Shadow rates and multiple equilibria in the theory of currency crises

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 275-286

  Cavallari, Lilia ^a   Corsetti, Giancarlo ^b  

^a SAPIENZA UNIVERSITY OF ROME   (Italy)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Balance of payment crises; Devaluation; Fixed exchange rate; Multiple equilibria; Speculative attack

Indexed keywords

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS; EXCHANGE RATE; FINANCIAL CRISIS;

EID: 0033948243     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(99)00030-6     Document Type: Article

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