How Owners Influence Strategy - A Comparison of Owner-Controlled and Manager-Controlled Firms

Long Range Planning

Volumn 31, Issue 5, 1998, Pages 755-761

  Katz, Jeffrey P ^a   Niehoff, Brian P ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347182006     PISSN: 00246301     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0024-6301(98)00080-6     Document Type: Article

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