Modeling rational players: Part I

Economics and Philosophy

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 1987, Pages 179-214

  Binmore, Ken ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84974211904     PISSN: 02662671     EISSN: 14740028     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0266267100002893     Document Type: Article

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