Monitoring and structure of debt contracts

Journal of Finance

Volumn 55, Issue 5, 2000, Pages 2157-2195

  Park, Cheol ^a  

^a HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039964962     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00283     Document Type: Article

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