The (Limited) Role of the Board

Long Range Planning

Volumn 29, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 572-575

  Goold, Michael ^a  

^a HULT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007073289     PISSN: 00246301     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0024-6301(96)00050-7     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. In this article my focus will be on the role of the board qua board and hence on the roles of executive and non-executive directors qua board members. I will not be concerned with the role of executive directors acting as senior managers of the company.
2. See e.g. Report of the Cadbury Committee on The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, The Stock Exchange, London (1992); J. Pound, The promise of the governed corporation, Harvard Business Review, March-April (1995); G. Donaldson, A new tool for boards: the strategic audit, Harvard Business Review, July-August (1995).
3. See e.g. Report of the Cadbury Committee on The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, The Stock Exchange, London (1992); J. Pound, The promise of the governed corporation, Harvard Business Review, March-April (1995); G. Donaldson, A new tool for boards: the strategic audit, Harvard Business Review, July-August (1995).
4. See e.g. Report of the Cadbury Committee on The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, The Stock Exchange, London (1992); J. Pound, The promise of the governed corporation, Harvard Business Review, March-April (1995); G. Donaldson, A new tool for boards: the strategic audit, Harvard Business Review, July-August (1995).
5. A. Demb and F. Neubauer, The Corporate Board, Oxford University Press, Oxford (1992).
6. J. Lorsch with E. MacIver, Pawns or Potentates: the Reality of America's Corporate Boards, Harvard Business School Press, Cambridge, MA (1989).
7. See M. Goold, A. Campbell and M. Alexander, Corporate-level Strategy, Chaps 5 and 6, Wiley, New York (1994).
8. There are, of course, other important audit responsibilities of the board concerned with the avoidance of fraud, executive management compensation and compliance with other legal obligations. Recent experience in the UK (Barings, British Gas etc.) shows how difficult it is for boards to control executive managers in discharging even these audit tasks.
9. The importance of this task is also stressed by J. Kay and A. Silberston, Corporate Governance, National Institute Economic Review, August (1995).
10. J. Lorsch, Empowering the board, Harvard Business Review, January-February (1995) has some useful suggestions concerning how boards can most effectively evaluate CEOs. J. Kay and A. Silberston op. cit., recommend fixed terms of office for the CEO and an end- of-term review process by the board.
11. J. Lorsch, Empowering the board, Harvard Business Review, January-February (1995) has some useful suggestions concerning how boards can most effectively evaluate CEOs. J. Kay and A. Silberston op. cit., recommend fixed terms of office for the CEO and an end-of-term review process by the board.