Shared-savings contracts for indirect materials in supply chains: Channel profits and environmental impacts

Management Science

Volumn 47, Issue 7, 2001, Pages 881-893

  Corbett, Charles J ^a,b   DeCroix, Gregory A ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Environmental Management; Game Theory; Indirect Materials; Shared Savings; Supply Contracts; Supply Chain Management

Indexed keywords

COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT; GAME THEORY; MANAGEMENT SCIENCE; PURCHASING;

SUPPLY-CHAIN MANAGEMENT;

CONTRACTS;

EID: 0035410551     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.47.7.881.9802     Document Type: Article

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