The 1.5th mover advantage

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 156-170

  Henkel, Joachim ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036510062     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2696380     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. Stackelberg versus cournot equilibrium
2. Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
3. Théorie mathématique de la richesse sociale (compte-rendu)
4. Being a leader or a follower: Reflection on the distribution of roles in duopoly
5. Commitment robust equilibria and endogenous timing
6. Von stackelberg and cournot duopoly: Choosing roles
7. First mover and second mover advantages
8. Endogenizing the order of moves in matrix games
9. Facilitating practices: The effect of advance notice and best-price policies
10. A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
11. On the uniqueness of endogenous strategic timing
12. Duopoly with endogenous strategic timing: Stackelberg regained
13. Commitment, flexibility and market outcomes