British intelligence and the Anglo-American 'special relationship' during the Cold War

Review of International Studies

Volumn 24, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 331-351

  Aldrich, Richard J ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0032373968     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210598003313     Document Type: Article

References (109)

1. R. K. Betts, 'Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable', World Politics, 31:1 (Oct. 1978), pp. 961-88. See also M. I. Handel, 'Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise', Journal of Strategic Studies, 7:3 (Sept. 1984), pp. 229-82; 'Clausewitz in the Age of Technology'. Journal of Strategic Studies, 9:3 (Sept. 1986), pp. 51-92.
2. R. K. Betts, 'Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable', World Politics, 31:1 (Oct. 1978), pp. 961-88. See also M. I. Handel, 'Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise', Journal of Strategic Studies, 7:3 (Sept. 1984), pp. 229-82; 'Clausewitz in the Age of Technology'. Journal of Strategic Studies, 9:3 (Sept. 1986), pp. 51-92.
3. R. K. Betts, 'Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable', World Politics, 31:1 (Oct. 1978), pp. 961-88. See also M. I. Handel, 'Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise', Journal of Strategic Studies, 7:3 (Sept. 1984), pp. 229-82; 'Clausewitz in the Age of Technology'. Journal of Strategic Studies, 9:3 (Sept. 1986), pp. 51-92.
4. Minute by the Director of Intelligence, Air Ministry, September 1945, AIR 20/3420, PRO. See also JIC (46)95 (0) Final, 'Future Scale of Air Attack Against the United Kingdom' (Limited Circulation), 12 November 1946, AIR 20/2740, PRO. On these scientific developments see Julian Lewis, Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence (London, 1988), pp. 178-241.
5. Slessor (AMP) minute to VCAS, 16 July 1945, AIR 2/12027, PRO; Christopher Andrew, 'The Making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance', in Hayden B. Peake and Samuel Halpern (eds.), In the Name of Intelligence (Washington, DC, 1994), pp. 94-109.
6. Evershed to Elliot (COS), 30 June 1949, DEFE 11/349, PRO.
7. American estimates of Soviet capabilities and intentions, unlike British ones, have long been a subject of study. See e.g., Lawrence Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Threat, 2nd edn (Princeton, NJ, 1986); John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: US Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength (New York, 1982; David H. Dunn, The Politics of Threat (London, 1997).
8. American estimates of Soviet capabilities and intentions, unlike British ones, have long been a subject of study. See e.g., Lawrence Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Threat, 2nd edn (Princeton, NJ, 1986); John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: US Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength (New York, 1982; David H. Dunn, The Politics of Threat (London, 1997).
9. American estimates of Soviet capabilities and intentions, unlike British ones, have long been a subject of study. See e.g., Lawrence Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Threat, 2nd edn (Princeton, NJ, 1986); John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: US Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength (New York, 1982; David H. Dunn, The Politics of Threat (London, 1997).
10. W/Cdr Keat. British Air Forces Austria, 1 October 1945, FO 371/ 47954, PRO; Military Attaché to H.M. Ambassador Poland, 1 October 1945, ibid. The FO minuted upon the latter report 'Read with interest and agreement'.
11. DO (50)45, 'Defence Policy and Global Strategy', 7 June 1950, Documents on British Policy Overseas, series II, vol. IV (London, 1991), pp. 411-34. See also T. J. Botti, The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945-58 (Westport, CT, 1987), pp. 102-27.
12. DO (50)45, 'Defence Policy and Global Strategy', 7 June 1950, Documents on British Policy Overseas, series II, vol. IV (London, 1991), pp. 411-34. See also T. J. Botti, The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945-58 (Westport, CT, 1987), pp. 102-27.
13. Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (London, 1995), p. 177; Richard J. Aldrich and Michael Coleman, 'The Cold War, the JIC and British Signals Intelligence, 1948', Intelligence and National Security, 4:3 (Jul. 1989), pp. 535-8. On the Long-Range Detection Program see C. A. Ziegler and D. Jacobson, Spying without Spies: The Origins of America's Secret Nuclear Surveillance System (New York, 1995).
14. Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (London, 1995), p. 177; Richard J. Aldrich and Michael Coleman, 'The Cold War, the JIC and British Signals Intelligence, 1948', Intelligence and National Security, 4:3 (Jul. 1989), pp. 535-8. On the Long-Range Detection Program see C. A. Ziegler and D. Jacobson, Spying without Spies: The Origins of America's Secret Nuclear Surveillance System (New York, 1995).
15. Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (London, 1995), p. 177; Richard J. Aldrich and Michael Coleman, 'The Cold War, the JIC and British Signals Intelligence, 1948', Intelligence and National Security, 4:3 (Jul. 1989), pp. 535-8. On the Long-Range Detection Program see C. A. Ziegler and D. Jacobson, Spying without Spies: The Origins of America's Secret Nuclear Surveillance System (New York, 1995).
16. The COS wondered 'might it not be better for us to concentrate the resources we had on vital projects to which we were more suited . . . (e.g Guided Weapons)? . . . The Chiefs of Staff agreed it was right to approach the problem with open minds', COS (50) 26th meeting, 'The United Kingdom Atomic Weapons Programme', Confidential Annex (Special Circulation), DEFE 32/1, PRO.
17. CAS to COS Committee, 'Soviet Interceptor Fighter Development' (Limited Circulation), September 1950, AIR 75/117, PRO. In 1955 the COS were no less shocked by intelligence on the MIG-17; see AIR 8/2460 passim, PRO.
18. Patrick E. Murray, 'An Initial Response to the Cold War: The Buildup of the U.S. Air Force in the United Kingdom, 1948-56', in Roger G. Miller (ed.), Seeing Off the Bear: Anglo-American Air Power Cooperation during the Cold War (Washington, DC, 1995), pp. 15-24.
19. The literature on Anglo-American nuclear relations since 1945 is immense. The three most recent studies are Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-62 (Oxford, 1994); Jan Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership: Britain, the United States and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance, 1952-9 (Groningen, 1993); J. Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-64 (Oxford, 1995).
20. The literature on Anglo-American nuclear relations since 1945 is immense. The three most recent studies are Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-62 (Oxford, 1994); Jan Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership: Britain, the United States and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance, 1952-9 (Groningen, 1993); J. Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-64 (Oxford, 1995).
21. The literature on Anglo-American nuclear relations since 1945 is immense. The three most recent studies are Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-62 (Oxford, 1994); Jan Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership: Britain, the United States and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance, 1952-9 (Groningen, 1993); J. Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-64 (Oxford, 1995).
22. Memorandum from the Directorate of Intelligence and Research (State Department) to Dean Rusk, 'What Now for Britain? Wilson's Visit and Britain's Future', REU-11, 7 February 1968, Philip M. Kaiser papers, Box 8, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.
23. James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: America's National Security Agency and its Special Relationship with Britain's GCHQ (London, 1982); Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties that Bind: Intelligence Co-operation between the UKUSA Countries - the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, 2nd edn (London, 1990).
24. James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: America's National Security Agency and its Special Relationship with Britain's GCHQ (London, 1982); Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties that Bind: Intelligence Co-operation between the UKUSA Countries - the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, 2nd edn (London, 1990).
25. Richelson and Ball, Ties that Bind, pp. 8-9. See also the correspondence between Jeffrey Richelson and Mark Lowenthal concerning methodology, Intelligence and National Security, 3:1 (Jan. 1988), pp. 226-7.
26. Richelson and Ball, Ties that Bind, pp. 8-9. See also the correspondence between Jeffrey Richelson and Mark Lowenthal concerning methodology, Intelligence and National Security, 3:1 (Jan. 1988), pp. 226-7.
27. See, e.g., C. J. Bartlett, 'The Special Relationship': A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London, 1992); Robert M. Hathaway, Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations since World War II (Boston, MA, 1990). For two exceptions see the useful discussions in Christopher Hitchen, Blood, Class and Nostalgia: Anglo-American Ironies (London, 1990); David Reynolds, 'A "Special Relationship"? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War', International Affairs, 62:1 (Winter 1985/6). pp. 1-20. On liaison generally, see H. Bradford Westerfield, 'America and the World of Liaison', Intelligence and National Security, 11:3 (Jul. 1996), pp. 523-60.
28. See, e.g., C. J. Bartlett, 'The Special Relationship': A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London, 1992); Robert M. Hathaway, Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations since World War II (Boston, MA, 1990). For two exceptions see the useful discussions in Christopher Hitchen, Blood, Class and Nostalgia: Anglo-American Ironies (London, 1990); David Reynolds, 'A "Special Relationship"? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War', International Affairs, 62:1 (Winter 1985/6). pp. 1-20. On liaison generally, see H. Bradford Westerfield, 'America and the World of Liaison', Intelligence and National Security, 11:3 (Jul. 1996), pp. 523-60.
29. See, e.g., C. J. Bartlett, 'The Special Relationship': A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London, 1992); Robert M. Hathaway, Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations since World War II (Boston, MA, 1990). For two exceptions see the useful discussions in Christopher Hitchen, Blood, Class and Nostalgia: Anglo-American Ironies (London, 1990); David Reynolds, 'A "Special Relationship"? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War', International Affairs, 62:1 (Winter 1985/6). pp. 1-20. On liaison generally, see H. Bradford Westerfield, 'America and the World of Liaison', Intelligence and National Security, 11:3 (Jul. 1996), pp. 523-60.
30. See, e.g., C. J. Bartlett, 'The Special Relationship': A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London, 1992); Robert M. Hathaway, Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations since World War II (Boston, MA, 1990). For two exceptions see the useful discussions in Christopher Hitchen, Blood, Class and Nostalgia: Anglo-American Ironies (London, 1990); David Reynolds, 'A "Special Relationship"? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War', International Affairs, 62:1 (Winter 1985/6). pp. 1-20. On liaison generally, see H. Bradford Westerfield, 'America and the World of Liaison', Intelligence and National Security, 11:3 (Jul. 1996), pp. 523-60.
31. See, e.g., C. J. Bartlett, 'The Special Relationship': A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London, 1992); Robert M. Hathaway, Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations since World War II (Boston, MA, 1990). For two exceptions see the useful discussions in Christopher Hitchen, Blood, Class and Nostalgia: Anglo-American Ironies (London, 1990); David Reynolds, 'A "Special Relationship"? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War', International Affairs, 62:1 (Winter 1985/6). pp. 1-20. On liaison generally, see H. Bradford Westerfield, 'America and the World of Liaison', Intelligence and National Security, 11:3 (Jul. 1996), pp. 523-60.
32. Wesley K. Wark, 'In Never-Never Land: The British Archives on Intelligence', Historical Journal, 35:1 (Feb. 1992), pp. 195-203; Richard J. Aldrich, 'Never-Never Land and Wonderland? British and American Policy on Intelligence Archives', Contemporary Record, 8:1 (Summer 1994), pp. 133-52.
33. Wesley K. Wark, 'In Never-Never Land: The British Archives on Intelligence', Historical Journal, 35:1 (Feb. 1992), pp. 195-203; Richard J. Aldrich, 'Never-Never Land and Wonderland? British and American Policy on Intelligence Archives', Contemporary Record, 8:1 (Summer 1994), pp. 133-52.
34. The incomplete range of estimate materials available in London rendered a quantitative approach unpromising. On the US see Scott A. Koch, CIA Cold War Records: Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, 1950-1959 (Washington, DC, 1993).
35. Robert K. Merton, 'Three Fragments from a Sociologist's Notebooks', Annual Review of Sociology, 13 (1987), pp. 2-6.
36. Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, pp. 186-8, 189-97; Patrick N. Mescall, 'The Triumph of Parochialism and Bureaucracy: Robert S. McNamara and the Birth of the Defense Intelligence Agency', in Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Andrew Lownie (eds.), North American Spies: New Revisionist Essays (Edinburgh, 1991).
37. Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, pp. 186-8, 189-97; Patrick N. Mescall, 'The Triumph of Parochialism and Bureaucracy: Robert S. McNamara and the Birth of the Defense Intelligence Agency', in Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Andrew Lownie (eds.), North American Spies: New Revisionist Essays (Edinburgh, 1991).
38. Strong (JIB) to Minister of Defence, 17 May 1950, AIR 8/1953, PRO.
39. Evans (STIB) to Smith (MI 10), 28 May 1951, DEFE 41/6, PRO.
40. Elliot (for COS) to Shinwell, COS 1403/23/10/50, 21 October 1950. DEFE 11/349, PRO. See also Shinwell to Attlee, 22 June 1950, ibid.
41. Memorandum by Mountbatten (CDS), 'Missile Intelligence', 15 March 1961, AIR 8/1953, PRO; Note by the CAS, 'Missile Intelligence: Air Ministry Comments on the Templer Report', 7 March 1961, ibid.; Hunt (JIC) to Bufton (ACAS (I)), JIC/1482/60, 9 September 1960, ibid.
42. Memorandum by Mountbatten (CDS), 'Missile Intelligence', 15 March 1961, AIR 8/1953, PRO; Note by the CAS, 'Missile Intelligence: Air Ministry Comments on the Templer Report', 7 March 1961, ibid.; Hunt (JIC) to Bufton (ACAS (I)), JIC/1482/60, 9 September 1960, ibid.
43. Memorandum by Mountbatten (CDS), 'Missile Intelligence', 15 March 1961, AIR 8/1953, PRO; Note by the CAS, 'Missile Intelligence: Air Ministry Comments on the Templer Report', 7 March 1961, ibid.; Hunt (JIC) to Bufton (ACAS (I)), JIC/1482/60, 9 September 1960, ibid.
44. Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars (Washington, DC, 1976), pp. 123-8.
45. See, e.g., Captain Hollinger USAF, attached AI3(f), Air Ministry, to Directorate of Intelligence, Washington, DC, 23 January 1951, enclosing 16 copies of AI3(f), 'Estimates of Soviet Aircraft Production', 31 December 1950, File 2-18347, Box 127, TS Cables and Section, RG 341, United States National Archives, Washington, DC (hereafter USNA). Correspondence with former members of AI3(c)1, Target Intelligence, Air Ministry, 10 and 20 February 1994.
46. Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-51 (New York, 1983). pp. 531-4, 659-61, 730-3; Stuart Croft, 'British Policy towards Western Europe, 1947-9: The Best of All Possible Worlds?', International Affairs, 64:4 (Autumn 1988), pp. 623-5.
47. Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-51 (New York, 1983). pp. 531-4, 659-61, 730-3; Stuart Croft, 'British Policy towards Western Europe, 1947-9: The Best of All Possible Worlds?', International Affairs, 64:4 (Autumn 1988), pp. 623-5.
48. These findings have been summarized in Richard J. Aldrich, 'European Integration: An American Intelligence Connection', in Anne Deighton (ed.), Building Postwar Europe: National Decision Makers and European Institutions, 1948-63 (London, 1995), pp. 159-79; and 'OSS, CIA and European Unity: The American Committee on United Europe, 1949-1960', Diplomacy and Statecraft, 8:1 (1997), pp. 184-227. See also Hugh Wilford, 'The Information Research Department: Britain's Secret Cold War Weapon Revealed', in this issue of Review of International Studies.
49. These findings have been summarized in Richard J. Aldrich, 'European Integration: An American Intelligence Connection', in Anne Deighton (ed.), Building Postwar Europe: National Decision Makers and European Institutions, 1948-63 (London, 1995), pp. 159-79; and 'OSS, CIA and European Unity: The American Committee on United Europe, 1949-1960', Diplomacy and Statecraft, 8:1 (1997), pp. 184-227. See also Hugh Wilford, 'The Information Research Department: Britain's Secret Cold War Weapon Revealed', in this issue of Review of International Studies.
50. These findings have been summarized in Richard J. Aldrich, 'European Integration: An American Intelligence Connection', in Anne Deighton (ed.), Building Postwar Europe: National Decision Makers and European Institutions, 1948-63 (London, 1995), pp. 159-79; and 'OSS, CIA and European Unity: The American Committee on United Europe, 1949-1960', Diplomacy and Statecraft, 8:1 (1997), pp. 184-227. See also Hugh Wilford, 'The Information Research Department: Britain's Secret Cold War Weapon Revealed', in this issue of Review of International Studies.
51. It appears that the 'multitude of embarrassments' caused by CIA operations in allied countries first began to be addressed under Kennedy. See Memorandum for the President by Arthur Schlesinger, 'CIA Reorganization', 30 June 1961, File: Central Intelligence Agency General (1961), Box 270A, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA.
52. The classic study of the liberation issue is Bennett Kovrig. The Myth of Liberation (Baltimore, MD, 1973). See also Klaus Larres, 'Preserving Law and Order: Britain, the USA and the East German Uprising of 1953', Twentieth Century British History, 5:3 (Nov. 1994), pp. 320-50; Jim Marchio, 'Resistance Potential and Rollback: US Intelligence and the Eisenhower Administration's Policies towards Eastern Europe, 1953-6'. Intelligence and National Security, 10:2 (Apr. 1995), pp. 219-41; Christian F. Osterman, 'The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback', Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 11 (Dec. 1994).
53. The classic study of the liberation issue is Bennett Kovrig. The Myth of Liberation (Baltimore, MD, 1973). See also Klaus Larres, 'Preserving Law and Order: Britain, the USA and the East German Uprising of 1953', Twentieth Century British History, 5:3 (Nov. 1994), pp. 320-50; Jim Marchio, 'Resistance Potential and Rollback: US Intelligence and the Eisenhower Administration's Policies towards Eastern Europe, 1953-6'. Intelligence and National Security, 10:2 (Apr. 1995), pp. 219-41; Christian F. Osterman, 'The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback', Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 11 (Dec. 1994).
54. The classic study of the liberation issue is Bennett Kovrig. The Myth of Liberation (Baltimore, MD, 1973). See also Klaus Larres, 'Preserving Law and Order: Britain, the USA and the East German Uprising of 1953', Twentieth Century British History, 5:3 (Nov. 1994), pp. 320-50; Jim Marchio, 'Resistance Potential and Rollback: US Intelligence and the Eisenhower Administration's Policies towards Eastern Europe, 1953-6'. Intelligence and National Security, 10:2 (Apr. 1995), pp. 219-41; Christian F. Osterman, 'The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback', Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 11 (Dec. 1994).
55. The classic study of the liberation issue is Bennett Kovrig. The Myth of Liberation (Baltimore, MD, 1973). See also Klaus Larres, 'Preserving Law and Order: Britain, the USA and the East German Uprising of 1953', Twentieth Century British History, 5:3 (Nov. 1994), pp. 320-50; Jim Marchio, 'Resistance Potential and Rollback: US Intelligence and the Eisenhower Administration's Policies towards Eastern Europe, 1953-6'. Intelligence and National Security, 10:2 (Apr. 1995), pp. 219-41; Christian F. Osterman, 'The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback', Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 11 (Dec. 1994).
56. See, e.g., RC (16)48, minutes of the Russia Committee, 25 November 1948, N13016/765/38, FO 371/71687, PRO; NSC 10/2. 'National Security Directive on the Office of Special Projects, 18 June 1948, reprinted in Thomas H. Etzold and John L. Gaddis (eds.), Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-50 (New York, 1978), pp. 125-8.
57. NSC-68, 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security', 14 April 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) 1950, vol. 1, pp. 237-92. As late as 1957 the JIC considered that attempts to liberate one of the satellites 'would give rise to extreme tension' and were one of only three scenarios which could 'increase the risk of Global War'. JIC (57)30, quoted in 'Air Defence of the UK, Annex E: The Likelihood of Attack on the British Isles in Each Year Between Now and 1965', September 1957, DEFE 7/970, PRO.
58. NSC-68, 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security', 14 April 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) 1950, vol. 1, pp. 237-92. As late as 1957 the JIC considered that attempts to liberate one of the satellites 'would give rise to extreme tension' and were one of only three scenarios which could 'increase the risk of Global War'. JIC (57)30, quoted in 'Air Defence of the UK, Annex E: The Likelihood of Attack on the British Isles in Each Year Between Now and 1965', September 1957, DEFE 7/970, PRO.
59. For a penetrating analysis of Britain and 'Cold War fighting' see John W. Young, Winston Churchill's Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War, 1951-1955 (Oxford, 1995).
60. The British paper in question was PUSC (51)16 (Final), 'Future Policy Towards Soviet Russia', and Annex B, 'Liberation of the Satellites', 17 January 1952, ZP10/4, FO 371/25002, PRO.
61. The British paper in question was PUSC (51)16 (Final), 'Future Policy Towards Soviet Russia', and Annex B, 'Liberation of the Satellites', 17 January 1952, ZP10/4, FO 371/25002, PRO.
62. Minutes of the JCS-SD Co-ordinating Committee, 12 March 1952, File: JCS-SD Meetings, Box 77, Policy Planning Staff Records, Lot Files 64D 563, RG 59, USNA. Throughout the 1950s the United States produced a stream of high-level estimates on this subject, e.g., NIE 10-58, 'Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc', 4 March 1958, FRUS 1958-60, vol. 10, Part 1, pp. 7-11.
63. Dulles (Copenhagen) to Washington, Dulte 15, 7 May 1958, 756D.00/5-758, RG 59, USNA, quoted in Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York, 1996), p. 174.
64. Brief for the CAS, 'Operations in Undeclared War', 30 May 1958, AIR 8/1954, PRO.
65. V. Newton, The Butcher's Embrace: The Philby Conspirators in Washington (New York, 1991).
66. An example of the cataclysmic impact of security failure is the case of James Jesus Angleton, a senior American counter-intelligence officer. See Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton, the CIA's Master Spy Hunter (London, 1991). See also John Cloake, Templer: Tiger of Malaya (London, 1985), pp. 179-80.
67. An example of the cataclysmic impact of security failure is the case of James Jesus Angleton, a senior American counter-intelligence officer. See Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton, the CIA's Master Spy Hunter (London, 1991). See also John Cloake, Templer: Tiger of Malaya (London, 1985), pp. 179-80.
68. Interview with a retired senior CIA officer, Washington, DC, 2 July 1992. Memorandum by Admiral Radford, (Chairman JCS), 'National Security Implications Resulting From the Defection of British Diplomats, Donald Duart Maclean and Guy Francis DeMoncy Burgess', 26 October 1955, CCS 385 (6-4-46) (2) Sec. 14, JCS Central Files, RG 218, USNA.
69. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense by Admiral Radford, 'Clandestine Listening Devices', 6 April 1956, File: Presidential Papers 1956 (8), Box 3, Presidential Subseries, Special Assistant Series, OSANA, WHO, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter DDEL).
70. Memorandum to Minister of Defence, 'Defection of US Personnel from NSA (US G.C.H.Q.)', 29 August 1960, DEFE 13/342, PRO.
71. Andrew For the President's Eyes Only, pp. 75-122. See also David Stafford. Camp X: SOE and the American Connection (London, 1986); Thomas F. Troy, Donman and the CIA (Frederick, MD, 1981).
72. Andrew For the President's Eyes Only, pp. 75-122. See also David Stafford. Camp X: SOE and the American Connection (London, 1986); Thomas F. Troy, Donman and the CIA (Frederick, MD, 1981).
73. Andrew For the President's Eyes Only, pp. 75-122. See also David Stafford. Camp X: SOE and the American Connection (London, 1986); Thomas F. Troy, Donman and the CIA (Frederick, MD, 1981).
74. See, e.g., Strong (JIB) to Bedell Smith (CIA), 16 April 1952, File S, Box 20, Bedell Smith papers, DDEL.
75. Ronald H. Spector, 'Allied Intelligence in Indochina, 1943-1945', Pacific Historical Review, 51:1 (Mar. 1982), pp. 23-50. The arrival of a large OSS contingent at the UN San Francisco Conference in 1945 was a clear indicator of this.
76. Memorandum by General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, 'Ninth Air Force Experience in the use of "Y"', 26 February 1945, File: Special Secret Activities, Box 63, Vandenberg papers, Library of Congress; Andrew, 'Making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance', pp. 103-7; Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, pp. 162-4.
77. Memorandum by General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, 'Ninth Air Force Experience in the use of "Y"', 26 February 1945, File: Special Secret Activities, Box 63, Vandenberg papers, Library of Congress; Andrew, 'Making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance', pp. 103-7; Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, pp. 162-4.
78. The Director of Naval Intelligence remarked in 1953 that in 'the face of intense security arrangements it is becoming progressively more difficult to gather intelligence on the Soviet Navy'. DNI in NID/GC Report No. 42, January 1953, DEFE 13/352, PRO. Interview, retired senior SIS officer, London, 8 August 1993; interview, former JIC chairman, London, 17 July 1993.
79. On fragmentary breaks into postwar Soviet 'Venona' material see Robert J. Lamphere and Tom Shachtman, The FBI-KGB War: A Special Agent's Story (New York, 1988), pp. 78-98; Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (London, 1990), pp. 326-9, 369-71.
80. On fragmentary breaks into postwar Soviet 'Venona' material see Robert J. Lamphere and Tom Shachtman, The FBI-KGB War: A Special Agent's Story (New York, 1988), pp. 78-98; Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (London, 1990), pp. 326-9, 369-71.
81. Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars, pp. 176-9; Chiang Ching-kuo Remembered: The Man and his Political Legacy (Washington, DC, 1989) pp. 83-92.
82. Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars, pp. 176-9; Chiang Ching-kuo Remembered: The Man and his Political Legacy (Washington, DC, 1989) pp. 83-92.
83. Major General C. A. Willoughby to Richard Nixon, Vice President, 3 November 1960, Folder 5, Box 9, Presidential-Vice Presidential, 1959-72, Willoughby Papers, RG 23, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, VA; Willoughby to Dean Rusk, 20 October 1961, Folder 10, ibid.
84. Major General George C. MacDonald, ACAS A-2, to Director of Naval Intelligence (USN), 'Exploitation of German Captured Photography', 24 July 1946, 2-22143, Box 37, TS Control and Cables Section, RG 341, USNA; Memorandum, 'New Photo Cover', 16 December 1948, File 2-5400-2-2599, Box 43, ibid.
85. 'USAF-RAF Joint Agreement on Target Intelligence', n.d. (presumed February 1948), File 2-19622, Box 57, TS Control and Cables, RG 341, USNA.
86. Paul Lashmar, 'Canberras over the USSR', Aeroplane Monthly, February 1995, pp. 32-5; OH-168, Oral History Interview with R. M. Bissell, Jr (CIA), p. 43, DDEL; presentation by Squadron Leader J. Carrington, 'RB-45 Operations' to conference on air intelligence at RAF Bracknell, 21 March 1996.
87. Paul Lashmar, 'Canberras over the USSR', Aeroplane Monthly, February 1995, pp. 32-5; OH-168, Oral History Interview with R. M. Bissell, Jr (CIA), p. 43, DDEL; presentation by Squadron Leader J. Carrington, 'RB-45 Operations' to conference on air intelligence at RAF Bracknell, 21 March 1996.
88. Paul Lashmar, 'Canberras over the USSR', Aeroplane Monthly, February 1995, pp. 32-5; OH-168, Oral History Interview with R. M. Bissell, Jr (CIA), p. 43, DDEL; presentation by Squadron Leader J. Carrington, 'RB-45 Operations' to conference on air intelligence at RAF Bracknell, 21 March 1996.
89. Minutes of a Russia Committee meeting, 12 September 1950, RC/133/50, N1053/26/G, FO 371/86762, PRO.
90. See, e.g., discussion of JIC (52)30 (Final) at COS (52) 102nd mtg, 15 July 1952, DEFE 32/2, PRO; DNI memorandum, 6 July 1953, ADM 205/89, PRO; Brownjohn to Minister of Defence, 26 June 1953, DEFE 13/352, PRO. See also I. Clark and N. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strateg, 1945-55 (Oxford, 1989), pp. 186-9.
91. Brownjohn to Minister of Defence, NCDB/M/4, 10 February 1953, DEFE 13/352, PRO.
92. For unnumbered British JIC papers in Washington that do not correspond to the numbered London series see 091.France, Box 10, and 091.Greece, Box 14, Army Plans and Operations Files 1948/9, RG 319, USNA. For American sanitization of material destined for London, see minutes of JIC 177th mtg, 13 January 1949, CCS 334 JIC (5-27-48), JCS Central Files, RG 218, USNA.
93. Slessor to VCAS, JCS 37/1, 20 September 1949, AIR 75/92, PRO. On the US JCS see Mescall, 'The Triumph of Parochialism', pp. 127-34.
94. Oral history of Colonel Herron W. Maples, SHAPE Intelligence and DIA, Box 1, Oral History Collection, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
95. The phrase 'a function of command' is drawn from Patrick Mescall's work on the DIA. A classic statement of the idealist position is S. Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton, NJ, 1949; rpt, 1966). A classic realist statement is P. J. McGarvey, 'DIA: Intelligence to Please', in Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter (eds.), Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston, MA, 1973), pp. 318-28.
96. The phrase 'a function of command' is drawn from Patrick Mescall's work on the DIA. A classic statement of the idealist position is S. Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton, NJ, 1949; rpt, 1966). A classic realist statement is P. J. McGarvey, 'DIA: Intelligence to Please', in Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter (eds.), Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston, MA, 1973), pp. 318-28.
97. Memorandum from the Directorate of Intelligence and Research (State Department) to Dean Rusk, 'What Now for Britain? Wilson's Visit and Britain's Future', REU-11, 7 February 1968, Philip M. Kaiser papers, Box 8, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.
98. NSC 5717, 'U.S. Policy on Hong Kong', 17 July 1957, Box 21, NSC Series, OSANA, White House Office, DDEL. For a discussion of the impact of Hong Kong-derived material on US policy in Cambodia in 1970 see Thomas Powers, The Man who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (London, 1979), pp. 216-17.
99. D (57)3, 'Defence Facilities in Ceylon', note by Minister of Defence, 21 January 1957, and 'draft opening statement', 3 December 1956, DEFE 13/230, PRO.
100. J. M. Lee, African Armies and Civil Order (London, 1969), pp. 63-70. This was especially true of the Arab Gulf states.
101. An outstanding survey of this subject is offered by Jeffrey Richelson, American Espionage and the Soviet Target (New York, 1987) . Britain's desire to be seen to make a substantial intelligence contribution to assist her alliance diplomacy generally remains a consideration in the 1990s. See James Adams and David Leppard, 'Spy Rivals Crow as GCHQ Faces Cuts', Sunday Times, 26 Mar. 1995, p. 22.
102. An outstanding survey of this subject is offered by Jeffrey Richelson, American Espionage and the Soviet Target (New York, 1987) . Britain's desire to be seen to make a substantial intelligence contribution to assist her alliance diplomacy generally remains a consideration in the 1990s. See James Adams and David Leppard, 'Spy Rivals Crow as GCHQ Faces Cuts', Sunday Times, 26 Mar. 1995, p. 22.
103. See, e.g., memorandum by Cabell, USAF Director of Intelligence, 'Basic Assumptions for Planning (British Report dated 8 April 1948)', 27 May 1948, File 2-1200-2-1299, Box 40, TS Control and Cables Section Records, RG 341, USNA. This memorandum discussed the British paper JP (48)11 (Final). Cf. Reynolds, '"Special Relationship"?', p. 11.
104. See, e.g., memorandum by Cabell, USAF Director of Intelligence, 'Basic Assumptions for Planning (British Report dated 8 April 1948)', 27 May 1948, File 2-1200-2-1299, Box 40, TS Control and Cables Section Records, RG 341, USNA. This memorandum discussed the British paper JP (48)11 (Final). Cf. Reynolds, '"Special Relationship"?', p. 11.
105. This subordination is illustrated by NSC 151/2, 'Disclosure of Atomic Information to Allied Countries', 4 December 1953, File: Presidential Papers 1953 (2), Box 1, Presidential Subseries, Special Assistant Series, OSANA, WHO, DDEL.
106. Memorandum of a conversation between Macmillan and Eisenhower entitled 'Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations', 29 March 1960, Box 5, McCone papers, DDEL. See also Eisenhower to Allen Dulles (CIA), 5 November 1957, File: Allen Dulles (2), Ann Whitman File, Administrative series, DDEL; Eisenhower to Allen Dulles (CIA), 5 March 1959, File: Allen Dulles (1), ibid.
107. Mescall, 'Triumph of Parochialism'; Philip H. J. Davies, 'Organizational Politics and the Development of Britain's Intelligence Producer/Consumer Interface', Intelligence and National Security, 10:4 (Oct. 1995), pp. 113-32.
108. Mescall, 'Triumph of Parochialism'; Philip H. J. Davies, 'Organizational Politics and the Development of Britain's Intelligence Producer/Consumer Interface', Intelligence and National Security, 10:4 (Oct. 1995), pp. 113-32.
109. Some of the issues in this article are elaborated on in Richard J. Aldrich (ed.), Espionage, Security and Intelligence in Britain, 1945-79: Documents in Contemporary History (Manchester, forthcoming 1998).