An experiment on enforcement strategies for managing a local environment resource

Journal of Economic Education

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 47-61

  Murphy, James J ^a   Cardenas, Juan Camilo ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

^b PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD JAVERIANA   (Colombia)

Author keywords

Classroom experiments; Common pool resources; Enforcement; Institutional crowding out; Public goods; Regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 1142302936     PISSN: 00220485     EISSN: 21524068     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3200/JECE.35.1.47-61     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Cardenas, J.-C., J. K. Stranlund, and C. Willis. 2000. Local environmental control and institutional crowding-out. World Development 28 (10):1719-33.
2. Davis, D. D., and C. A. Holt. 1993. Experimental economics. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press.
3. Frey, B. S., and F. Oberholzer-Gee. 1997. The cost of price incentives:An empirical analysis of motivation crowding-out. American Economic Review 87 (4):746-55.
4. Kagel, J. H., and A. E. Roth, eds. 1995. The handbook of experimental economics. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press.
5. Ostmann, A. 1998. External control may destroy the commons. Rationality and Society 10 (1):103-22.
6. Ostrom, E., and J. M. Walker. 1991. Communication in a commons:Cooperation without external enforcement. In T. R. Palfrey, ed. Laboratory research in political economy. Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press.
7. Ostrom, E. 2000. Collective action and the evolution of social norms. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (3):137-58.
8. Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the commons:The evolution of institutions for collective action. New York:Cambridge University Press.