Ancients, moderns and Americans: The republicanism-liberalism debate revisited

History of Political Thought

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 249-307

  Gibson, Alan ^a  

^a ST AMBROSE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0347603128     PISSN: 0143781X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (262)

1. Antipathy for the republicanism-liberalism debate has grown throughout the 1990s. Daniel Rodgers' important article 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', The Journal of American History, 79 (1992), pp. 11-38, reads like an obituary for the concept of republicanism and the republicanism-liberalism debate. See also the comments by Drew McCoy in 'Introduction', The Republican Synthesis Revisited: Essays in Honor of George Athan Bilias, ed. Milton M. Klein, Richard D. Brown and John B. Hench (Worcester, MA, 1992), p. 12; and Rogen Kersh, 'The Founding: Liberalism Redux Review of The Foundations of American Citizenship: Liberalism, the Constitution, and Civic Virtue by Richard Sinopoli', The Review of Politics, 55 (1993), p. 729.
2. Antipathy for the republicanism-liberalism debate has grown throughout the 1990s. Daniel Rodgers' important article 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', The Journal of American History, 79 (1992), pp. 11-38, reads like an obituary for the concept of republicanism and the republicanism-liberalism debate. See also the comments by Drew McCoy in 'Introduction', The Republican Synthesis Revisited: Essays in Honor of George Athan Bilias, ed. Milton M. Klein, Richard D. Brown and John B. Hench (Worcester, MA, 1992), p. 12; and Rogen Kersh, 'The Founding: Liberalism Redux Review of The Foundations of American Citizenship: Liberalism, the Constitution, and Civic Virtue by Richard Sinopoli', The Review of Politics, 55 (1993), p. 729.
3. Antipathy for the republicanism-liberalism debate has grown throughout the 1990s. Daniel Rodgers' important article 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', The Journal of American History, 79 (1992), pp. 11-38, reads like an obituary for the concept of republicanism and the republicanism-liberalism debate. See also the comments by Drew McCoy in 'Introduction', The Republican Synthesis Revisited: Essays in Honor of George Athan Bilias, ed. Milton M. Klein, Richard D. Brown and John B. Hench (Worcester, MA, 1992), p. 12; and Rogen Kersh, 'The Founding: Liberalism Redux Review of The Foundations of American Citizenship: Liberalism, the Constitution, and Civic Virtue by Richard Sinopoli', The Review of Politics, 55 (1993), p. 729.
4. Kersh, 'The Founding: Liberalism Redux', p. 729.
5. th Century England and America (Ithaca, NY, 1990); I. Kramnick, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 818; Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, KS, 1985); F. McDonald, 'The Intellectual World of the Founding Fathers', in Requiem: Variations on Eighteenth-Century Themes, ed. Forrest McDonald and Ellen Shapiro McDonald (Lawrence, KS, 1988), p. 9; John Murrin, 'Fundamental Values, the Founding Fathers, and the Constitution', in To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, ed. Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, VA, 1992), pp. 11-25; J.G.A. Pocock, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 817; Cass Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', The Yale Law Journal, 97 (1988), pp. 1539-90; Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 4-5; Gordon S. Wood, 'Afterword', in The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. Klein et al., pp. 143-51. For discussions of the movement within scholarship on the Founding to paradigmatic pluralism see Peter S. Onuf, 'Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective', The William and Mary Quarterly, 46 (1989), pp. 341-75; Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 35-7.
6. th Century England and America (Ithaca, NY, 1990); I. Kramnick, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 818; Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, KS, 1985); F. McDonald, 'The Intellectual World of the Founding Fathers', in Requiem: Variations on Eighteenth-Century Themes, ed. Forrest McDonald and Ellen Shapiro McDonald (Lawrence, KS, 1988), p. 9; John Murrin, 'Fundamental Values, the Founding Fathers, and the Constitution', in To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, ed. Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, VA, 1992), pp. 11-25; J.G.A. Pocock, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 817; Cass Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', The Yale Law Journal, 97 (1988), pp. 1539-90; Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 4-5; Gordon S. Wood, 'Afterword', in The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. Klein et al., pp. 143-51. For discussions of the movement within scholarship on the Founding to paradigmatic pluralism see Peter S. Onuf, 'Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective', The William and Mary Quarterly, 46 (1989), pp. 341-75; Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 35-7.
7. th Century England and America (Ithaca, NY, 1990); I. Kramnick, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 818; Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, KS, 1985); F. McDonald, 'The Intellectual World of the Founding Fathers', in Requiem: Variations on Eighteenth-Century Themes, ed. Forrest McDonald and Ellen Shapiro McDonald (Lawrence, KS, 1988), p. 9; John Murrin, 'Fundamental Values, the Founding Fathers, and the Constitution', in To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, ed. Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, VA, 1992), pp. 11-25; J.G.A. Pocock, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 817; Cass Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', The Yale Law Journal, 97 (1988), pp. 1539-90; Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 4-5; Gordon S. Wood, 'Afterword', in The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. Klein et al., pp. 143-51. For discussions of the movement within scholarship on the Founding to paradigmatic pluralism see Peter S. Onuf, 'Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective', The William and Mary Quarterly, 46 (1989), pp. 341-75; Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 35-7.
8. th Century England and America (Ithaca, NY, 1990); I. Kramnick, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 818; Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, KS, 1985); F. McDonald, 'The Intellectual World of the Founding Fathers', in Requiem: Variations on Eighteenth-Century Themes, ed. Forrest McDonald and Ellen Shapiro McDonald (Lawrence, KS, 1988), p. 9; John Murrin, 'Fundamental Values, the Founding Fathers, and the Constitution', in To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, ed. Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, VA, 1992), pp. 11-25; J.G.A. Pocock, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 817; Cass Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', The Yale Law Journal, 97 (1988), pp. 1539-90; Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 4-5; Gordon S. Wood, 'Afterword', in The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. Klein et al., pp. 143-51. For discussions of the movement within scholarship on the Founding to paradigmatic pluralism see Peter S. Onuf, 'Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective', The William and Mary Quarterly, 46 (1989), pp. 341-75; Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 35-7.
9. th Century England and America (Ithaca, NY, 1990); I. Kramnick, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 818; Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, KS, 1985); F. McDonald, 'The Intellectual World of the Founding Fathers', in Requiem: Variations on Eighteenth-Century Themes, ed. Forrest McDonald and Ellen Shapiro McDonald (Lawrence, KS, 1988), p. 9; John Murrin, 'Fundamental Values, the Founding Fathers, and the Constitution', in To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, ed. Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, VA, 1992), pp. 11-25; J.G.A. Pocock, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 817; Cass Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', The Yale Law Journal, 97 (1988), pp. 1539-90; Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 4-5; Gordon S. Wood, 'Afterword', in The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. Klein et al., pp. 143-51. For discussions of the movement within scholarship on the Founding to paradigmatic pluralism see Peter S. Onuf, 'Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective', The William and Mary Quarterly, 46 (1989), pp. 341-75; Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 35-7.
10. th Century England and America (Ithaca, NY, 1990); I. Kramnick, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 818; Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, KS, 1985); F. McDonald, 'The Intellectual World of the Founding Fathers', in Requiem: Variations on Eighteenth-Century Themes, ed. Forrest McDonald and Ellen Shapiro McDonald (Lawrence, KS, 1988), p. 9; John Murrin, 'Fundamental Values, the Founding Fathers, and the Constitution', in To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, ed. Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, VA, 1992), pp. 11-25; J.G.A. Pocock, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 817; Cass Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', The Yale Law Journal, 97 (1988), pp. 1539-90; Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 4-5; Gordon S. Wood, 'Afterword', in The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. Klein et al., pp. 143-51. For discussions of the movement within scholarship on the Founding to paradigmatic pluralism see Peter S. Onuf, 'Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective', The William and Mary Quarterly, 46 (1989), pp. 341-75; Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 35-7.
11. th Century England and America (Ithaca, NY, 1990); I. Kramnick, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 818; Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, KS, 1985); F. McDonald, 'The Intellectual World of the Founding Fathers', in Requiem: Variations on Eighteenth-Century Themes, ed. Forrest McDonald and Ellen Shapiro McDonald (Lawrence, KS, 1988), p. 9; John Murrin, 'Fundamental Values, the Founding Fathers, and the Constitution', in To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, ed. Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, VA, 1992), pp. 11-25; J.G.A. Pocock, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 817; Cass Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', The Yale Law Journal, 97 (1988), pp. 1539-90; Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 4-5; Gordon S. Wood, 'Afterword', in The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. Klein et al., pp. 143-51. For discussions of the movement within scholarship on the Founding to paradigmatic pluralism see Peter S. Onuf, 'Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective', The William and Mary Quarterly, 46 (1989), pp. 341-75; Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 35-7.
12. th Century England and America (Ithaca, NY, 1990); I. Kramnick, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 818; Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, KS, 1985); F. McDonald, 'The Intellectual World of the Founding Fathers', in Requiem: Variations on Eighteenth-Century Themes, ed. Forrest McDonald and Ellen Shapiro McDonald (Lawrence, KS, 1988), p. 9; John Murrin, 'Fundamental Values, the Founding Fathers, and the Constitution', in To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, ed. Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, VA, 1992), pp. 11-25; J.G.A. Pocock, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 817; Cass Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', The Yale Law Journal, 97 (1988), pp. 1539-90; Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 4-5; Gordon S. Wood, 'Afterword', in The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. Klein et al., pp. 143-51. For discussions of the movement within scholarship on the Founding to paradigmatic pluralism see Peter S. Onuf, 'Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective', The William and Mary Quarterly, 46 (1989), pp. 341-75; Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 35-7.
13. th Century England and America (Ithaca, NY, 1990); I. Kramnick, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 818; Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, KS, 1985); F. McDonald, 'The Intellectual World of the Founding Fathers', in Requiem: Variations on Eighteenth-Century Themes, ed. Forrest McDonald and Ellen Shapiro McDonald (Lawrence, KS, 1988), p. 9; John Murrin, 'Fundamental Values, the Founding Fathers, and the Constitution', in To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, ed. Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, VA, 1992), pp. 11-25; J.G.A. Pocock, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 817; Cass Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', The Yale Law Journal, 97 (1988), pp. 1539-90; Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 4-5; Gordon S. Wood, 'Afterword', in The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. Klein et al., pp. 143-51. For discussions of the movement within scholarship on the Founding to paradigmatic pluralism see Peter S. Onuf, 'Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective', The William and Mary Quarterly, 46 (1989), pp. 341-75; Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 35-7.
14. th Century England and America (Ithaca, NY, 1990); I. Kramnick, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 818; Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, KS, 1985); F. McDonald, 'The Intellectual World of the Founding Fathers', in Requiem: Variations on Eighteenth-Century Themes, ed. Forrest McDonald and Ellen Shapiro McDonald (Lawrence, KS, 1988), p. 9; John Murrin, 'Fundamental Values, the Founding Fathers, and the Constitution', in To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, ed. Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, VA, 1992), pp. 11-25; J.G.A. Pocock, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 817; Cass Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', The Yale Law Journal, 97 (1988), pp. 1539-90; Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 4-5; Gordon S. Wood, 'Afterword', in The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. Klein et al., pp. 143-51. For discussions of the movement within scholarship on the Founding to paradigmatic pluralism see Peter S. Onuf, 'Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective', The William and Mary Quarterly, 46 (1989), pp. 341-75; Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 35-7.
15. th Century England and America (Ithaca, NY, 1990); I. Kramnick, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 818; Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, KS, 1985); F. McDonald, 'The Intellectual World of the Founding Fathers', in Requiem: Variations on Eighteenth-Century Themes, ed. Forrest McDonald and Ellen Shapiro McDonald (Lawrence, KS, 1988), p. 9; John Murrin, 'Fundamental Values, the Founding Fathers, and the Constitution', in To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, ed. Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, VA, 1992), pp. 11-25; J.G.A. Pocock, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 817; Cass Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', The Yale Law Journal, 97 (1988), pp. 1539-90; Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 4-5; Gordon S. Wood, 'Afterword', in The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. Klein et al., pp. 143-51. For discussions of the movement within scholarship on the Founding to paradigmatic pluralism see Peter S. Onuf, 'Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective', The William and Mary Quarterly, 46 (1989), pp. 341-75; Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 35-7.
16. th Century England and America (Ithaca, NY, 1990); I. Kramnick, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 818; Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, KS, 1985); F. McDonald, 'The Intellectual World of the Founding Fathers', in Requiem: Variations on Eighteenth-Century Themes, ed. Forrest McDonald and Ellen Shapiro McDonald (Lawrence, KS, 1988), p. 9; John Murrin, 'Fundamental Values, the Founding Fathers, and the Constitution', in To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, ed. Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, VA, 1992), pp. 11-25; J.G.A. Pocock, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 817; Cass Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', The Yale Law Journal, 97 (1988), pp. 1539-90; Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 4-5; Gordon S. Wood, 'Afterword', in The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. Klein et al., pp. 143-51. For discussions of the movement within scholarship on the Founding to paradigmatic pluralism see Peter S. Onuf, 'Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective', The William and Mary Quarterly, 46 (1989), pp. 341-75; Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 35-7.
17. th Century England and America (Ithaca, NY, 1990); I. Kramnick, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 818; Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, KS, 1985); F. McDonald, 'The Intellectual World of the Founding Fathers', in Requiem: Variations on Eighteenth-Century Themes, ed. Forrest McDonald and Ellen Shapiro McDonald (Lawrence, KS, 1988), p. 9; John Murrin, 'Fundamental Values, the Founding Fathers, and the Constitution', in To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, ed. Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, VA, 1992), pp. 11-25; J.G.A. Pocock, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 817; Cass Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', The Yale Law Journal, 97 (1988), pp. 1539-90; Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 4-5; Gordon S. Wood, 'Afterword', in The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. Klein et al., pp. 143-51. For discussions of the movement within scholarship on the Founding to paradigmatic pluralism see Peter S. Onuf, 'Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective', The William and Mary Quarterly, 46 (1989), pp. 341-75; Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 35-7.
18. th Century England and America (Ithaca, NY, 1990); I. Kramnick, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 818; Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, KS, 1985); F. McDonald, 'The Intellectual World of the Founding Fathers', in Requiem: Variations on Eighteenth-Century Themes, ed. Forrest McDonald and Ellen Shapiro McDonald (Lawrence, KS, 1988), p. 9; John Murrin, 'Fundamental Values, the Founding Fathers, and the Constitution', in To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, ed. Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, VA, 1992), pp. 11-25; J.G.A. Pocock, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 817; Cass Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', The Yale Law Journal, 97 (1988), pp. 1539-90; Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 4-5; Gordon S. Wood, 'Afterword', in The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. Klein et al., pp. 143-51. For discussions of the movement within scholarship on the Founding to paradigmatic pluralism see Peter S. Onuf, 'Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective', The William and Mary Quarterly, 46 (1989), pp. 341-75; Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 35-7.
19. th Century England and America (Ithaca, NY, 1990); I. Kramnick, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 818; Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, KS, 1985); F. McDonald, 'The Intellectual World of the Founding Fathers', in Requiem: Variations on Eighteenth-Century Themes, ed. Forrest McDonald and Ellen Shapiro McDonald (Lawrence, KS, 1988), p. 9; John Murrin, 'Fundamental Values, the Founding Fathers, and the Constitution', in To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, ed. Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, VA, 1992), pp. 11-25; J.G.A. Pocock, 'Communications', The William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), p. 817; Cass Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', The Yale Law Journal, 97 (1988), pp. 1539-90; Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 4-5; Gordon S. Wood, 'Afterword', in The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. Klein et al., pp. 143-51. For discussions of the movement within scholarship on the Founding to paradigmatic pluralism see Peter S. Onuf, 'Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective', The William and Mary Quarterly, 46 (1989), pp. 341-75; Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 35-7.
20. Michael Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic: Studies in the Foundation of the American Political Tradition (Notre Dame, IN, 1996), p. 209. Banning's 1986 article 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited' was central in catapulting the debate over the intellectual origins of the American republic out of the 'either republicanism or liberalism' phase and into its current configuration in which scholars are trying to determine the way in which liberalism, republicanism, and perhaps other intellectual traditions were related to each other. Lance Banning, 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic', The William and Mary Quarterly, 42 (1987), pp. 11-19. See also L. Banning, 'Quid Transit? Paradigms and Process in the Transformation of Republican Ideas', Reviews in American History, 17 (1989), pp. 199-204; and L. Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', in The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. Klein et al., pp. 91-117.
21. Michael Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic: Studies in the Foundation of the American Political Tradition (Notre Dame, IN, 1996), p. 209. Banning's 1986 article 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited' was central in catapulting the debate over the intellectual origins of the American republic out of the 'either republicanism or liberalism' phase and into its current configuration in which scholars are trying to determine the way in which liberalism, republicanism, and perhaps other intellectual traditions were related to each other. Lance Banning, 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic', The William and Mary Quarterly, 42 (1987), pp. 11-19. See also L. Banning, 'Quid Transit? Paradigms and Process in the Transformation of Republican Ideas', Reviews in American History, 17 (1989), pp. 199-204; and L. Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', in The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. Klein et al., pp. 91-117.
22. Michael Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic: Studies in the Foundation of the American Political Tradition (Notre Dame, IN, 1996), p. 209. Banning's 1986 article 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited' was central in catapulting the debate over the intellectual origins of the American republic out of the 'either republicanism or liberalism' phase and into its current configuration in which scholars are trying to determine the way in which liberalism, republicanism, and perhaps other intellectual traditions were related to each other. Lance Banning, 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic', The William and Mary Quarterly, 42 (1987), pp. 11-19. See also L. Banning, 'Quid Transit? Paradigms and Process in the Transformation of Republican Ideas', Reviews in American History, 17 (1989), pp. 199-204; and L. Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', in The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. Klein et al., pp. 91-117.
23. Michael Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic: Studies in the Foundation of the American Political Tradition (Notre Dame, IN, 1996), p. 209. Banning's 1986 article 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited' was central in catapulting the debate over the intellectual origins of the American republic out of the 'either republicanism or liberalism' phase and into its current configuration in which scholars are trying to determine the way in which liberalism, republicanism, and perhaps other intellectual traditions were related to each other. Lance Banning, 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic', The William and Mary Quarterly, 42 (1987), pp. 11-19. See also L. Banning, 'Quid Transit? Paradigms and Process in the Transformation of Republican Ideas', Reviews in American History, 17 (1989), pp. 199-204; and L. Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', in The Republican Synthesis Revisited, ed. Klein et al., pp. 91-117.
24. James T. Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse', Journal of American History, 74 (1987), p. 11. Interpretations that ignore the diversity of intellectual traditions present in the American Founding are often deterministic and question-begging and have been presented by scholars on both sides of this debate. Pocock, for example, has argued that to understand the eighteenth century fully we must trace out the persistence of civic humanism. He has then simply ignored - cast out of vision - central documents, such as the Declaration of Independence, that illustrate the importance of the social contract-natural rights tradition. Moreover, as Joyce Appleby has most persistently charged, the republican revisionists have been guilty of determinism, in particular by fastening on to a mode of interpretation that is unable to take into account the numerous changes in social practice and ideology that were taking place in the eighteenth century. In the initial stages of this debate at least, the republican revisionists were too quick to say that the Founders were locked into a conceptual world of classical republican language that precluded the development and use of other political languages. Similarly, Thomas Pangle, Paul Rahe, and before them Martin Diamond have interpreted the Founders' political thought as a species of the 'New Science of Politics' of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke. They have then ignored or presented perverse interpretations of important dimensions of the Founders' political thought that challenge this reading, especially Jeffersonian political economy. For the tendency of the republican revisionists to ignore the Declaration of Independence and the natural rights tradition see Scott Gerber, 'What Ever Happened to the Declaration? A Commentary on the Republican Revisionism in the Political Thought of the American Revolution', Polity, 26 (1993), pp. 207-31; and Gerber, To Secure These Rights (New York, 1995), esp. pp. 19-56. For the deterministic tendencies of the republican revisionists' methodology see Joyce Appleby, 'Republicanism in Old and New Contexts', The William and Mary Quarterly, 43 (1986), pp. 26-31. See Eugene Miller, 'What Publius Says About Interest', The Political Science Reviewer, 19 (1990), pp. 20-1, for warnings about how interpreting the political thought of the Founders through the lens of the 'New Science of Politics' can lead to interpretations that take for granted what they are designed to prove. The reductionism of Rahe, Pangle and Diamond's interpretations of Jeffersonian political economy can be grasped by comparing Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent' and 'Ethics and Politics', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit: Essays by Martin Diamond, ed. William A. Schambra (Washington, 1992), esp. pp. 31-5, 337-68; Diamond, The Founding of the Democratic Republic (Itasca, IL, 1981), pp. 71-8; Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago, 1988), pp. 98-104; and Paul Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC, & London, 1992), pp. 726-47, with McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, NC, 1980), pp. 120-35. See also Alan Gibson, 'The Commercial Republic and the Pluralist Critique of Marxism: An Analysis of Martin Diamond's Interpretation of Federalist 10', Polity, 25 (1993), pp. 521-8. For the way in which paradigms of interpretation change because scholars have identified a new set of problems as central, not necessarily because new paradigms envelop old ones and provide a more comprehensive interpretation of the facts, see Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 11-12.
25. James T. Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse', Journal of American History, 74 (1987), p. 11. Interpretations that ignore the diversity of intellectual traditions present in the American Founding are often deterministic and question-begging and have been presented by scholars on both sides of this debate. Pocock, for example, has argued that to understand the eighteenth century fully we must trace out the persistence of civic humanism. He has then simply ignored - cast out of vision - central documents, such as the Declaration of Independence, that illustrate the importance of the social contract-natural rights tradition. Moreover, as Joyce Appleby has most persistently charged, the republican revisionists have been guilty of determinism, in particular by fastening on to a mode of interpretation that is unable to take into account the numerous changes in social practice and ideology that were taking place in the eighteenth century. In the initial stages of this debate at least, the republican revisionists were too quick to say that the Founders were locked into a conceptual world of classical republican language that precluded the development and use of other political languages. Similarly, Thomas Pangle, Paul Rahe, and before them Martin Diamond have interpreted the Founders' political thought as a species of the 'New Science of Politics' of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke. They have then ignored or presented perverse interpretations of important dimensions of the Founders' political thought that challenge this reading, especially Jeffersonian political economy. For the tendency of the republican revisionists to ignore the Declaration of Independence and the natural rights tradition see Scott Gerber, 'What Ever Happened to the Declaration? A Commentary on the Republican Revisionism in the Political Thought of the American Revolution', Polity, 26 (1993), pp. 207-31; and Gerber, To Secure These Rights (New York, 1995), esp. pp. 19-56. For the deterministic tendencies of the republican revisionists' methodology see Joyce Appleby, 'Republicanism in Old and New Contexts', The William and Mary Quarterly, 43 (1986), pp. 26-31. See Eugene Miller, 'What Publius Says About Interest', The Political Science Reviewer, 19 (1990), pp. 20-1, for warnings about how interpreting the political thought of the Founders through the lens of the 'New Science of Politics' can lead to interpretations that take for granted what they are designed to prove. The reductionism of Rahe, Pangle and Diamond's interpretations of Jeffersonian political economy can be grasped by comparing Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent' and 'Ethics and Politics', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit: Essays by Martin Diamond, ed. William A. Schambra (Washington, 1992), esp. pp. 31-5, 337-68; Diamond, The Founding of the Democratic Republic (Itasca, IL, 1981), pp. 71-8; Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago, 1988), pp. 98-104; and Paul Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC, & London, 1992), pp. 726-47, with McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, NC, 1980), pp. 120-35. See also Alan Gibson, 'The Commercial Republic and the Pluralist Critique of Marxism: An Analysis of Martin Diamond's Interpretation of Federalist 10', Polity, 25 (1993), pp. 521-8. For the way in which paradigms of interpretation change because scholars have identified a new set of problems as central, not necessarily because new paradigms envelop old ones and provide a more comprehensive interpretation of the facts, see Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 11-12.
26. James T. Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse', Journal of American History, 74 (1987), p. 11. Interpretations that ignore the diversity of intellectual traditions present in the American Founding are often deterministic and question-begging and have been presented by scholars on both sides of this debate. Pocock, for example, has argued that to understand the eighteenth century fully we must trace out the persistence of civic humanism. He has then simply ignored - cast out of vision - central documents, such as the Declaration of Independence, that illustrate the importance of the social contract-natural rights tradition. Moreover, as Joyce Appleby has most persistently charged, the republican revisionists have been guilty of determinism, in particular by fastening on to a mode of interpretation that is unable to take into account the numerous changes in social practice and ideology that were taking place in the eighteenth century. In the initial stages of this debate at least, the republican revisionists were too quick to say that the Founders were locked into a conceptual world of classical republican language that precluded the development and use of other political languages. Similarly, Thomas Pangle, Paul Rahe, and before them Martin Diamond have interpreted the Founders' political thought as a species of the 'New Science of Politics' of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke. They have then ignored or presented perverse interpretations of important dimensions of the Founders' political thought that challenge this reading, especially Jeffersonian political economy. For the tendency of the republican revisionists to ignore the Declaration of Independence and the natural rights tradition see Scott Gerber, 'What Ever Happened to the Declaration? A Commentary on the Republican Revisionism in the Political Thought of the American Revolution', Polity, 26 (1993), pp. 207-31; and Gerber, To Secure These Rights (New York, 1995), esp. pp. 19-56. For the deterministic tendencies of the republican revisionists' methodology see Joyce Appleby, 'Republicanism in Old and New Contexts', The William and Mary Quarterly, 43 (1986), pp. 26-31. See Eugene Miller, 'What Publius Says About Interest', The Political Science Reviewer, 19 (1990), pp. 20-1, for warnings about how interpreting the political thought of the Founders through the lens of the 'New Science of Politics' can lead to interpretations that take for granted what they are designed to prove. The reductionism of Rahe, Pangle and Diamond's interpretations of Jeffersonian political economy can be grasped by comparing Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent' and 'Ethics and Politics', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit: Essays by Martin Diamond, ed. William A. Schambra (Washington, 1992), esp. pp. 31-5, 337-68; Diamond, The Founding of the Democratic Republic (Itasca, IL, 1981), pp. 71-8; Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago, 1988), pp. 98-104; and Paul Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC, & London, 1992), pp. 726-47, with McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, NC, 1980), pp. 120-35. See also Alan Gibson, 'The Commercial Republic and the Pluralist Critique of Marxism: An Analysis of Martin Diamond's Interpretation of Federalist 10', Polity, 25 (1993), pp. 521-8. For the way in which paradigms of interpretation change because scholars have identified a new set of problems as central, not necessarily because new paradigms envelop old ones and provide a more comprehensive interpretation of the facts, see Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 11-12.
27. James T. Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse', Journal of American History, 74 (1987), p. 11. Interpretations that ignore the diversity of intellectual traditions present in the American Founding are often deterministic and question-begging and have been presented by scholars on both sides of this debate. Pocock, for example, has argued that to understand the eighteenth century fully we must trace out the persistence of civic humanism. He has then simply ignored - cast out of vision - central documents, such as the Declaration of Independence, that illustrate the importance of the social contract-natural rights tradition. Moreover, as Joyce Appleby has most persistently charged, the republican revisionists have been guilty of determinism, in particular by fastening on to a mode of interpretation that is unable to take into account the numerous changes in social practice and ideology that were taking place in the eighteenth century. In the initial stages of this debate at least, the republican revisionists were too quick to say that the Founders were locked into a conceptual world of classical republican language that precluded the development and use of other political languages. Similarly, Thomas Pangle, Paul Rahe, and before them Martin Diamond have interpreted the Founders' political thought as a species of the 'New Science of Politics' of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke. They have then ignored or presented perverse interpretations of important dimensions of the Founders' political thought that challenge this reading, especially Jeffersonian political economy. For the tendency of the republican revisionists to ignore the Declaration of Independence and the natural rights tradition see Scott Gerber, 'What Ever Happened to the Declaration? A Commentary on the Republican Revisionism in the Political Thought of the American Revolution', Polity, 26 (1993), pp. 207-31; and Gerber, To Secure These Rights (New York, 1995), esp. pp. 19-56. For the deterministic tendencies of the republican revisionists' methodology see Joyce Appleby, 'Republicanism in Old and New Contexts', The William and Mary Quarterly, 43 (1986), pp. 26-31. See Eugene Miller, 'What Publius Says About Interest', The Political Science Reviewer, 19 (1990), pp. 20-1, for warnings about how interpreting the political thought of the Founders through the lens of the 'New Science of Politics' can lead to interpretations that take for granted what they are designed to prove. The reductionism of Rahe, Pangle and Diamond's interpretations of Jeffersonian political economy can be grasped by comparing Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent' and 'Ethics and Politics', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit: Essays by Martin Diamond, ed. William A. Schambra (Washington, 1992), esp. pp. 31-5, 337-68; Diamond, The Founding of the Democratic Republic (Itasca, IL, 1981), pp. 71-8; Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago, 1988), pp. 98-104; and Paul Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC, & London, 1992), pp. 726-47, with McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, NC, 1980), pp. 120-35. See also Alan Gibson, 'The Commercial Republic and the Pluralist Critique of Marxism: An Analysis of Martin Diamond's Interpretation of Federalist 10', Polity, 25 (1993), pp. 521-8. For the way in which paradigms of interpretation change because scholars have identified a new set of problems as central, not necessarily because new paradigms envelop old ones and provide a more comprehensive interpretation of the facts, see Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 11-12.
28. James T. Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse', Journal of American History, 74 (1987), p. 11. Interpretations that ignore the diversity of intellectual traditions present in the American Founding are often deterministic and question-begging and have been presented by scholars on both sides of this debate. Pocock, for example, has argued that to understand the eighteenth century fully we must trace out the persistence of civic humanism. He has then simply ignored - cast out of vision - central documents, such as the Declaration of Independence, that illustrate the importance of the social contract-natural rights tradition. Moreover, as Joyce Appleby has most persistently charged, the republican revisionists have been guilty of determinism, in particular by fastening on to a mode of interpretation that is unable to take into account the numerous changes in social practice and ideology that were taking place in the eighteenth century. In the initial stages of this debate at least, the republican revisionists were too quick to say that the Founders were locked into a conceptual world of classical republican language that precluded the development and use of other political languages. Similarly, Thomas Pangle, Paul Rahe, and before them Martin Diamond have interpreted the Founders' political thought as a species of the 'New Science of Politics' of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke. They have then ignored or presented perverse interpretations of important dimensions of the Founders' political thought that challenge this reading, especially Jeffersonian political economy. For the tendency of the republican revisionists to ignore the Declaration of Independence and the natural rights tradition see Scott Gerber, 'What Ever Happened to the Declaration? A Commentary on the Republican Revisionism in the Political Thought of the American Revolution', Polity, 26 (1993), pp. 207-31; and Gerber, To Secure These Rights (New York, 1995), esp. pp. 19-56. For the deterministic tendencies of the republican revisionists' methodology see Joyce Appleby, 'Republicanism in Old and New Contexts', The William and Mary Quarterly, 43 (1986), pp. 26-31. See Eugene Miller, 'What Publius Says About Interest', The Political Science Reviewer, 19 (1990), pp. 20-1, for warnings about how interpreting the political thought of the Founders through the lens of the 'New Science of Politics' can lead to interpretations that take for granted what they are designed to prove. The reductionism of Rahe, Pangle and Diamond's interpretations of Jeffersonian political economy can be grasped by comparing Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent' and 'Ethics and Politics', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit: Essays by Martin Diamond, ed. William A. Schambra (Washington, 1992), esp. pp. 31-5, 337-68; Diamond, The Founding of the Democratic Republic (Itasca, IL, 1981), pp. 71-8; Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago, 1988), pp. 98-104; and Paul Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC, & London, 1992), pp. 726-47, with McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, NC, 1980), pp. 120-35. See also Alan Gibson, 'The Commercial Republic and the Pluralist Critique of Marxism: An Analysis of Martin Diamond's Interpretation of Federalist 10', Polity, 25 (1993), pp. 521-8. For the way in which paradigms of interpretation change because scholars have identified a new set of problems as central, not necessarily because new paradigms envelop old ones and provide a more comprehensive interpretation of the facts, see Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 11-12.
29. James T. Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse', Journal of American History, 74 (1987), p. 11. Interpretations that ignore the diversity of intellectual traditions present in the American Founding are often deterministic and question-begging and have been presented by scholars on both sides of this debate. Pocock, for example, has argued that to understand the eighteenth century fully we must trace out the persistence of civic humanism. He has then simply ignored - cast out of vision - central documents, such as the Declaration of Independence, that illustrate the importance of the social contract-natural rights tradition. Moreover, as Joyce Appleby has most persistently charged, the republican revisionists have been guilty of determinism, in particular by fastening on to a mode of interpretation that is unable to take into account the numerous changes in social practice and ideology that were taking place in the eighteenth century. In the initial stages of this debate at least, the republican revisionists were too quick to say that the Founders were locked into a conceptual world of classical republican language that precluded the development and use of other political languages. Similarly, Thomas Pangle, Paul Rahe, and before them Martin Diamond have interpreted the Founders' political
30. James T. Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse', Journal of American History, 74 (1987), p. 11. Interpretations that ignore the diversity of intellectual traditions present in the American Founding are often deterministic and question-begging and have been presented by scholars on both sides of this debate. Pocock, for example, has argued that to understand the eighteenth century fully we must trace out the persistence of civic humanism. He has then simply ignored - cast out of vision - central documents, such as the Declaration of Independence, that illustrate the importance of the social contract-natural rights tradition. Moreover, as Joyce Appleby has most persistently charged, the republican revisionists have been guilty of determinism, in particular by fastening on to a mode of interpretation that is unable to take into account the numerous changes in social practice and ideology that were taking place in the eighteenth century. In the initial stages of this debate at least, the republican revisionists were too quick to say that the Founders were locked into a conceptual world of classical republican language that precluded the development and use of other political languages. Similarly, Thomas Pangle, Paul Rahe, and before them Martin Diamond have interpreted the Founders' political thought as a species of the 'New Science of Politics' of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke. They have then ignored or presented perverse interpretations of important dimensions of the Founders' political thought that challenge this reading, especially Jeffersonian political economy. For the tendency of the republican revisionists to ignore the Declaration of Independence and the natural rights tradition see Scott Gerber, 'What Ever Happened to the Declaration? A Commentary on the Republican Revisionism in the Political Thought of the American Revolution', Polity, 26 (1993), pp. 207-31; and Gerber, To Secure These Rights (New York, 1995), esp. pp. 19-56. For the deterministic tendencies of the republican revisionists' methodology see Joyce Appleby, 'Republicanism in Old and New Contexts', The William and Mary Quarterly, 43 (1986), pp. 26-31. See Eugene Miller, 'What Publius Says About Interest', The Political Science Reviewer, 19 (1990), pp. 20-1, for warnings about how interpreting the political thought of the Founders through the lens of the 'New Science of Politics' can lead to interpretations that take for granted what they are designed to prove. The reductionism of Rahe, Pangle and Diamond's interpretations of Jeffersonian political economy can be grasped by comparing Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent' and 'Ethics and Politics', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit: Essays by Martin Diamond, ed. William A. Schambra (Washington, 1992), esp. pp. 31-5, 337-68; Diamond, The Founding of the Democratic Republic (Itasca, IL, 1981), pp. 71-8; Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago, 1988), pp. 98-104; and Paul Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC, & London, 1992), pp. 726-47, with McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, NC, 1980), pp. 120-35. See also Alan Gibson, 'The Commercial Republic and the Pluralist Critique of Marxism: An Analysis of Martin Diamond's Interpretation of Federalist 10', Polity, 25 (1993), pp. 521-8. For the way in which paradigms of interpretation change because scholars have identified a new set of problems as central, not necessarily because new paradigms envelop old ones and provide a more comprehensive interpretation of the facts, see Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 11-12.
31. James T. Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse', Journal of American History, 74 (1987), p. 11. Interpretations that ignore the diversity of intellectual traditions present in the American Founding are often deterministic and question-begging and have been presented by scholars on both sides of this debate. Pocock, for example, has argued that to understand the eighteenth century fully we must trace out the persistence of civic humanism. He has then simply ignored - cast out of vision - central documents, such as the Declaration of Independence, that illustrate the importance of the social contract-natural rights tradition. Moreover, as Joyce Appleby has most persistently charged, the republican revisionists have been guilty of determinism, in particular by fastening on to a mode of interpretation that is unable to take into account the numerous changes in social practice and ideology that were taking place in the eighteenth century. In the initial stages of this debate at least, the republican revisionists were too quick to say that the Founders were locked into a conceptual world of classical republican language that precluded the development and use of other political languages. Similarly, Thomas Pangle, Paul Rahe, and before them Martin Diamond have interpreted the Founders' political thought as a species of the 'New Science of Politics' of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke. They have then ignored or presented perverse interpretations of important dimensions of the Founders' political thought that challenge this reading, especially Jeffersonian political economy. For the tendency of the republican revisionists to ignore the Declaration of Independence and the natural rights tradition see Scott Gerber, 'What Ever Happened to the Declaration? A Commentary on the Republican Revisionism in the Political Thought of the American Revolution', Polity, 26 (1993), pp. 207-31; and Gerber, To Secure These Rights (New York, 1995), esp. pp. 19-56. For the deterministic tendencies of the republican revisionists' methodology see Joyce Appleby, 'Republicanism in Old and New Contexts', The William and Mary Quarterly, 43 (1986), pp. 26-31. See Eugene Miller, 'What Publius Says About Interest', The Political Science Reviewer, 19 (1990), pp. 20-1, for warnings about how interpreting the political thought of the Founders through the lens of the 'New Science of Politics' can lead to interpretations that take for granted what they are designed to prove. The reductionism of Rahe, Pangle and Diamond's interpretations of Jeffersonian political economy can be grasped by comparing Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent' and 'Ethics and Politics', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit: Essays by Martin Diamond, ed. William A. Schambra (Washington, 1992), esp. pp. 31-5, 337-68; Diamond, The Founding of the Democratic Republic (Itasca, IL, 1981), pp. 71-8; Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago, 1988), pp. 98-104; and Paul Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC, & London, 1992), pp. 726-47, with McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, NC, 1980), pp. 120-35. See also Alan Gibson, 'The Commercial Republic and the Pluralist Critique of Marxism: An Analysis of Martin Diamond's Interpretation of Federalist 10', Polity, 25 (1993), pp. 521-8. For the way in which paradigms of interpretation change because scholars have identified a new set of problems as central, not necessarily because new paradigms envelop old ones and provide a more comprehensive interpretation of the facts, see Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 11-12.
32. James T. Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse', Journal of American History, 74 (1987), p. 11. Interpretations that ignore the diversity of intellectual traditions present in the American Founding are often deterministic and question-begging and have been presented by scholars on both sides of this debate. Pocock, for example, has argued that to understand the eighteenth century fully we must trace out the persistence of civic humanism. He has then simply ignored - cast out of vision - central documents, such as the Declaration of Independence, that illustrate the importance of the social contract-natural rights tradition. Moreover, as Joyce Appleby has most persistently charged, the republican revisionists have been guilty of determinism, in particular by fastening on to a mode of interpretation that is unable to take into account the numerous changes in social practice and ideology that were taking place in the eighteenth century. In the initial stages of this debate at least, the republican revisionists were too quick to say that the Founders were locked into a conceptual world of classical republican language that precluded the development and use of other political languages. Similarly, Thomas Pangle, Paul Rahe, and before them Martin Diamond have interpreted the Founders' political thought as a species of the 'New Science of Politics' of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke. They have then ignored or presented perverse interpretations of important dimensions of the Founders' political thought that challenge this reading, especially Jeffersonian political economy. For the tendency of the republican revisionists to ignore the Declaration of Independence and the natural rights tradition see Scott Gerber, 'What Ever Happened to the Declaration? A Commentary on the Republican Revisionism in the Political Thought of the American Revolution', Polity, 26 (1993), pp. 207-31; and Gerber, To Secure These Rights (New York, 1995), esp. pp. 19-56. For the deterministic tendencies of the republican revisionists' methodology see Joyce Appleby, 'Republicanism in Old and New Contexts', The William and Mary Quarterly, 43 (1986), pp. 26-31. See Eugene Miller, 'What Publius Says About Interest', The Political Science Reviewer, 19 (1990), pp. 20-1, for warnings about how interpreting the political thought of the Founders through the lens of the 'New Science of Politics' can lead to interpretations that take for granted what they are designed to prove. The reductionism of Rahe, Pangle and Diamond's interpretations of Jeffersonian political economy can be grasped by comparing Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent' and 'Ethics and Politics', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit: Essays by Martin Diamond, ed. William A. Schambra (Washington, 1992), esp. pp. 31-5, 337-68; Diamond, The Founding of the Democratic Republic (Itasca, IL, 1981), pp. 71-8; Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago, 1988), pp. 98-104; and Paul Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC, & London, 1992), pp. 726-47, with McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, NC, 1980), pp. 120-35. See also Alan Gibson, 'The Commercial Republic and the Pluralist Critique of Marxism: An Analysis of Martin Diamond's Interpretation of Federalist 10', Polity, 25 (1993), pp. 521-8. For the way in which paradigms of interpretation change because scholars have identified a new set of problems as central, not necessarily because new paradigms envelop old ones and provide a more comprehensive interpretation of the facts, see Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 11-12.
33. James T. Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse', Journal of American History, 74 (1987), p. 11. Interpretations that ignore the diversity of intellectual traditions present in the American Founding are often deterministic and question-begging and have been presented by scholars on both sides of this debate. Pocock, for example, has argued that to understand the eighteenth century fully we must trace out the persistence of civic humanism. He has then simply ignored - cast out of vision - central documents, such as the Declaration of Independence, that illustrate the importance of the social contract-natural rights tradition. Moreover, as Joyce Appleby has most persistently charged, the republican revisionists have been guilty of determinism, in particular by fastening on to a mode of interpretation that is unable to take into account the numerous changes in social practice and ideology that were taking place in the eighteenth century. In the initial stages of this debate at least, the republican revisionists were too quick to say that the Founders were locked into a conceptual world of classical republican language that precluded the development and use of other political languages. Similarly, Thomas Pangle, Paul Rahe, and before them Martin Diamond have interpreted the Founders' political thought as a species of the 'New Science of Politics' of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke. They have then ignored or presented perverse interpretations of important dimensions of the Founders' political thought that challenge this reading, especially Jeffersonian political economy. For the tendency of the republican revisionists to ignore the Declaration of Independence and the natural rights tradition see Scott Gerber, 'What Ever Happened to the Declaration? A Commentary on the Republican Revisionism in the Political Thought of the American Revolution', Polity, 26 (1993), pp. 207-31; and Gerber, To Secure These Rights (New York, 1995), esp. pp. 19-56. For the deterministic tendencies of the republican revisionists' methodology see Joyce Appleby, 'Republicanism in Old and New Contexts', The William and Mary Quarterly, 43 (1986), pp. 26-31. See Eugene Miller, 'What Publius Says About Interest', The Political Science Reviewer, 19 (1990), pp. 20-1, for warnings about how interpreting the political thought of the Founders through the lens of the 'New Science of Politics' can lead to interpretations that take for granted what they are designed to prove. The reductionism of Rahe, Pangle and Diamond's interpretations of Jeffersonian political economy can be grasped by comparing Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent' and 'Ethics and Politics', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit: Essays by Martin Diamond, ed. William A. Schambra (Washington, 1992), esp. pp. 31-5, 337-68; Diamond, The Founding of the Democratic Republic (Itasca, IL, 1981), pp. 71-8; Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago, 1988), pp. 98-104; and Paul Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC, & London, 1992), pp. 726-47, with McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, NC, 1980), pp. 120-35. See also Alan Gibson, 'The Commercial Republic and the Pluralist Critique of Marxism: An Analysis of Martin Diamond's Interpretation of Federalist 10', Polity, 25 (1993), pp. 521-8. For the way in which paradigms of interpretation change because scholars have identified a new set of problems as central, not necessarily because new paradigms envelop old ones and provide a more comprehensive interpretation of the facts, see Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 11-12.
34. James T. Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse', Journal of American History, 74 (1987), p. 11. Interpretations that ignore the diversity of intellectual traditions present in the American Founding are often deterministic and question-begging and have been presented by scholars on both sides of this debate. Pocock, for example, has argued that to understand the eighteenth century fully we must trace out the persistence of civic humanism. He has then simply ignored - cast out of vision - central documents, such as the Declaration of Independence, that illustrate the importance of the social contract-natural rights tradition. Moreover, as Joyce Appleby has most persistently charged, the republican revisionists have been guilty of determinism, in particular by fastening on to a mode of interpretation that is unable to take into account the numerous changes in social practice and ideology that were taking place in the eighteenth century. In the initial stages of this debate at least, the republican revisionists were too quick to say that the Founders were locked into a conceptual world of classical republican language that precluded the development and use of other political languages. Similarly, Thomas Pangle, Paul Rahe, and before them Martin Diamond have interpreted the Founders' political thought as a species of the 'New Science of Politics' of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke. They have then ignored or presented perverse interpretations of important dimensions of the Founders' political thought that challenge this reading, especially Jeffersonian political economy. For the tendency of the republican revisionists to ignore the Declaration of Independence and the natural rights tradition see Scott Gerber, 'What Ever Happened to the Declaration? A Commentary on the Republican Revisionism in the Political Thought of the American Revolution', Polity, 26 (1993), pp. 207-31; and Gerber, To Secure These Rights (New York, 1995), esp. pp. 19-56. For the deterministic tendencies of the republican revisionists' methodology see Joyce Appleby, 'Republicanism in Old and New Contexts', The William and Mary Quarterly, 43 (1986), pp. 26-31. See Eugene Miller, 'What Publius Says About Interest', The Political Science Reviewer, 19 (1990), pp. 20-1, for warnings about how interpreting the political thought of the Founders through the lens of the 'New Science of Politics' can lead to interpretations that take for granted what they are designed to prove. The reductionism of Rahe, Pangle and Diamond's interpretations of Jeffersonian political economy can be grasped by comparing Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent' and 'Ethics and Politics', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit: Essays by Martin Diamond, ed. William A. Schambra (Washington, 1992), esp. pp. 31-5, 337-68; Diamond, The Founding of the Democratic Republic (Itasca, IL, 1981), pp. 71-8; Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago, 1988), pp. 98-104; and Paul Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC, & London, 1992), pp. 726-47, with McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, NC, 1980), pp. 120-35. See also Alan Gibson, 'The Commercial Republic and the Pluralist Critique of Marxism: An Analysis of Martin Diamond's Interpretation of Federalist 10', Polity, 25 (1993), pp. 521-8. For the way in which paradigms of interpretation change because scholars have identified a new set of problems as central, not necessarily because new paradigms envelop old ones and provide a more comprehensive interpretation of the facts, see Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 11-12.
35. James T. Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse', Journal of American History, 74 (1987), p. 11. Interpretations that ignore the diversity of intellectual traditions present in the American Founding are often deterministic and question-begging and have been presented by scholars on both sides of this debate. Pocock, for example, has argued that to understand the eighteenth century fully we must trace out the persistence of civic humanism. He has then simply ignored - cast out of vision - central documents, such as the Declaration of Independence, that illustrate the importance of the social contract-natural rights tradition. Moreover, as Joyce Appleby has most persistently charged, the republican revisionists have been guilty of determinism, in particular by fastening on to a mode of interpretation that is unable to take into account the numerous changes in social practice and ideology that were taking place in the eighteenth century. In the initial stages of this debate at least, the republican revisionists were too quick to say that the Founders were locked into a conceptual world of classical republican language that precluded the development and use of other political languages. Similarly, Thomas Pangle, Paul Rahe, and before them Martin Diamond have interpreted the Founders' political thought as a species of the 'New Science of Politics' of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke. They have then ignored or presented perverse interpretations of important dimensions of the Founders' political thought that challenge this reading, especially Jeffersonian political economy. For the tendency of the republican revisionists to ignore the Declaration of Independence and the natural rights tradition see Scott Gerber, 'What Ever Happened to the Declaration? A Commentary on the Republican Revisionism in the Political Thought of the American Revolution', Polity, 26 (1993), pp. 207-31; and Gerber, To Secure These Rights (New York, 1995), esp. pp. 19-56. For the deterministic tendencies of the republican revisionists' methodology see Joyce Appleby, 'Republicanism in Old and New Contexts', The William and Mary Quarterly, 43 (1986), pp. 26-31. See Eugene Miller, 'What Publius Says About Interest', The Political Science Reviewer, 19 (1990), pp. 20-1, for warnings about how interpreting the political thought of the Founders through the lens of the 'New Science of Politics' can lead to interpretations that take for granted what they are designed to prove. The reductionism of Rahe, Pangle and Diamond's interpretations of Jeffersonian political economy can be grasped by comparing Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent' and 'Ethics and Politics', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit: Essays by Martin Diamond, ed. William A. Schambra (Washington, 1992), esp. pp. 31-5, 337-68; Diamond, The Founding of the Democratic Republic (Itasca, IL, 1981), pp. 71-8; Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago, 1988), pp. 98-104; and Paul Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC, & London, 1992), pp. 726-47, with McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, NC, 1980), pp. 120-35. See also Alan Gibson, 'The Commercial Republic and the Pluralist Critique of Marxism: An Analysis of Martin Diamond's Interpretation of Federalist 10', Polity, 25 (1993), pp. 521-8. For the way in which paradigms of interpretation change because scholars have identified a new set of problems as central, not necessarily because new paradigms envelop old ones and provide a more comprehensive interpretation of the facts, see Rodgers, 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', pp. 11-12.
36. Gordon Wood, 'Ideology and the Origins of Liberal America', The William and Mary Quarterly, 44 (1987), p. 634.
37. Banning, 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited', p. 12; Banning, 'Quid Transit?', p. 201; Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', pp. 92-3, 111-13; Robert Shalhope, The Roots of Democracy: American Thought and Culture, 1760-1800 (Boston, 1990), p. xii; Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic, pp. 209-10; Ralph Ketcham, 'Review of If Men Were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason by Richard K. Matthews', William and Mary Quarterly, 52 (1995), pp. 697-702.
38. Banning, 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited', p. 12; Banning, 'Quid Transit?', p. 201; Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', pp. 92-3, 111-13; Robert Shalhope, The Roots of Democracy: American Thought and Culture, 1760-1800 (Boston, 1990), p. xii; Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic, pp. 209-10; Ralph Ketcham, 'Review of If Men Were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason by Richard K. Matthews', William and Mary Quarterly, 52 (1995), pp. 697-702.
39. Banning, 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited', p. 12; Banning, 'Quid Transit?', p. 201; Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', pp. 92-3, 111-13; Robert Shalhope, The Roots of Democracy: American Thought and Culture, 1760-1800 (Boston, 1990), p. xii; Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic, pp. 209-10; Ralph Ketcham, 'Review of If Men Were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason by Richard K. Matthews', William and Mary Quarterly, 52 (1995), pp. 697-702.
40. Banning, 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited', p. 12; Banning, 'Quid Transit?', p. 201; Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', pp. 92-3, 111-13; Robert Shalhope, The Roots of Democracy: American Thought and Culture, 1760-1800 (Boston, 1990), p. xii; Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic, pp. 209-10; Ralph Ketcham, 'Review of If Men Were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason by Richard K. Matthews', William and Mary Quarterly, 52 (1995), pp. 697-702.
41. Banning, 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited', p. 12; Banning, 'Quid Transit?', p. 201; Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', pp. 92-3, 111-13; Robert Shalhope, The Roots of Democracy: American Thought and Culture, 1760-1800 (Boston, 1990), p. xii; Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic, pp. 209-10; Ralph Ketcham, 'Review of If Men Were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason by Richard K. Matthews', William and Mary Quarterly, 52 (1995), pp. 697-702.
42. Banning, 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited', p. 12; Banning, 'Quid Transit?', p. 201; Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', pp. 92-3, 111-13; Robert Shalhope, The Roots of Democracy: American Thought and Culture, 1760-1800 (Boston, 1990), p. xii; Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic, pp. 209-10; Ralph Ketcham, 'Review of If Men Were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason by Richard K. Matthews', William and Mary Quarterly, 52 (1995), pp. 697-702.
43. For a particularly clear and forceful statement of this position see Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic, pp. 7-8, 95-6, 209-10.
44. Not all scholars of course have come to this conclusion. Many continue to interpret the Founders' political thought as a species of liberalism. In addition to works of Gerber and Pangle cited above see also John Patrick Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism (Chicago, 1986); Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and Its Legacy (Chicago, 1990); Richard Matthews, If Men Were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason (Lawrence, KS, 1995); Asher Horowitz and Richard K. Matthews, 'Narcissism of the Minor Differences: What is at Issue and What is at Stake in the Civic Humanism Question', Polity, 30 (1997), pp. 1-27.
45. Not all scholars of course have come to this conclusion. Many continue to interpret the Founders' political thought as a species of liberalism. In addition to works of Gerber and Pangle cited above see also John Patrick Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism (Chicago, 1986); Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and Its Legacy (Chicago, 1990); Richard Matthews, If Men Were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason (Lawrence, KS, 1995); Asher Horowitz and Richard K. Matthews, 'Narcissism of the Minor Differences: What is at Issue and What is at Stake in the Civic Humanism Question', Polity, 30 (1997), pp. 1-27.
46. Not all scholars of course have come to this conclusion. Many continue to interpret the Founders' political thought as a species of liberalism. In addition to works of Gerber and Pangle cited above see also John Patrick Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism (Chicago, 1986); Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and Its Legacy (Chicago, 1990); Richard Matthews, If Men Were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason (Lawrence, KS, 1995); Asher Horowitz and Richard K. Matthews, 'Narcissism of the Minor Differences: What is at Issue and What is at Stake in the Civic Humanism Question', Polity, 30 (1997), pp. 1-27.
47. Not all scholars of course have come to this conclusion. Many continue to interpret the Founders' political thought as a species of liberalism. In addition to works of Gerber and Pangle cited above see also John Patrick Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism (Chicago, 1986); Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and Its Legacy (Chicago, 1990); Richard Matthews, If Men Were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason (Lawrence, KS, 1995); Asher Horowitz and Richard K. Matthews, 'Narcissism of the Minor Differences: What is at Issue and What is at Stake in the Civic Humanism Question', Polity, 30 (1997), pp. 1-27.
48. Kramnick, 'The "Great National Discussion"', p. 4.
49. Banning, 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited', p. 19.
50. I borrow the phrase 'multiple traditions approach' from Rogers Smith. See R. Smith, 'Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America', American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), pp. 549-66, and citations to Smith's works below.
51. In addition to the works analysed in the text, Jeffery Isaac and Alan Craig Houston have presented studies which, although they do not directly interpret the American Founding, have important implications for its study and should be read in conjunction with the works discussed above. Both Isaac and Houston argue that the political thought of the 'Commonwealthmen' or 'radical Whigs' of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England was a synthesis composed centrally of liberalism, but also containing important strains of republicanism. They then hypothesize - although it is not their goal to prove - that this synthesis was also characteristic of the American Founders. See Jeffrey Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. Liberalism?', History of Political Thought, IX (1988), pp. 349-77; and A.C. Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America (Princeton, NJ, 1991). Moreover, James Kloppenberg's oft-cited essay 'The Virtues of Liberalism', his recently published book by the same name, and especially Jerome Huyler's study Locke in America and Richard Sinopoli's excellent book The Foundations of American Citizenship also present interpretations of the American Founding that suggest that the Founders incorporated diverse strains of political thought within a capacious conception of liberalism. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; J. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism (New York, 1998); Jerome Huyler, Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the Founding Era (Lawrence, KS, 1995); Richard Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship: Liberalism, the Constitution, and Civic Virtue (New York, 1992).
52. In addition to the works analysed in the text, Jeffery Isaac and Alan Craig Houston have presented studies which, although they do not directly interpret the American Founding, have important implications for its study and should be read in conjunction with the works discussed above. Both Isaac and Houston argue that the political thought of the 'Commonwealthmen' or 'radical Whigs' of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England was a synthesis composed centrally of liberalism, but also containing important strains of republicanism. They then hypothesize - although it is not their goal to prove - that this synthesis was also characteristic of the American Founders. See Jeffrey Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. Liberalism?', History of Political Thought, IX (1988), pp. 349-77; and A.C. Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America (Princeton, NJ, 1991). Moreover, James Kloppenberg's oft-cited essay 'The Virtues of Liberalism', his recently published book by the same name, and especially Jerome Huyler's study Locke in America and Richard Sinopoli's excellent book The Foundations of American Citizenship also present interpretations of the American Founding that suggest that the Founders incorporated diverse strains of political thought within a capacious conception of liberalism. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; J. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism (New York, 1998); Jerome Huyler, Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the Founding Era (Lawrence, KS, 1995); Richard Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship: Liberalism, the Constitution, and Civic Virtue (New York, 1992).
53. In addition to the works analysed in the text, Jeffery Isaac and Alan Craig Houston have presented studies which, although they do not directly interpret the American Founding, have important implications for its study and should be read in conjunction with the works discussed above. Both Isaac and Houston argue that the political thought of the 'Commonwealthmen' or 'radical Whigs' of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England was a synthesis composed centrally of liberalism, but also containing important strains of republicanism. They then hypothesize - although it is not their goal to prove - that this synthesis was also characteristic of the American Founders. See Jeffrey Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. Liberalism?', History of Political Thought, IX (1988), pp. 349-77; and A.C. Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America (Princeton, NJ, 1991). Moreover, James Kloppenberg's oft-cited essay 'The Virtues of Liberalism', his recently published book by the same name, and especially Jerome Huyler's study Locke in America and Richard Sinopoli's excellent book The Foundations of American Citizenship also present interpretations of the American Founding that suggest that the Founders incorporated diverse strains of political thought within a capacious conception of liberalism. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; J. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism (New York, 1998); Jerome Huyler, Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the Founding Era (Lawrence, KS, 1995); Richard Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship: Liberalism, the Constitution, and Civic Virtue (New York, 1992).
54. In addition to the works analysed in the text, Jeffery Isaac and Alan Craig Houston have presented studies which, although they do not directly interpret the American Founding, have important implications for its study and should be read in conjunction with the works discussed above. Both Isaac and Houston argue that the political thought of the 'Commonwealthmen' or 'radical Whigs' of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England was a synthesis composed centrally of liberalism, but also containing important strains of republicanism. They then hypothesize - although it is not their goal to prove - that this synthesis was also characteristic of the American Founders. See Jeffrey Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. Liberalism?', History of Political Thought, IX (1988), pp. 349-77; and A.C. Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America (Princeton, NJ, 1991). Moreover, James Kloppenberg's oft-cited essay 'The Virtues of Liberalism', his recently published book by the same name, and especially Jerome Huyler's study Locke in America and Richard Sinopoli's excellent book The Foundations of American Citizenship also present interpretations of the American Founding that suggest that the Founders incorporated diverse strains of political thought within a capacious conception of liberalism. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; J. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism (New York, 1998); Jerome Huyler, Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the Founding Era (Lawrence, KS, 1995); Richard Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship: Liberalism, the Constitution, and Civic Virtue (New York, 1992).
55. In addition to the works analysed in the text, Jeffery Isaac and Alan Craig Houston have presented studies which, although they do not directly interpret the American Founding, have important implications for its study and should be read in conjunction with the works discussed above. Both Isaac and Houston argue that the political thought of the 'Commonwealthmen' or 'radical Whigs' of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England was a synthesis composed centrally of liberalism, but also containing important strains of republicanism. They then hypothesize - although it is not their goal to prove - that this synthesis was also characteristic of the American Founders. See Jeffrey Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. Liberalism?', History of Political Thought, IX (1988), pp. 349-77; and A.C. Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America (Princeton, NJ, 1991). Moreover, James Kloppenberg's oft-cited essay 'The Virtues of Liberalism', his recently published book by the same name, and especially Jerome Huyler's study Locke in America and Richard Sinopoli's excellent book The Foundations of American Citizenship also present interpretations of the American Founding that suggest that the Founders incorporated diverse strains of political thought within a capacious conception of liberalism. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; J. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism (New York, 1998); Jerome Huyler, Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the Founding Era (Lawrence, KS, 1995); Richard Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship: Liberalism, the Constitution, and Civic Virtue (New York, 1992).
56. In addition to the works analysed in the text, Jeffery Isaac and Alan Craig Houston have presented studies which, although they do not directly interpret the American Founding, have important implications for its study and should be read in conjunction with the works discussed above. Both Isaac and Houston argue that the political thought of the 'Commonwealthmen' or 'radical Whigs' of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England was a synthesis composed centrally of liberalism, but also containing important strains of republicanism. They then hypothesize - although it is not their goal to prove - that this synthesis was also characteristic of the American Founders. See Jeffrey Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. Liberalism?', History of Political Thought, IX (1988), pp. 349-77; and A.C. Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America (Princeton, NJ, 1991). Moreover, James Kloppenberg's oft-cited essay 'The Virtues of Liberalism', his recently published book by the same name, and especially Jerome Huyler's study Locke in America and Richard Sinopoli's excellent book The Foundations of American Citizenship also present interpretations of the American Founding that suggest that the Founders incorporated diverse strains of political thought within a capacious conception of liberalism. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; J. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism (New York, 1998); Jerome Huyler, Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the Founding Era (Lawrence, KS, 1995); Richard Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship: Liberalism, the Constitution, and Civic Virtue (New York, 1992).
57. In addition to the works analysed in the text, Jeffery Isaac and Alan Craig Houston have presented studies which, although they do not directly interpret the American Founding, have important implications for its study and should be read in conjunction with the works discussed above. Both Isaac and Houston argue that the political thought of the 'Commonwealthmen' or 'radical Whigs' of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England was a synthesis composed centrally of liberalism, but also containing important strains of republicanism. They then hypothesize - although it is not their goal to prove - that this synthesis was also characteristic of the American Founders. See Jeffrey Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. Liberalism?', History of Political Thought, IX (1988), pp. 349-77; and A.C. Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America (Princeton, NJ, 1991). Moreover, James Kloppenberg's oft-cited essay 'The Virtues of Liberalism', his recently published book by the same name, and especially Jerome Huyler's study Locke in America and Richard Sinopoli's excellent book The Foundations of American Citizenship also present interpretations of the American Founding that suggest that the Founders incorporated diverse strains of political thought within a capacious conception of liberalism. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; J. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism (New York, 1998); Jerome Huyler, Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the Founding Era (Lawrence, KS, 1995); Richard Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship: Liberalism, the Constitution, and Civic Virtue (New York, 1992).
58. In addition to the works analysed in the text, Jeffery Isaac and Alan Craig Houston have presented studies which, although they do not directly interpret the American Founding, have important implications for its study and should be read in conjunction with the works discussed above. Both Isaac and Houston argue that the political thought of the 'Commonwealthmen' or 'radical Whigs' of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England was a synthesis composed centrally of liberalism, but also containing important strains of republicanism. They then hypothesize - although it is not their goal to prove - that this synthesis was also characteristic of the American Founders. See Jeffrey Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. Liberalism?', History of Political Thought, IX (1988), pp. 349-77; and A.C. Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America (Princeton, NJ, 1991). Moreover, James Kloppenberg's oft-cited essay 'The Virtues of Liberalism', his recently published book by the same name, and especially Jerome Huyler's study Locke in America and Richard Sinopoli's excellent book The Foundations of American Citizenship also present interpretations of the American Founding that suggest that the Founders incorporated diverse strains of political thought within a capacious conception of liberalism. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; J. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism (New York, 1998); Jerome Huyler, Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the Founding Era (Lawrence, KS, 1995); Richard Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship: Liberalism, the Constitution, and Civic Virtue (New York, 1992).
59. In addition to the works analysed in the text, Jeffery Isaac and Alan Craig Houston have presented studies which, although they do not directly interpret the American Founding, have important implications for its study and should be read in conjunction with the works discussed above. Both Isaac and Houston argue that the political thought of the 'Commonwealthmen' or 'radical Whigs' of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England was a synthesis composed centrally of liberalism, but also containing important strains of republicanism. They then hypothesize - although it is not their goal to prove - that this synthesis was also characteristic of the American Founders. See Jeffrey Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. Liberalism?', History of Political Thought, IX (1988), pp. 349-77; and A.C. Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America (Princeton, NJ, 1991). Moreover, James Kloppenberg's oft-cited essay 'The Virtues of Liberalism', his recently published book by the same name, and especially Jerome Huyler's study Locke in America and Richard Sinopoli's excellent book The Foundations of American Citizenship also present interpretations of the American Founding that suggest that the Founders incorporated diverse strains of political thought within a capacious conception of liberalism. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; J. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism (New York, 1998); Jerome Huyler, Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the Founding Era (Lawrence, KS, 1995); Richard Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship: Liberalism, the Constitution, and Civic Virtue (New York, 1992).
60. J.D. Greenstone, The Lincoln Persuasion: Remaking American Liberalism (Princeton, NJ, 1993), p. 51.
61. J.D. Greenstone, 'Against Simplicity: The Cultural Dimensions of the Constitution', The University of Chicago Law Review, 40 (1988), pp. 438-42 (quote is on p. 439); J.D. Greenstone, 'Political Culture and American Political Development: Liberty, Union, and the Liberal Bipolarity', Studies in American Political Development: An Annual (New Haven, CT, 1986), 1, pp. 5-6; Greenstone, The Lincoln Persuasion, pp. 51-3. This interpretation is also explored in the work of one of Greenstone's students, David F. Ericson. See D.F. Ericson, The Shaping of American Liberalism: the Debates Over Ratification, Nullification, and Slavery (Chicago, 1993).
62. J.D. Greenstone, 'Against Simplicity: The Cultural Dimensions of the Constitution', The University of Chicago Law Review, 40 (1988), pp. 438-42 (quote is on p. 439); J.D. Greenstone, 'Political Culture and American Political Development: Liberty, Union, and the Liberal Bipolarity', Studies in American Political Development: An Annual (New Haven, CT, 1986), 1, pp. 5-6; Greenstone, The Lincoln Persuasion, pp. 51-3. This interpretation is also explored in the work of one of Greenstone's students, David F. Ericson. See D.F. Ericson, The Shaping of American Liberalism: the Debates Over Ratification, Nullification, and Slavery (Chicago, 1993).
63. J.D. Greenstone, 'Against Simplicity: The Cultural Dimensions of the Constitution', The University of Chicago Law Review, 40 (1988), pp. 438-42 (quote is on p. 439); J.D. Greenstone, 'Political Culture and American Political Development: Liberty, Union, and the Liberal Bipolarity', Studies in American Political Development: An Annual (New Haven, CT, 1986), 1, pp. 5-6; Greenstone, The Lincoln Persuasion, pp. 51-3. This interpretation is also explored in the work of one of Greenstone's students, David F. Ericson. See D.F. Ericson, The Shaping of American Liberalism: the Debates Over Ratification, Nullification, and Slavery (Chicago, 1993).
64. J.D. Greenstone, 'Against Simplicity: The Cultural Dimensions of the Constitution', The University of Chicago Law Review, 40 (1988), pp. 438-42 (quote is on p. 439); J.D. Greenstone, 'Political Culture and American Political Development: Liberty, Union, and the Liberal Bipolarity', Studies in American Political Development: An Annual (New Haven, CT, 1986), 1, pp. 5-6; Greenstone, The Lincoln Persuasion, pp. 51-3. This interpretation is also explored in the work of one of Greenstone's students, David F. Ericson. See D.F. Ericson, The Shaping of American Liberalism: the Debates Over Ratification, Nullification, and Slavery (Chicago, 1993).
65. Greenstone, 'Against Simplicity', p. 51.
66. Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism, pp. 167-8.
67. Ibid., p. 299.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid., p. 305.
70. Ibid., p. 308.
71. Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic, p. 2.
72. Ibid., p. 16.
73. Ibid., p. 106.
74. For quotes see ibid., pp. 31, 240, 241, 95.
75. I also interpret this as one of the central purposes of Huyler's excellent work, Locke in America.
76. Nathan Tarcov, 'A "Non-Lockean" Locke and the Character of Liberalism', in Liberalism Reconsidered, ed. Douglas MacLean and Claudia Mills (Totowa, NJ, 1983), pp. 130-40. Such reappraisals of Locke's political thought parallel the effort of a number of scholars, including William Galston, Michael Walzer, Stephen Macedo, Amy Gutman and, most recently, James Kloppenberg, to provide a more sympathetic understanding of liberalism by arguing that it is more capacious than its critics charge. See William Galston, 'Defending Liberalism', American Political Science Review, 76 (1982), pp. 621-9; W. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (New York, 1991); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York, 1983); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (New York, 1990); Amy Gutman, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985), pp. 308-22; Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism.
77. Nathan Tarcov, 'A "Non-Lockean" Locke and the Character of Liberalism', in Liberalism Reconsidered, ed. Douglas MacLean and Claudia Mills (Totowa, NJ, 1983), pp. 130-40. Such reappraisals of Locke's political thought parallel the effort of a number of scholars, including William Galston, Michael Walzer, Stephen Macedo, Amy Gutman and, most recently, James Kloppenberg, to provide a more sympathetic understanding of liberalism by arguing that it is more capacious than its critics charge. See William Galston, 'Defending Liberalism', American Political Science Review, 76 (1982), pp. 621-9; W. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (New York, 1991); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York, 1983); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (New York, 1990); Amy Gutman, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985), pp. 308-22; Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism.
78. Nathan Tarcov, 'A "Non-Lockean" Locke and the Character of Liberalism', in Liberalism Reconsidered, ed. Douglas MacLean and Claudia Mills (Totowa, NJ, 1983), pp. 130-40. Such reappraisals of Locke's political thought parallel the effort of a number of scholars, including William Galston, Michael Walzer, Stephen Macedo, Amy Gutman and, most recently, James Kloppenberg, to provide a more sympathetic understanding of liberalism by arguing that it is more capacious than its critics charge. See William Galston, 'Defending Liberalism', American Political Science Review, 76 (1982), pp. 621-9; W. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (New York, 1991); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York, 1983); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (New York, 1990); Amy Gutman, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985), pp. 308-22; Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism.
79. Nathan Tarcov, 'A "Non-Lockean" Locke and the Character of Liberalism', in Liberalism Reconsidered, ed. Douglas MacLean and Claudia Mills (Totowa, NJ, 1983), pp. 130-40. Such reappraisals of Locke's political thought parallel the effort of a number of scholars, including William Galston, Michael Walzer, Stephen Macedo, Amy Gutman and, most recently, James Kloppenberg, to provide a more sympathetic understanding of liberalism by arguing that it is more capacious than its critics charge. See William Galston, 'Defending Liberalism', American Political Science Review, 76 (1982), pp. 621-9; W. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (New York, 1991); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York, 1983); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (New York, 1990); Amy Gutman, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985), pp. 308-22; Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism.
80. Nathan Tarcov, 'A "Non-Lockean" Locke and the Character of Liberalism', in Liberalism Reconsidered, ed. Douglas MacLean and Claudia Mills (Totowa, NJ, 1983), pp. 130-40. Such reappraisals of Locke's political thought parallel the effort of a number of scholars, including William Galston, Michael Walzer, Stephen Macedo, Amy Gutman and, most recently, James Kloppenberg, to provide a more sympathetic understanding of liberalism by arguing that it is more capacious than its critics charge. See William Galston, 'Defending Liberalism', American Political Science Review, 76 (1982), pp. 621-9; W. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (New York, 1991); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York, 1983); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (New York, 1990); Amy Gutman, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985), pp. 308-22; Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism.
81. Nathan Tarcov, 'A "Non-Lockean" Locke and the Character of Liberalism', in Liberalism Reconsidered, ed. Douglas MacLean and Claudia Mills (Totowa, NJ, 1983), pp. 130-40. Such reappraisals of Locke's political thought parallel the effort of a number of scholars, including William Galston, Michael Walzer, Stephen Macedo, Amy Gutman and, most recently, James Kloppenberg, to provide a more sympathetic understanding of liberalism by arguing that it is more capacious than its critics charge. See William Galston, 'Defending Liberalism', American Political Science Review, 76 (1982), pp. 621-9; W. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (New York, 1991); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York, 1983); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (New York, 1990); Amy Gutman, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985), pp. 308-22; Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism.
82. Nathan Tarcov, 'A "Non-Lockean" Locke and the Character of Liberalism', in Liberalism Reconsidered, ed. Douglas MacLean and Claudia Mills (Totowa, NJ, 1983), pp. 130-40. Such reappraisals of Locke's political thought parallel the effort of a number of scholars, including William Galston, Michael Walzer, Stephen Macedo, Amy Gutman and, most recently, James Kloppenberg, to provide a more sympathetic understanding of liberalism by arguing that it is more capacious than its critics charge. See William Galston, 'Defending Liberalism', American Political Science Review, 76 (1982), pp. 621-9; W. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (New York, 1991); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York, 1983); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (New York, 1990); Amy Gutman, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985), pp. 308-22; Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism.
83. Tarcov, 'A "Non-Lockean" Locke', p. 131.
84. Ibid., p. 130.
85. Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', p. 99.
86. Ibid., p. 113.
87. Ibid., p. 93.
88. Banning, 'Quid Transit', p. 201.
89. Pocock often makes this same suggestion. Republicanism, he has further contended, was never displaced by liberalism, but rather has 'survived to furnish liberalism with one of its modes of self-criticism and self-doubt'. See J.G.A. Pocock, 'Between Gog and Magog: The Republican Thesis and the Ideologia Americana', Journal of the History of Ideas, 48 (1987), p. 341.
90. Micheal Lienesch has also provided a narrative of the transformation of the Founders' political thought suggesting both its duality and its ambiguous legacy. See M. Lienesch, The New Order of the Ages: Time, the Constitution, and the Making of Modern American Political Thought (Princeton, NJ, 1988).
91. Ralph Ketcham, Framed for Posterity: The Enduring Philosophy of the Constitution (Lawrence, KS, 1993), pp. 38-45, pp. 165-72 (quotes are on pp. 169 and 166). For a similar understanding of the Framers' conception of 'liberty' see also Banning, 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited', pp. 17-19.
92. Ralph Ketcham, Framed for Posterity: The Enduring Philosophy of the Constitution (Lawrence, KS, 1993), pp. 38-45, pp. 165-72 (quotes are on pp. 169 and 166). For a similar understanding of the Framers' conception of 'liberty'
93. See for example the studies of Robert Shalhope. Shalhope treats republicanism in the early American Republic as a 'familiar ideology permeating all walks of life' but liberalism as more of an 'unarticulated behavioral pattern'. The rise of liberalism in his account is, in part at least, a story of how liberal practices eventually became ascendant and demanded intellectual justifications. Shalhope, The Roots of Democracy (quote is from p. 50). It is in this sense that the important works of Joyce Appleby are relevant and she can also be considered among the scholars who accept the multiple traditions approach. Although she argues for an exclusively liberal interpretation of the Jeffersonians, Appleby believes that members of the Federalist Party accepted the precepts of opposition ideology. She thus sees the eighteenth century as a period of transition in which liberalism and republicanism vied for ascendancy. Even more than Shalhope, she also contends that liberalism emerged as an intellectual justification for the liberal practices that accompanied the English financial revolution and became commonplace during the eighteenth century. See especially Appleby, 'Republicanism in Old and New Contexts', pp. 20-34; J. Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (Cambridge, MA, 1992); and J. Appleby, Capitalism and the New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York, 1984).
94. See for example the studies of Robert Shalhope. Shalhope treats republicanism in the early American Republic as a 'familiar ideology permeating all walks of life' but liberalism as more of an 'unarticulated behavioral pattern'. The rise of liberalism in his account is, in part at least, a story of how liberal practices eventually became ascendant and demanded intellectual justifications. Shalhope, The Roots of Democracy (quote is from p. 50). It is in this sense that the important works of Joyce Appleby are relevant and she can also be considered among the scholars who accept the multiple traditions approach. Although she argues for an exclusively liberal interpretation of the Jeffersonians, Appleby believes that members of the Federalist Party accepted the precepts of opposition ideology. She thus sees the eighteenth century as a period of transition in which liberalism and republicanism vied for ascendancy. Even more than Shalhope, she also contends that liberalism emerged as an intellectual justification for the liberal practices that accompanied the English financial revolution and became commonplace during the eighteenth century. See especially Appleby, 'Republicanism in Old and New Contexts', pp. 20-34; J. Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (Cambridge, MA, 1992); and J. Appleby, Capitalism and the New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York, 1984).
95. See for example the studies of Robert Shalhope. Shalhope treats republicanism in the early American Republic as a 'familiar ideology permeating all walks of life' but liberalism as more of an 'unarticulated behavioral pattern'. The rise of liberalism in his account is, in part at least, a story of how liberal practices eventually became ascendant and demanded intellectual justifications. Shalhope, The Roots of Democracy (quote is from p. 50). It is in this sense that the important works of Joyce Appleby are relevant and she can also be considered among the scholars who accept the multiple traditions approach. Although she argues for an exclusively liberal interpretation of the Jeffersonians, Appleby believes that members of the Federalist Party accepted the precepts of opposition ideology. She thus sees the eighteenth century as a period of transition in which liberalism and republicanism vied for ascendancy. Even more than Shalhope, she also contends that liberalism emerged as an intellectual justification for the liberal practices that accompanied the English financial revolution and became commonplace during the eighteenth century. See especially Appleby, 'Republicanism in Old and New Contexts', pp. 20-34; J. Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (Cambridge, MA, 1992); and J. Appleby, Capitalism and the New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York, 1984).
96. See for example the studies of Robert Shalhope. Shalhope treats republicanism in the early American Republic as a 'familiar ideology permeating all walks of life' but liberalism as more of an 'unarticulated behavioral pattern'. The rise of liberalism in his account is, in part at least, a story of how liberal practices eventually became ascendant and demanded intellectual justifications. Shalhope, The Roots of Democracy (quote is from p. 50). It is in this sense that the important works of Joyce Appleby are relevant and she can also be considered among the scholars who accept the multiple traditions approach. Although she argues for an exclusively liberal interpretation of the Jeffersonians, Appleby believes that members of the Federalist Party accepted the precepts of opposition ideology. She thus sees the eighteenth century as a period of transition in which liberalism and republicanism vied for ascendancy. Even more than Shalhope, she also contends that liberalism emerged as an intellectual justification for the liberal practices that accompanied the English financial revolution and became commonplace during the eighteenth century. See especially Appleby, 'Republicanism in Old and New Contexts', pp. 20-34; J. Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (Cambridge, MA, 1992); and J. Appleby, Capitalism and the New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York, 1984).
97. McCoy, The Elusive Republic, p. 134.
98. Several additional works have traced out the synthetic quality of the political thought of individual Founders. See for example Steven Conrad, 'Polite Foundation: Citizenship and Common Sense in James Wilson's Republican Theory', 1984: Supreme Court Review (Chicago, 1985), pp. 359-88, esp. pp. 383-5; Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison & the Founding of the Federal Republic (Ithaca, NY, 1995). For broader studies which analyse the synthetic thought of the Founders considered collectively see Banning, 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited', pp. 11-19; Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', pp. 1539-90; Jean Yarbrough, 'Republicanism Reconsidered: Some Thoughts on the Foundation and Preservation of the American Republic', The Review of Politics, 41 (1979), pp. 61-95.
99. Several additional works have traced out the synthetic quality of the political thought of individual Founders. See for example Steven Conrad, 'Polite Foundation: Citizenship and Common Sense in James Wilson's Republican Theory', 1984: Supreme Court Review (Chicago, 1985), pp. 359-88, esp. pp. 383-5; Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison & the Founding of the Federal Republic (Ithaca, NY, 1995). For broader studies which analyse the synthetic thought of the Founders considered collectively see Banning, 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited', pp. 11-19; Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', pp. 1539-90; Jean Yarbrough, 'Republicanism Reconsidered: Some Thoughts on the Foundation and Preservation of the American Republic', The Review of Politics, 41 (1979), pp. 61-95.
100. Several additional works have traced out the synthetic quality of the political thought of individual Founders. See for example Steven Conrad, 'Polite Foundation: Citizenship and Common Sense in James Wilson's Republican Theory', 1984: Supreme Court Review (Chicago, 1985), pp. 359-88, esp. pp. 383-5; Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison & the Founding of the Federal Republic (Ithaca, NY, 1995). For broader studies which analyse the synthetic thought of the Founders considered collectively see Banning, 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited', pp. 11-19; Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', pp. 1539-90; Jean Yarbrough, 'Republicanism Reconsidered: Some Thoughts on the Foundation and Preservation of the American Republic', The Review of Politics, 41 (1979), pp. 61-95.
101. Several additional works have traced out the synthetic quality of the political thought of individual Founders. See for example Steven Conrad, 'Polite Foundation: Citizenship and Common Sense in James Wilson's Republican Theory', 1984: Supreme Court Review (Chicago, 1985), pp. 359-88, esp. pp. 383-5; Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison & the Founding of the Federal Republic (Ithaca, NY, 1995). For broader studies which analyse the synthetic thought of the Founders considered collectively see Banning, 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited', pp. 11-19; Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', pp. 1539-90; Jean Yarbrough, 'Republicanism Reconsidered: Some Thoughts on the Foundation and Preservation of the American Republic', The Review of Politics, 41 (1979), pp. 61-95.
102. Several additional works have traced out the synthetic quality of the political thought of individual Founders. See for example Steven Conrad, 'Polite Foundation: Citizenship and Common Sense in James Wilson's Republican Theory', 1984: Supreme Court Review (Chicago, 1985), pp. 359-88, esp. pp. 383-5; Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison & the Founding of the Federal Republic (Ithaca, NY, 1995). For broader studies which analyse the synthetic thought of the Founders considered collectively see Banning, 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited', pp. 11-19; Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', pp. 1539-90; Jean Yarbrough, 'Republicanism Reconsidered: Some Thoughts on the Foundation and Preservation of the American Republic', The Review of Politics, 41 (1979), pp. 61-95.
103. Garrett Ward Sheldon, The Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson (Baltimore, MD, 1991), p. 169.
104. Ibid., pp. 93-4.
105. Ketcham, 'Sustaining the Republican Principle', p. 579.
106. Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven, 1997). This study was preceded by a number of essays in which Smith outlined dimensions of his complex argument. See R. Smith, The "American Creed" and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States', Western Political Quarterly, 41 (1988), pp. 225-51; R. Smith, '"One United People": Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community', Yale Journal of Law & Humanities, 1 (1989), pp. 229-93; Smith, 'Beyond Tocqueville', pp. 549-66; R. Smith, 'Unfinished Liberalism', Social Research, 61 (1994), pp. 631-70. See also the exchanges between Smith and his critics: Jacqueline Stevens, 'Beyond Tocqueville, Please!', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Jacqueline Stevens', American Political Science Review, 89 (December, 1995), pp. 987-95; Karen Orren, 'Structure, Sequence, and Subordination in American Political Culture: What's Tradition Got to Do With It?', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Karen Orren', Journal of Policy History, 8 (1996), pp. 470-90. Similar interpretations which emphasize the cultural dissension and ideological confrontation in American political thought can be found in Richard J. Ellis, American Political Cultures (New York, 1993), and James A. Morone, 'The Struggle for American Culture', PS: Political Science and Politics, 29 (1996), pp. 425-30.
107. Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven, 1997). This study was preceded by a number of essays in which Smith outlined dimensions of his complex argument. See R. Smith, The "American Creed" and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States', Western Political Quarterly, 41 (1988), pp. 225-51; R. Smith, '"One United People": Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community', Yale Journal of Law & Humanities, 1 (1989), pp. 229-93; Smith, 'Beyond Tocqueville', pp. 549-66; R. Smith, 'Unfinished Liberalism', Social Research, 61 (1994), pp. 631-70. See also the exchanges between Smith and his critics: Jacqueline Stevens, 'Beyond Tocqueville, Please!', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Jacqueline Stevens', American Political Science Review, 89 (December, 1995), pp. 987-95; Karen Orren, 'Structure, Sequence, and Subordination in American Political Culture: What's Tradition Got to Do With It?', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Karen Orren', Journal of Policy History, 8 (1996), pp. 470-90. Similar interpretations which emphasize the cultural dissension and ideological confrontation in American political thought can be found in Richard J. Ellis, American Political Cultures (New York, 1993), and James A. Morone, 'The Struggle for American Culture', PS: Political Science and Politics, 29 (1996), pp. 425-30.
108. Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven, 1997). This study was preceded by a number of essays in which Smith outlined dimensions of his complex argument. See R. Smith, The "American Creed" and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States', Western Political Quarterly, 41 (1988), pp. 225-51; R. Smith, '"One United People": Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community', Yale Journal of Law & Humanities, 1 (1989), pp. 229-93; Smith, 'Beyond Tocqueville', pp. 549-66; R. Smith, 'Unfinished Liberalism', Social Research, 61 (1994), pp. 631-70. See also the exchanges between Smith and his critics: Jacqueline Stevens, 'Beyond Tocqueville, Please!', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Jacqueline Stevens', American Political Science Review, 89 (December, 1995), pp. 987-95; Karen Orren, 'Structure, Sequence, and Subordination in American Political Culture: What's Tradition Got to Do With It?', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Karen Orren', Journal of Policy History, 8 (1996), pp. 470-90. Similar interpretations which emphasize the cultural dissension and ideological confrontation in American political thought can be found in Richard J. Ellis, American Political Cultures (New York, 1993), and James A. Morone, 'The Struggle for American Culture', PS: Political Science and Politics, 29 (1996), pp. 425-30.
109. Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven, 1997). This study was preceded by a number of essays in which Smith outlined dimensions of his complex argument. See R. Smith, The "American Creed" and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States', Western Political Quarterly, 41 (1988), pp. 225-51; R. Smith, '"One United People": Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community', Yale Journal of Law & Humanities, 1 (1989), pp. 229-93; Smith, 'Beyond Tocqueville', pp. 549-66; R. Smith, 'Unfinished Liberalism', Social Research, 61 (1994), pp. 631-70. See also the exchanges between Smith and his critics: Jacqueline Stevens, 'Beyond Tocqueville, Please!', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Jacqueline Stevens', American Political Science Review, 89 (December, 1995), pp. 987-95; Karen Orren, 'Structure, Sequence, and Subordination in American Political Culture: What's Tradition Got to Do With It?', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Karen Orren', Journal of Policy History, 8 (1996), pp. 470-90. Similar interpretations which emphasize the cultural dissension and ideological confrontation in American political thought can be found in Richard J. Ellis, American Political Cultures (New York, 1993), and James A. Morone, 'The Struggle for American Culture', PS: Political Science and Politics, 29 (1996), pp. 425-30.
110. Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven, 1997). This study was preceded by a number of essays in which Smith outlined dimensions of his complex argument. See R. Smith, The "American Creed" and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States', Western Political Quarterly, 41 (1988), pp. 225-51; R. Smith, '"One United People": Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community', Yale Journal of Law & Humanities, 1 (1989), pp. 229-93; Smith, 'Beyond Tocqueville', pp. 549-66; R. Smith, 'Unfinished Liberalism', Social Research, 61 (1994), pp. 631-70. See also the exchanges between Smith and his critics: Jacqueline Stevens, 'Beyond Tocqueville, Please!', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Jacqueline Stevens', American Political Science Review, 89 (December, 1995), pp. 987-95; Karen Orren, 'Structure, Sequence, and Subordination in American Political Culture: What's Tradition Got to Do With It?', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Karen Orren', Journal of Policy History, 8 (1996), pp. 470-90. Similar interpretations which emphasize the cultural dissension and ideological confrontation in American political thought can be found in Richard J. Ellis, American Political Cultures (New York, 1993), and James A. Morone, 'The Struggle for American Culture', PS: Political Science and Politics, 29 (1996), pp. 425-30.
111. Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven, 1997). This study was preceded by a number of essays in which Smith outlined dimensions of his complex argument. See R. Smith, The "American Creed" and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States', Western Political Quarterly, 41 (1988), pp. 225-51; R. Smith, '"One United People": Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community', Yale Journal of Law & Humanities, 1 (1989), pp. 229-93; Smith, 'Beyond Tocqueville', pp. 549-66; R. Smith, 'Unfinished Liberalism', Social Research, 61 (1994), pp. 631-70. See also the exchanges between Smith and his critics: Jacqueline Stevens, 'Beyond Tocqueville, Please!', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Jacqueline Stevens', American Political Science Review, 89 (December, 1995), pp. 987-95; Karen Orren, 'Structure, Sequence, and Subordination in American Political Culture: What's Tradition Got to Do With It?', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Karen Orren', Journal of Policy History, 8 (1996), pp. 470-90. Similar interpretations which emphasize the cultural dissension and ideological confrontation in American political thought can be found in Richard J. Ellis, American Political Cultures (New York, 1993), and James A. Morone, 'The Struggle for American Culture', PS: Political Science and Politics, 29 (1996), pp. 425-30.
112. Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven, 1997). This study was preceded by a number of essays in which Smith outlined dimensions of his complex argument. See R. Smith, The "American Creed" and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States', Western Political Quarterly, 41 (1988), pp. 225-51; R. Smith, '"One United People": Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community', Yale Journal of Law & Humanities, 1 (1989), pp. 229-93; Smith, 'Beyond Tocqueville', pp. 549-66; R. Smith, 'Unfinished Liberalism', Social Research, 61 (1994), pp. 631-70. See also the exchanges between Smith and his critics: Jacqueline Stevens, 'Beyond Tocqueville, Please!', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Jacqueline Stevens', American Political Science Review, 89 (December, 1995), pp. 987-95; Karen Orren, 'Structure, Sequence, and Subordination in American Political Culture: What's Tradition Got to Do With It?', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Karen Orren', Journal of Policy History, 8 (1996), pp. 470-90. Similar interpretations which emphasize the cultural dissension and ideological confrontation in American political thought can be found in Richard J. Ellis, American Political Cultures (New York, 1993), and James A. Morone, 'The Struggle for American Culture', PS: Political Science and Politics, 29 (1996), pp. 425-30.
113. Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven, 1997). This study was preceded by a number of essays in which Smith outlined dimensions of his complex argument. See R. Smith, The "American Creed" and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States', Western Political Quarterly, 41 (1988), pp. 225-51; R. Smith, '"One United People": Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community', Yale Journal of Law & Humanities, 1 (1989), pp. 229-93; Smith, 'Beyond Tocqueville', pp. 549-66; R. Smith, 'Unfinished Liberalism', Social Research, 61 (1994), pp. 631-70. See also the exchanges between Smith and his critics: Jacqueline Stevens, 'Beyond Tocqueville, Please!', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Jacqueline Stevens', American Political Science Review, 89 (December, 1995), pp. 987-95; Karen Orren, 'Structure, Sequence, and Subordination in American Political Culture: What's Tradition Got to Do With It?', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Karen Orren', Journal of Policy History, 8 (1996), pp. 470-90. Similar interpretations which emphasize the cultural dissension and ideological confrontation in American political thought can be found in Richard J. Ellis, American Political Cultures (New York, 1993), and James A. Morone, 'The Struggle for American Culture', PS: Political Science and Politics, 29 (1996), pp. 425-30.
114. Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven, 1997). This study was preceded by a number of essays in which Smith outlined dimensions of his complex argument. See R. Smith, The "American Creed" and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States', Western Political Quarterly, 41 (1988), pp. 225-51; R. Smith, '"One United People": Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community', Yale Journal of Law & Humanities, 1 (1989), pp. 229-93; Smith, 'Beyond Tocqueville', pp. 549-66; R. Smith, 'Unfinished Liberalism', Social Research, 61 (1994), pp. 631-70. See also the exchanges between Smith and his critics: Jacqueline Stevens, 'Beyond Tocqueville, Please!', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Jacqueline Stevens', American Political Science Review, 89 (December, 1995), pp. 987-95; Karen Orren, 'Structure, Sequence, and Subordination in American Political Culture: What's Tradition Got to Do With It?', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Karen Orren', Journal of Policy History, 8 (1996), pp. 470-90. Similar interpretations which emphasize the cultural dissension and ideological confrontation in American political thought can be found in Richard J. Ellis, American Political Cultures (New York, 1993), and James A. Morone, 'The Struggle for American Culture', PS: Political Science and Politics, 29 (1996), pp. 425-30.
115. Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven, 1997). This study was preceded by a number of essays in which Smith outlined dimensions of his complex argument. See R. Smith, The "American Creed" and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States', Western Political Quarterly, 41 (1988), pp. 225-51; R. Smith, '"One United People": Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community', Yale Journal of Law & Humanities, 1 (1989), pp. 229-93; Smith, 'Beyond Tocqueville', pp. 549-66; R. Smith, 'Unfinished Liberalism', Social Research, 61 (1994), pp. 631-70. See also the exchanges between Smith and his critics: Jacqueline Stevens, 'Beyond Tocqueville, Please!', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Jacqueline Stevens', American Political Science Review, 89 (December, 1995), pp. 987-95; Karen Orren, 'Structure, Sequence, and Subordination in American Political Culture: What's Tradition Got to Do With It?', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Karen Orren', Journal of Policy History, 8 (1996), pp. 470-90. Similar interpretations which emphasize the cultural dissension and ideological confrontation in American political thought can be found in Richard J. Ellis, American Political Cultures (New York, 1993), and James A. Morone, 'The Struggle for American Culture', PS: Political Science and Politics, 29 (1996), pp. 425-30.
116. Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven, 1997). This study was preceded by a number of essays in which Smith outlined dimensions of his complex argument. See R. Smith, The "American Creed" and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States', Western Political Quarterly, 41 (1988), pp. 225-51; R. Smith, '"One United People": Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community', Yale Journal of Law & Humanities, 1 (1989), pp. 229-93; Smith, 'Beyond Tocqueville', pp. 549-66; R. Smith, 'Unfinished Liberalism', Social Research, 61 (1994), pp. 631-70. See also the exchanges between Smith and his critics: Jacqueline Stevens, 'Beyond Tocqueville, Please!', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Jacqueline Stevens', American Political Science Review, 89 (December, 1995), pp. 987-95; Karen Orren, 'Structure, Sequence, and Subordination in American Political Culture: What's Tradition Got to Do With It?', and Rogers Smith, 'Response to Karen Orren', Journal of Policy History, 8 (1996), pp. 470-90. Similar interpretations which emphasize the cultural dissension and ideological confrontation in American political thought can be found in Richard J. Ellis, American Political Cultures (New York, 1993), and James A. Morone, 'The Struggle for American Culture', PS: Political Science and Politics, 29 (1996), pp. 425-30.
117. Smith, 'Beyond Tocqueville', p. 555.
118. Ibid., p. 549.
119. Smith, 'One United People', p. 229.
120. Simply put, coverture was a feudal doctrine that became embedded in common law that held that upon marriage the legal identity of a married woman (a feme covert) was 'absolutely subsumed' to that of her husband. This doctrine, according to Smith, was enforced in colonial and Revolutionary America with single women (feme soles) accorded only slightly greater legal rights. In documenting the importance of the concept of 'republican motherhood' in early America, Smith follows the scholarship of Linda Kerber. Again, simply put, 'republican motherhood' referred to the belief that women were citizens and the moral equals of men, but nevertheless that their peculiar, apolitical function was to raise children to be virtuous republican citizens. In general, Smith documents how in early America, custom, common law doctrine, Protestant ideology and republicanism all converged to support what he sometimes refers to as 'domestic sphere' ideology - the belief and practice that 'women had no proper place in the public realm and only a subordinate one in the home'. See Smith, 'One United People', pp. 241-50; Smith, Civic Ideals, pp. 67-9.
121. Simply put, coverture was a feudal doctrine that became embedded in common law that held that upon marriage the legal identity of a married woman (a feme covert) was 'absolutely subsumed' to that of her husband. This doctrine, according to Smith, was enforced in colonial and Revolutionary America with single women (feme soles) accorded only slightly greater legal rights. In documenting the importance of the concept of 'republican motherhood' in early America, Smith follows the scholarship of Linda Kerber. Again, simply put, 'republican motherhood' referred to the belief that women were citizens and the moral equals of men, but nevertheless that their peculiar, apolitical function was to raise children to be virtuous republican citizens. In general, Smith documents how in early America, custom, common law doctrine, Protestant ideology and republicanism all converged to support what he sometimes refers to as 'domestic sphere' ideology - the belief and practice that 'women had no proper place in the public realm and only a subordinate one in the home'. See Smith, 'One United People', pp. 241-50; Smith, Civic Ideals, pp. 67-9.
122. Smith, Civic Ideals, p. 9.
123. Smith, 'Response to Stevens', p. 991; Smith 'One United People', p. 233; Smith, 'Beyond Tocqueville', p. 554. My emphasis.
124. Smith, 'Response to Stevens', p. 991; Smith 'One United People', p. 233; Smith, 'Beyond Tocqueville', p. 554. My emphasis.
125. Smith, 'Response to Stevens', p. 991; Smith 'One United People', p. 233; Smith, 'Beyond Tocqueville', p. 554. My emphasis.
126. Smith, Civic Ideals, p. 6.
127. Smith, 'Beyond Tocqueville', p. 555.
128. Smith, Civic Ideals, p. 6. My emphasis.
129. Ibid., p. 29.
130. Stevens, 'Beyond Tocqueville, Please!', p. 987. Smith also discusses this criticism of his thesis in Civic Ideals, pp. 27-30. See also Uday Mehta, 'Liberal Strategies of Exclusion', Politics and Society, 18 (1990), pp. 427-54.
131. Stevens, 'Beyond Tocqueville, Please!', p. 987. Smith also discusses this criticism of his thesis in Civic Ideals, pp. 27-30. See also Uday Mehta, 'Liberal Strategies of Exclusion', Politics and Society, 18 (1990), pp. 427-54.
132. Stevens, 'Beyond Tocqueville, Please!', p. 987. Smith also discusses this criticism of his thesis in Civic Ideals, pp. 27-30. See also Uday Mehta, 'Liberal Strategies of Exclusion', Politics and Society, 18 (1990), pp. 427-54.
133. Smith, Civic Ideals, p. 28; See also Smith, 'Response to Stevens', p. 991.
134. Smith, Civic Ideals, p. 28; See also Smith, 'Response to Stevens', p. 991.
135. Smith, Civic Ideals, p. 140.
136. Ibid., p. 138.
137. Ibid., p. 28.
138. Ibid., p. 122.
139. The common ground that has emerged within this debate is the product of movement by scholars on both sides of the debate. Scholars have argued, learned, made concessions (often silently), and we are now closer to each other in our interpretations of the Founders than we suspect. Specifically, the 'republican revolution' in scholarship led to the identification of a constellation of concepts and a language of political thought that had either been ignored or lost by previous generations of scholars. Scholars began to trace out the importance within the Founders' political thought of concepts such as public virtue, liberty understood as freedom to participate in public affairs, and the public good understood as something more than an aggregation of the individual interests of the citizenry. But almost from the beginning the choice to call this strain of eighteenth-century English Opposition Ideology 'classical republicanism' and to interpret it as an alternative to Lockean liberalism met with strong opposition from numerous scholars. These scholars therefore conducted a counter-revolution that subjected virtually every aspect of the republican interpretation to intense scrutiny and simultaneously reemphasized the importance of liberalism in the American Founding. Neo-Lockean scholars have argued that the republican revisionists accepted a deterministic approach to the study of political thought that made it impossible for them to recognize and account for the numerous changes that were taking place during the eighteenth century. Republican revisionists have also been charged with providing inaccurate definitions of republicanism and imprecise ones that in the words of one scholar have 'been plagued by language too weak to rule out anything and, hence, to mean anything'. Scholars have also challenged the republican revisionists' interpretations of Greek and Roman republicanism, of Machiavelli, of James Harrington, of the 'Neo-Harringtonians', and of the influence of republicanism in America. On the various criticisms that have been lodged against the republican synthesis see Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic, pp. 207-8 (quote above is from Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship, p. 10). Nevertheless, the response of many of the principal proponents of the republican interpretation to this counter-revolution was not to redouble their efforts and argue for the exclusivity of republicanism in the American Founding. Instead, many of these scholars hastily retreated from some of their strongest claims, maintained that they had also never meant to suggest that republicanism and liberalism were rival and mutually exclusive traditions of political thought, and thus made considerable room for the place of liberalism within their interpretations of the Founding.
140. The common ground that has emerged within this debate is the product of movement by scholars on both sides of the debate. Scholars have argued, learned, made concessions (often silently), and we are now closer to each other in our interpretations of the Founders than we suspect. Specifically, the 'republican revolution' in scholarship led to the identification of a constellation of concepts and a language of political thought that had either been ignored or lost by previous generations of scholars. Scholars began to trace out the importance within the Founders' political thought of concepts such as public virtue, liberty understood as freedom to participate in public affairs, and the public good understood as something more than an aggregation of the individual interests of the citizenry. But almost from the beginning the choice to call this strain of eighteenth-century English Opposition Ideology 'classical republicanism' and to interpret it as an alternative to Lockean liberalism met with strong opposition from numerous scholars. These scholars therefore conducted a counter-revolution that subjected virtually every aspect of the republican interpretation to intense scrutiny and simultaneously reemphasized the importance of liberalism in the American Founding. Neo-Lockean scholars have argued that the republican revisionists accepted a deterministic approach to the study of political thought that made it impossible for them to recognize and account for the numerous changes that were taking place during the eighteenth century. Republican revisionists have also been charged with providing inaccurate definitions of republicanism and imprecise ones that in the words of one scholar have 'been plagued by language too weak to rule out anything and, hence, to mean anything'. Scholars have also challenged the republican revisionists' interpretations of Greek and Roman republicanism, of Machiavelli, of James Harrington, of the 'Neo-Harringtonians', and of the influence of republicanism in America. On the various criticisms that have been lodged against the republican synthesis see Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic, pp. 207-8 (quote above is from Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship, p. 10). Nevertheless, the response of many of the principal proponents of the republican interpretation to this counter-revolution was not to redouble their efforts and argue for the exclusivity of republicanism in the American Founding. Instead, many of these scholars hastily retreated from some of their strongest claims, maintained that they had also never meant to suggest that republicanism and liberalism were rival and mutually exclusive traditions of political thought, and thus made considerable room for the place of liberalism within their interpretations of the Founding.
141. This is true even for the leading proponents of the 'republican synthesis', who have recently argued that they never meant to suggest otherwise. Banning, for example, has recently stated: 'I do not now, nor did I ever, think of the republican tradition as a rival or alternative to a Lockean or liberal conception of the origins and limits of political society. Indeed, I do not think that any of the major architects of the republican interpretation ever claimed that revolutionary thinking could be fully understood without regard to Locke and other early modern theories of natural rights and social compacts'. Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', pp. 98-9.
142. Two different kinds of arguments have been made by scholars to suggest that the Founders, like classical republicans, constructed a political system that would engage in the formation of opinion and the development of a common character among the citizenry. The first, I would contend, fails, while the second is yet unproven. Several 'West Coast' Straussians have pointed to the Founders' goals of refining or filtering public opinion especially through representation and have equated this with the classical republican goal of educating and moulding public opinion and thus forming a common character among the citizenry. Madison and his colleagues of course did hope to refine public opinion and believed that representatives should represent the reason not the passions, of the public. Still, the Founders' conception of 'opinion' was modern and Humean, not classical. They argued that governments 'rest on opinion' and thus sought to secure an affective bond between the citizenry and people in order to create stability. Furthermore, Madison and many of his colleagues conceived of public opinion in a remarkably modern manner as a product of the society independent of the government and believed that when public opinion had crystallized that it was sovereign. In other words, while the 'West Coast' Straussians have emphasized the degree to which the Framers hoped to influence or even consciously mould public opinion towards fundamental values, Madison and his colleagues actually saw their role and the role of government in general as the much more limited one of refining existing public opinion in areas where it was not already set. The opinion of the citizenry, most of them believed, would be formed through education and participation in voluntary organizations, not by government. In general, then, the Founders' goal of refining public opinion is far different from the classical goal of promoting homonoia (political oneness) through the use of sumptuary laws and laws that establish religious belief. Forexamples of the 'West Coast' Straussians' efforts to interpret the American regime as designed to achieve classical ends see the essays in Saving the Revolution: the Federalist Papers and the American Founding, ed. Charles Kesler (New York, 1987); C. Kesler, 'The Founders and the Classics', in The Revival of Constitutionalism, ed. James W. Muller (Lincoln, NE, 1988), pp. 57-90; Colleen Sheehan, 'Madison's Party Press Essays', Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, XVII (1990), pp. 355-77; and C. Sheehan, 'The Politics of Public Opinion: James Madison's "Notes on Government"', William and Mary Quarterly, 44(1992), pp. 609-27. For a judicious evaluation of this interpretation see Harvey Flaumenhaft, 'Review of Saving the Revolution: The Federalist Papers and the American Founding', Constitutional Commentary, V (1988), pp. 460-76. For Madison's understanding of the relationship of government to public opinion see Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York, 1961), No. 49, pp. 314-15, and the essays 'Public Opinion' and 'Charters' in The Papers of James Madison, ed. William T. Hutchinson et al. (Vols. I-X, Chicago; Vols. XI-XVII, Charlottesville, VA, 1962-), XIV, pp. 170, 191. Hereafter this work will be cited as PJM. Another case for the thesis that the Framers did not abandon concern for the development of character can perhaps be built by emphasizing the federal nature of the Constitution. This argument suggests that, although the Constitution did not explicitly provide for the education of statesmen and citizens, public support of religion, and institutions which would foster political participation, the Framers simply assumed that these concerns would be addressed by the state governments. See Jean Yarbrough, 'The Constitution and Character: The Missing Critical Principle?', in To Form a More Perfect Union, ed. Belz et al., pp. 220-1, 237-48. This argument, however, depends upon documentation not only that the laws in the state governments at the time of the adoption of the Constitution addressed such concerns, but that the Framers knew this and consciously made the decision that the state governments were the proper arena for fostering education, religion and political participation. As far as I know, no study has yet proven this case.
143. Two different kinds of arguments have been made by scholars to suggest that the Founders, like classical republicans, constructed a political system that would engage in the formation of opinion and the development of a common character among the citizenry. The first, I would contend, fails, while the second is yet unproven. Several 'West Coast' Straussians have pointed to the Founders' goals of refining or filtering public opinion especially through representation and have equated this with the classical republican goal of educating and moulding public opinion and thus forming a common character among the citizenry. Madison and his colleagues of course did hope to refine public opinion and believed that representatives should represent the reason not the passions, of the public. Still, the Founders' conception of 'opinion' was modern and Humean, not classical. They argued that governments 'rest on opinion' and thus sought to secure an affective bond between the citizenry and people in order to create stability. Furthermore, Madison and many of his colleagues conceived of public opinion in a remarkably modern manner as a product of the society independent of the government and believed that when public opinion had crystallized that it was sovereign. In other words, while the 'West Coast' Straussians have emphasized the degree to which the Framers hoped to influence or even consciously mould public opinion towards fundamental values, Madison and his colleagues actually saw their role and the role of government in general as the much more limited one of refining existing public opinion in areas where it was not already set. The opinion of the citizenry, most of them believed, would be formed through education and participation in voluntary organizations, not by government. In general, then, the Founders' goal of refining public opinion is far different from the classical goal of promoting homonoia (political oneness) through the use of sumptuary laws and laws that establish religious belief. Forexamples of the 'West Coast' Straussians' efforts to interpret the American regime as designed to achieve classical ends see the essays in Saving the Revolution: the Federalist Papers and the American Founding, ed. Charles Kesler (New York, 1987); C. Kesler, 'The Founders and the Classics', in The Revival of Constitutionalism, ed. James W. Muller (Lincoln, NE, 1988), pp. 57-90; Colleen Sheehan, 'Madison's Party Press Essays', Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, XVII (1990), pp. 355-77; and C. Sheehan, 'The Politics of Public Opinion: James Madison's "Notes on Government"', William and Mary Quarterly, 44(1992), pp. 609-27. For a judicious evaluation of this interpretation see Harvey Flaumenhaft, 'Review of Saving the Revolution: The Federalist Papers and the American Founding', Constitutional Commentary, V (1988), pp. 460-76. For Madison's understanding of the relationship of government to public opinion see Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York, 1961), No. 49, pp. 314-15, and the essays 'Public Opinion' and 'Charters' in The Papers of James Madison, ed. William T. Hutchinson et al. (Vols. I-X, Chicago; Vols. XI-XVII, Charlottesville, VA, 1962-), XIV, pp. 170, 191. Hereafter this work will be cited as PJM. Another case for the thesis that the Framers did not abandon concern for the development of character can perhaps be built by emphasizing the federal nature of the Constitution. This argument suggests that, although the Constitution did not explicitly provide for the education of statesmen and citizens, public support of religion, and institutions which would foster political participation, the Framers simply assumed that these concerns would be addressed by the state governments. See Jean Yarbrough, 'The Constitution and Character: The Missing Critical Principle?', in To Form a More Perfect Union, ed. Belz et al., pp. 220-1, 237-48. This argument, however, depends upon documentation not only that the laws in the state governments at the time of the adoption of the Constitution addressed such concerns, but that the Framers knew this and consciously made the decision that the state governments were the proper arena for fostering education, religion and political participation. As far as I know, no study has yet proven this case.
144. Two different kinds of arguments have been made by scholars to suggest that the Founders, like classical republicans, constructed a political system that would engage in the formation of opinion and the development of a common character among the citizenry. The first, I would contend, fails, while the second is yet unproven. Several 'West Coast' Straussians have pointed to the Founders' goals of refining or filtering public opinion especially through representation and have equated this with the classical republican goal of educating and moulding public opinion and thus forming a common character among the citizenry. Madison and his colleagues of course did hope to refine public opinion and believed that representatives should represent the reason not the passions, of the public. Still, the Founders' conception of 'opinion' was modern and Humean, not classical. They argued that governments 'rest on opinion' and thus sought to secure an affective bond between the citizenry and people in order to create stability. Furthermore, Madison and many of his colleagues conceived of public opinion in a remarkably modern manner as a product of the society independent of the government and believed that when public opinion had crystallized that it was sovereign. In other words, while the 'West Coast' Straussians have emphasized the degree to which the Framers hoped to influence or even consciously mould public opinion towards fundamental values, Madison and his colleagues actually saw their role and the role of government in general as the much more limited one of refining existing public opinion in areas where it was not already set. The opinion of the citizenry, most of them believed, would be formed through education and participation in voluntary organizations, not by government. In general, then, the Founders' goal of refining public opinion is far different from the classical goal of promoting homonoia (political oneness) through the use of sumptuary laws and laws that establish religious belief. Forexamples of the 'West Coast' Straussians' efforts to interpret the American regime as designed to achieve classical ends see the essays in Saving the Revolution: the Federalist Papers and the American Founding, ed. Charles Kesler (New York, 1987); C. Kesler, 'The Founders and the Classics', in The Revival of Constitutionalism, ed. James W. Muller (Lincoln, NE, 1988), pp. 57-90; Colleen Sheehan, 'Madison's Party Press Essays', Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, XVII (1990), pp. 355-77; and C. Sheehan, 'The Politics of Public Opinion: James Madison's "Notes on Government"', William and Mary Quarterly, 44(1992), pp. 609-27. For a judicious evaluation of this interpretation see Harvey Flaumenhaft, 'Review of Saving the Revolution: The Federalist Papers and the American Founding', Constitutional Commentary, V (1988), pp. 460-76. For Madison's understanding of the relationship of government to public opinion see Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York, 1961), No. 49, pp. 314-15, and the essays 'Public Opinion' and 'Charters' in The Papers of James Madison, ed. William T. Hutchinson et al. (Vols. I-X, Chicago; Vols. XI-XVII, Charlottesville, VA, 1962-), XIV, pp. 170, 191. Hereafter this work will be cited as PJM. Another case for the thesis that the Framers did not abandon concern for the development of character can perhaps be built by emphasizing the federal nature of the Constitution. This argument suggests that, although the Constitution did not explicitly provide for the education of statesmen and citizens, public support of religion, and institutions which would foster political participation, the Framers simply assumed that these concerns would be addressed by the state governments. See Jean Yarbrough, 'The Constitution and Character: The Missing Critical Principle?', in To Form a More Perfect Union, ed. Belz et al., pp. 220-1, 237-48. This argument, however, depends upon documentation not only that the laws in the state governments at the time of the adoption of the Constitution addressed such concerns, but that the Framers knew this and consciously made the decision that the state governments were the proper arena for fostering education, religion and political participation. As far as I know, no study has yet proven this case.
145. Two different kinds of arguments have been made by scholars to suggest that the Founders, like classical republicans, constructed a political system that would engage in the formation of opinion and the development of a common character among the citizenry. The first, I would contend, fails, while the second is yet unproven. Several 'West Coast' Straussians have pointed to the Founders' goals of refining or filtering public opinion especially through representation and have equated this with the classical republican goal of educating and moulding public opinion and thus forming a common character among the citizenry. Madison and his colleagues of course did hope to refine public opinion and believed that representatives should represent the reason not the passions, of the public. Still, the Founders' conception of 'opinion' was modern and Humean, not classical. They argued that governments 'rest on opinion' and thus sought to secure an affective bond between the citizenry and people in order to create stability. Furthermore, Madison and many of his colleagues conceived of public opinion in a remarkably modern manner as a product of the society independent of the government and believed that when public opinion had crystallized that it was sovereign. In other words, while the 'West Coast' Straussians have emphasized the degree to which the Framers hoped to influence or even consciously mould public opinion towards fundamental values, Madison and his colleagues actually saw their role and the role of government in general as the much more limited one of refining existing public opinion in areas where it was not already set. The opinion of the citizenry, most of them believed, would be formed through education and participation in voluntary organizations, not by government. In general, then, the Founders' goal of refining public opinion is far different from the classical goal of promoting homonoia (political oneness) through the use of sumptuary laws and laws that establish religious belief. Forexamples of the 'West Coast' Straussians' efforts to interpret the American regime as designed to achieve classical ends see the essays in Saving the Revolution: the Federalist Papers and the American Founding, ed. Charles Kesler (New York, 1987); C. Kesler, 'The Founders and the Classics', in The Revival of Constitutionalism, ed. James W. Muller (Lincoln, NE, 1988), pp. 57-90; Colleen Sheehan, 'Madison's Party Press Essays', Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, XVII (1990), pp. 355-77; and C. Sheehan, 'The Politics of Public Opinion: James Madison's "Notes on Government"', William and Mary Quarterly, 44(1992), pp. 609-27. For a judicious evaluation of this interpretation see Harvey Flaumenhaft, 'Review of Saving the Revolution: The Federalist Papers and the American Founding', Constitutional Commentary, V (1988), pp. 460-76. For Madison's understanding of the relationship of government to public opinion see Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York, 1961), No. 49, pp. 314-15, and the essays 'Public Opinion' and 'Charters' in The Papers of James Madison, ed. William T. Hutchinson et al. (Vols. I-X, Chicago; Vols. XI-XVII, Charlottesville, VA, 1962-), XIV, pp. 170, 191. Hereafter this work will be cited as PJM. Another case for the thesis that the Framers did not abandon concern for the development of character can perhaps be built by emphasizing the federal nature of the Constitution. This argument suggests that, although the Constitution did not explicitly provide for the education of statesmen and citizens, public support of religion, and institutions which would foster political participation, the Framers simply assumed that these concerns would be addressed by the state governments. See Jean Yarbrough, 'The Constitution and Character: The Missing Critical Principle?', in To Form a More Perfect Union, ed. Belz et al., pp. 220-1, 237-48. This argument, however, depends upon documentation not only that the laws in the state governments at the time of the adoption of the Constitution addressed such concerns, but that the Framers knew this and consciously made the decision that the state governments were the proper arena for fostering education, religion and political participation. As far as I know, no study has yet proven this case.
146. Two different kinds of arguments have been made by scholars to suggest that the Founders, like classical republicans, constructed a political system that would engage in the formation of opinion and the development of a common character among the citizenry. The first, I would contend, fails, while the second is yet unproven. Several 'West Coast' Straussians have pointed to the Founders' goals of refining or filtering public opinion especially through representation and have equated this with the classical republican goal of educating and moulding public opinion and thus forming a common character among the citizenry. Madison and his colleagues of course did hope to refine public opinion and believed that representatives should represent the reason not the passions, of the public. Still, the Founders' conception of 'opinion' was modern and Humean, not classical. They argued that governments 'rest on opinion' and thus sought to secure an affective bond between the citizenry and people in order to create stability. Furthermore, Madison and many of his colleagues conceived of public opinion in a remarkably modern manner as a product of the society independent of the government and believed that when public opinion had crystallized that it was sovereign. In other words, while the 'West Coast' Straussians have emphasized the degree to which the Framers hoped to influence or even consciously mould public opinion towards fundamental values, Madison and his colleagues actually saw their role and the role of government in general as the much more limited one of refining existing public opinion in areas where it was not already set. The opinion of the citizenry, most of them believed, would be formed through education and participation in voluntary organizations, not by government. In general, then, the Founders' goal of refining public opinion is far different from the classical goal of promoting homonoia (political oneness) through the use of sumptuary laws and laws that establish religious belief. Forexamples of the 'West Coast' Straussians' efforts to interpret the American regime as designed to achieve classical ends see the essays in Saving the Revolution: the Federalist Papers and the American Founding, ed. Charles Kesler (New York, 1987); C. Kesler, 'The Founders and the Classics', in The Revival of Constitutionalism, ed. James W. Muller (Lincoln, NE, 1988), pp. 57-90; Colleen Sheehan, 'Madison's Party Press Essays', Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, XVII (1990), pp. 355-77; and C. Sheehan, 'The Politics of Public Opinion: James Madison's "Notes on Government"', William and Mary Quarterly, 44(1992), pp. 609-27. For a judicious evaluation of this interpretation see Harvey Flaumenhaft, 'Review of Saving the Revolution: The Federalist Papers and the American Founding', Constitutional Commentary, V (1988), pp. 460-76. For Madison's understanding of the relationship of government to public opinion see Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York, 1961), No. 49, pp. 314-15, and the essays 'Public Opinion' and 'Charters' in The Papers of James Madison, ed. William T. Hutchinson et al. (Vols. I-X, Chicago; Vols. XI-XVII, Charlottesville, VA, 1962-), XIV, pp. 170, 191. Hereafter this work will be cited as PJM. Another case for the thesis that the Framers did not abandon concern for the development of character can perhaps be built by emphasizing the federal nature of the Constitution. This argument suggests that, although the Constitution did not explicitly provide for the education of statesmen and citizens, public support of religion, and institutions which would foster political participation, the Framers simply assumed that these concerns would be addressed by the state governments. See Jean Yarbrough, 'The Constitution and Character: The Missing Critical Principle?', in To Form a More Perfect Union, ed. Belz et al., pp. 220-1, 237-48. This argument, however, depends upon documentation not only that the laws in the state governments at the time of the adoption of the Constitution addressed such concerns, but that the Framers knew this and consciously made the decision that the state governments were the proper arena for fostering education, religion and political participation. As far as I know, no study has yet proven this case.
147. Two different kinds of arguments have been made by scholars to suggest that the Founders, like classical republicans, constructed a political system that would engage in the formation of opinion and the development of a common character among the citizenry. The first, I would contend, fails, while the second is yet unproven. Several 'West Coast' Straussians have pointed to the Founders' goals of refining or filtering public opinion especially through representation and have equated this with the classical republican goal of educating and moulding public opinion and thus forming a common character among the citizenry. Madison and his colleagues of course did hope to refine public opinion and believed that representatives should represent the reason not the passions, of the public. Still, the Founders' conception of 'opinion' was modern and Humean, not classical. They argued that governments 'rest on opinion' and thus sought to secure an affective bond between the citizenry and people in order to create stability. Furthermore, Madison and many of his colleagues conceived of public opinion in a remarkably modern manner as a product of the society independent of the government and believed that when public opinion had crystallized that it was sovereign. In other words, while the 'West Coast' Straussians have emphasized the degree to which the Framers hoped to influence or even consciously mould public opinion towards fundamental values, Madison and his colleagues actually saw their role and the role of government in general as the much more limited one of refining existing public opinion in areas where it was not already set. The opinion of the citizenry, most of them believed, would be formed through education and participation in voluntary organizations, not by government. In general, then, the Founders' goal of refining public opinion is far different from the classical goal of promoting homonoia (political oneness) through the use of sumptuary laws and laws that establish religious belief. Forexamples of the 'West Coast' Straussians' efforts to interpret the American regime as designed to achieve classical ends see the essays in Saving the Revolution: the Federalist Papers and the American Founding, ed. Charles Kesler (New York, 1987); C. Kesler, 'The Founders and the Classics', in The Revival of Constitutionalism, ed. James W. Muller (Lincoln, NE, 1988), pp. 57-90; Colleen Sheehan, 'Madison's Party Press Essays', Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, XVII (1990), pp. 355-77; and C. Sheehan, 'The Politics of Public Opinion: James Madison's "Notes on Government"', William and Mary Quarterly, 44(1992), pp. 609-27. For a judicious evaluation of this interpretation see Harvey Flaumenhaft, 'Review of Saving the Revolution: The Federalist Papers and the American Founding', Constitutional Commentary, V (1988), pp. 460-76. For Madison's understanding of the relationship of government to public opinion see Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York, 1961), No. 49, pp. 314-15, and the essays 'Public Opinion' and 'Charters' in The Papers of James Madison, ed. William T. Hutchinson et al. (Vols. I-X, Chicago; Vols. XI-XVII, Charlottesville, VA, 1962-), XIV, pp. 170, 191. Hereafter this work will be cited as PJM. Another case for the thesis that the Framers did not abandon concern for the development of character can perhaps be built by emphasizing the federal nature of the Constitution. This argument suggests that, although the Constitution did not explicitly provide for the education of statesmen and citizens, public support of religion, and institutions which would foster political participation, the Framers simply assumed that these concerns would be addressed by the state governments. See Jean Yarbrough, 'The Constitution and
148. Two different kinds of arguments have been made by scholars to suggest that the Founders, like classical republicans, constructed a political system that would engage in the formation of opinion and the development of a common character among the citizenry. The first, I would contend, fails, while the second is yet unproven. Several 'West Coast' Straussians have pointed to the Founders' goals of refining or filtering public opinion especially through representation and have equated this with the classical republican goal of educating and moulding public opinion and thus forming a common character among the citizenry. Madison and his colleagues of course did hope to refine public opinion and believed that representatives should represent the reason not the passions, of the public. Still, the Founders' conception of 'opinion' was modern and Humean, not classical. They argued that governments 'rest on opinion' and thus sought to secure an affective bond between the citizenry and people in order to create stability. Furthermore, Madison and many of his colleagues conceived of public opinion in a remarkably modern manner as a product of the society independent of the government and believed that when public opinion had crystallized that it was sovereign. In other words, while the 'West Coast' Straussians have emphasized the degree to which the Framers hoped to influence or even consciously mould public opinion towards fundamental values, Madison and his colleagues actually saw their role and the role of government in general as the much more limited one of refining existing public opinion in areas where it was not already set. The opinion of the citizenry, most of them believed, would be formed through education and participation in voluntary organizations, not by government. In general, then, the Founders' goal of refining public opinion is far different from the classical goal of promoting homonoia (political oneness) through the use of sumptuary laws and laws that establish religious belief. Forexamples of the 'West Coast' Straussians' efforts to interpret the American regime as designed to achieve classical ends see the essays in Saving the Revolution: the Federalist Papers and the American Founding, ed. Charles Kesler (New York, 1987); C. Kesler, 'The Founders and the Classics', in The Revival of Constitutionalism, ed. James W. Muller (Lincoln, NE, 1988), pp. 57-90; Colleen Sheehan, 'Madison's Party Press Essays', Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, XVII (1990), pp. 355-77; and C. Sheehan, 'The Politics of Public Opinion: James Madison's "Notes on Government"', William and Mary Quarterly, 44(1992), pp. 609-27. For a judicious evaluation of this interpretation see Harvey Flaumenhaft, 'Review of Saving the Revolution: The Federalist Papers and the American Founding', Constitutional Commentary, V (1988), pp. 460-76. For Madison's understanding of the relationship of government to public opinion see Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York, 1961), No. 49, pp. 314-15, and the essays 'Public Opinion' and 'Charters' in The Papers of James Madison, ed. William T. Hutchinson et al. (Vols. I-X, Chicago; Vols. XI-XVII, Charlottesville, VA, 1962-), XIV, pp. 170, 191. Hereafter this work will be cited as PJM. Another case for the thesis that the Framers did not abandon concern for the development of character can perhaps be built by emphasizing the federal nature of the Constitution. This argument suggests that, although the Constitution did not explicitly provide for the education of statesmen and citizens, public support of religion, and institutions which would foster political participation, the Framers simply assumed that these concerns would be addressed by the state governments. See Jean Yarbrough, 'The Constitution and Character: The Missing Critical Principle?', in To Form a More Perfect Union, ed. Belz et al., pp. 220-1, 237-48. This argument, however, depends upon documentation not only that the laws in the state governments at the time of the adoption of the Constitution addressed such concerns, but that the Framers knew this and consciously made the decision that the state governments were the proper arena for fostering education, religion and political participation. As far as I know, no study has yet proven this case.
149. Two different kinds of arguments have been made by scholars to suggest that the Founders, like classical republicans, constructed a political system that would engage in the formation of opinion and the development of a common character among the citizenry. The first, I would contend, fails, while the second is yet unproven. Several 'West Coast' Straussians have pointed to the Founders' goals of refining or filtering public opinion especially through representation and have equated this with the classical republican goal of educating and moulding public opinion and thus forming a common character among the citizenry. Madison and his colleagues of course did hope to refine public opinion and believed that representatives should represent the reason not the passions, of the public. Still, the Founders' conception of 'opinion' was modern and Humean, not classical. They argued that governments 'rest on opinion' and thus sought to secure an affective bond between the citizenry and people in order to create stability. Furthermore, Madison and many of his colleagues conceived of public opinion in a remarkably modern manner as a product of the society independent of the government and believed that when public opinion had crystallized that it was sovereign. In other words, while the 'West Coast' Straussians have emphasized the degree to which the Framers hoped to influence or even consciously mould public opinion towards fundamental values, Madison and his colleagues actually saw their role and the role of government in general as the much more limited one of refining existing public opinion in areas where it was not already set. The opinion of the citizenry, most of them believed, would be formed through education and participation in voluntary organizations, not by government. In general, then, the Founders' goal of refining public opinion is far different from the classical goal of promoting homonoia (political oneness) through the use of sumptuary laws and laws that establish religious belief. Forexamples of the 'West Coast' Straussians' efforts to interpret the American regime as designed to achieve classical ends see the essays in Saving the Revolution: the Federalist Papers and the American Founding, ed. Charles Kesler (New York, 1987); C. Kesler, 'The Founders and the Classics', in The Revival of Constitutionalism, ed. James W. Muller (Lincoln, NE, 1988), pp. 57-90; Colleen Sheehan, 'Madison's Party Press Essays', Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, XVII (1990), pp. 355-77; and C. Sheehan, 'The Politics of Public Opinion: James Madison's "Notes on Government"', William and Mary Quarterly, 44(1992), pp. 609-27. For a judicious evaluation of this interpretation see Harvey Flaumenhaft, 'Review of Saving the Revolution: The Federalist Papers and the American Founding', Constitutional Commentary, V (1988), pp. 460-76. For Madison's understanding of the relationship of government to public opinion see Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York, 1961), No. 49, pp. 314-15, and the essays 'Public Opinion' and 'Charters' in The Papers of James Madison, ed. William T. Hutchinson et al. (Vols. I-X, Chicago; Vols. XI-XVII, Charlottesville, VA, 1962-), XIV, pp. 170, 191. Hereafter this work will be cited as PJM. Another case for the thesis that the Framers did not abandon concern for the development of character can perhaps be built by emphasizing the federal nature of the Constitution. This argument suggests that, although the Constitution did not explicitly provide for the education of statesmen and citizens, public support of religion, and institutions which would foster political participation, the Framers simply assumed that these concerns would be addressed by the state governments. See Jean Yarbrough, 'The Constitution and Character: The Missing Critical Principle?', in To Form a More Perfect Union, ed. Belz et al., pp. 220-1, 237-48. This argument, however, depends upon documentation not only that the laws in the state governments at the time of the adoption of the Constitution addressed such concerns, but that the Framers knew this and consciously made the decision that the state governments were the proper arena for fostering education, religion and political participation. As far as I know, no study has yet proven this case.
150. Two different kinds of arguments have been made by scholars to suggest that the Founders, like classical republicans, constructed a political system that would engage in the formation of opinion and the development of a common character among the citizenry. The first, I would contend, fails, while the second is yet unproven. Several 'West Coast' Straussians have pointed to the Founders' goals of refining or filtering public opinion especially through representation and have equated this with the classical republican goal of educating and moulding public opinion and thus forming a common character among the citizenry. Madison and his colleagues of course did hope to refine public opinion and believed that representatives should represent the reason not the passions, of the public. Still, the Founders' conception of 'opinion' was modern and Humean, not classical. They argued that governments 'rest on opinion' and thus sought to secure an affective bond between the citizenry and people in order to create stability. Furthermore, Madison and many of his colleagues conceived of public opinion in a remarkably modern manner as a product of the society independent of the government and believed that when public opinion had crystallized that it was sovereign. In other words, while the 'West Coast' Straussians have emphasized the degree to which the Framers hoped to influence or even consciously mould public opinion towards fundamental values, Madison and his colleagues actually saw their role and the role of government in general as the much more limited one of refining existing public opinion in areas where it was not already set. The opinion of the citizenry, most of them believed, would be formed through education and participation in voluntary organizations, not by government. In general, then, the Founders' goal of refining public opinion is far different from the classical goal of promoting homonoia (political oneness) through the use of sumptuary laws and laws that establish religious belief. Forexamples of the 'West Coast' Straussians' efforts to interpret the American regime as designed to achieve classical ends see the essays in Saving the Revolution: the Federalist Papers and the American Founding, ed. Charles Kesler (New York, 1987); C. Kesler, 'The Founders and the Classics', in The Revival of Constitutionalism, ed. James W. Muller (Lincoln, NE, 1988), pp. 57-90; Colleen Sheehan, 'Madison's Party Press Essays', Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, XVII (1990), pp. 355-77; and C. Sheehan, 'The Politics of Public Opinion: James Madison's "Notes on Government"', William and Mary Quarterly, 44(1992), pp. 609-27. For a judicious evaluation of this interpretation see Harvey Flaumenhaft, 'Review of Saving the Revolution: The Federalist Papers and the American Founding', Constitutional Commentary, V (1988), pp. 460-76. For Madison's understanding of the relationship of government to public opinion see Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York, 1961), No. 49, pp. 314-15, and the essays 'Public Opinion' and 'Charters' in The Papers of James Madison, ed. William T. Hutchinson et al. (Vols. I-X, Chicago; Vols. XI-XVII, Charlottesville, VA, 1962-), XIV, pp. 170, 191. Hereafter this work will be cited as PJM. Another case for the thesis that the Framers did not abandon concern for the development of character can perhaps be built by emphasizing the federal nature of the Constitution. This argument suggests that, although the Constitution did not explicitly provide for the education of statesmen and citizens, public support of religion, and institutions which would foster political participation, the Framers simply assumed that these concerns would be addressed by the state governments. See Jean Yarbrough, 'The Constitution and Character: The Missing Critical Principle?', in To Form a More Perfect Union, ed. Belz et al., pp. 220-1, 237-48. This argument, however, depends upon documentation not only that the laws in the state governments at the time of the adoption of the Constitution addressed such concerns, but that the Framers knew this and consciously made the decision that the state governments were the proper arena for fostering education, religion and political participation. As far as I know, no study has yet proven this case.
151. Rigorous definitions and conceptual clarity, however, are what this debate has of course lacked. As a result, much of the disagreement between scholars who espouse a republican interpretation and their Neo-Lockean opponents has really been a submerged debate over the meaning of classical republicanism itself, not simply the content of the Founders' political thought. These scholars, in other words, have often argued past each other because they have used different standards for what constitutes classical republicanism. For their part, the republican revisionists have implied or set forth a series of definitions within their works. Indeed, as Michael Zuckert has recently pointed out, a retrospective rereading of the masterworks of the republican interpretation challenges whether these scholars ever achieved a common characterization of republicanism and thus whether this interpretation merits its appellation as a synthesis. As it was initially formulated by Bernard Bailyn in The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, English opposition ideology (he did not call it classical republicanism) was characterized as a set of concepts, anxieties, hopes, and calls for specific institutional arrangements and reforms that were pervasive in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English radical thought and became especially important in America during the Revolution. Specifically, Bailyn argued that this ideology was grounded in then commonplace political concepts such as natural rights, the contractual basis of government and praise for England's mixed Constitution. But its peculiarity came from the emphasis with which its spokesmen stressed the fragility of republics, the encroaching nature of power and the danger to liberty of rulers wielding it, fear of ministerial corruption by placemen, the necessity of vigilance against government, concern for the moral qualities that were necessary to preserve liberty including the importance of an independent, uncorrupted, land-holding citizenry, and finally appeals for a range of institutional reforms from adult manhood suffrage to binding instructions on representatives. Bailyn then interpreted this universe of concepts and apprehensions as a form of libertarianism or a 'peculiar strain of anti-authoritarianism' rooted in 'extreme solicitude for the individual and an equal hostility to government'. This ideology, he further contended, carried into modernity 'the traditional anti-statist convictions of seventeenth-century liberalism'. Bailyn thus did not contrast Anglo-American republicanism with the social contract-natural rights tradition or charge it with many of the connotations that it would later be given. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA, 1967), pp. viii, 48; B. Bailyn, 'The Central Themes of the American Revolution: An Interpretation', in Essays on the American Revolution, ed. Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson (Chapel Hill, NC, 1973), p. 9 . In different ways, however, Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York, 1969) and J.G.A. Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ, 1975) transformed this understanding of Anglo-American republicanism. Wood linked English opposition ideology to an organic conception of the public good and argued that the American Revolutionaries believed that the sole purpose of government was to promote the public good. Meanwhile, Pocock maintained that English opposition ideology was a restatement of the classical republican or, as he called it, a civic humanism conception of political liberty. For Zuckert's analysis of the different variations of republicanism present in the 'republicanism synthesis' and the evolution of this interpretation see Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism, pp. 151-64. During the 1980s, as the interpretations of the republican synthesis became more and more influential and began to be used by a variety of scholars for contemporary political purposes, classical republicanism seemingly came to be identified with both the hopes, anxieties, concepts and institutional arrangements that Bailyn had originally identified from radical Whig ideology and the three political concepts identified in the writings of Pocock and Wood: political liberty understood as the necessity of participating in ruling and being ruled in a political community, virtue understood as requiring self-sacrifice for the public good, and the public good or common interest understood as an entity that transcended the aggregate interests of the community and was not simply a residue of self-interested competition among special-interest groups. In contrast to these understandings of classical republicanism, the Aristotelean characterization of classical republicanism that I use as a standard above is drawn from Paul Rahe's Republics: Ancient and Modern.
152. Rigorous definitions and conceptual clarity, however, are what this debate has of course lacked. As a result, much of the disagreement between scholars who espouse a republican interpretation and their Neo-Lockean opponents has really been a submerged debate over the meaning of classical republicanism itself, not simply the content of the Founders' political thought. These scholars, in other words, have often argued past each other because they have used different standards for what constitutes classical republicanism. For their part, the republican revisionists have implied or set forth a series of definitions within their works. Indeed, as Michael Zuckert has recently pointed out, a retrospective rereading of the masterworks of the republican interpretation challenges whether these scholars ever achieved a common characterization of republicanism and thus whether this interpretation merits its appellation as a synthesis. As it was initially formulated by Bernard Bailyn in The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, English opposition ideology (he did not call it classical republicanism) was characterized as a set of concepts, anxieties, hopes, and calls for specific institutional arrangements and reforms that were pervasive in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English radical thought and became especially important in America during the Revolution. Specifically, Bailyn argued that this ideology was grounded in then commonplace political concepts such as natural rights, the contractual basis of government and praise for England's mixed Constitution. But its peculiarity came from the emphasis with which its spokesmen stressed the fragility of republics, the encroaching nature of power and the danger to liberty of rulers wielding it, fear of ministerial corruption by placemen, the necessity of vigilance against government, concern for the moral qualities that were necessary to preserve liberty including the importance of an independent, uncorrupted, land-holding citizenry, and finally appeals for a range of institutional reforms from adult manhood suffrage to binding instructions on representatives. Bailyn then interpreted this universe of concepts and apprehensions as a form of libertarianism or a 'peculiar strain of anti-authoritarianism' rooted in 'extreme solicitude for the individual and an equal hostility to government'. This ideology, he further contended, carried into modernity 'the traditional anti-statist convictions of seventeenth-century liberalism'. Bailyn thus did not contrast Anglo-American republicanism with the social contract-natural rights tradition or charge it with many of the connotations that it would later be given. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA, 1967), pp. viii, 48; B. Bailyn, 'The Central Themes of the American Revolution: An Interpretation', in Essays on the American Revolution, ed. Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson (Chapel Hill, NC, 1973), p. 9 . In different ways, however, Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York, 1969) and J.G.A. Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ, 1975) transformed this understanding of Anglo-American republicanism. Wood linked English opposition ideology to an organic conception of the public good and argued that the American Revolutionaries believed that the sole purpose of government was to promote the public good. Meanwhile, Pocock maintained that English opposition ideology was a restatement of the classical republican or, as he called it, a civic humanism conception of political liberty. For Zuckert's analysis of the different variations of republicanism present in the 'republicanism synthesis' and the evolution of this interpretation see Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism, pp. 151-64. During the 1980s, as the interpretations of the republican synthesis became more and more influential and began to be used by a variety of scholars for contemporary political purposes, classical republicanism seemingly came to be identified with both the hopes, anxieties, concepts and institutional arrangements that Bailyn had originally identified from radical Whig ideology and the three political concepts identified in the writings of Pocock and Wood: political liberty understood as the necessity of participating in ruling and being ruled in a political community, virtue understood as requiring self-sacrifice for the public good, and the public good or common interest understood as an entity that transcended the aggregate interests of the community and was not simply a residue of self-interested competition among special-interest groups. In contrast to these understandings of classical republicanism, the Aristotelean characterization of classical republicanism that I use as a standard above is drawn from Paul Rahe's Republics: Ancient and Modern.
153. Rigorous definitions and conceptual clarity, however, are what this debate has of course lacked. As a result, much of the disagreement between scholars who espouse a republican interpretation and their Neo-Lockean opponents has really been a submerged debate over the meaning of classical republicanism itself, not simply the content of the Founders' political thought. These scholars, in other words, have often argued past each other because they have used different standards for what constitutes classical republicanism. For their part, the republican revisionists have implied or set forth a series of definitions within their works. Indeed, as Michael Zuckert has recently pointed out, a retrospective rereading of the masterworks of the republican interpretation challenges whether these scholars ever achieved a common characterization of republicanism and thus whether this interpretation merits its appellation as a synthesis. As it was initially formulated by Bernard Bailyn in The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, English opposition ideology (he did not call it classical republicanism) was characterized as a set of concepts, anxieties, hopes, and calls for specific institutional arrangements and reforms that were pervasive in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English radical thought and became especially important in America during the Revolution. Specifically, Bailyn argued that this ideology was grounded in then commonplace political concepts such as natural rights, the contractual basis of government and praise for England's mixed Constitution. But its peculiarity came from the emphasis with which its spokesmen stressed the fragility of republics, the encroaching nature of power and the danger to liberty of rulers wielding it, fear of ministerial corruption by placemen, the necessity of vigilance against government, concern for the moral qualities that were necessary to preserve liberty including the importance of an independent, uncorrupted, land-holding citizenry, and finally appeals for a range of institutional reforms from adult manhood suffrage to binding instructions on representatives. Bailyn then interpreted this universe of concepts and apprehensions as a form of libertarianism or a 'peculiar strain of anti-authoritarianism' rooted in 'extreme solicitude for the individual and an equal hostility to government'. This ideology, he further contended, carried into modernity 'the traditional anti-statist convictions of seventeenth-century liberalism'. Bailyn thus did not contrast Anglo-American republicanism with the social contract-natural rights tradition or charge it with many of the connotations that it would later be given. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA, 1967), pp. viii, 48; B. Bailyn, 'The Central Themes of the American Revolution: An Interpretation', in Essays on the American Revolution, ed. Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson (Chapel Hill, NC, 1973), p. 9 . In different ways, however, Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York, 1969) and J.G.A. Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ, 1975) transformed this understanding of Anglo-American republicanism. Wood linked English opposition ideology to an organic conception of the public good and argued that the American Revolutionaries believed that the sole purpose of government was to promote the public good. Meanwhile, Pocock maintained that English opposition ideology was a restatement of the classical republican or, as he called it, a civic humanism conception of political liberty. For Zuckert's analysis of the different variations of republicanism present in the 'republicanism synthesis' and the evolution of this interpretation see Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism, pp. 151-64. During the 1980s, as the interpretations of the republican synthesis became more and more influential and began to be used by a variety of scholars for contemporary political purposes, classical republicanism seemingly came to be identified with both the hopes, anxieties, concepts and institutional arrangements that Bailyn had originally identified from radical Whig ideology and the three political concepts identified in the writings of Pocock and Wood: political liberty understood as the necessity of participating in ruling and being ruled in a political community, virtue understood as requiring self-sacrifice for the public good, and the public good or common interest understood as an entity that transcended the aggregate interests of the community and was not simply a residue of self-interested competition among special-interest groups. In contrast to these understandings of classical republicanism, the Aristotelean characterization of classical republicanism that I use as a standard above is drawn from Paul Rahe's Republics: Ancient and Modern.
154. Rigorous definitions and conceptual clarity, however, are what this debate has of course lacked. As a result, much of the disagreement between scholars who espouse a republican interpretation and their Neo-Lockean opponents has really been a submerged debate over the meaning of classical republicanism itself, not simply the content of the Founders' political thought. These scholars, in other words, have often argued past each other because they have used different standards for what constitutes classical republicanism. For their part, the republican revisionists have implied or set forth a series of definitions within their works. Indeed, as Michael Zuckert has recently pointed out, a retrospective rereading of the masterworks of the republican interpretation challenges whether these scholars ever achieved a common characterization of republicanism and thus whether this interpretation merits its appellation as a synthesis. As it was initially formulated by Bernard Bailyn in The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, English opposition ideology (he did not call it classical republicanism) was characterized as a set of concepts, anxieties, hopes, and calls for specific institutional arrangements and reforms that were pervasive in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English radical thought and became especially important in America during the Revolution. Specifically, Bailyn argued that this ideology was grounded in then commonplace political concepts such as natural rights, the contractual basis of government and praise for England's mixed Constitution. But its peculiarity came from the emphasis with which its spokesmen stressed the fragility of republics, the encroaching nature of power and the danger to liberty of rulers wielding it, fear of ministerial corruption by placemen, the necessity of vigilance against government, concern for the moral qualities that were necessary to preserve liberty including the importance of an independent, uncorrupted, land-holding citizenry, and finally appeals for a range of institutional reforms from adult manhood suffrage to binding instructions on representatives. Bailyn then interpreted this universe of concepts and apprehensions as a form of libertarianism or a 'peculiar strain of anti-authoritarianism' rooted in 'extreme solicitude for the individual and an equal hostility to government'. This ideology, he further contended, carried into modernity 'the traditional anti-statist convictions of seventeenth-century liberalism'. Bailyn thus did not contrast Anglo-American republicanism with the social contract-natural rights tradition or charge it with many of the connotations that it would later be given. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA, 1967), pp. viii, 48; B. Bailyn, 'The Central Themes of the American Revolution: An Interpretation', in Essays on the American Revolution, ed. Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson (Chapel Hill, NC, 1973), p. 9 . In different ways, however, Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York, 1969) and J.G.A. Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ, 1975) transformed this understanding of Anglo-American republicanism. Wood linked English opposition ideology to an organic conception of the public good and argued that the American Revolutionaries believed that the sole purpose of government was to promote the public good. Meanwhile, Pocock maintained that English opposition ideology was a restatement of the classical republican or, as he called it, a civic humanism conception of political liberty. For Zuckert's analysis of the different variations of republicanism present in the 'republicanism synthesis' and the evolution of this interpretation see Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism, pp. 151-64. During the 1980s, as the interpretations of the republican synthesis became more and more influential and began to be used by a variety of scholars for contemporary political purposes, classical republicanism seemingly came to be identified with both the hopes, anxieties, concepts and institutional arrangements that Bailyn had originally identified from radical Whig ideology and the three political concepts identified in the writings of Pocock and Wood: political liberty understood as the necessity of participating in ruling and being ruled in a political community, virtue understood as requiring self-sacrifice for the public good, and the public good or common interest understood as an entity that transcended the aggregate interests of the community and was not simply a residue of self-interested competition among special-interest groups. In contrast to these understandings of classical republicanism, the Aristotelean characterization of classical republicanism that I use as a standard above is drawn from Paul Rahe's Republics: Ancient and Modern.
155. Rigorous definitions and conceptual clarity, however, are what this debate has of course lacked. As a result, much of the disagreement between scholars who espouse a republican interpretation and their Neo-Lockean opponents has really been a submerged debate over the meaning of classical republicanism itself, not simply the content of the Founders' political thought. These scholars, in other words, have often argued past each other because they have used different standards for what constitutes classical republicanism. For their part, the republican revisionists have implied or set forth a series of definitions within their works. Indeed, as Michael Zuckert has recently pointed out, a retrospective rereading of the masterworks of the republican interpretation challenges whether these scholars ever achieved a common characterization of republicanism and thus whether this interpretation merits its appellation as a synthesis. As it was initially formulated by Bernard Bailyn in The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, English opposition ideology (he did not call it classical republicanism) was characterized as a set of concepts, anxieties, hopes, and calls for specific institutional arrangements and reforms that were pervasive in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English radical thought and became especially important in America during the Revolution. Specifically, Bailyn argued that this ideology was grounded in then commonplace political concepts such as natural rights, the contractual basis of government and praise for England's mixed Constitution. But its peculiarity came from the emphasis with which its spokesmen stressed the fragility of republics, the encroaching nature of power and the danger to liberty of rulers wielding it, fear of ministerial corruption by placemen, the necessity of vigilance against government, concern for the moral qualities that were necessary to preserve liberty including the importance of an independent, uncorrupted, land-holding citizenry, and finally appeals for a range of institutional reforms from adult manhood suffrage to binding instructions on representatives. Bailyn then interpreted this universe of concepts and apprehensions as a form of libertarianism or a 'peculiar strain of anti-authoritarianism' rooted in 'extreme solicitude for the individual and an equal hostility to government'. This ideology, he further contended, carried into modernity 'the traditional anti-statist convictions of seventeenth-century liberalism'. Bailyn thus did not contrast Anglo-American republicanism with the social contract-natural rights tradition or charge it with many of the connotations that it would later be given. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA, 1967), pp. viii, 48; B. Bailyn, 'The Central Themes of the American Revolution: An Interpretation', in Essays on the American Revolution, ed. Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson (Chapel Hill, NC, 1973), p. 9 . In different ways, however, Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York, 1969) and J.G.A. Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ, 1975) transformed this understanding of Anglo-American republicanism. Wood linked English opposition ideology to an organic conception of the public good and argued that the American Revolutionaries believed that the sole purpose of government was to promote the public good. Meanwhile, Pocock maintained that English opposition ideology was a restatement of the classical republican or, as he called it, a civic humanism conception of political liberty. For Zuckert's analysis of the different variations of republicanism present in the 'republicanism synthesis' and the evolution of this interpretation see Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism, pp. 151-64. During the 1980s, as the interpretations of the republican synthesis became more and more influential and began to be used by a variety of scholars for contemporary political purposes, classical republicanism seemingly came to be identified with both the hopes, anxieties, concepts and institutional arrangements that Bailyn had originally identified from radical Whig ideology and the three political concepts identified in the writings of Pocock and Wood: political liberty understood as the necessity of participating in ruling and being ruled in a political community, virtue understood as requiring self-sacrifice for the public good, and the public good or common interest understood as an entity that transcended the aggregate interests of the community and was not simply a residue of self-interested competition among special-interest groups. In contrast to these understandings of classical republicanism, the Aristotelean characterization of classical republicanism that I use as a standard above is drawn from Paul Rahe's Republics: Ancient and Modern.
156. Rigorous definitions and conceptual clarity, however, are what this debate has of course lacked. As a result, much of the disagreement between scholars who espouse a republican interpretation and their Neo-Lockean opponents has really been a submerged debate over the meaning of classical republicanism itself, not simply the content of the Founders' political thought. These scholars, in other words, have often argued past each other because they have used different standards for what constitutes classical republicanism. For their part, the republican revisionists have implied or set forth a series of definitions within their works. Indeed, as Michael Zuckert has recently pointed out, a retrospective rereading of the masterworks of the republican interpretation challenges whether these scholars ever achieved a common characterization of republicanism and thus whether this interpretation merits its appellation as a synthesis. As it was initially formulated by Bernard Bailyn in The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, English opposition ideology (he did not call it classical republicanism) was characterized as a set of concepts, anxieties, hopes, and calls for specific institutional arrangements and reforms that were pervasive in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English radical thought and became especially important in America during the Revolution. Specifically, Bailyn argued that this ideology was grounded in then commonplace political concepts such as natural rights, the contractual basis of government and praise for England's mixed Constitution. But its peculiarity came from the emphasis with which its spokesmen stressed the fragility of republics, the encroaching nature of power and the danger to liberty of rulers wielding it, fear of ministerial corruption by placemen, the necessity of vigilance against government, concern for the moral qualities that were necessary to preserve liberty including the importance of an independent, uncorrupted, land-holding citizenry, and finally appeals for a range of institutional reforms from adult manhood suffrage to binding instructions on representatives. Bailyn then interpreted this universe of concepts and apprehensions as a form of libertarianism or a 'peculiar strain of anti-authoritarianism' rooted in 'extreme solicitude for the individual and an equal hostility to government'. This ideology, he further contended, carried into modernity 'the traditional anti-statist convictions of seventeenth-century liberalism'. Bailyn thus did not contrast Anglo-American republicanism with the social contract-natural rights tradition or charge it with many of the connotations that it would later be given. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA, 1967), pp. viii, 48; B. Bailyn, 'The Central Themes of the American Revolution: An Interpretation', in Essays on the American Revolution, ed. Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson (Chapel Hill, NC, 1973), p. 9 . In different ways, however, Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York, 1969) and J.G.A. Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ, 1975) transformed this understanding of Anglo-American republicanism. Wood linked English opposition ideology to an organic conception of the public good and argued that the American Revolutionaries believed that the sole purpose of government was to promote the public good. Meanwhile, Pocock maintained that English opposition ideology was a restatement of the classical republican or, as he called it, a civic humanism conception of political liberty. For Zuckert's analysis of the different variations of republicanism present in the 'republicanism synthesis' and the evolution of this interpretation see Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism, pp. 151-64. During the 1980s, as the interpretations of the republican synthesis became more and more influential and began to be used by a variety of scholars for contemporary political purposes, classical republicanism seemingly came to be identified with both the hopes, anxieties, concepts and institutional arrangements that Bailyn had originally identified from radical Whig ideology and the three political concepts identified in the writings of Pocock and Wood: political liberty understood as the necessity of participating in ruling and being ruled in a political community, virtue understood as requiring self-sacrifice for the public good, and the public good or common interest understood as an entity that transcended the aggregate interests of the community and was not simply a residue of self-interested competition among special-interest groups. In contrast to these understandings of classical republicanism, the Aristotelean characterization of classical republicanism that I use as a standard above is drawn from Paul Rahe's Republics: Ancient and Modern.
157. Rigorous definitions and conceptual clarity, however, are what this debate has of course lacked. As a result, much of the disagreement between scholars who espouse a republican interpretation and their Neo-Lockean opponents has really been a submerged debate over the meaning of classical republicanism itself, not simply the content of the Founders' political thought. These scholars, in other words, have often argued past each other because they have used different standards for what constitutes classical republicanism. For their part, the republican revisionists have implied or set forth a series of definitions within their works. Indeed, as Michael Zuckert has recently pointed out, a retrospective rereading of the masterworks of the republican interpretation challenges whether these scholars ever achieved a common characterization of republicanism and thus whether this interpretation merits its appellation as a synthesis. As it was initially formulated by Bernard Bailyn in The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, English opposition ideology (he did not call it classical republicanism) was characterized as a set of concepts, anxieties, hopes, and calls for specific institutional arrangements and reforms that were pervasive in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English radical thought and became especially important in America during the Revolution. Specifically, Bailyn argued that this ideology was grounded in then commonplace political concepts such as natural rights, the contractual basis of government and praise for England's mixed Constitution. But its peculiarity came from the emphasis with which its spokesmen stressed the fragility of republics, the encroaching nature of power and the danger to liberty of rulers wielding it, fear of ministerial corruption by placemen, the necessity of vigilance against government, concern for the moral qualities that were necessary to preserve liberty including the importance of an independent, uncorrupted, land-holding citizenry, and finally appeals for a range of institutional reforms from adult manhood suffrage to binding instructions on representatives. Bailyn then interpreted this universe of concepts and apprehensions as a form of libertarianism or a 'peculiar strain of anti-authoritarianism' rooted in 'extreme solicitude for the individual and an equal hostility to government'. This ideology, he further contended, carried into modernity 'the traditional anti-statist convictions of seventeenth-century liberalism'. Bailyn thus did not contrast Anglo-American republicanism with the social contract-natural rights tradition or charge it with many of the connotations that it would later be given. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA, 1967), pp. viii, 48; B. Bailyn, 'The Central Themes of the American Revolution: An Interpretation', in Essays on the American Revolution, ed. Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson (Chapel Hill, NC, 1973), p. 9 . In different ways, however, Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York, 1969) and J.G.A. Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ, 1975) transformed this understanding of Anglo-American republicanism. Wood linked English opposition ideology to an organic conception of the public good and argued that the American Revolutionaries believed that the sole purpose of government was to promote the public good. Meanwhile, Pocock maintained that English opposition ideology was a restatement of the classical republican or, as he called it, a civic humanism conception of political liberty. For Zuckert's analysis of the different variations of republicanism present in the 'republicanism synthesis' and the evolution of this interpretation see Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism, pp. 151-64. During the 1980s, as the interpretations of the republican synthesis became more and more influential and began to be used by a variety of scholars for contemporary political purposes, classical republicanism seemingly came to be identified with both the hopes, anxieties, concepts and institutional arrangements that Bailyn had originally identified from radical Whig ideology and the three political concepts identified in the writings of Pocock and Wood: political liberty understood as the necessity of participating in ruling and being ruled in a political community, virtue understood as requiring self-sacrifice for the public good, and the public good or common interest understood as an entity that transcended the aggregate interests of the community and was not simply a residue of self-interested competition among special-interest groups. In contrast to these understandings of classical republicanism, the Aristotelean characterization of classical republicanism that I use as a standard above is drawn from Paul Rahe's Republics: Ancient and Modern.
158. The Politics of Aristotle, ed. Ernest Barker (New York, 1958), Book I, especially Chs. I and II, pp. 1-8. Quote is from p. 7. See also Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern, pp. 28-54.
159. The Politics of Aristotle, ed. Ernest Barker (New York, 1958), Book I, especially Chs. I and II, pp. 1-8. Quote is from p. 7. See also Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern, pp. 28-54.
160. Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern, p. 31.
161. The Federalist Papers, ed. Rossiter, No. 10, p. 81.
162. Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern, esp. pp. 29-31.
163. Ibid., p. 31. Jean Bethke Elshtain has also recently emphasized this difference between classical and modern republics. 'The classical view', she observes, 'is that the city-state should have complete control of human bodies for the purposes of labor, procreation, and war.' J.B. Elshtain, '"In Common Together": Unity, Diversity, and Civic Virtue', in 'The Constitution of the People' Reflections on Citizens and Civil Society, ed. Robert E. Calvert (Lawrence, KS, 1991), especially pp. 69-72 (quote is on p. 70).
164. Ibid., p. 31. Jean Bethke Elshtain has also recently emphasized this difference between classical and modern republics. 'The classical view', she observes, 'is that the city-state should have complete control of human bodies for the purposes of labor, procreation, and war.' J.B. Elshtain, '"In Common Together": Unity, Diversity, and Civic Virtue', in 'The Constitution of the People' Reflections on Citizens and Civil Society, ed. Robert E. Calvert (Lawrence, KS, 1991), especially pp. 69-72 (quote is on p. 70).
165. On this point see the famous quote by Benjamin Constant in Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern, p. 15.
166. Lance Banning acknowledges this when he writes: '"Classical Republicanism" it now appears, has proved a deeply troubling term for the collection of ideas whose influence on the Revolution scholars have been emphasizing since the publication of Wood's Creation of the American Republic. Over time, that term, which was originally employed for sensible and solid reasons, has encouraged an impression that the thinking of the early Revolution was considerably less modern than it was - less modern, at a minimum, than "modern" ordinarily implies for scholars trained in political theory.' Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty, p. 215.
167. Lance Banning acknowledges this when he writes: '"Classical Republicanism" it now appears, has proved a deeply troubling term for the collection of ideas whose influence on the Revolution scholars have been emphasizing since the publication of Wood's Creation of the American Republic. Over time, that term, which was originally employed for sensible and solid reasons, has encouraged an impression that the thinking of the early Revolution was considerably less modern than it was - less modern, at a minimum, than "modern" ordinarily implies for scholars trained in political theory.' Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty, p. 215.
168. See Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 15, pp. 110-11; James Madison, 'Vices of the Political System of the United States', PJM, IX, p. 356.
169. See Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 15, pp. 110-11; James Madison, 'Vices of the Political System of the United States', PJM, IX, p. 356.
170. Indeed, classical democracy and the conception of political liberty that went with it were never options for the Founders in the first place. Representation was accepted within Anglo-American republicanism long before the American Founding and none of the Founders really envisioned anything but a representative republic. Furthermore, the state governments at the time of the adoption of the Constitution were of course designed on the principle of representation, not collective deliberation, and were, as Hamilton pointed out, already much larger than ancient republics. See Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty, pp. 216-17; Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 9, pp. 73-4.
171. Indeed, classical democracy and the conception of political liberty that went with it were never options for the Founders in the first place. Representation was accepted within Anglo-American republicanism long before the American Founding and none of the Founders really envisioned anything but a representative republic. Furthermore, the state governments at the time of the adoption of the Constitution were of course designed on the principle of representation, not collective deliberation, and were, as Hamilton pointed out, already much larger than ancient republics. See Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty, pp. 216-17; Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 9, pp. 73-4.
172. The Founders believed that promotion of the public good or common interest was still one of the primary purposes of government and thus, at least on the surface, seem to share this understanding of the function of government with classical republicanism. Nevertheless, the Founders' understanding of the common interest was profoundly different from the classical conception of a public good. In classical political thought, the 'public good' implied a full-blown defence of a specific conception of the good life. In the Founders' conception of a 'common interest', however, this concept took on a much more economic meaning - a meaning which does not involve the promotion of a single conception of the good life and thus does not challenge the characterization of their political system as a species of deontological liberalism. In other words, the Founders' conception of a common interest was compatible with individual autonomy and a high degree of scepticism about what constitutes the good life and an unwillingness to have the government foster it.
173. Greenstone, Lincolnian Persuasion, p. 51.
174. Zuckert makes this point with characteristic clarity: 'The distance of the republican conception from the theory of the Declaration should be apparent from even this brief sketch. According to the republican thesis, human beings are intensely political (Pocock) and/or communal (Wood); according to the Declaration, human beings are not originally or naturally political - the origin is a state of nature understood as an apolitical condition. Although polity is essential, it is not natural; it is made by human beings. Politics, according to the Declaration, is for the sake of natural rights, and natural rights are emphatically prepolitical. The Declaration nowhere intimates that in political participation lies human fulfillment; in place of human fulfillment is the right to the pursuit of happiness.' Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic, p. 206.
175. Bailyn, Ideological Origins, p. 43; Bernard Bailyn, The Origin of American Politics (New York, 1968), p. 53.
176. Bailyn, Ideological Origins, p. 43; Bernard Bailyn, The Origin of American Politics (New York, 1968), p. 53.
177. The significance of Cato's Letters is for example stressed by Huyler, Zuckert and Shalhope. See Huyler, Locke in America, pp. 211-30; Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism, pp. xix-xx, 305-19; Shalhope, The Roots of Democracy, pp. 41-2.
178. The significance of Cato's Letters is for example stressed by Huyler, Zuckert and Shalhope. See Huyler, Locke in America, pp. 211-30; Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism, pp. xix-xx, 305-19; Shalhope, The Roots of Democracy, pp. 41-2.
179. The significance of Cato's Letters is for example stressed by Huyler, Zuckert and Shalhope. See Huyler, Locke in America, pp. 211-30; Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism, pp. xix-xx, 305-19; Shalhope, The Roots of Democracy, pp. 41-2.
180. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA, 1992. Enlarged Edition), pp. 351-79; The Federalist, No. 24, pp. 157-62; The Federalist, No. 26, pp. 168-74.
181. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA, 1992. Enlarged Edition), pp. 351-79; The Federalist, No. 24, pp. 157-62; The Federalist, No. 26, pp. 168-74.
182. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA, 1992. Enlarged Edition), pp. 351-79; The Federalist, No. 24, pp. 157-62; The Federalist, No. 26, pp. 168-74.
183. Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, NY, 1978); L. Banning, 'Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789 to 1793', The William and Mary Quarterly, 31 (1974), pp. 178-9; John Murrin, 'The Great Inversion, or Court versus Country: A Comparison of the Revolutionary Settlements in England (1688-1721) and America (1776-1816)', in Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776, ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Princeton, NJ, 1980), pp. 368-453; McCoy, The Elusive Republic; Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism (New York, 1993).
184. Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, NY, 1978); L. Banning, 'Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789 to 1793', The William and Mary Quarterly, 31 (1974), pp. 178-9; John Murrin, 'The Great Inversion, or Court versus Country: A Comparison of the Revolutionary Settlements in England (1688-1721) and America (1776-1816)', in Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776, ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Princeton, NJ, 1980), pp. 368-453; McCoy, The Elusive Republic; Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism (New York, 1993).
185. Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, NY, 1978); L. Banning, 'Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789 to 1793', The William and Mary Quarterly, 31 (1974), pp. 178-9; John Murrin, 'The Great Inversion, or Court versus Country: A Comparison of the Revolutionary Settlements in England (1688-1721) and America (1776-1816)', in Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776, ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Princeton, NJ, 1980), pp. 368-453; McCoy, The Elusive Republic; Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism (New York, 1993).
186. Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, NY, 1978); L. Banning, 'Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789 to 1793', The William and Mary Quarterly, 31 (1974), pp. 178-9; John Murrin, 'The Great Inversion, or Court versus Country: A Comparison of the Revolutionary Settlements in England (1688-1721) and America (1776-1816)', in Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776, ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Princeton, NJ, 1980), pp. 368-453; McCoy, The Elusive Republic; Stanley Elkins
187. Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, NY, 1978); L. Banning, 'Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789 to 1793', The William and Mary Quarterly, 31 (1974), pp. 178-9; John Murrin, 'The Great Inversion, or Court versus Country: A Comparison of the Revolutionary Settlements in England (1688-1721) and America (1776-1816)', in Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776, ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Princeton, NJ, 1980), pp. 368-453; McCoy, The Elusive Republic; Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism (New York, 1993).
188. Elkins and McKitrick, The Age of Federalism, p. 23.
189. See Lance Banning, 'Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of Revolutionary Thinking', in Conceptual Change and the Constitution, ed. Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock (Lawrence, KS, 1988), pp. 194-212; Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', pp. 106-17; Lance Banning, Jefferson and Madison: Three Conversations From the Founding (Madison, WI, 1995), pp. 57-99. Bailyn, Ideological Origins, pp. 368-79; Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner, In Search of The Republic: Public Virtue and the Roots of American Government (Totowa, NJ, 1987); John Ashworth, 'The Jeffersonians: Classical Republicans or Liberal Capitalists?', Journal of American Studies, 18 (1984), pp. 428-30; Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship; Richard Sinopoli, 'Liberalism, Republicanism & the Constitution', Polity, 19 (1984), pp. 331-52. Most scholars seem also to have concluded that this understanding of virtue was further modified during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and increasingly became equated with 'benevolence', 'bourgeois propriety' and 'feminine purity'. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', p. 29; Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York, 1992), pp. 213-25, 356-7.
190. See Lance Banning, 'Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of Revolutionary Thinking', in Conceptual Change and the Constitution, ed. Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock (Lawrence, KS, 1988), pp. 194-212; Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', pp. 106-17; Lance Banning, Jefferson and Madison: Three Conversations From the Founding (Madison, WI, 1995), pp. 57-99. Bailyn, Ideological Origins, pp. 368-79; Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner, In Search of The Republic: Public Virtue and the Roots of American Government (Totowa, NJ, 1987); John Ashworth, 'The Jeffersonians: Classical Republicans or Liberal Capitalists?', Journal of American Studies, 18 (1984), pp. 428-30; Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship; Richard Sinopoli, 'Liberalism, Republicanism & the Constitution', Polity, 19 (1984), pp. 331-52. Most scholars seem also to have concluded that this understanding of virtue was further modified during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and increasingly became equated with 'benevolence', 'bourgeois propriety' and 'feminine purity'. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', p. 29; Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York, 1992), pp. 213-25, 356-7.
191. See Lance Banning, 'Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of Revolutionary Thinking', in Conceptual Change and the Constitution, ed. Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock (Lawrence, KS, 1988), pp. 194-212; Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', pp. 106-17; Lance Banning, Jefferson and Madison: Three Conversations From the Founding (Madison, WI, 1995), pp. 57-99. Bailyn, Ideological Origins, pp. 368-79; Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner, In Search of The Republic: Public Virtue and the Roots of American Government (Totowa, NJ, 1987); John Ashworth, 'The Jeffersonians: Classical Republicans or Liberal Capitalists?', Journal of American Studies, 18 (1984), pp. 428-30; Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship; Richard Sinopoli, 'Liberalism, Republicanism & the Constitution', Polity, 19 (1984), pp. 331-52. Most scholars seem also to have concluded that this understanding of virtue was further modified during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and increasingly became equated with 'benevolence', 'bourgeois propriety' and 'feminine purity'. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', p. 29; Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York, 1992), pp. 213-25, 356-7.
192. See Lance Banning, 'Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of Revolutionary Thinking', in Conceptual Change and the Constitution, ed. Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock (Lawrence, KS, 1988), pp. 194-212; Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', pp. 106-17; Lance Banning, Jefferson and Madison: Three Conversations From the Founding (Madison, WI, 1995), pp. 57-99. Bailyn, Ideological Origins, pp. 368-79; Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner, In Search of The Republic: Public Virtue and the Roots of American Government (Totowa, NJ, 1987); John Ashworth, 'The Jeffersonians: Classical Republicans or Liberal Capitalists?', Journal of American Studies, 18 (1984), pp. 428-30; Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship; Richard Sinopoli, 'Liberalism, Republicanism & the Constitution', Polity, 19 (1984), pp. 331-52. Most scholars seem also to have concluded that this understanding of virtue was further modified during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and increasingly became equated with 'benevolence', 'bourgeois propriety' and 'feminine purity'. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', p. 29; Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York, 1992), pp. 213-25, 356-7.
193. See Lance Banning, 'Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of Revolutionary Thinking', in Conceptual Change and the Constitution, ed. Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock (Lawrence, KS, 1988), pp. 194-212; Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', pp. 106-17; Lance Banning, Jefferson and Madison: Three Conversations From the Founding (Madison, WI, 1995), pp. 57-99. Bailyn, Ideological Origins, pp. 368-79; Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner, In Search of The Republic: Public Virtue and the Roots of American Government (Totowa, NJ, 1987); John Ashworth, 'The Jeffersonians: Classical Republicans or Liberal Capitalists?', Journal of American Studies, 18 (1984), pp. 428-30; Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship; Richard Sinopoli, 'Liberalism, Republicanism & the Constitution', Polity, 19 (1984), pp. 331-52. Most scholars seem also to have concluded that this understanding of virtue was further modified during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and increasingly became equated with 'benevolence', 'bourgeois propriety' and 'feminine purity'. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', p. 29; Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York, 1992), pp. 213-25, 356-7.
194. See Lance Banning, 'Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of Revolutionary Thinking', in Conceptual Change and the Constitution, ed. Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock (Lawrence, KS, 1988), pp. 194-212; Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', pp. 106-17; Lance Banning, Jefferson and Madison: Three Conversations From the Founding (Madison, WI, 1995), pp. 57-99. Bailyn, Ideological Origins, pp. 368-79; Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner, In Search of The Republic: Public Virtue and the Roots of American Government (Totowa, NJ, 1987); John Ashworth, 'The Jeffersonians: Classical Republicans or Liberal Capitalists?', Journal of American Studies, 18 (1984), pp. 428-30; Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship; Richard Sinopoli, 'Liberalism, Republicanism & the Constitution', Polity, 19 (1984), pp. 331-52. Most scholars seem also to have concluded that this understanding of virtue was further modified during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and increasingly became equated with 'benevolence', 'bourgeois propriety' and 'feminine purity'. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', p. 29; Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York, 1992), pp. 213-25, 356-7.
195. See Lance Banning, 'Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of Revolutionary Thinking', in Conceptual Change and the Constitution, ed. Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock (Lawrence, KS, 1988), pp. 194-212; Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', pp. 106-17; Lance Banning, Jefferson and Madison: Three Conversations From the Founding (Madison, WI, 1995), pp. 57-99. Bailyn, Ideological Origins, pp. 368-79; Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner, In Search of The Republic: Public Virtue and the Roots of American Government (Totowa, NJ, 1987); John Ashworth, 'The Jeffersonians: Classical Republicans or Liberal Capitalists?', Journal of American Studies, 18 (1984), pp. 428-30; Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship; Richard Sinopoli, 'Liberalism, Republicanism & the Constitution', Polity, 19 (1984), pp. 331-52. Most scholars seem also to have concluded that this understanding of virtue was further modified during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and increasingly became equated with 'benevolence', 'bourgeois propriety' and 'feminine purity'. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', p. 29; Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York, 1992), pp. 213-25, 356-7.
196. See Lance Banning, 'Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of Revolutionary Thinking', in Conceptual Change and the Constitution, ed. Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock (Lawrence, KS, 1988), pp. 194-212; Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', pp. 106-17; Lance Banning, Jefferson and Madison: Three Conversations From the Founding (Madison, WI, 1995), pp. 57-99. Bailyn, Ideological Origins, pp. 368-79; Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner, In Search of The Republic: Public Virtue and the Roots of American Government (Totowa, NJ, 1987); John Ashworth, 'The Jeffersonians: Classical Republicans or Liberal Capitalists?', Journal of American Studies, 18 (1984), pp. 428-30; Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship; Richard Sinopoli, 'Liberalism, Republicanism & the Constitution', Polity, 19 (1984), pp. 331-52. Most scholars seem also to have concluded that this understanding of virtue was further modified during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and increasingly became equated with 'benevolence', 'bourgeois propriety' and 'feminine purity'. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', p. 29; Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York, 1992), pp. 213-25, 356-7.
197. See Lance Banning, 'Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of Revolutionary Thinking', in Conceptual Change and the Constitution, ed. Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock (Lawrence, KS, 1988), pp. 194-212; Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', pp. 106-17; Lance Banning, Jefferson and Madison: Three Conversations From the Founding (Madison, WI, 1995), pp. 57-99. Bailyn, Ideological Origins, pp. 368-79; Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner, In Search of The Republic: Public Virtue and the Roots of American Government (Totowa, NJ, 1987); John Ashworth, 'The Jeffersonians: Classical Republicans or Liberal Capitalists?', Journal of American Studies, 18 (1984), pp. 428-30; Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship; Richard Sinopoli, 'Liberalism, Republicanism & the Constitution', Polity, 19 (1984), pp. 331-52. Most scholars seem also to have concluded that this understanding of virtue was further modified during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and increasingly became equated with 'benevolence', 'bourgeois propriety' and 'feminine purity'. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', p. 29; Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York, 1992), pp. 213-25, 356-7.
198. See Lance Banning, 'Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of Revolutionary Thinking', in Conceptual Change and the Constitution, ed. Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock (Lawrence, KS, 1988), pp. 194-212; Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', pp. 106-17; Lance Banning, Jefferson and Madison: Three Conversations From the Founding (Madison, WI, 1995), pp. 57-99. Bailyn, Ideological Origins, pp. 368-79; Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner, In Search of The Republic: Public Virtue and the Roots of American Government (Totowa, NJ, 1987); John Ashworth, 'The Jeffersonians: Classical Republicans or Liberal Capitalists?', Journal of American Studies, 18 (1984), pp. 428-30; Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship; Richard Sinopoli, 'Liberalism, Republicanism & the Constitution', Polity, 19 (1984), pp. 331-52. Most scholars seem also to have concluded that this understanding of virtue was further modified during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and increasingly became equated with 'benevolence', 'bourgeois propriety' and 'feminine purity'. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', p. 29; Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York, 1992), pp. 213-25, 356-7.
199. See Lance Banning, 'Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of Revolutionary Thinking', in Conceptual Change and the Constitution, ed. Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock (Lawrence, KS, 1988), pp. 194-212; Banning, 'Retrospect and Prospect', pp. 106-17; Lance Banning, Jefferson and Madison: Three Conversations From the Founding (Madison, WI, 1995), pp. 57-99. Bailyn, Ideological Origins, pp. 368-79; Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner, In Search of The Republic: Public Virtue and the Roots of American Government (Totowa, NJ, 1987); John Ashworth, 'The Jeffersonians: Classical Republicans or Liberal Capitalists?', Journal of American Studies, 18 (1984), pp. 428-30; Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', pp. 9-33; Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship; Richard Sinopoli, 'Liberalism, Republicanism & the Constitution', Polity, 19 (1984), pp. 331-52. Most scholars seem also to have concluded that this understanding of virtue was further modified during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and increasingly became equated with 'benevolence', 'bourgeois propriety' and 'feminine purity'. See Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism', p. 29; Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York, 1992), pp. 213-25, 356-7.
200. Vetterli and Bryner, In Search of the Republic, p. 6. Emphasis theirs.
201. See the classic expressions of this view in David Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York, 1951), pp. 50-1, and Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures (Chicago, 1908).
202. See the classic expressions of this view in David Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York, 1951), pp. 50-1, and Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures (Chicago, 1908).
203. See The Federalist, No. 49, p. 317.
204. The Federalist, No. 51, p. 322.
205. This phrase is from Micheal Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American Culture (New York, 1986).
206. Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York, reprinted 1974), p. 10.
207. Benjamin Barber, 'The Compromised Republic: Public Purposelessness in America', in The Moral Foundations of the American Republic, ed. Robert H. Horwitz (Charlottesville, VA, 1979), p. 19.
208. George Will, Statecraft as Soulcraft: What Government Does (New York, 1983), pp. 31, 38. Examples of this thesis can be found in Barber, 'The Compromised Republic', esp. pp. 20-30; Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, 1956), pp. 1-33; Martin Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent', 'The Federalist, 1787-1788', 'Ethics and Politics: The American Way', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit, pp. 17-36, 37-57, 337-68; Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, pp. 3-21; Isaac Kramnick, 'Editor's Introduction', in The Federalist Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick (London, 1987), pp. 73-4; Arthur Lovejoy, 'The Theory of Human Nature in the American Constitution and the Method of Counterpoise', in Reflections on Human Nature (Baltimore, 1961), pp. 37-65; Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston, 1960), pp. 388-93. Even Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American Republic can be read as setting forth a pluralist interpretation. Consider Wood's analysis on pp. 605-6.
209. George Will, Statecraft as Soulcraft: What Government Does (New York, 1983), pp. 31, 38. Examples of this thesis can be found in Barber, 'The Compromised Republic', esp. pp. 20-30; Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, 1956), pp. 1-33; Martin Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent', 'The Federalist, 1787-1788', 'Ethics and Politics: The American Way', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit, pp. 17-36, 37-57, 337-68; Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, pp. 3-21; Isaac Kramnick, 'Editor's Introduction', in The Federalist Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick (London, 1987), pp. 73-4; Arthur Lovejoy, 'The Theory of Human Nature in the American Constitution and the Method of Counterpoise', in Reflections on Human Nature (Baltimore, 1961), pp. 37-65; Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston, 1960), pp. 388-93. Even Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American Republic can be read as setting forth a pluralist interpretation. Consider Wood's analysis on pp. 605-6.
210. George Will, Statecraft as Soulcraft: What Government Does (New York, 1983), pp. 31, 38. Examples of this thesis can be found in Barber, 'The Compromised Republic', esp. pp. 20-30; Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, 1956), pp. 1-33; Martin Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent', 'The Federalist, 1787-1788', 'Ethics and Politics: The American Way', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit, pp. 17-36, 37-57, 337-68; Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, pp. 3-21; Isaac Kramnick, 'Editor's Introduction', in The Federalist Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick (London, 1987), pp. 73-4; Arthur Lovejoy, 'The Theory of Human Nature in the American Constitution and the Method of Counterpoise', in Reflections on Human Nature (Baltimore, 1961), pp. 37-65; Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston, 1960), pp. 388-93. Even Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American Republic can be read as setting forth a pluralist interpretation. Consider Wood's analysis on pp. 605-6.
211. George Will, Statecraft as Soulcraft: What Government Does (New York, 1983), pp. 31, 38. Examples of this thesis can be found in Barber, 'The Compromised Republic', esp. pp. 20-30; Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, 1956), pp. 1-33; Martin Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent', 'The Federalist, 1787-1788', 'Ethics and Politics: The American Way', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit, pp. 17-36, 37-57, 337-68; Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, pp. 3-21; Isaac Kramnick, 'Editor's Introduction', in The Federalist Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick (London, 1987), pp. 73-4; Arthur Lovejoy, 'The Theory of Human Nature in the American Constitution and the Method of Counterpoise', in Reflections on Human Nature (Baltimore, 1961), pp. 37-65; Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston, 1960), pp. 388-93. Even Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American Republic can be read as setting forth a pluralist interpretation. Consider Wood's analysis on pp. 605-6.
212. George Will, Statecraft as Soulcraft: What Government Does (New York, 1983), pp. 31, 38. Examples of this thesis can be found in Barber, 'The Compromised Republic', esp. pp. 20-30; Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, 1956), pp. 1-33; Martin Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent', 'The Federalist, 1787-1788', 'Ethics and Politics: The American Way', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit, pp. 17-36, 37-57, 337-68; Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, pp. 3-21; Isaac Kramnick, 'Editor's Introduction', in The Federalist Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick (London, 1987), pp. 73-4; Arthur Lovejoy, 'The Theory of Human Nature in the American Constitution and the Method of Counterpoise', in Reflections on Human Nature (Baltimore, 1961), pp. 37-65; Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston, 1960), pp. 388-93. Even Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American Republic can be read as setting forth a pluralist interpretation. Consider Wood's analysis on pp. 605-6.
213. George Will, Statecraft as Soulcraft: What Government Does (New York, 1983), pp. 31, 38. Examples of this thesis can be found in Barber, 'The Compromised Republic', esp. pp. 20-30; Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, 1956), pp. 1-33; Martin Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent', 'The Federalist, 1787-1788', 'Ethics and Politics: The American Way', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit, pp. 17-36, 37-57, 337-68; Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, pp. 3-21; Isaac Kramnick, 'Editor's Introduction', in The Federalist Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick (London, 1987), pp. 73-4; Arthur Lovejoy, 'The Theory of Human Nature in the American Constitution and the Method of Counterpoise', in Reflections on Human Nature (Baltimore, 1961), pp. 37-65; Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston, 1960), pp. 388-93. Even Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American Republic can be read as setting forth a pluralist interpretation. Consider Wood's analysis on pp. 605-6.
214. George Will, Statecraft as Soulcraft: What Government Does (New York, 1983), pp. 31, 38. Examples of this thesis can be found in Barber, 'The Compromised Republic', esp. pp. 20-30; Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, 1956), pp. 1-33; Martin Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent', 'The Federalist, 1787-1788', 'Ethics and Politics: The American Way', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit, pp. 17-36, 37-57, 337-68; Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, pp. 3-21; Isaac Kramnick, 'Editor's Introduction', in The Federalist Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick (London, 1987), pp. 73-4; Arthur Lovejoy, 'The Theory of Human Nature in the American Constitution and the Method of Counterpoise', in Reflections on Human Nature (Baltimore, 1961), pp. 37-65; Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston, 1960), pp. 388-93. Even Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American Republic can be read as setting forth a pluralist interpretation. Consider Wood's analysis on pp. 605-6.
215. George Will, Statecraft as Soulcraft: What Government Does (New York, 1983), pp. 31, 38. Examples of this thesis can be found in Barber, 'The Compromised Republic', esp. pp. 20-30; Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, 1956), pp. 1-33; Martin Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent', 'The Federalist, 1787-1788', 'Ethics and Politics: The American Way', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit, pp. 17-36, 37-57, 337-68; Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, pp. 3-21; Isaac Kramnick, 'Editor's Introduction', in The Federalist Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick (London, 1987), pp. 73-4; Arthur Lovejoy, 'The Theory of Human Nature in the American Constitution and the Method of Counterpoise', in Reflections on Human Nature (Baltimore, 1961), pp. 37-65; Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston, 1960), pp. 388-93. Even Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American Republic can be read as setting forth a pluralist interpretation. Consider Wood's analysis on pp. 605-6.
216. George Will, Statecraft as Soulcraft: What Government Does (New York, 1983), pp. 31, 38. Examples of this thesis can be found in Barber, 'The Compromised Republic', esp. pp. 20-30; Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, 1956), pp. 1-33; Martin Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent', 'The Federalist, 1787-1788', 'Ethics and Politics: The American Way', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit, pp. 17-36, 37-57, 337-68; Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, pp. 3-21; Isaac Kramnick, 'Editor's Introduction', in The Federalist Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick (London, 1987), pp. 73-4; Arthur Lovejoy, 'The Theory of Human Nature in the American Constitution and the Method of Counterpoise', in Reflections on Human Nature (Baltimore, 1961), pp. 37-65; Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston, 1960), pp. 388-93. Even Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American Republic can be read as setting forth a pluralist interpretation. Consider Wood's analysis on pp. 605-6.
217. George Will, Statecraft as Soulcraft: What Government Does (New York, 1983), pp. 31, 38. Examples of this thesis can be found in Barber, 'The Compromised Republic', esp. pp. 20-30; Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, 1956), pp. 1-33; Martin Diamond, 'Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent', 'The Federalist, 1787-1788', 'Ethics and Politics: The American Way', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit, pp. 17-36, 37-57, 337-68; Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, pp. 3-21; Isaac Kramnick, 'Editor's Introduction', in The Federalist Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick (London, 1987), pp. 73-4; Arthur Lovejoy, 'The Theory of Human Nature in the American Constitution and the Method of Counterpoise', in Reflections on Human Nature (Baltimore, 1961), pp. 37-65; Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston, 1960), pp. 388-93. Even Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American Republic can be read as setting forth a pluralist interpretation. Consider Wood's analysis on pp. 605-6.
218. Ralph Lerner, 'Commerce and Character', in The Thinking Revolutionary: Principle and Practice in the New Republic (Ithaca, NY, 1979), pp. 195-221; Hiram Caton, The Politics of Progress: The Origins and Development of the Commercial Republic, 1600-1835 (Gainesville, FL, 1988), pp. 459-78; Martin Diamond, 'Ethics and Politics: The American Way', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit, pp. 337-68; John R. Nelson, Liberty and Property: Political Economy and Policymaking in the New Nation, 1789-1812 (Baltimore, MD, 1987). See also Albert Hirshman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments For Capitalism Before Its Triumph (Princeton, NJ, 1977).
219. Ralph Lerner, 'Commerce and Character', in The Thinking Revolutionary: Principle and Practice in the New Republic (Ithaca, NY, 1979), pp. 195-221; Hiram Caton, The Politics of Progress: The Origins and Development of the Commercial Republic, 1600-1835 (Gainesville, FL, 1988), pp. 459-78; Martin Diamond, 'Ethics and Politics: The American Way', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit, pp. 337-68; John R. Nelson, Liberty and Property: Political Economy and Policymaking in the New Nation, 1789-1812 (Baltimore, MD, 1987). See also Albert Hirshman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments For Capitalism Before Its Triumph (Princeton, NJ, 1977).
220. Ralph Lerner, 'Commerce and Character', in The Thinking Revolutionary: Principle and Practice in the New Republic (Ithaca, NY, 1979), pp. 195-221; Hiram Caton, The Politics of Progress: The Origins and Development of the Commercial Republic, 1600-1835 (Gainesville, FL, 1988), pp. 459-78; Martin Diamond, 'Ethics and Politics: The American Way', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit, pp. 337-68; John R. Nelson, Liberty and Property: Political Economy and Policymaking in the New Nation, 1789-1812 (Baltimore, MD, 1987). See also Albert Hirshman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments For Capitalism Before Its Triumph (Princeton, NJ, 1977).
221. Ralph Lerner, 'Commerce and Character', in The Thinking Revolutionary: Principle and Practice in the New Republic (Ithaca, NY, 1979), pp. 195-221; Hiram Caton, The Politics of Progress: The Origins and Development of the Commercial Republic, 1600-1835 (Gainesville, FL, 1988), pp. 459-78; Martin Diamond, 'Ethics and Politics: The American Way', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit, pp. 337-68; John R. Nelson, Liberty and Property: Political Economy and Policymaking in the New Nation, 1789-1812 (Baltimore, MD, 1987). See also Albert Hirshman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments For Capitalism Before Its Triumph (Princeton, NJ, 1977).
222. Ralph Lerner, 'Commerce and Character', in The Thinking Revolutionary: Principle and Practice in the New Republic (Ithaca, NY, 1979), pp. 195-221; Hiram Caton, The Politics of Progress: The Origins and Development of the Commercial Republic, 1600-1835 (Gainesville, FL, 1988), pp. 459-78; Martin Diamond, 'Ethics and Politics: The American Way', in As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit, pp. 337-68; John R. Nelson, Liberty and Property: Political Economy and Policymaking in the New Nation, 1789-1812 (Baltimore, MD, 1987). See also Albert Hirshman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments For Capitalism Before Its Triumph (Princeton, NJ, 1977).
223. Alan Gibson, 'Impartial Representation and the Extended Republic: Towards a Comprehensive and Balanced Interpretation of the Tenth Federalist', History of Political Thought, 12 (1991), pp. 276-9.
224. Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern, p. 601.
225. Joseph M. Bessette, 'Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government', How Democratic Is the Constitution?, ed. Robert A. Goldwin and William A. Schambra (Washington, DC, 1980), pp. 102-16.
226. McCoy, The Elusive Republic, pp. 120-35; See also Elkins and McKitrick, The Age of Federalism, pp. 79-92, 195-208; Lienesch, New Order of the Ages, pp. 83-96.
227. McCoy, The Elusive Republic, pp. 120-35; See also Elkins and McKitrick, The Age of Federalism, pp. 79-92, 195-208; Lienesch, New Order of the Ages, pp. 83-96.
228. McCoy, The Elusive Republic, pp. 120-35; See also Elkins and McKitrick, The Age of Federalism, pp. 79-92, 195-208; Lienesch, New Order of the Ages, pp. 83-96.
229. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism, pp. 98-104; Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern, pp. 726-47.
230. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism, pp. 98-104; Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern, pp. 726-47.
231. This is the essential truth in Joyce Appleby's characterization of Jeffersonian political economy. See especially Appleby, 'Commercial Farming and the "Agrarian Myth" in the Early Republic', Journal of American History, 68 (1982), pp. 833-49.
232. Madison, 'Republican Distribution of Citizens', PJM, XIV, p. 245.
233. McCoy, The Elusive Republic, pp. 120-35. See also John Ashworth, 'The Jeffersonians: Classical Republicans or Liberal Capitalists', pp. 425-35; Lienesch, New Order of the Ages, pp. 82-115.
234. McCoy, The Elusive Republic, pp. 120-35. See also John Ashworth, 'The Jeffersonians: Classical Republicans or Liberal Capitalists', pp. 425-35; Lienesch, New Order of the Ages, pp. 82-115.
235. McCoy, The Elusive Republic, pp. 120-35. See also John Ashworth, 'The Jeffersonians: Classical Republicans or Liberal Capitalists', pp. 425-35; Lienesch, New Order of the Ages, pp. 82-115.
236. Banning, 'Jeffersonian Ideology', p. 14.
237. Banning, Jefferson and Madison, pp. 57-99.
238. Jean Bethke Elshtain seemingly speaks for many scholars when she writes: 'Curiously, the framers of the American Constitution paid little explicit attention to such institutions, including the family. Perhaps they did not do so because they simply assumed that these associations of civil society were vital and would be long-lasting.' J.B. Elshtain, Democracy on Trial (New York, 1995), p. 6. So far little scholarship has been devoted to challenging this common assumption, but for one exception see the essays in 'The Constitution of the People': Reflections on Citizens and Civil Society, ed. Robert E. Calvert (Lawrence, KS, 1991).
239. Jean Bethke Elshtain seemingly speaks for many scholars when she writes: 'Curiously, the framers of the American Constitution paid little explicit attention to such institutions, including the family. Perhaps they did not do so because they simply assumed that these associations of civil society were vital and would be long-lasting.' J.B. Elshtain, Democracy on Trial (New York, 1995), p. 6. So far little scholarship has been devoted to challenging this common assumption, but for one exception see the essays in 'The Constitution of the People': Reflections on Citizens and Civil Society, ed. Robert E. Calvert (Lawrence, KS, 1991).
240. It is in this context that Gordon Wood's famous closing remarks to The Creation of the American Republic should be reconsidered thirty years after they were written. The political theory of the American Founders, Wood wrote, was 'diffusive and open ended; it was not delineated in a single book; it was peculiarly the product of a democratic society, without a precise beginning or an ending. It was not political theory in the grand manner, but it was political theory worthy of a prominent place in the history of Western thought.' Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, p. 615.
241. The belief that the Founders saw themselves as participants in a battle between the ancients and the moderns seems to be, in some form at least, an almost universally accepted point in this debate. As a result of the scholarship of the late Martin Diamond, many Straussians begin from this point. See As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit; Thomas Pangle's The Spirit of Modern Republicanism and The Ennobling of Democracy: The Challenge of the Postmodern Era (Baltimore, 1992), pp. 93-102; and especially Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern. The proponents of the republican synthesis also seem to hold this same view in a modified form. The Pocock-Banning St Louis version of the republican interpretation traces the continuity of classical republican concepts (especially positive liberty) into the American Founding and then throughout American history. In contrast, the Bailyn-Wood Harvard republican interpretation suggests that the American Founding should be viewed as resting on the pivot between the exhaustion of classical and emergence of modern political concepts. Both of these interpretations, however, suggest that the Founders held a dualistic view of the history of political thought and viewed themselves somewhere on a continuum between liberal and classical political thought. The Straussians and the scholars of the republican interpretation, however, have assumed rather than convincingly shown that this was indeed the Founders' self-understanding of the history of political thought and their place within it. Until such a case is convincingly made, such interpretations are problematic because they contradict the foundational assumption about interpretation held by both groups, namely that past political thinkers should be interpreted from a genuinely historical perspective that attempts first to understand how they understood themselves.
242. The belief that the Founders saw themselves as participants in a battle between the ancients and the moderns seems to be, in some form at least, an almost universally accepted point in this debate. As a result of the scholarship of the late Martin Diamond, many Straussians begin from this point. See As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit; Thomas Pangle's The Spirit of Modern Republicanism and The Ennobling of Democracy: The Challenge of the Postmodern Era (Baltimore, 1992), pp. 93-102; and especially Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern. The proponents of the republican synthesis also seem to hold this same view in a modified form. The Pocock-Banning St Louis version of the republican interpretation traces the continuity of classical republican concepts (especially positive liberty) into the American Founding and then throughout American history. In contrast, the Bailyn-Wood Harvard republican interpretation suggests that the American Founding should be viewed as resting on the pivot between the exhaustion of classical and emergence of modern political concepts. Both of these interpretations, however, suggest that the Founders held a dualistic view of the history of political thought and viewed themselves somewhere on a continuum between liberal and classical political thought. The Straussians and the scholars of the republican interpretation, however, have assumed rather than convincingly shown that this was indeed the Founders' self-understanding of the history of political thought and their place within it. Until such a case is convincingly made, such interpretations are problematic because they contradict the foundational assumption about interpretation held by both groups, namely that past political thinkers should be interpreted from a genuinely historical perspective that attempts first to understand how they understood themselves.
243. The belief that the Founders saw themselves as participants in a battle between the ancients and the moderns seems to be, in some form at least, an almost universally accepted point in this debate. As a result of the scholarship of the late Martin Diamond, many Straussians begin from this point. See As Far As Republican Principles Will Admit; Thomas Pangle's The Spirit of Modern Republicanism and The Ennobling of Democracy: The Challenge of the Postmodern Era (Baltimore, 1992), pp. 93-102; and especially Rahe, Republics: Ancient and Modern. The proponents of the republican synthesis also seem to hold this same view in a modified form. The Pocock-Banning St Louis version of the republican interpretation traces the continuity of classical republican concepts (especially positive liberty) into the American Founding and then throughout American history. In contrast, the Bailyn-Wood Harvard republican interpretation suggests that the American Founding should be viewed as resting on the pivot between the exhaustion of classical and emergence of modern political concepts. Both of these interpretations, however, suggest that the Founders held a dualistic view of the history of political thought and viewed themselves somewhere on a continuum between liberal and classical political thought. The Straussians and the scholars of the republican interpretation, however, have assumed rather than convincingly shown that this was indeed the Founders' self-understanding of the history of political thought and their place within it. Until such a case is convincingly made, such interpretations are problematic because they contradict the foundational assumption about interpretation held by both groups, namely that past political thinkers should be interpreted from a genuinely historical perspective that attempts first to understand how they understood themselves.
244. In a short but highly provocative appreciation of the scholarship of Martin Diamond, Diamond's friend Marvin Meyers eloquently made several points that have influenced the interpretation presented below. The Founders, Meyers wrote, 'simply did not cast themselves in a universal war between the Moderns and the Ancients'. We should, he continued, 'try faithfully to look through their eyes and texts, acknowledge provisionally their chosen masters, friends, and adversaries. In short, we might do well to borrow their map to the great political and moral campaign of history before superimposing our own.' According to Meyers, such an approach will teach us that the Framers did indeed engage in a 'great campaign', but not against classical Athens or Rome. Instead, Meyers insists, 'their evil Old Regime was rather a model of Early Modern polity that blended remnants of the canon and the feudal law, loosely conceived (by John Adams, for example) as general forms of clerical and aristocratic oppression, with a new kind of enlightened despotism, concentrating and rationalizing and enlarging the power of the state through its monarchical head.' This model of the early modern polity was evident to the Founders most immediately in the corrupt British monarchy of George III but it was also evident in numerous other regimes led by ambitious princes. Finally, Meyers notes that when this view of the Founders' project is accepted, then it becomes clear that they did not view themselves as lowering the ends of politics, but rather as elevating America to the 'full dignity of human nature'. See Marvin Meyers, 'The Least Imperfect Government: On Martin Diamond's "Ethics and Politics"', Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, 8 (1980), pp. 11-13 for above quotes.
245. The Federalist, No. 10, p. 81. See also The Federalist, No. 9, pp. 71-2; The Federalist, No. 10, p. 77.
246. The Federalist, No. 10, p. 81. See also The Federalist, No. 9, pp. 71-2; The Federalist, No. 10, p. 77.
247. The Federalist, No. 10, p. 81. See also The Federalist, No. 9, pp. 71-2; The Federalist, No. 10, p. 77.
248. The Federalist, No. 18, p. 128.
249. The Federalist, No. 20, p. 138.
250. Madison's 'Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies', PJM, IX, pp. 3-24; The Federalist, Nos. 18-20, pp. 122-38.
251. Madison's 'Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies', PJM, IX, pp. 3-24; The Federalist, Nos. 18-20, pp. 122-38.
252. In contrast, the Anti-federalists and many of the Jeffersonians remained closely fastened to the synthesis of opposition ideology and natural rights philosophy that had accompanied the Revolution. In particular, their undiluted attachment to the fears and anxieties of opposition ideology led them to interpret the experiences of the 1780s profoundly differently from the Framers of the Constitution. Unlike the Framers, the Anti-federalists continued to believe that the central threat to liberty was unaccountable rulers (not majority factions). The Anti-federalists therefore could not accept the institutional innovations that the Framers offered. Direct forms of representation, a scheme of separation of powers designed to prevent independent acts of tyranny by rulers, a small republic, and a revitalized confederation in which the lion's share of power remained in the states, according to the Anti-federalists, would be necessary if liberty was to be preserved.
253. McCoy, The Elusive Republic, pp. 19-23. See also Lienesch, New Order of the Ages, pp. 83-5.
254. McCoy, The Elusive Republic, pp. 19-23. See also Lienesch, New Order of the Ages, pp. 83-5.
255. When the synergism between natural rights philosophy and opposition ideology is recognized, it becomes possible to understand how many of the Founders not only could have viewed the American Revolution as a response to the loss of virtue in Britain, but also could have believed that this loss of virtue threatened the natural rights of mankind, violated the terms of the original contract, and justified rebellion.
256. Smith, Civic Ideals, p. 2.
257. Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic, p. 3.
258. Jacqueline Stevens, 'Beyond Tocqueville, Please!', p. 987.
259. Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic, pp. 241-3 (quote is on p. 241).
260. Smith, 'Beyond Tocqueville', p. 563; Smith, 'Response to Stevens', p. 992.
261. Smith, 'Beyond Tocqueville', p. 563; Smith, 'Response to Stevens', p. 992.
262. Smith, Civic Ideals, pp. 4-5, 9.