Decentralized multi-echelon supply chains: incentives and information

Management Science

Volumn 45, Issue 5, 1999, Pages 633-640

  Lee, Hau ^a   Whang, Seungjin ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COST EFFECTIVENESS; DECENTRALIZED CONTROL; DECISION MAKING; INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT; INFORMATION MANAGEMENT; INVENTORY CONTROL; PERFORMANCE;

COST CONSERVATION; DECENTRALIZED MULTI ECHELON SUPPLY CHAIN; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY; INCENTIVE PROBLEMS; INFORMATIONAL DECENTRALIZABILITY PROPERTIES; PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT;

OPERATIONS RESEARCH;

EID: 0032656505     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.45.5.633     Document Type: Article

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