North Atlantic Chemical and Biological Research Collaboration: 1916-1995

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 74-103

  Carter, Gradon ^a   Pearson, Graham S ^b  

^a DEFENCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030558153     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402399608437627     Document Type: Article

References (61)

1. John Bryden, Deadly Allies (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart 1989) gives an account of early Canadian bilateral and multilateral collaboration on BW (and CW), gleaned mainly from Canadian archives. Wrong inferences are occasionally made.
2. At least 140 books and booklets in English have been published in Britain, America or Canada exclusively or substantially about CW or BW. They are listed in G.B. Carter, 'A Bibliography of Major English Language Books and Booklets on Chemical and Biological Warfare' (Unpub. report 1994).
3. The US ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol in 1975. In July 1990 it also signed an agreement with the USSR to cease CW agent production, dispose of stockpiles, share disposal technology and develop protection procedures. In 1993 the US signed the CWC. It is also a co-depository and signatory of the 1972 BWC, which came into force in 1975.
4. Many such documents are in the Public Record Office (PRO), e.g. WO195, 'Scientific Advisory Council papers'.
5. For a general historical account see G.B. Carter, Porton Down: 75 years of Chemical and Biological Research (London: HMSO 1992). A select biblio. provides references to earlier sources.
6. PRO: WO142/264.
7. Ibid.
8. The US entered the war on 6 April 1917. For a good account of the creation of the US Army CWC see Amos A. Fries, Chemical Warfare (NY and London: McGraw-Hill 1921).
9. S. J. M. Auld, Gas and Flame in Modern Warfare (NY: George H. Doran 1918).
10. The proving ground referred to may have been that at Lakehurst NJ.
11. See Fries (note 8).
12. PRO: WO188/802, Lt-Col A.E. Kent DSO MC RE, A History of Porton (1960).
13. PRO: WO33/1012, 'Report on a chemical warfare mission to America, March 1922' (B22/ 183), Chemical Warfare Committee Office, War Office, dated 12 June 1922.
14. PRO: WO33/987B, 'Report of the Secretary of the Chemical Warfare Committee for the year ending 31 March 1921' (A2398).
15. Capt. James Davidson Pratt CBE (1891-1978), a chemist by training, was one of the most significant figures in British CW. In Aug. 1916, after recovering from wounds sustained at Hooge in 1915, he was posted to the Ministry of Munitions to be Asst Secretary of the CW Committee. After the war, as a civilian, he became Secretary of the Committee and the Controller (later Chief Supt) of the CW Research Dept, until 1928, when he became General Manager and Secretary of what is now the Chemical Industries Association. In 1940 he was recalled to become Controller of Chemical Defence. After the war he returned to the Association of British Chemical Manufacturers as Director and Secretary, but remained associated with the MOS through membership of the Chemical Defence Advisory Board of the Scientific Advisory Council, and of the Council itself. An obituary with an account of his considerable roles appeared in Chemistry and Industry, 21 Oct. 1978.
16. PRO: WO33/1012, 'Report on a chemical warfare mission to America, March 1922' (B22/ 183), Chemical Warfare Committee Office, War Office, dated 12 June 1922.
17. PRO: WO33/1078, 'Fifth annual report of the Chemical Warfare Committee: report for the year ending 31 March 1925', War Office July 1925.
18. PRO: WO33/1565, 'Eighteenth annual report of the Chemical Defence Research Department: report for the year ended 31 March 1938'.
19. See esp. Ch.2 of Leo P. Brophy and George J. B. Fisher, The Chemical Warfare Service: Organising for War (hereafter Brophy and Fisher) part of The Technical Services: United States Army in World War II (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept of the Army 1959). This a major source of information on the complexities of the Allied CW programme. Note the early use of the term 'United Nations' as synonymous with 'Allies'. The title was first used in the Washington Declaration of Jan. 1942 to describe the 26 allied nations at war with the Axis nations. The present UN came into being in Oct. 1945.
20. See esp. Ch.2 of Leo P. Brophy and George J. B. Fisher, The Chemical Warfare Service: Organising for War (hereafter Brophy and Fisher) part of The Technical Services: United States Army in World War II (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept of the Army 1959). This a major source of information on the complexities of the Allied CW programme. Note the early use of the term 'United Nations' as synonymous with 'Allies'. The title was first used in the Washington Declaration of Jan. 1942 to describe the 26 allied nations at war with the Axis nations. The present UN came into being in Oct. 1945.
21. See Brophy and Fisher (note 19) and that work's companion volumes: Leo P. Brophy, Wyndham D. Miles and Rexmond C. Cochrane, The Chemical Warfare Service: from Laboratory to Field (Washington DC: Dept of the Army 1959), (hereafter Brophy, Miles and Cochrane); Brooks E. Kleber and Dale Birdsell, The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat ("Washington DC: US Army 1966), (hereafter Kleber and Birdsell). See also a useful earlier account, The Chemical Warfare Service in World War II (NY: Reinhold for Chemical Corps Assoc. 1948). One of the few major (and now unclassified) British sources is Lt-Col D.C. Wiseman, Special Weapons and Types of Warfare: Volume I, Gas Warfare in the Second World War 1939-1945 (London: War Office 1951).
22. See Brophy and Fisher (note 19) and that work's companion volumes: Leo P. Brophy, Wyndham D. Miles and Rexmond C. Cochrane, The Chemical Warfare Service: from Laboratory to Field (Washington DC: Dept of the Army 1959), (hereafter Brophy, Miles and Cochrane); Brooks E. Kleber and Dale Birdsell, The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat ("Washington DC: US Army 1966), (hereafter Kleber and Birdsell). See also a useful earlier account, The Chemical Warfare Service in World War II (NY: Reinhold for Chemical Corps Assoc. 1948). One of the few major (and now unclassified) British sources is Lt-Col D.C. Wiseman, Special Weapons and Types of Warfare: Volume I, Gas Warfare in the Second World War 1939-1945 (London: War Office 1951).
23. See Brophy and Fisher (note 19) and that work's companion volumes: Leo P. Brophy, Wyndham D. Miles and Rexmond C. Cochrane, The Chemical Warfare Service: from Laboratory to Field (Washington DC: Dept of the Army 1959), (hereafter Brophy, Miles and Cochrane); Brooks E. Kleber and Dale Birdsell, The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat ("Washington DC: US Army 1966), (hereafter Kleber and Birdsell). See also a useful earlier account, The Chemical Warfare Service in World War II (NY: Reinhold for Chemical Corps Assoc. 1948). One of the few major (and now unclassified) British sources is Lt-Col D.C. Wiseman, Special Weapons and Types of Warfare: Volume I, Gas Warfare in the Second World War 1939-1945 (London: War Office 1951).
24. See Brophy and Fisher (note 19) and that work's companion volumes: Leo P. Brophy, Wyndham D. Miles and Rexmond C. Cochrane, The Chemical Warfare Service: from Laboratory to Field (Washington DC: Dept of the Army 1959), (hereafter Brophy, Miles and Cochrane); Brooks E. Kleber and Dale Birdsell, The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat ("Washington DC: US Army 1966), (hereafter Kleber and Birdsell). See also a useful earlier account, The Chemical Warfare Service in World War II (NY: Reinhold for Chemical Corps Assoc. 1948). One of the few major (and now unclassified) British sources is Lt-Col D.C. Wiseman, Special Weapons and Types of Warfare: Volume I, Gas Warfare in the Second World War 1939-1945 (London: War Office 1951).
25. The text of these statements has been cited in many sources but there is also a useful commentary in E.M. Spiers, Chemical Warfare (London: Macmillan 1986), pp.73-6 (hereafter Spiers).
26. See Brophy and Fisher (note 19), Brophy, Miles and Cochrane (note 20), Kleber and Birdsell (note 20); also Spiers (note 21).
27. Robert Kingan (1890-1968), a chemist, came to Porton in 1920 where he became Director of Experiments in 1936. He was appointed Chief Supt of CDRD in London in 1938. This Dept and post lapsed during the war and Kingan was appointed Principal Technical Advisor to J. Davidson Pratt, the Dep. Dir-Gen. Chemical Defence (Research). Before long a further change evoked the Controllerate of Chemical Defence Development, which, with Pratt as controller, continued to exist under this title until 1946. The further history of the London HQ for chemical and biological defence, which although much eroded, survived until 1979, is far too complex to be summarised here.
28. B.T. Tozer, personal communication Jan. 1973.
29. Organisations and bodies such as the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), National Defence Research Committee (NDRC), U. of Chicago Toxicology Laboratory, the Committee on the Treatment of Gas Casualties, the Council for Medical Research, Edgewood Arsenal, Dugway, the Massachusetts Inst. of Technology, US Naval Research Laboratory, Columbia U. etc.
30. See sources cited in note 20.
31. The words 'in the Tropics' were dropped from the title in May 1945.
32. See sources cited in note 20.
33. G. B. Carter, 'Biological Warfare and Biological Defence in the United Kingdom 1940-1979', RUSI Jnl 137/6 (Dec. 1992) pp.67-74. Graham S. Pearson, 'Biological weapons: the British view', in Brad Roberts (ed.) 'Biological weapons: weapons of the future?' Significant Issues Series 1993 15/1, pp.7-13 (Washington DC: Center for Strat. and Int. Studies). A list of earlier publications relating to BW (and CW) in the UK appears in the select biblio. on pp.103-14 of Carter, Porton Down (note 5).
34. G. B. Carter, 'Biological Warfare and Biological Defence in the United Kingdom 1940-1979', RUSI Jnl 137/6 (Dec. 1992) pp.67-74. Graham S. Pearson, 'Biological weapons: the British view', in Brad Roberts (ed.) 'Biological weapons: weapons of the future?' Significant Issues Series 1993 15/1, pp.7-13 (Washington DC: Center for Strat. and Int. Studies). A list of earlier publications relating to BW (and CW) in the UK appears in the select biblio. on pp.103-14 of Carter, Porton Down (note 5).
35. See Ch.2 of Brophy and Fisher (note 19), which describes the initiatives of the NDRC, the Surgeon General and the CWS, which led to the creation of the 'WBC' (the Committee on Biological Warfare, with initials reversed, but according to some sources the War Bureau of Consultants) and the Oct. 1941 directive that the CWS carry out research on BW. In 1942 the War Research Service (WRS) was set up to co-ordinate US activity and supervise the Special Assignments Branch of the CWS and the USBWC, created to advise on policy and liaise with the United Kingdom and Canada. Paul Harris, 'British preparations for offensive chemical warfare 19??', RUSI Jnl 125/2 (June 1980) pp.56-62. See esp. Ch.4 of Norman M. Covert, A History of Fort Detrick Maryland 1943-1993 (Ft Detrick MD: HQ US Army Garrison 1993). Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing (London: Chatto & Windus 1982). Leonard A. Cole, Clouds of Secrecy (NJ: Rowman & Littlefield 1988).
36. See Ch.2 of Brophy and Fisher (note 19), which describes the initiatives of the NDRC, the Surgeon General and the CWS, which led to the creation of the 'WBC' (the Committee on Biological Warfare, with initials reversed, but according to some sources the War Bureau of Consultants) and the Oct. 1941 directive that the CWS carry out research on BW. In 1942 the War Research Service (WRS) was set up to co-ordinate US activity and supervise the Special Assignments Branch of the CWS and the USBWC, created to advise on policy and liaise with the United Kingdom and Canada. Paul Harris, 'British preparations for offensive chemical warfare 19??', RUSI Jnl 125/2 (June 1980) pp.56-62. See esp. Ch.4 of Norman M. Covert, A History of Fort Detrick Maryland 1943-1993 (Ft Detrick MD: HQ US Army Garrison 1993). Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing (London: Chatto & Windus 1982). Leonard A. Cole, Clouds of Secrecy (NJ: Rowman & Littlefield 1988).
37. See Ch.2 of Brophy and Fisher (note 19), which describes the initiatives of the NDRC, the Surgeon General and the CWS, which led to the creation of the 'WBC' (the Committee on Biological Warfare, with initials reversed, but according to some sources the War Bureau of Consultants) and the Oct. 1941 directive that the CWS carry out research on BW. In 1942 the War Research Service (WRS) was set up to co-ordinate US activity and supervise the Special Assignments Branch of the CWS and the USBWC, created to advise on policy and liaise with the United Kingdom and Canada. Paul Harris, 'British preparations for offensive chemical warfare 19??', RUSI Jnl 125/2 (June 1980) pp.56-62. See esp. Ch.4 of Norman M. Covert, A History of Fort Detrick Maryland 1943-1993 (Ft Detrick MD: HQ US Army Garrison 1993). Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing (London: Chatto & Windus 1982). Leonard A. Cole, Clouds of Secrecy (NJ: Rowman & Littlefield 1988).
38. See Ch.2 of Brophy and Fisher (note 19), which describes the initiatives of the NDRC, the Surgeon General and the CWS, which led to the creation of the 'WBC' (the Committee on Biological Warfare, with initials reversed, but according to some sources the War Bureau of Consultants) and the Oct. 1941 directive that the CWS carry out research on BW. In 1942 the War Research Service (WRS) was set up to co-ordinate US activity and supervise the Special Assignments Branch of the CWS and the USBWC, created to advise on policy and liaise with the United Kingdom and Canada. Paul Harris, 'British preparations for offensive chemical warfare 19??', RUSI Jnl 125/2 (June 1980) pp.56-62. See esp. Ch.4 of Norman M. Covert, A History of Fort Detrick Maryland 1943-1993 (Ft Detrick MD: HQ US Army Garrison 1993). Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing (London: Chatto & Windus 1982). Leonard A. Cole, Clouds of Secrecy (NJ: Rowman & Littlefield 1988).
39. See Brophy and Fisher (note 19).
40. Dr Baldwin, Professor of Bacteriology at the U. of Wisconsin, was selected by George Merck for this role. Initially Baldwin worked from Edgewood Arsenal, planning the programme for Camp Detrick and gathering together his scientific staff.
41. Prof. Lord Stamp (1907-87) was a bacteriologist of note, a leading Liberal and later cross-bencher and son of the famous economist Josiah Stamp. Obituaries appeared in British Medical Jnl, 12 Dec. 1987, The Lancet, 19 Dec. 1987 and The Times, 19 Nov. 1987. See also 'Occasional papers on biological warfare No.8. A chapter from the unpublished memoirs of the third Lord Stamp', G.B. Carter, CDE Technical Note No.918, Feb. 1988. (The then CDE was permitted by Lord Stamp to incorporate one chapter of his memoirs 'in its records'. As far as is known. Lord Stamp's memoirs remain unpub.) See also Hansard, House of Lords 299/30, Wed. 5 Feb 1969, which recounts a debate on CW and BW initiated by the Bishop of St Albans, in which Trevor Stamp describes how he came to Porton and was sent to North America.
42. Prof. Lord Stamp (1907-87) was a bacteriologist of note, a leading Liberal and later cross-bencher and son of the famous economist Josiah Stamp. Obituaries appeared in British Medical Jnl, 12 Dec. 1987, The Lancet, 19 Dec. 1987 and The Times, 19 Nov. 1987. See also 'Occasional papers on biological warfare No.8. A chapter from the unpublished memoirs of the third Lord Stamp', G.B. Carter, CDE Technical Note No.918, Feb. 1988. (The then CDE was permitted by Lord Stamp to incorporate one chapter of his memoirs 'in its records'. As far as is known. Lord Stamp's memoirs remain unpub.) See also Hansard, House of Lords 299/30, Wed. 5 Feb 1969, which recounts a debate on CW and BW initiated by the Bishop of St Albans, in which Trevor Stamp describes how he came to Porton and was sent to North America.
43. Prof. Lord Stamp (1907-87) was a bacteriologist of note, a leading Liberal and later cross-bencher and son of the famous economist Josiah Stamp. Obituaries appeared in British Medical Jnl, 12 Dec. 1987, The Lancet, 19 Dec. 1987 and The Times, 19 Nov. 1987. See also 'Occasional papers on biological warfare No.8. A chapter from the unpublished memoirs of the third Lord Stamp', G.B. Carter, CDE Technical Note No.918, Feb. 1988. (The then CDE was permitted by Lord Stamp to incorporate one chapter of his memoirs 'in its records'. As far as is known. Lord Stamp's memoirs remain unpub.) See also Hansard, House of Lords 299/30, Wed. 5 Feb 1969, which recounts a debate on CW and BW initiated by the Bishop of St Albans, in which Trevor Stamp describes how he came to Porton and was sent to North America.
44. Paul Harris (note 30).
45. The BW trials on Gruinard Island during WW2 have been well described by several sources. See esp. Graham S. Pearson, 'Gruinard Island returns to civil use', ASA Newsletter No.20 (1990).
46. A brief history of the Experimental Station at Suffield is in Dinosaurs to Defence: a Story of the Suffield Block, authors 'BATUS and others' (sic; BATUS is British Army Training Unit Suffield.) No publisher or date; sold locally c1980s for base funds.
47. The term 'toxicological warfare' is of uncertain origin. At various times it has embraced CW, BW, smoke weapons, flame and also warfare involving the use of radioactive compounds (but not nuclear weapons per se).
48. This ambiguity could be taken to mean either strategic, stand-off dissemination of BW agents or long-term fundamental study. All evidence suggests the latter, although the UK was to be preoccupied by the former, albeit in the sole context of hazard and defence.
49. The essentials of the MWDP were set out in information brochures dated 20 Sept. 1956 and 1 Aug. 1961 from the Mutual Weapons Development team in Paris.
50. The V-agents, exemplified by VX, were more potent than the early types of nerve agents, with low volatility, remarkable percutaneous toxicity, considerable penetrative powers and persistency.
51. There are two basic methods of large-scale production of micro-organisms: batch culture and continuous culture. In the latter the process is notionally continuous; media laden with micro-organisms is slowly eluted while fresh media is added. Continuous culture is more logical, economical and elegant, but batch culture is older and easier.
52. The factors which control physical and biological stability of BW agent aerosols produced by weapons were a topic of fundamental importance.
53. The fate of the MWDP is obscure: see Hansard (Written Answers) 20 July 1993, item 11 para.3 p.172, letters to Mr Harry Cohen MP from Graham Pearson as Chief Executive of CBDE.
54. Research and development: The Technical Co-operation Program, Army Regulation No.70-23 (Washington DC: HQ Dept of the Army 11 Jan 1967). (Note that TTCP can mean Tripartite Technical Co-operation Programme, as from 1957 to 1965, or The Technical Co-operation Programme, as at present. TTCP was never used to describe the earlier tripartite toxicological warfare conferences.)
55. Ibid.
56. Nixon seized upon the perceived unpredictability of BW and the apparent possibility of subsequent uncontrollable effects as the major rationale for disposing of the US capability. In reality, according to Julian Perry Robinson (see below), he was merely signalling to the USSR a serious intent in arms control and particularly in the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT). The real potential of BW was successfully camouflaged to inhibit interest by developing nations, and, as pointed out elsewhere, to deflect some of the international opprobrium away from the proven utility manifest in the US CW capability, which had recently been used in a minor way in Vietnam, where riot control agents (DM, CS and CN) had been deployed for military purposes. See J. P. Perry Robinson, 'Origins of the Chemical Weapons Convention' in Benoit Morel and Kyle Olson (eds.) Shadows and Substance: the Chemical Weapons Convention (Boulder, San Francisco and London: Westview Press 1993) pp.37-54. Also G. B. Carter, Porton Down (note 5). See Defending Our Future: Statement on the Defence Estimates Cmnd.2270 London: HMSO July 1993) pp.55 and 58. Also James Adams The New Spies (London: Hutchinson 1994) Ch.20. Also idem, 'The Red Death', Sunday Times, 27 March 1994, News Review, Section 4, pp. 1-2. The USSR (and successors) illegally maintained an offensive BW programme until at least March 1992. Russia, US and UK subsequently agreed a framework of measures to 'rebuild' [sic] confidence in Russian compliance with the BWC.
57. Nixon seized upon the perceived unpredictability of BW and the apparent possibility of subsequent uncontrollable effects as the major rationale for disposing of the US capability. In reality, according to Julian Perry Robinson (see below), he was merely signalling to the USSR a serious intent in arms control and particularly in the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT). The real potential of BW was successfully camouflaged to inhibit interest by developing nations, and, as pointed out elsewhere, to deflect some of the international opprobrium away from the proven utility manifest in the US CW capability, which had recently been used in a minor way in Vietnam, where riot control agents (DM, CS and CN) had been deployed for military purposes. See J. P. Perry Robinson, 'Origins of the Chemical Weapons Convention' in Benoit Morel and Kyle Olson (eds.) Shadows and Substance: the Chemical Weapons Convention (Boulder, San Francisco and London: Westview Press 1993) pp.37-54. Also G. B. Carter, Porton Down (note 5). See Defending Our Future: Statement on the Defence Estimates Cmnd.2270 London: HMSO July 1993) pp.55 and 58. Also James Adams The New Spies (London: Hutchinson 1994) Ch.20. Also idem, 'The Red Death', Sunday Times, 27 March 1994, News Review, Section 4, pp. 1-2. The USSR (and successors) illegally maintained an offensive BW programme until at least March 1992. Russia, US and UK subsequently agreed a framework of measures to 'rebuild' [sic] confidence in Russian compliance with the BWC.
58. Nixon seized upon the perceived unpredictability of BW and the apparent possibility of subsequent uncontrollable effects as the major rationale for disposing of the US capability. In reality, according to Julian Perry Robinson (see below), he was merely signalling to the USSR a serious intent in arms control and particularly in the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT). The real potential of BW was successfully camouflaged to inhibit interest by developing nations, and, as pointed out elsewhere, to deflect some of the international opprobrium away from the proven utility manifest in the US CW capability, which had recently been used in a minor way in Vietnam, where riot control agents (DM, CS and CN) had been deployed for military purposes. See J. P. Perry Robinson, 'Origins of the Chemical Weapons Convention' in Benoit Morel and Kyle Olson (eds.) Shadows and Substance: the Chemical Weapons Convention (Boulder, San Francisco and London: Westview Press 1993) pp.37-54. Also G. B. Carter, Porton Down (note 5). See Defending Our Future: Statement on the Defence Estimates Cmnd.2270 London: HMSO July 1993) pp.55 and 58. Also James Adams The New Spies (London: Hutchinson 1994) Ch.20. Also idem, 'The Red Death', Sunday Times, 27 March 1994, News Review, Section 4, pp. 1-2. The USSR (and successors) illegally maintained an offensive BW programme until at least March 1992. Russia, US and UK subsequently agreed a framework of measures to 'rebuild' [sic] confidence in Russian compliance with the BWC.
59. Nixon seized upon the perceived unpredictability of BW and the apparent possibility of subsequent uncontrollable effects as the major rationale for disposing of the US capability. In reality, according to Julian Perry Robinson (see below), he was merely signalling to the USSR a serious intent in arms control and particularly in the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT). The real potential of BW was successfully camouflaged to inhibit interest by developing nations, and, as pointed out elsewhere, to deflect some of the international opprobrium away from the proven utility manifest in the US CW capability, which had recently been used in a minor way in Vietnam, where riot control agents (DM, CS and CN) had been deployed for military purposes. See J. P. Perry Robinson, 'Origins of the Chemical Weapons Convention' in Benoit Morel and Kyle Olson (eds.) Shadows and Substance: the Chemical Weapons Convention (Boulder, San Francisco and London: Westview Press 1993) pp.37-54. Also G. B. Carter, Porton Down (note 5). See Defending Our Future: Statement on the Defence Estimates Cmnd.2270 London: HMSO July 1993) pp.55 and 58. Also James Adams The New Spies (London: Hutchinson 1994) Ch.20. Also idem, 'The Red Death', Sunday Times, 27 March 1994, News Review, Section 4, pp. 1-2. The USSR (and successors) illegally maintained an offensive BW programme until at least March 1992. Russia, US and UK subsequently agreed a framework of measures to 'rebuild' [sic] confidence in Russian compliance with the BWC.
60. Nixon seized upon the perceived unpredictability of BW and the apparent possibility of subsequent uncontrollable effects as the major rationale for disposing of the US capability. In reality, according to Julian Perry Robinson (see below), he was merely signalling to the USSR a serious intent in arms control and particularly in the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT). The real potential of BW was successfully camouflaged to inhibit interest by developing nations, and, as pointed out elsewhere, to deflect some of the international opprobrium away from the proven utility manifest in the US CW capability, which had recently been used in a minor way in Vietnam, where riot control agents (DM, CS and CN) had been deployed for military purposes. See J. P. Perry Robinson, 'Origins of the Chemical Weapons Convention' in Benoit Morel and Kyle Olson (eds.) Shadows and Substance: the Chemical Weapons Convention (Boulder, San Francisco and London: Westview Press 1993) pp.37-54. Also G. B. Carter, Porton Down (note 5). See Defending Our Future: Statement on the Defence Estimates Cmnd.2270 London: HMSO July 1993) pp.55 and 58. Also James Adams The New Spies (London: Hutchinson 1994) Ch.20. Also idem, 'The Red Death', Sunday Times, 27 March 1994, News Review, Section 4, pp. 1-2. The USSR (and successors) illegally maintained an offensive BW programme until at least March 1992. Russia, US and UK subsequently agreed a framework of measures to 'rebuild' [sic] confidence in Russian compliance with the BWC.
61. Carter, Porton Down (note 5); Carter (note 29).