The political economy of international trade and factor mobility

Journal of Economic Surveys

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 1-32

  Facchini, Giovanni ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

International trade; Political economy; Trade policy

Indexed keywords

INTERNATIONAL TRADE; MOBILITY; POLITICAL ECONOMY; THEORETICAL STUDY; TRADE POLICY;

EID: 1142281889     PISSN: 09500804     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6419.2004.00214.x     Document Type: Article

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