The Consequences for a Monopolistic Insurance Firm of Evaluating Risk Better than Customers: The Adverse Selection Hypothesis Reversed

GENEVA Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 65-79

  Villeneuve, Bertrand ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOULOUSE CAPITOLE   (France)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Informed principal; Insurance markets; Multidimensional signaling; Value of information

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346677886     PISSN: 09264957     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008749524517     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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