What was the cold war about? Evidence from its ending

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 119, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 609-631

  Mueller, John ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 11244329263     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/j.1538-165X.2004.tb00532.x     Document Type: Review

References (114)

1. Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Robert D. English, "Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War's End," International Security 26 (Spring 2002): 70-92; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War," International Security 25 (Winter 2000/01): 5-53; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "From Old Thinking to New Thinking in Qualitative Research," International Security 26 (Spring 2002): 93-111; see also Mark Kramer, "Ideology and the Cold War," Review of International Studies 25 (October 1999): 539-576.
2. Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Robert D. English, "Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War's End," International Security 26 (Spring 2002): 70-92; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War," International Security 25 (Winter 2000/01): 5-53; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "From Old Thinking to New Thinking in Qualitative Research," International Security 26 (Spring 2002): 93-111; see also Mark Kramer, "Ideology and the Cold War," Review of International Studies 25 (October 1999): 539-576.
3. Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Robert D. English, "Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War's End," International Security 26 (Spring 2002): 70-92; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War," International Security 25 (Winter 2000/01): 5-53; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "From Old Thinking to New Thinking in Qualitative Research," International Security 26 (Spring 2002): 93-111; see also Mark Kramer, "Ideology and the Cold War," Review of International Studies 25 (October 1999): 539-576.
4. Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Robert D. English, "Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War's End," International Security 26 (Spring 2002): 70-92; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War," International Security 25 (Winter 2000/01): 5-53; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "From Old Thinking to New Thinking in Qualitative Research," International Security 26 (Spring 2002): 93-111; see also Mark Kramer, "Ideology and the Cold War," Review of International Studies 25 (October 1999): 539-576.
5. Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Robert D. English, "Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War's End," International Security 26 (Spring 2002): 70-92; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War," International Security 25 (Winter 2000/01): 5-53; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "From Old Thinking to New Thinking in Qualitative Research," International Security 26 (Spring 2002): 93-111; see also Mark Kramer, "Ideology and the Cold War," Review of International Studies 25 (October 1999): 539-576.
6. Don Oberdorfer, "Thatcher Says Cold War Has Come to an End: Briton Calls for Support of Gorbachev," Washington Post, 18 November 1988.
7. See New York Times, 9 December 1988. Reagan had actually strongly signaled this perspective earlier in 1988 on a trip to Moscow. Asked whether he still believed the Soviet Union to be an evil empire, he responded firmly in the negative and explained, "I was talking about another time, another era"; Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era, The United States and the Soviet Union 1983-1990 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 299.
8. See New York Times, 9 December 1988. Reagan had actually strongly signaled this perspective earlier in 1988 on a trip to Moscow. Asked whether he still believed the Soviet Union to be an evil empire, he responded firmly in the negative and explained, "I was talking about another time, another era"; Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era, The United States and the Soviet Union 1983-1990 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 299.
9. "In Gorbachev's Words," New York Times, 8 December 1988.
10. By 1986, Gorbachev had begun forcefully to undercut Communist ideology about the "class struggle" and about the Soviet Union's "internationalist duty" as the leader of world socialism. Oberdorfer, The Turn, 158-164, see also 141-142. By mid-1988, the Soviets were admitting the "inadequacy of the thesis that peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle," and began to refer to the "world socialist system" or the "socialist community of nations" rather than to the "socialist camp." David Binder, "Soviet and Allies Shift on Doctrine: Guiding Terminology Changes-'Class Struggle' Is Out, 'Struggle for Peace' In," New York Times, 25 May 1988. And by October, the Kremlin's chief ideologist was explicitly rejecting the notion that a world struggle was going on between capitalism and Communism. Bill Keller, "New Soviet Ideologist Rejects Idea Of World Struggle Against West," New York Times, 6 October 1988. There is a very substantial literature on the origins and development of this important ideological change and on Gorbachev's internal struggles. In addition to the references above and to those in note 1, see, for example, Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" International Security 12 (Winter 1987/88): 93-131; John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989), ch. 9; William G. Hyland, The Cold War Is Over (New York: Times Books, 1990), ch. 14; Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1994), 255-265,358-368,753-757,769-778; Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), ch. 1; Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 13; Jeremi Suri, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?" Journal of Cold War Studies 4 (Fall 2002): 60-92.
11. By 1986, Gorbachev had begun forcefully to undercut Communist ideology about the "class struggle" and about the Soviet Union's "internationalist duty" as the leader of world socialism. Oberdorfer, The Turn, 158-164, see also 141-142. By mid-1988, the Soviets were admitting the "inadequacy of the thesis that peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle," and began to refer to the "world socialist system" or the "socialist community of nations" rather than to the "socialist camp." David Binder, "Soviet and Allies Shift on Doctrine: Guiding Terminology Changes-'Class Struggle' Is Out, 'Struggle for Peace' In," New York Times, 25 May 1988. And by October, the Kremlin's chief ideologist was explicitly rejecting the notion that a world struggle was going on between capitalism and Communism. Bill Keller, "New Soviet Ideologist Rejects Idea Of World Struggle Against West," New York Times, 6 October 1988. There is a very substantial literature on the origins and development of this important ideological change and on Gorbachev's internal struggles. In addition to the references above and to those in note 1, see, for example, Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" International Security 12 (Winter 1987/88): 93-131; John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989), ch. 9; William G. Hyland, The Cold War Is Over (New York: Times Books, 1990), ch. 14; Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1994), 255-265,358-368,753-757,769-778; Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), ch. 1; Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 13; Jeremi Suri, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?" Journal of Cold War Studies 4 (Fall 2002): 60-92.
12. By 1986, Gorbachev had begun forcefully to undercut Communist ideology about the "class struggle" and about the Soviet Union's "internationalist duty" as the leader of world socialism. Oberdorfer, The Turn, 158-164, see also 141-142. By mid-1988, the Soviets were admitting the "inadequacy of the thesis that peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle," and began to refer to the "world socialist system" or the "socialist community of nations" rather than to the "socialist camp." David Binder, "Soviet and Allies Shift on Doctrine: Guiding Terminology Changes-'Class Struggle' Is Out, 'Struggle for Peace' In," New York Times, 25 May 1988. And by October, the Kremlin's chief ideologist was explicitly rejecting the notion that a world struggle was going on between capitalism and Communism. Bill Keller, "New Soviet Ideologist Rejects Idea Of World Struggle Against West," New York Times, 6 October 1988. There is a very substantial literature on the origins and development of this important ideological change and on Gorbachev's internal struggles. In addition to the references above and to those in note 1, see, for example, Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" International Security 12 (Winter 1987/88): 93-131; John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989), ch. 9; William G. Hyland, The Cold War Is Over (New York: Times Books, 1990), ch. 14; Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1994), 255-265,358-368,753-757,769-778; Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), ch. 1; Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 13; Jeremi Suri, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?" Journal of Cold War Studies 4 (Fall 2002): 60-92.
13. By 1986, Gorbachev had begun forcefully to undercut Communist ideology about the "class struggle" and about the Soviet Union's "internationalist duty" as the leader of world socialism. Oberdorfer, The Turn, 158-164, see also 141-142. By mid-1988, the Soviets were admitting the "inadequacy of the thesis that peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle," and began to refer to the "world socialist system" or the "socialist community of nations" rather than to the "socialist camp." David Binder, "Soviet and Allies Shift on Doctrine: Guiding Terminology Changes-'Class Struggle' Is Out, 'Struggle for Peace' In," New York Times, 25 May 1988. And by October, the Kremlin's chief ideologist was explicitly rejecting the notion that a world struggle was going on between capitalism and Communism. Bill Keller, "New Soviet Ideologist Rejects Idea Of World Struggle Against West," New York Times, 6 October 1988. There is a very substantial literature on the origins and development of this important ideological change and on Gorbachev's internal struggles. In addition to the references above and to those in note 1, see, for example, Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" International Security 12 (Winter 1987/88): 93-131; John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989), ch. 9; William G. Hyland, The Cold War Is Over (New York: Times Books, 1990), ch. 14; Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1994), 255-265,358-368,753-757,769-778; Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), ch. 1; Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 13; Jeremi Suri, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?" Journal of Cold War Studies 4 (Fall 2002): 60-92.
14. By 1986, Gorbachev had begun forcefully to undercut Communist ideology about the "class struggle" and about the Soviet Union's "internationalist duty" as the leader of world socialism. Oberdorfer, The Turn, 158-164, see also 141-142. By mid-1988, the Soviets were admitting the "inadequacy of the thesis that peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle," and began to refer to the "world socialist system" or the "socialist community of nations" rather than to the "socialist camp." David Binder, "Soviet and Allies Shift on Doctrine: Guiding Terminology Changes-'Class Struggle' Is Out, 'Struggle for Peace' In," New York Times, 25 May 1988. And by October, the Kremlin's chief ideologist was explicitly rejecting the notion that a world struggle was going on between capitalism and Communism. Bill Keller, "New Soviet Ideologist Rejects Idea Of World Struggle Against West," New York Times, 6 October 1988. There is a very substantial literature on the origins and development of this important ideological change and on Gorbachev's internal struggles. In addition to the references above and to those in note 1, see, for example, Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" International Security 12 (Winter 1987/88): 93-131; John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989), ch. 9; William G. Hyland, The Cold War Is Over (New York: Times Books, 1990), ch. 14; Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1994), 255-265,358-368,753-757,769-778; Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), ch. 1; Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 13; Jeremi Suri, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?" Journal of Cold War Studies 4 (Fall 2002): 60-92.
15. By 1986, Gorbachev had begun forcefully to undercut Communist ideology about the "class struggle" and about the Soviet Union's "internationalist duty" as the leader of world socialism. Oberdorfer, The Turn, 158-164, see also 141-142. By mid-1988, the Soviets were admitting the "inadequacy of the thesis that peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle," and began to refer to the "world socialist system" or the "socialist community of nations" rather than to the "socialist camp." David Binder, "Soviet and Allies Shift on Doctrine: Guiding Terminology Changes-'Class Struggle' Is Out, 'Struggle for Peace' In," New York Times, 25 May 1988. And by October, the Kremlin's chief ideologist was explicitly rejecting the notion that a world struggle was going on between capitalism and Communism. Bill Keller, "New Soviet Ideologist Rejects Idea Of World Struggle Against West," New York Times, 6 October 1988. There is a very substantial literature on the origins and development of this important ideological change and on Gorbachev's internal struggles. In addition to the references above and to those in note 1, see, for example, Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" International Security 12 (Winter 1987/88): 93-131; John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989), ch. 9; William G. Hyland, The Cold War Is Over (New York: Times Books, 1990), ch. 14; Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1994), 255-265,358-368,753-757,769-778; Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), ch. 1; Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 13; Jeremi Suri, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?" Journal of Cold War Studies 4 (Fall 2002): 60-92.
16. By 1986, Gorbachev had begun forcefully to undercut Communist ideology about the "class struggle" and about the Soviet Union's "internationalist duty" as the leader of world socialism. Oberdorfer, The Turn, 158-164, see also 141-142. By mid-1988, the Soviets were admitting the "inadequacy of the thesis that peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle," and began to refer to the "world socialist system" or the "socialist community of nations" rather than to the "socialist camp." David Binder, "Soviet and Allies Shift on Doctrine: Guiding Terminology Changes-'Class Struggle' Is Out, 'Struggle for Peace' In," New York Times, 25 May 1988. And by October, the Kremlin's chief ideologist was explicitly rejecting the notion that a world struggle was going on between capitalism and Communism. Bill Keller, "New Soviet Ideologist Rejects Idea Of World Struggle Against West," New York Times, 6 October 1988. There is a very substantial literature on the origins and development of this important ideological change and on Gorbachev's internal struggles. In addition to the references above and to those in note 1, see, for example, Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" International Security 12 (Winter 1987/88): 93-131; John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989), ch. 9; William G. Hyland, The Cold War Is Over (New York: Times Books, 1990), ch. 14; Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1994), 255-265,358-368,753-757,769-778; Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), ch. 1; Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 13; Jeremi Suri, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?" Journal of Cold War Studies 4 (Fall 2002): 60-92.
17. By 1986, Gorbachev had begun forcefully to undercut Communist ideology about the "class struggle" and about the Soviet Union's "internationalist duty" as the leader of world socialism. Oberdorfer, The Turn, 158-164, see also 141-142. By mid-1988, the Soviets were admitting the "inadequacy of the thesis that peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle," and began to refer to the "world socialist system" or the "socialist community of nations" rather than to the "socialist camp." David Binder, "Soviet and Allies Shift on Doctrine: Guiding Terminology Changes-'Class Struggle' Is Out, 'Struggle for Peace' In," New York Times, 25 May 1988. And by October, the Kremlin's chief ideologist was explicitly rejecting the notion that a world struggle was going on between capitalism and Communism. Bill Keller, "New Soviet Ideologist Rejects Idea Of World Struggle Against West," New York Times, 6 October 1988. There is a very substantial literature on the origins and development of this important ideological change and on Gorbachev's internal struggles. In addition to the references above and to those in note 1, see, for example, Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" International Security 12 (Winter 1987/88): 93-131; John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989), ch. 9; William G. Hyland, The Cold War Is Over (New York: Times Books, 1990), ch. 14; Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1994), 255-265,358-368,753-757,769-778; Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), ch. 1; Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 13; Jeremi Suri, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?" Journal of Cold War Studies 4 (Fall 2002): 60-92.
18. By 1986, Gorbachev had begun forcefully to undercut Communist ideology about the "class struggle" and about the Soviet Union's "internationalist duty" as the leader of world socialism. Oberdorfer, The Turn, 158-164, see also 141-142. By mid-1988, the Soviets were admitting the "inadequacy of the thesis that peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle," and began to refer to the "world socialist system" or the "socialist community of nations" rather than to the "socialist camp." David Binder, "Soviet and Allies Shift on Doctrine: Guiding Terminology Changes-'Class Struggle' Is Out, 'Struggle for Peace' In," New York Times, 25 May 1988. And by October, the Kremlin's chief ideologist was explicitly rejecting the notion that a world struggle was going on between capitalism and Communism. Bill Keller, "New Soviet Ideologist Rejects Idea Of World Struggle Against West," New York Times, 6 October 1988. There is a very substantial literature on the origins and development of this important ideological change and on Gorbachev's internal struggles. In addition to the references above and to those in note 1, see, for example, Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" International Security 12 (Winter 1987/88): 93-131; John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989), ch. 9; William G. Hyland, The Cold War Is Over (New York: Times Books, 1990), ch. 14; Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1994), 255-265,358-368,753-757,769-778; Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), ch. 1; Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 13; Jeremi Suri, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?" Journal of Cold War Studies 4 (Fall 2002): 60-92.
19. By 1986, Gorbachev had begun forcefully to undercut Communist ideology about the "class struggle" and about the Soviet Union's "internationalist duty" as the leader of world socialism. Oberdorfer, The Turn, 158-164, see also 141-142. By mid-1988, the Soviets were admitting the "inadequacy of the thesis that peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle," and began to refer to the "world socialist system" or the "socialist community of nations" rather than to the "socialist camp." David Binder, "Soviet and Allies Shift on Doctrine: Guiding Terminology Changes-'Class Struggle' Is Out, 'Struggle for Peace' In," New York Times, 25 May 1988. And by October, the Kremlin's chief ideologist was explicitly rejecting the notion that a world struggle was going on between capitalism and Communism. Bill Keller, "New Soviet Ideologist Rejects Idea Of World Struggle Against West," New York Times, 6 October 1988. There is a very substantial literature on the origins and development of this important ideological change and on Gorbachev's internal struggles. In addition to the references above and to those in note 1, see, for example, Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" International Security 12 (Winter 1987/88): 93-131; John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989), ch. 9; William G. Hyland, The Cold War Is Over (New York: Times Books, 1990), ch. 14; Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1994), 255-265,358-368,753-757,769-778; Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), ch. 1; Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 13; Jeremi Suri, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?" Journal of Cold War Studies 4 (Fall 2002): 60-92.
20. By 1986, Gorbachev had begun forcefully to undercut Communist ideology about the "class struggle" and about the Soviet Union's "internationalist duty" as the leader of world socialism. Oberdorfer, The Turn, 158-164, see also 141-142. By mid-1988, the Soviets were admitting the "inadequacy of the thesis that peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle," and began to refer to the "world socialist system" or the "socialist community of nations" rather than to the "socialist camp." David Binder, "Soviet and Allies Shift on Doctrine: Guiding Terminology Changes-'Class Struggle' Is Out, 'Struggle for Peace' In," New York Times, 25 May 1988. And by October, the Kremlin's chief ideologist was explicitly rejecting the notion that a world struggle was going on between capitalism and Communism. Bill Keller, "New Soviet Ideologist Rejects Idea Of World Struggle Against West," New York Times, 6 October 1988. There is a very substantial literature on the origins and development of this important ideological change and on Gorbachev's internal struggles. In addition to the references above and to those in note 1, see, for example, Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" International Security 12 (Winter 1987/88): 93-131; John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989), ch. 9; William G. Hyland, The Cold War Is Over (New York: Times Books, 1990), ch. 14; Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1994), 255-265,358-368,753-757,769-778; Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), ch. 1; Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 13; Jeremi Suri, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?" Journal of Cold War Studies 4 (Fall 2002): 60-92.
21. By 1986, Gorbachev had begun forcefully to undercut Communist ideology about the "class struggle" and about the Soviet Union's "internationalist duty" as the leader of world socialism. Oberdorfer, The Turn, 158-164, see also 141-142. By mid-1988, the Soviets were admitting the "inadequacy of the thesis that peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle," and began to refer to the "world socialist system" or the "socialist community of nations" rather than to the "socialist camp." David Binder, "Soviet and Allies Shift on Doctrine: Guiding Terminology Changes-'Class Struggle' Is Out, 'Struggle for Peace' In," New York Times, 25 May 1988. And by October, the Kremlin's chief ideologist was explicitly rejecting the notion that a world struggle was going on between capitalism and Communism. Bill Keller, "New Soviet Ideologist Rejects Idea Of World Struggle Against West," New York Times, 6 October 1988. There is a very substantial literature on the origins and development of this important ideological change and on Gorbachev's internal struggles. In addition to the references above and to those in note 1, see, for example, Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" International Security 12 (Winter 1987/88): 93-131; John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989), ch. 9; William G. Hyland, The Cold War Is Over (New York: Times Books, 1990), ch. 14; Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1994), 255-265,358-368,753-757,769-778; Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), ch. 1; Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 13; Jeremi Suri, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?" Journal of Cold War Studies 4 (Fall 2002): 60-92.
22. Oberdorfer, The Turn, 243.
23. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribner's, 1993), 1107; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 16; Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), 154, 192. Additionally, on a trip to Cuba in April 1989, Gorbachev publicly denounced the "export of revolution and counterrevolution" and had begun to cut off aid to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and to other like-minded forces-though not yet to a degree that made the new Bush administration fully comfortable. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1993), 58-59, 105; George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), 135. He also worked to extricate the Soviet Union from Angola and to secure the withdrawal of Communist Vietnam from Cambodia.
24. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribner's, 1993), 1107; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 16; Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), 154, 192. Additionally, on a trip to Cuba in April 1989, Gorbachev publicly denounced the "export of revolution and counterrevolution" and had begun to cut off aid to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and to other like-minded forces-though not yet to a degree that made the new Bush administration fully comfortable. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1993), 58-59, 105; George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), 135. He also worked to extricate the Soviet Union from Angola and to secure the withdrawal of Communist Vietnam from Cambodia.
25. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribner's, 1993), 1107; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 16; Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), 154, 192. Additionally, on a trip to Cuba in April 1989, Gorbachev publicly denounced the "export of revolution and counterrevolution" and had begun to cut off aid to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and to other like-minded forces-though not yet to a degree that made the new Bush administration fully comfortable. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1993), 58-59, 105; George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), 135. He also worked to extricate the Soviet Union from Angola and to secure the withdrawal of Communist Vietnam from Cambodia.
26. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribner's, 1993), 1107; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 16; Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), 154, 192. Additionally, on a trip to Cuba in April 1989, Gorbachev publicly denounced the "export of revolution and counterrevolution" and had begun to cut off aid to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and to other like-minded forces-though not yet to a degree that made the new Bush administration fully comfortable. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1993), 58-59, 105; George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), 135. He also worked to extricate the Soviet Union from Angola and to secure the withdrawal of Communist Vietnam from Cambodia.
27. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribner's, 1993), 1107; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 16; Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), 154, 192. Additionally, on a trip to Cuba in April 1989, Gorbachev publicly denounced the "export of revolution and counterrevolution" and had begun to cut off aid to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and to other like-minded forces-though not yet to a degree that made the new Bush administration fully comfortable. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1993), 58-59, 105; George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), 135. He also worked to extricate the Soviet Union from Angola and to secure the withdrawal of Communist Vietnam from Cambodia.
28. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 1131, 1138; see also Matlock, Autopsy, 197.
29. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 1131, 1138; see also Matlock, Autopsy, 197.
30. Cold War Retrospective, panel discussion, School of International Affairs, Princeton University, 26 February 1993, as recorded by C-SPAN.
31. Don Oberdorfer, "Eased East-West Tension Offers Chances, Dangers," Washington Post, 1 May 1989; see also Oberdorfer, The Turn, 346.
32. Don Oberdorfer, "Eased East-West Tension Offers Chances, Dangers," Washington Post, 1 May 1989; see also Oberdorfer, The Turn, 346.
33. See also the editorial, "The Empire Pulls Back," Wall Street Journal, 10 February 1989.
34. Oberdorfer, The Turn, 347.
35. Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 69.
36. Ibid., 70.
37. Quoted by Philip Zelikow at the Annual Conference of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Princeton University, 25 June 1999; see also Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 20. On Scowcroft's continuing "reservations" about Gorbachev even after the spring of 1989, see Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 135.
38. Quoted by Philip Zelikow at the Annual Conference of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Princeton University, 25 June 1999; see also Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 20. On Scowcroft's continuing "reservations" about Gorbachev even after the spring of 1989, see Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 135.
39. Quoted by Philip Zelikow at the Annual Conference of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Princeton University, 25 June 1999; see also Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 20. On Scowcroft's continuing "reservations" about Gorbachev even after the spring of 1989, see Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 135.
40. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), 541, 543.
41. Ibid., 546, 553, 602.
42. Ibid., 606, 617, 667-668.
43. Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 55.
44. Although Bush rather liked the Open Skies idea, Scowcroft says he found that it "smacked of gimmickry, and would wrongly give the impression that we did not have the brain power to think of something innovative and had to reach back thirty years for an idea." Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 54.
45. In an effort to jigger things along, Blackwill promised an excellent dinner to anyone in the administration who used the phrase "beyond containment" on television after the Texas A&M speech: Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 70.
46. Francis Fukuyama, "Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy," Problems of Communism 36 (September-October 1987): 1-13.
47. G.F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: Praeger, 1961), 214. Similarly, his successor, Leonid Breznhev, declared in 1976, "Detente does not in the slightest way abolish, and cannot abolish or change the laws of the class struggle. We do not conceal the fact that we see detente as a way to create more favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction." Geir Lundestad, East, West, North, South, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 111.
48. G.F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: Praeger, 1961), 214. Similarly, his successor, Leonid Breznhev, declared in 1976, "Detente does not in the slightest way abolish, and cannot abolish or change the laws of the class struggle. We do not conceal the fact that we see detente as a way to create more favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction." Geir Lundestad, East, West, North, South, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 111.
49. Strobe Talbott, ed., Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1974), 530-531.
50. Edward Crankshaw and Strobe Talbott, eds., Khrushchev Remembers (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1970), 512.
51. Andrew Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation," International Organization 54 (Spring 2000): 346.
52. In his 1987 essay, Fukuyama pointedly suggested that Soviet behavior in Afghanistan would "provide a good test of how far-reaching the changes in Soviet Third World policy are." Fukuyama, "Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy," 11.
53. For an assessment of conservative analysts who wanted more evidence and who waited for the Eastern European revolutions of late 1989 to relax, see Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation," 349-350.
54. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 98, 170.
55. Frank C. Carlucci, "Is the Cold War Over: No Time to Change U.S. Defense Policy," New York Times, 27 January 1989.
56. Public Papers of the Presidents: Bush, 541; see also Vasquez, Power of Power Politics, 330; Owen Harries, "Is the Cold War Really Over?" National Review, 10 November 1989, 45.
57. Public Papers of the Presidents: Bush, 541; see also Vasquez, Power of Power Politics, 330; Owen Harries, "Is the Cold War Really Over?" National Review, 10 November 1989, 45.
58. Public Papers of the Presidents: Bush, 541; see also Vasquez, Power of Power Politics, 330; Owen Harries, "Is the Cold War Really Over?" National Review, 10 November 1989, 45.
59. See Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation," 345-348, 350. With its later withdrawal from Eastern Europe, the Soviet ability to invade Western Europe was, of course, vastly reduced, but it still retained a huge army and nuclear capacity. The failure of the Soviet economic and administrative system clearly encouraged Gorbachev and others to reexamine their basic ideology. However, as Myron Rush notes, these problems by no means required a doctrinal change: had the Soviet Union done nothing about them, "its survival to the end of the century would have been likely," and "by cutting defense spending sharply ... a prudent conservative leader in 1985 could have improved the Soviet economy markedly." Myron Rush, "Fortune and Fate," National Interest (Spring 1993): 21.
60. See Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation," 345-348, 350. With its later withdrawal from Eastern Europe, the Soviet ability to invade Western Europe was, of course, vastly reduced, but it still retained a huge army and nuclear capacity. The failure of the Soviet economic and administrative system clearly encouraged Gorbachev and others to reexamine their basic ideology. However, as Myron Rush notes, these problems by no means required a doctrinal change: had the Soviet Union done nothing about them, "its survival to the end of the century would have been likely," and "by cutting defense spending sharply ... a prudent conservative leader in 1985 could have improved the Soviet economy markedly." Myron Rush, "Fortune and Fate," National Interest (Spring 1993): 21.
61. In a parallel to the Cold War discussion, if terrorists led by Osama bin Laden were to credibly give up their anti-American ideological zeal, concerns about them would diminish markedly, even though their physical capacity to commit damaging acts of terror would be unchanged.
62. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1948), 327; see also James Lee Ray and Bruce Russett, "The Future as Arbiter of Theoretical Controversies: Predictions, Explanations and the End of the Cold War," British Journal of Political Science 26 (October 1996): 457.
63. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1948), 327; see also James Lee Ray and Bruce Russett, "The Future as Arbiter of Theoretical Controversies: Predictions, Explanations and the End of the Cold War," British Journal of Political Science 26 (October 1996): 457.
64. Amity Shlaes, "Talk Turns to Triple Zero in West Germany," Wall Street Journal, 9 December 1988; Robert Keatley, "Gorbachev Peace Offensive Jars the West," Wall Street Journal, 20 January 1989; editorial, Wall Street Journal, 31 May 1989; see also R. Jeffrey Smith, "Arms Cuts Gain Favor as Anxieties Ebb," Washington Post, 8 May 1989. On the phenomenon of the negative arms race, see John Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), ch. 3.
65. Amity Shlaes, "Talk Turns to Triple Zero in West Germany," Wall Street Journal, 9 December 1988; Robert Keatley, "Gorbachev Peace Offensive Jars the West," Wall Street Journal, 20 January 1989; editorial, Wall Street Journal, 31 May 1989; see also R. Jeffrey Smith, "Arms Cuts Gain Favor as Anxieties Ebb," Washington Post, 8 May 1989. On the phenomenon of the negative arms race, see John Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), ch. 3.
66. Amity Shlaes, "Talk Turns to Triple Zero in West Germany," Wall Street Journal, 9 December 1988; Robert Keatley, "Gorbachev Peace Offensive Jars the West," Wall Street Journal, 20 January 1989; editorial, Wall Street Journal, 31 May 1989; see also R. Jeffrey Smith, "Arms Cuts Gain Favor as Anxieties Ebb," Washington Post, 8 May 1989. On the phenomenon of the negative arms race, see John Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), ch. 3.
67. Amity Shlaes, "Talk Turns to Triple Zero in West Germany," Wall Street Journal, 9 December 1988; Robert Keatley, "Gorbachev Peace Offensive Jars the West," Wall Street Journal, 20 January 1989; editorial, Wall Street Journal, 31 May 1989; see also R. Jeffrey Smith, "Arms Cuts Gain Favor as Anxieties Ebb," Washington Post, 8 May 1989. On the phenomenon of the negative arms race, see John Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), ch. 3.
68. Amity Shlaes, "Talk Turns to Triple Zero in West Germany," Wall Street Journal, 9 December 1988; Robert Keatley, "Gorbachev Peace Offensive Jars the West," Wall Street Journal, 20 January 1989; editorial, Wall Street Journal, 31 May 1989; see also R. Jeffrey Smith, "Arms Cuts Gain Favor as Anxieties Ebb," Washington Post, 8 May 1989. On the phenomenon of the negative arms race, see John Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), ch. 3.
69. Suri, "Explaining the End of the Cold War," 84.
70. Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 437.
71. W John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford, 1982), 143.
72. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1963), 551.
73. "In Gorbachev's Words," New York Times, 8 December 1988.
74. Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 417-418; Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 515-516; Matlock, Autopsy, 565-566.
75. Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 417-418; Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 515-516; Matlock, Autopsy, 565-566.
76. Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 417-418; Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 515-516; Matlock, Autopsy, 565-566.
77. On this issue, see also Michael Mandelbaum, "Ending Where It Began," New York Times, 21 February 1989. By mid-1988, some analysts were noting that the Soviet position in burdensome Eastern Europe had become negotiable and might lead to some sort of Finlandization of the Soviet colonies there. Irving Kristol, "The Soviets' Albatross States," Wall Street Journal, 22 July 1988. See also Garthoff, Great Transition, 377-378.
78. On this issue, see also Michael Mandelbaum, "Ending Where It Began," New York Times, 21 February 1989. By mid-1988, some analysts were noting that the Soviet position in burdensome Eastern Europe had become negotiable and might lead to some sort of Finlandization of the Soviet colonies there. Irving Kristol, "The Soviets' Albatross States," Wall Street Journal, 22 July 1988. See also Garthoff, Great Transition, 377-378.
79. On this issue, see also Michael Mandelbaum, "Ending Where It Began," New York Times, 21 February 1989. By mid-1988, some analysts were noting that the Soviet position in burdensome Eastern Europe had become negotiable and might lead to some sort of Finlandization of the Soviet colonies there. Irving Kristol, "The Soviets' Albatross States," Wall Street Journal, 22 July 1988. See also Garthoff, Great Transition, 377-378.
80. Public Papers of the Presidents: Bush, 431. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 24, 31. Zelikow and Rice date the end of the Cold War with the unification of Germany. Ibid., 3.
81. Public Papers of the Presidents: Bush, 431. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 24, 31. Zelikow and Rice date the end of the Cold War with the unification of Germany. Ibid., 3.
82. Public Papers of the Presidents: Bush, 431. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 24, 31. Zelikow and Rice date the end of the Cold War with the unification of Germany. Ibid., 3.
83. George F. Kennan, "This Is No Time for Talk Of German Reunification," Washington Post, 12 November 1989. Similarly, Henry Kissinger anticipated at the time that it would take three or four years even for a de facto unification of Germany to take place. Michael R. Gordon, "Kissinger Expects a United Germany: Declares Changes in the East Set in Motion Forces That Cannot Be Reversed," New York Times, 16 November 1989. In a spring 1989 memo, Scowcroft noted that "virtually no West German expects German unification to happen in this century." Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 28. A personal note may be of interest in this regard. In 1986, I presented a paper at the International Studies Association meetings arguing that because the Cold War was about ideology (a theme continued in the present article) and because Gorbachev was already in the process of dismembering this crucial element, the Cold War might well be in terminal demise-that we might be coming to the end of the world as we knew it (the paper can be found at http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/ isal986.pdf). In 1985 and 1986, I tried to get the unfashionable argument published, in various versions, in Foreign Policy, National Interest, Washington Post, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, and New Republic to no avail. I then gave up and blended the argument into a book that came out in February 1989 (Retreat from Doomsday, see especially 211-214). While I think I got the basic mechanism for the demise of the Cold War right, I was as flabbergasted as anybody by the speed with which events in Eastern Europe took place. At the 1986 meeting, someone asked me when I thought the Soviet Union might decide to leave Eastern Europe. The paper suggests that this might happen "eventually" and "in the long term," and I tried to take refuge behind such crafty vapidities. But he kept badgering me, and I finally blurted out, "Maybe by 1995," with what I felt was amazing heroism. If I had heard myself saying "1989" I would have had myself committed.
84. George F. Kennan, "This Is No Time for Talk Of German Reunification," Washington Post, 12 November 1989. Similarly, Henry Kissinger anticipated at the time that it would take three or four years even for a de facto unification of Germany to take place. Michael R. Gordon, "Kissinger Expects a United Germany: Declares Changes in the East Set in Motion Forces That Cannot Be Reversed," New York Times, 16 November 1989. In a spring 1989 memo, Scowcroft noted that "virtually no West German expects German unification to happen in this century." Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 28. A personal note may be of interest in this regard. In 1986, I presented a paper at the International Studies Association meetings arguing that because the Cold War was about ideology (a theme continued in the present article) and because Gorbachev was already in the process of dismembering this crucial element, the Cold War might well be in terminal demise-that we might be coming to the end of the world as we knew it (the paper can be found at http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/ isal986.pdf). In 1985 and 1986, I tried to get the unfashionable argument published, in various versions, in Foreign Policy, National Interest, Washington Post, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, and New Republic to no avail. I then gave up and blended the argument into a book that came out in February 1989 (Retreat from Doomsday, see especially 211-214). While I think I got the basic mechanism for the demise of the Cold War right, I was as flabbergasted as anybody by the speed with which events in Eastern Europe took place. At the 1986 meeting, someone asked me when I thought the Soviet Union might decide to leave Eastern Europe. The paper suggests that this might happen "eventually" and "in the long term," and I tried to take refuge behind such crafty vapidities. But he kept badgering me, and I finally blurted out, "Maybe by 1995," with what I felt was amazing heroism. If I had heard myself saying "1989" I would have had myself committed.
85. George F. Kennan, "This Is No Time for Talk Of German Reunification," Washington Post, 12 November 1989. Similarly, Henry Kissinger anticipated at the time that it would take three or four years even for a de facto unification of Germany to take place. Michael R. Gordon, "Kissinger Expects a United Germany: Declares Changes in the East Set in Motion Forces That Cannot Be Reversed," New York Times, 16 November 1989. In a spring 1989 memo, Scowcroft noted that "virtually no West German expects German unification to happen in this century." Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 28. A personal note may be of interest in this regard. In 1986, I presented a paper at the International Studies Association meetings arguing that because the Cold War was about ideology (a theme continued in the present article) and because Gorbachev was already in the process of dismembering this crucial element, the Cold War might well be in terminal demise-that we might be coming to the end of the world as we knew it (the paper can be found at http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/ isal986.pdf). In 1985 and 1986, I tried to get the unfashionable argument published, in various versions, in Foreign Policy, National Interest, Washington Post, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, and New Republic to no avail. I then gave up and blended the argument into a book that came out in February 1989 (Retreat from Doomsday, see especially 211-214). While I think I got the basic mechanism for the demise of the Cold War right, I was as flabbergasted as anybody by the speed with which events in Eastern Europe took place. At the 1986 meeting, someone asked me when I thought the Soviet Union might decide to leave Eastern Europe. The paper suggests that this might happen "eventually" and "in the long term," and I tried to take refuge behind such crafty vapidities. But he kept badgering me, and I finally blurted out, "Maybe by 1995," with what I felt was amazing heroism. If I had heard myself saying "1989" I would have had myself committed.
86. George F. Kennan, "This Is No Time for Talk Of German Reunification," Washington Post, 12 November 1989. Similarly, Henry Kissinger anticipated at the time that it would take three or four years even for a de facto unification of Germany to take place. Michael R. Gordon, "Kissinger Expects a United Germany: Declares Changes in the East Set in Motion Forces That Cannot Be Reversed," New York Times, 16 November 1989. In a spring 1989 memo, Scowcroft noted that "virtually no West German expects German unification to happen in this century." Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 28. A personal note may be of interest in this regard. In 1986, I presented a paper at the International Studies Association meetings arguing that because the Cold War was about ideology (a theme continued in the present article) and because Gorbachev was already in the process of dismembering this crucial element, the Cold War might well be in terminal demise-that we might be coming to the end of the world as we knew it (the paper can be found at http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/ isal986.pdf). In 1985 and 1986, I tried to get the unfashionable argument published, in various versions, in Foreign Policy, National Interest, Washington Post, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, and New Republic to no avail. I then gave up
87. George F. Kennan, "This Is No Time for Talk Of German Reunification," Washington Post, 12 November 1989. Similarly, Henry Kissinger anticipated at the time that it would take three or four years even for a de facto unification of Germany to take place. Michael R. Gordon, "Kissinger Expects a United Germany: Declares Changes in the East Set in Motion Forces That Cannot Be Reversed," New York Times, 16 November 1989. In a spring 1989 memo, Scowcroft noted that "virtually no West German expects German unification to happen in this century." Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 28. A personal note may be of interest in this regard. In 1986, I presented a paper at the International Studies Association meetings arguing that because the Cold War was about ideology (a theme continued in the present article) and because Gorbachev was already in the process of dismembering this crucial element, the Cold War might well be in terminal demise-that we might be coming to the end of the world as we knew it (the paper can be found at http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/ isal986.pdf). In 1985 and 1986, I tried to get the unfashionable argument published, in various versions, in Foreign Policy, National Interest, Washington Post, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, and New Republic to no avail. I then gave up and blended the argument into a book that came out in February 1989 (Retreat from Doomsday, see especially 211-214). While I think I got the basic mechanism for the demise of the Cold War right, I was as flabbergasted as anybody by the speed with which events in Eastern Europe took place. At the 1986 meeting, someone asked me when I thought the Soviet Union might decide to leave Eastern Europe. The paper suggests that this might happen "eventually" and "in the long term," and I tried to take refuge behind such crafty vapidities. But he kept badgering me, and I finally blurted out, "Maybe by 1995," with what I felt was amazing heroism. If I had heard myself saying "1989" I would have had myself committed.
88. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 2.
89. Oberdorfer, "Thatcher Says Cold War Has Come to an End."
90. Comment at the Annual Conference of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Princeton University, 26 June 1999.
91. John C. Campbell, Tito's Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 24-27.
92. Jonathan D. Pollack, "China and the Global Strategic Balance" in Harry Harding, ed., China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), 159. On the potential for alliance, see also Strobe Talbott, "The Strategic Dimension of the Sino-American Relationship" in Richard H. Solomon, ed., The China Factor (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981), 81-113. On China's abandonment of threatening ideology, see Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday, 184-186.
93. Jonathan D. Pollack, "China and the Global Strategic Balance" in Harry Harding, ed., China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), 159. On the potential for alliance, see also Strobe Talbott, "The Strategic Dimension of the Sino-American Relationship" in Richard H. Solomon, ed., The China Factor (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981), 81-113. On China's abandonment of threatening ideology, see Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday, 184-186.
94. Jonathan D. Pollack, "China and the Global Strategic Balance" in Harry Harding, ed., China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), 159. On the potential for alliance, see also Strobe Talbott, "The Strategic Dimension of the Sino-American Relationship" in Richard H. Solomon, ed., The China Factor (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981), 81-113. On China's abandonment of threatening ideology, see Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday, 184-186.
95. In his assessment of the end of the Cold War, Andrew Kydd ignores ideological change and seeks to explain the development by stressing instead various tangible signals and reassurances put forward by Gorbachev. But as he notes in passing, China abandoned the Cold War, and was accepted by the West, even without such tangible signals. The experience serves, he suggests, "as a reminder that a transition path from communism exists that does not provide a great deal of reassurance to the outside world." Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation," 350.
96. Policy Review (Winter 1985): 33. An interesting comparison can be made with Cuba. Although there is little concern that that tiny nation can do much to harm the United States, a great deal of hostility toward the regime lingers in part at least because, however materially impotent, it still subscribes to a hostile ideology.
97. An important Soviet official observed in 1987, "Previously we reasoned: the worse for the adversary, the better for us.... But today this is no longer true ... The better things are going in the European world economy, the higher the stability and the better the prospects for our development." Snyder, "Gorbachev Revolution," 115. See also Harries, "Is the Cold War Really Over?" 40-42.
98. An important Soviet official observed in 1987, "Previously we reasoned: the worse for the adversary, the better for us.... But today this is no longer true ... The better things are going in the European world economy, the higher the stability and the better the prospects for our development." Snyder, "Gorbachev Revolution," 115. See also Harries, "Is the Cold War Really Over?" 40-42.
99. New York Times, 9 December 1988.
100. Public Papers of the Presidents: Bush, 541, 602.
101. X [George F. Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947): 566-567.
102. For an able analysis and discussion, see Nigel Gould-Davies, "Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics During the Cold War," Journal of Cold War Studies 1 (Winter 1999): 90-109.
103. Frederic S. Burin, "The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitability of War," American Political Science Review 57 (June 1963): 337.
104. Melvyn P. Leffler, The Specter of Communism (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 17.
105. Historicus [George Alien Morgan], "Stalin on Revolution," Foreign Affairs 27 (January 1949): 198.
106. William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy (New York: Norton, 1982), 224. As Taubman points out, Stalin was referring to wars between capitalist states, something often neglected when the West examined this statement. Nevertheless, even taking that into account, the declaration clearly remains profoundly threatening to capitalist states. On this issue more generally, see Burin, "Communist Doctrine."
107. William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy (New York: Norton, 1982), 224. As Taubman points out, Stalin was referring to wars between capitalist states, something often neglected when the West examined this statement. Nevertheless, even taking that into account, the declaration clearly remains profoundly threatening to capitalist states. On this issue more generally, see Burin, "Communist Doctrine."
108. Hudson et al., Sino-Soviet Dispute, 196.
109. This is essentially the position taken in the waning months of the Cold War by Gorbachev adviser Giorgi Arbatov, who argued that Gorbachev was in the process of destroying "anti-Soviet stereotypes." He concluded, "Something very serious is happening: The beginning of the demise of the entire political infrastructure of the Cold War. The Western press is already saying that Gorbachev's destruction of the stereotype of the 'enemy' is his 'secret weapon.' The arms race, power politics in the Third World, and military blocs are unthinkable without the 'Soviet threat.' " "Is America No Longer Exceptional?" New Perspectives Quarterly 5 (Summer 1988): 31. For the forceful argument that the sentiments reflected real ideological zeal and importantly affected policy during the Cold War, see Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism," International Security 20 (Winter 1995/96): 152-188.
110. This is essentially the position taken in the waning months of the Cold War by Gorbachev adviser Giorgi Arbatov, who argued that Gorbachev was in the process of destroying "anti-Soviet stereotypes." He concluded, "Something very serious is happening: The beginning of the demise of the entire political infrastructure of the Cold War. The Western press is already saying that Gorbachev's destruction of the stereotype of the 'enemy' is his 'secret weapon.' The arms race, power politics in the Third World, and military blocs are unthinkable without the 'Soviet threat.' " "Is America No Longer Exceptional?" New Perspectives Quarterly 5 (Summer 1988): 31. For the forceful argument that the sentiments reflected real ideological zeal and importantly affected policy during the Cold War, see Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism," International Security 20 (Winter 1995/96): 152-188.
111. See Robert H. Johnson, Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After (New York: St. Martin's, 1994).
112. John Lewis Gaddis, "Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?" Foreign Affairs 52 (January 1974): 388; see also Garthoff, Great Transition, ch. 16.
113. John Lewis Gaddis, "Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?" Foreign Affairs 52 (January 1974): 388; see also Garthoff, Great Transition, ch. 16.
114. Matlock, Autopsy, 649.