Consumer risk perceptions and information in insurance markets with adverse selection

GENEVA Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 191-210

  Ligon, James A ^a   Thistle, Paul D ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA   (United States)

^b WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Hidden information; Informational equilibrium; Learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 0345734116     PISSN: 09264957     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF00941938     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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