Manipulations in contests

Economics Letters

Volumn 86, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 135-139

  Cohen, Chen ^a   Sela, Aner ^a  

^a BEN GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV   (Israel)

Author keywords

Contests; Tullock's model

Indexed keywords

EID: 10944262519     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2004.07.006     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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3. M. Baye D. Kovenock C.G. de Vries The solution to the Tullock rent-seeking game when R>2: Mixed-strategy equilibrium and mean dissipation rates Public Choice 81 1994 363-380
4. M. Baye D. Kovenock C. de Vries The all-pay auction with complete information Economic Theory 8 1996 291-305
5. R. Fullerton P. McAfee Auctioning entry into tournaments Journal of Political Economy 107 1999 573-605
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7. Groh, C., Moldovanu, B., Sela, A., Sunde, U., 2003. "Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments," mimeo.
8. B. Moldovanu A. Sela The optimal allocation of prizes in contests American Economic Review 91 2001 542-558
9. S. Szymanski The economic design of sporting contests Journal of Economic Literature XLT 2003 1137-1187
10. G. Tullock Efficient rent-seeking J.M. Buchanan R.D. Tollison G. Tullock (Eds.) Toward a Theory of Rent-Seeking Society 1980 Texas A.&M. University Press College Station