Merging the modern and the traditional: Market reform in Chile and Argentina

Comparative Politics

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 2004, Pages

  Teichman, Judith ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 10044283894     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/4150122     Document Type: Review

References (80)

1. For example, see William Ratcliff, "Development and Civil Society in Latin America and Asia," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 565 (September 1999), 91-112. For a contrary view that highlights the democratic leanings of Latin American technocrats, see Jorge Domínguez, ed., Technopols: Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin America in the 1990s (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
2. For example, see William Ratcliff, "Development and Civil Society in Latin America and Asia," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 565 (September 1999), 91-112. For a contrary view that highlights the democratic leanings of Latin American technocrats, see Jorge Domínguez, ed., Technopols: Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin America in the 1990s (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
3. See, for example, G. Richards, "The Poverty of Democracy in Latin America," Review of Radical Political Economy, 2 (2001); Guillermo O'Donnell, "Reflections on Contemporary South American Democracies," Journal of Latin American Studies, 3 (2001); Richard S. Hillman, John A. Peeler, and Elsa Cardozo Da Silva, eds., Democracy and Human Rights in Latin America (Westport: Praeger, 2002).
4. See, for example, G. Richards, "The Poverty of Democracy in Latin America," Review of Radical Political Economy, 2 (2001); Guillermo O'Donnell, "Reflections on Contemporary South American Democracies," Journal of Latin American Studies, 3 (2001); Richard S. Hillman, John A. Peeler, and Elsa Cardozo Da Silva, eds., Democracy and Human Rights in Latin America (Westport: Praeger, 2002).
5. See, for example, G. Richards, "The Poverty of Democracy in Latin America," Review of Radical Political Economy, 2 (2001); Guillermo O'Donnell, "Reflections on Contemporary South American Democracies," Journal of Latin American Studies, 3 (2001); Richard S. Hillman, John A. Peeler, and Elsa Cardozo Da Silva, eds., Democracy and Human Rights in Latin America (Westport: Praeger, 2002).
6. Much of the data in this article is drawn from seventy-two open-ended interviews of government officials, politicians, trade union officials, and business leaders: twenty-nine in Chile in 1996, twenty-eight in Argentina in 1995, and fifteen of World Bank officials in Washington, D.C. in 1998. Because of confidentiality, the interviewees will be referred to only in descriptive, nonidentifying terms. Senior government official refers to ministers and the two levels below ministerial rank, while senior World Bank official refers to vice presidents, division chiefs, senior and lead economists, and lead sectoral specialists. Specific positions and dates can not be divulged without identifying the interviewees.
7. Hugh O'Shaughnessy, Pinochet: The Politics of Torture (New York: New York University Press, 2000), pp. 98-106.
8. See Alan Doig and Stephanie McIvor, "Corruption and Its Control in the Development Context: An Analysis and Selective Review of the Literature," Third World Quarterly, 20 (June 1999), 657-76.
9. Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1990), pp. 7, 44.
10. The term "neopatrimonial" recognizes the presence of both patrimonial and institutional bases of power.
11. Sidney M. Greenfield, "The Patrimonial State and Patron Client Relations in Iberia and Latin America," Program in Latin American Studies, Occasional Papers Series No. 1, International Area Studies Program (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1976). The term "patron-client relations" refers to personal ties between actors of unequal wealth and status in which material rewards are given to lower status clients in exchange for nonmaterial benefits, such as deference, loyalty, and political support, for patrons.
12. See, for example, Glen Biglaiser, "The Internationalization of Chicago's Economics in Latin America," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 50 (January 2002); Miguel Angel Centeno, Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
13. See, for example, Glen Biglaiser, "The Internationalization of Chicago's Economics in Latin America," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 50 (January 2002); Miguel Angel Centeno, Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
14. Paolo Ledlowski, "The New Class on the Periphery: Modernization, Professionalization, and Clientelism in Southern Italy," in Hansfried Kellner and Frank W. Heuberger, eds., Hidden Technocrats: The New Class and New Capitalism (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1992).
15. Jean Meynard, Technocracy (New York: The Free Press 1968); Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park: Sage, 1990).
16. Jean Meynard, Technocracy (New York: The Free Press 1968); Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park: Sage, 1990).
17. Although both Augusto Pinochet and Carlos Menem exercised personal authority, their power also drew on institutional and legal sources. Pinochet was careful to construct a legal edifice legitimizing his rule, while Carlos Menem was elected president twice as the Peronist party candidate.
18. This term is from William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (New York: The Free Press, 1959).
19. See Maria Eugenia Oyarzún, Augusto Pinochet: Diálogos con su historia, conversaciones inéditas (Santiago: Editorial Sudamerica Chilena, 1999), pp. 99-102.
20. Juan Gabriel Valdés, Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School in Chile (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 153, 156, 175.
21. Judith A. Teichman, The Politics of Freeing Markets in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 70.
22. Interviews with three senior officials, Santiago, June 17, 19, 1996. The Chicago boys did not explicitly call for military rule, but they became increasingly open to an authoritarian solution.
23. Carlos Huneeus, "Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime: The ODEPLAN Boys and the Gremialistas in Pinochet's Chile," Journal of Latin American Studies, 32 (May 2000), 462-63.
24. Victor Osorio and Iván Cabezas, Los hijos de Pinochet (Santiago: Planeta, 1995), pp. 232, 284.
25. De Castro entered the new military administration as advisor to the economy minister in 1973. He served as economy minister and then, from 1976 to 1982, as finance minister.
26. Carlos Huneeus, El Régimen de Pinochet (Santiago: Editorial Sudamericana Chilena), pp. 390-401; Eduardo Silva, The State and Capital in Chile: Business Elites, Technocrats and Market Economics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. 102.
27. Carlos Huneeus, El Régimen de Pinochet (Santiago: Editorial Sudamericana Chilena), pp. 390-401; Eduardo Silva, The State and Capital in Chile: Business Elites, Technocrats and Market Economics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. 102.
28. Manuel Délano and Hugo Traslaviña, La herencia de los Chicago Boys (Santiago: Las Ediciones del Ornitorrinco, 1989), p. 45.
29. José Pinera, La revolución laboral en Chile (Santiago: Zig Zag, 1990), p 17; Veronica Monetecinos, Economists, Politics and the State: Chile 1958-1994 (Amsterdam: CEDLA, 1998), p. 32.
30. José Pinera, La revolución laboral en Chile (Santiago: Zig Zag, 1990), p 17; Veronica Monetecinos, Economists, Politics and the State: Chile 1958-1994 (Amsterdam: CEDLA, 1998), p. 32.
31. Argentina has had a long history in which key political actors (politicians, labor leaders) have made alliances with military leaders both to support particular policies and to engineer the overthrow of governments not to their liking. See Marcelo Cavarozzi, Autoritarismo y democracia, 1955-1996 (Buenos Aires: Compañía Editorial Calpe Argentina, 1997), p. 28.
32. Patricio Meller, The Unidad Popular and the Pinochet Dictatorship: A Political Economy Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), p. 84.
33. Valdés, pp. 29-30; Silva, p. 152.
34. Interview with senior official, Santiago, July 3, 1996.
35. Sergio Fernández, who served as both labor and interior minister under Pinochet, refers in his memoirs to the importance of Pinochet's commitment to market reform for its survival during "its most difficult hours." Sergio Fernandez, Mi lucha por la democracia (Santiago: Editorial Los Andes, 1994), p. 187.
36. Interview with senior government official, Santiago, June 17, 1996.
37. Huneeus, El régimen de Pinochet, pp. 140-41.
38. Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies: Chile under Pinochet (New York: Norton, 1991), pp. 60-61; Augusto Varas, "The Crisis of Legitimacy of Military Rule in the 80s," in Paul W. Drake and Iván Jaksić, eds., The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, rev. ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), p. 55.
39. Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies: Chile under Pinochet (New York: Norton, 1991), pp. 60-61; Augusto Varas, "The Crisis of Legitimacy of Military Rule in the 80s," in Paul W. Drake and Iván Jaksić, eds., The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, rev. ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), p. 55.
40. See Mónica Peralta Ramos, The Political Economy of Argentina: Power and Class since 1930 (Boulder: Westview Press: 1992), p. 76.
41. Interview with senior government official, Santiago, June 19, 1996. Huneeus, El Régimen de Pinochet, p. 509, suggests that Pinochet lost confidence in the Chicago boys. Arturo Fontaine Aldunate, Los Economistas y el Presidente Pinochet (Santiago: Empresa Editorial Zig-Zag, 1988), p. 154, also claims de Castro appointed his successor.
42. Interview with senior government official, Santiago, June 19, 1996. Huneeus, El Régimen de Pinochet, p. 509, suggests that Pinochet lost confidence in the Chicago boys. Arturo Fontaine Aldunate, Los Economistas y el Presidente Pinochet (Santiago: Empresa Editorial Zig-Zag, 1988), p. 154, also claims de Castro appointed his successor.
43. Meller, pp. 126, 136.
44. The description of events and actors in this section is drawn from interviews with two top advisors to one of the key actors in this process, Santiago, July 21, 1996, and with one senior World Bank official who was directly involved, Washington, D.C., April 21, 1998, and from OED, The World Bank, Program Performance Audit Report, First, Second and Third Structural Adjustment Loans (June 1990).
45. Although not a Chicago graduate, Büchi served as an advisor to de Castro in 1975 and went on to work on a variety of reform programs, including the labor and pension reforms.
46. Interviews with two senior government officials, Santiago, June 17, 19, 1996.
47. In general, the longer devaluation is delayed, the more rapidly confidence in a country's currency is undermined, and the more profound the drop in the currency is once devaluation is carried out.
48. Silva, p. 155; Teichman, p. 77.
49. Indeed, this close collusion between key policymakers of Pinochet's government and privatized companies continued even after the 1985 attempts to disperse ownership. Hector E. Schamis, Re-forming the State: The Politics of Privatization in Latin America and Europe (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002).
50. See, for example, Javier Corrales, "Why Argentines Followed Cavallo: A Technopol between Democracy and Economic Reform," in Javier Corrales, Technopols, Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin America (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 51.
51. Interviews with two senior Radical government officials, Buenos Aires, March 7, 30, 1995, and with one senior Peronist government official, March 30, 1995.
52. Interviews with senior Argentine government official, Buenos Aires, March 14, 1998, and with senior World Bank official, Washington, D.C., May 4, 1998.
53. Mariana Llanos, "Understanding Presidential Power in Argentina: A Study of Privatization in the 1990s," Journal of Latin American Studies, 33 (2001), 67-99.
54. Interview with senior Peronist government official, March 30, 1995. This point is confirmed by Domingo Cavallo, Pasión par crear: En diálogo con Juan Carlos de Pablo (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 2001), p. 152.
55. Ricardo Sidicaro, "Poder político, liberalismo economico y sectores populares en la Argentina," in Atilio Borón, Manuel Mora y Araujo, José Nun, Juan Carlos Portantiero, and Ricardo Sidicaro, Peronismo y Menemiso avatores del populismo en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Ediciones El Cielo por Asalto, 1995), p. 140.
56. Interview with two senior Peronist government officials, Buenos Aires, March 14, 28, 1995.
57. Gustave Blutman, "Orden y desorden en la reforma del estado argentino (1989-1994)," Ciclos, 4 (1994), 61.
58. See Christopher Larkins, "The Judiciary and Delegative Democracy in Argentina," Comparative Politics, 30 (July 1998), 432-36.
59. Of course, Argentine presidents are not likely to appoint political opponents to positions of power. The point is that personal loyalty outweighed all other considerations in appointments.
60. Roberto Pablo Saba and Luigi Manzetti, "Privatization in Argentina: The Implications for Corruption," Crime, Law and Social Change, 25 (1997).
61. Latin American Weekly Report, Mar. 1, 1990, p. 11.
62. Steven Levitsky, "Organization and Labor Based Party Adaptation: The Transformation of Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective," World Politics, 54 (October 2000), 27-56.
63. Luigi Manzetti, Institutions, Parties and Coalitions in Argentine Politics (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), p. 200.
64. Interviews with two senior government officials, Buenos Aires, March 14, 15, 1995.
65. Interviews with conglomerate executive and member of the executive board, Argentine Business Council, Buenos Aires, March 13, 1995, and with senior government official, Alfonsín's government, Buenos Aires, March 14, 1995.
66. See Sebastian Etchemendy, "Constructing Reform Coalitions: The Politics of Compensations in Argentina's Economic Liberalization," Latin American Politics and Society, 43 (Fall 2001).
67. Victoria Murillo, Labor Unions, Partisan Coalitions and Market Reforms in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge Unversity Press, 2001), pp. 152-62.
68. Interview with trade union leader, Buenos Aires, March 13, 1995.
69. Interview with trade union leader, Buenos Aires, March 21, 1995.
70. Cavallo, p. 152.
71. The plan pegged the peso to the US. dollar, requiring the Argentine central bank to buy the peso to keep it at par.
72. The discussion in this paragraph is taken from interviews with two senior Peronist government officials, Buenos Aires, March 15, 24, 1995.
73. As attested by virtually everyone (in congress, labor, and the private sector) who was asked about Domingo Cavallo.
74. El Clarin Internacional, Jan. 30-Feb. 5, 1996, p. 3.
75. Cavallo, pp. 160, 171.
76. Interview with economist and former Peronist activist, Buenos Aires, March 30, 1995.
77. Latin American Weekly Report, Nov. 26, 1992, p. 2.
78. Latin American Weekly Report, Nov. 19, 1991, p. 2.
79. Osvaldo Larrañaga J., "Ajuste macroeconomico y financas públicas, 1982-1988," Programa Postgrado de Economia ILADES/Georgetown University (June 1-22, 1992), p. 15.
80. "Latinobarometro Poll: An Alarm for Latin America's Democrats," The Economist, July 28-Aug 3, 2001, pp. 37-38. By 2001 over 80 percent of Argentines were dissatisfied with the way democracy was working in their country, and nearly 70 percent felt that the privatization of state companies had not been beneficial.