Import penetration and the politics of trade protection

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 287-304

  Maggi, Giovanni ^a   Rodríguez Clare, Andrés ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Import penetration; Political economy; Quotas

Indexed keywords

POLITICAL ECONOMY; PROTECTIONISM; TRADE POLICY;

EID: 0343932891     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(99)00029-X     Document Type: Article

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