Extension of values to games with multiple alternatives

Annals of Operations Research

Volumn 84, Issue , 1998, Pages 63-78

  Amer, R ^a   Carreras, F ^a   Magana A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITAT POLITÈCNICA DE CATALUNYA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Games with multiple alternatives; Values; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032268204     PISSN: 02545330     EISSN: 15729338     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1018901306738     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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9. L.S. Shapley, A value for n-person games, in: Contributions to the Theory of Games II, eds. H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker, Princeton, 1953, pp. 307-317.