Design for optimized multi-lateral multi-commodity markets

European Journal of Operational Research

Volumn 163, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 503-529

  Bourbeau, Benoît ^a   Crainic, Teodor Gabriel ^b,c,e   Gendreau, Michel ^c,e   Robert, Jacques ^d,e  

^a INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN IMMUNOLOGY AND CANCER   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^c UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^d HEC MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^e CIRANO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Market design; Multi round auctions; Optimized multi lateral multi commodity markets

Indexed keywords

COSTS; INTERNET; MARKETING; OPERATIONS RESEARCH; OPTIMIZATION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; SALES;

COMPLEMENTARY COMMODITIES; MARKET DESIGN; MULTI-ROUND AUCTIONS; OPTIMIZED MULTI-LATERAL MULTI-COMMODITY MARKETS;

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

EID: 10044220874     PISSN: 03772217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2003.07.022     Document Type: Article

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