul 1957, our italics.
137. A fighter defence based on the P1 (Lightning) and a surface-to-air guided weapon system based on Green Flax.
138. For example: "the cancellation of research projects concerned with high speed flight" (OR329, OR330 and Barnes Wallis' Project Swallow) and "removal of intra-mural support of benefit to civil aviation."
139. PRO DEFE 7/1394. Chilver to Powell, 16 Jan 1958.
140. PRO DEFE 7/1394. Chilver to Powell, 1 May 1958.
141. PRO DEFE 7/1394. Makins to Powell, 21 Apr 1958.
142. PRO DEFE 7/1394. HCB to Powell, 28 Aug 1957.
143. PRO DEFE 7/1394. Makins to Powell, 4 Dec 1957.
144. PRO DEFE 7/1394. Chilver to Musgrave, 5 Jun 1958.
145. PRO DEFE 7/1394. Powell to Brandrett, 10 Jul 1958. The meeting consisted of Sir Roger Makins (Permanent Secretary, Treasury), Sir Thomas Padmore (Second Secretary, Treasury), Sir Cyril Musgrave (PS, Ministry of Supply), Sir John Lang (PS, Admiralty) and Sir Maurice Dean (Permanent Undersecretary of State, Air Ministry). David Serpell became the Treasury's DRPC representative.
146. PRO DEFE 10/277. Minutes, DRP/M(58)8, 17 June 1958. The only query stemmed from interservice fault-lines: Vice Admiral Sir Manley Power did not want the TSR-2 to interfere with the naval aircraft NA39.
147. PRO DEFE 7/301. Macmillan to Watkinson, 14 Sep 1960.
148. PRO DEFE 7/301. Draft, Watkinson to Macmillan, 10 Oct 1960. Privately, it was considered within the Ministry of Defence that the technical details of defence projects would be "too complicated for ministers."
149. Among the DRP Staff there was doubt that "a major research project could slide imperceptibly into a development," the only example thought of being the Lightning. PRO DEFE 7/1853. Cornford to Wood, 26 Jan 1962.
150. PRO DEFE 7/271. Zuckerman to Secretary, COS, 14 Feb 1961, our emphasis.
151. PRO DEFE 10/417. Minutes, DRP/M(61)7, 14 Jun 1961.
152. The management procedures of TSR-2 were adopted for other large projects: a Management Board, a Systems Integration Panel, the financial responsibility assigned to technical Directorates, consultation between Controllerates, and the use of modern PERT (a compterized management technique) techniques.
153. PRO DEFE 10 10/417. Minutes, DRP/M(62)15, 10 Oct 1962.
154. PRO DEFE 7/1853. Thorneycroft to Watkinson, 9 Aug 1961.