State Policy and Guanxi Network Adaptation in China: Local Bureaucratic Rent-Seeking

Issues and Studies

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 20-48

  Jieh Min, Wu ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

China; Guanxi network; Local government; Renting seeking; State

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346485990     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (121)

1. Xizhu, a code name for a prosperous city in the Pearl River delta, hosts thousands of factories that are supported by foreign capital, mostly from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Most industries in Xizhu are labor-intensive and export-oriented. Xizhu is a typical region in Southeast China that has utilized foreign capital for rapid rural industrialization. Townships and villages have thrived and have also urbanized in a somewhat crude way thanks to these processing and assembly-type investments. The author conducted interviews in Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Pearl River delta, and other regions of China in the period 1994-96. Most of the names, institutes, and locales are coded in order to protect informants in the field.
2. See, for example: Gary Hamilton and Kao Cheng Shu, "The Institutional Foundations of Chinese Business: The Family Firm in Taiwan," Comparative Social Research 12 (1990): 95-112; Alan Smart, "Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi: A Reconsideration of Bourdieu's Social Capital," Cultural Anthropology 8, no. 3 (1993): 388-408; David L. Wank, "The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism: Guanxi and Private Business in a South China City," The China Quarterly, no. 147 (September 1996): 820-38; and Macro Orru, Nicole Woolsey Biggart, and Gary Hamilton, eds., The Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism (London: Sage, 1997).
3. See, for example: Gary Hamilton and Kao Cheng Shu, "The Institutional Foundations of Chinese Business: The Family Firm in Taiwan," Comparative Social Research 12 (1990): 95-112; Alan Smart, "Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi: A Reconsideration of Bourdieu's Social Capital," Cultural Anthropology 8, no. 3 (1993): 388-408; David L. Wank, "The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism: Guanxi and Private Business in a South China City," The China Quarterly, no. 147 (September 1996): 820-38; and Macro Orru, Nicole Woolsey Biggart, and Gary Hamilton, eds., The Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism (London: Sage, 1997).
4. See, for example: Gary Hamilton and Kao Cheng Shu, "The Institutional Foundations of Chinese Business: The Family Firm in Taiwan," Comparative Social Research 12 (1990): 95-112; Alan Smart, "Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi: A Reconsideration of Bourdieu's Social Capital," Cultural Anthropology 8, no. 3 (1993): 388-408; David L. Wank, "The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism: Guanxi and Private Business in a South China City," The China Quarterly, no. 147 (September 1996): 820-38; and Macro Orru, Nicole Woolsey Biggart, and Gary Hamilton, eds., The Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism (London: Sage, 1997).
5. See, for example: Gary Hamilton and Kao Cheng Shu, "The Institutional Foundations of Chinese Business: The Family Firm in Taiwan," Comparative Social Research 12 (1990): 95-112; Alan Smart, "Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi: A Reconsideration of Bourdieu's Social Capital," Cultural Anthropology 8, no. 3 (1993): 388-408; David L. Wank, "The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism: Guanxi and Private Business in a South China City," The China Quarterly, no. 147 (September 1996): 820-38; and Macro Orru, Nicole Woolsey Biggart, and Gary Hamilton, eds., The Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism (London: Sage, 1997).
6. The allusive and vague notion of "being a Chinese" has been a focus of academic debate. It is further complicated by the recent popular use of "Greater China." For the problem of "Chineseness," see Wang Gungwu, The Chineseness of China: Selected Essays (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991); Wang Gungwu, "Greater China and the Chinese Overseas," The China Quarterly, no. 136 (December 1993): 926-48; and Tu Wei-ming, ed., The Living Tree: The Meaning of Being Chinese Today (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1994). For a discussion of Greater China, see Harry Harding, "The Concept of 'Greater China': Themes, Variations, and Reservations," The China Quarterly, no. 136 (December 1993): 660-86. Aware of the debate, I technically treat Taiwan in this research as a Chinese society (huaren shehui) for its linguistic and cultural similarity with mainland China. We can thereby make cross-societal comparison among the Chinese societies such as colonial Hong Kong, sovereign Singapore state, and overseas Chinese communities around the world.
7. The allusive and vague notion of "being a Chinese" has been a focus of academic debate. It is further complicated by the recent popular use of "Greater China." For the problem of "Chineseness," see Wang Gungwu, The Chineseness of China: Selected Essays (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991); Wang Gungwu, "Greater China and the Chinese Overseas," The China Quarterly, no. 136 (December 1993): 926-48; and Tu Wei-ming, ed., The Living Tree: The Meaning of Being Chinese Today (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1994). For a discussion of Greater China, see Harry Harding, "The Concept of 'Greater China': Themes, Variations, and Reservations," The China Quarterly, no. 136 (December 1993): 660-86. Aware of the debate, I technically treat Taiwan in this research as a Chinese society (huaren shehui) for its linguistic and cultural similarity with mainland China. We can thereby make cross-societal comparison among the Chinese societies such as colonial Hong Kong, sovereign Singapore state, and overseas Chinese communities around the world.
8. The allusive and vague notion of "being a Chinese" has been a focus of academic debate. It is further complicated by the recent popular use of "Greater China." For the problem of "Chineseness," see Wang Gungwu, The Chineseness of China: Selected Essays (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991); Wang Gungwu, "Greater China and the Chinese Overseas," The China Quarterly, no. 136 (December 1993): 926-48; and Tu Wei-ming, ed., The Living Tree: The Meaning of Being Chinese Today (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1994). For a discussion of Greater China, see Harry Harding, "The Concept of 'Greater China': Themes, Variations, and Reservations," The China Quarterly, no. 136 (December 1993): 660-86. Aware of the debate, I technically treat Taiwan in this research as a Chinese society (huaren shehui) for its linguistic and cultural similarity with mainland China. We can thereby make cross-societal comparison among the Chinese societies such as colonial Hong Kong, sovereign Singapore state, and overseas Chinese communities around the world.
9. The allusive and vague notion of "being a Chinese" has been a focus of academic debate. It is further complicated by the recent popular use of "Greater China." For the problem of "Chineseness," see Wang Gungwu, The Chineseness of China: Selected Essays (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991); Wang Gungwu, "Greater China and the Chinese Overseas," The China Quarterly, no. 136 (December 1993): 926-48; and Tu Wei-ming, ed., The Living Tree: The Meaning of Being Chinese Today (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1994). For a discussion of Greater China, see Harry Harding, "The Concept of 'Greater China': Themes, Variations, and Reservations," The China Quarterly, no. 136 (December 1993): 660-86. Aware of the debate, I technically treat Taiwan in this research as a Chinese society (huaren shehui) for its linguistic and cultural similarity with mainland China. We can thereby make cross-societal comparison among the Chinese societies such as colonial Hong Kong, sovereign Singapore state, and overseas Chinese communities around the world.
10. Alice H. Amsden, "Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to Dependency Theory," in Toward a Political Economy of Development, ed. Robert Bates (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 142-75; Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Frederic C. Deyo, ed., The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Chalmers Johnson, "Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan," ibid., 136-64; Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman, eds., Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Richard Whitley, Business Systems in East Asia: Firms, Markets, and Society (London: Sage, 1992); and Richard Whitley, "Dominant Forms of Economic Organization in Market Economies," Organization Studies 15, no. 2 (1994): 153-82.
11. Alice H. Amsden, "Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to Dependency Theory," in Toward a Political Economy of Development, ed. Robert Bates (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 142-75; Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Frederic C. Deyo, ed., The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Chalmers Johnson, "Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan," ibid., 136-64; Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman, eds., Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Richard Whitley, Business Systems in East Asia: Firms, Markets, and Society (London: Sage, 1992); and Richard Whitley, "Dominant Forms of Economic Organization in Market Economies," Organization Studies 15, no. 2 (1994): 153-82.
12. Alice H. Amsden, "Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to Dependency Theory," in Toward a Political Economy of Development, ed. Robert Bates (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 142-75; Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Frederic C. Deyo, ed., The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Chalmers Johnson, "Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan," ibid., 136-64; Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman, eds., Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Richard Whitley, Business Systems in East Asia: Firms, Markets, and Society (London: Sage, 1992); and Richard Whitley, "Dominant Forms of Economic Organization in Market Economies," Organization Studies 15, no. 2 (1994): 153-82.
13. Alice H. Amsden, "Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to Dependency Theory," in Toward a Political Economy of Development, ed. Robert Bates (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 142-75; Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Frederic C. Deyo, ed., The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Chalmers Johnson, "Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan," ibid., 136-64; Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman, eds., Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Richard Whitley, Business Systems in East Asia: Firms, Markets, and Society (London: Sage, 1992); and Richard Whitley, "Dominant Forms of Economic Organization in Market Economies," Organization Studies 15, no. 2 (1994): 153-82.
14. Alice H. Amsden, "Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to Dependency Theory," in Toward a Political Economy of Development, ed. Robert Bates (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 142-75; Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Frederic C. Deyo, ed., The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Chalmers Johnson, "Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan," ibid., 136-64; Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman, eds., Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Richard Whitley, Business Systems in East Asia: Firms, Markets, and Society (London: Sage, 1992); and Richard Whitley, "Dominant Forms of Economic Organization in Market Economies," Organization Studies 15, no. 2 (1994): 153-82.
15. Alice H. Amsden, "Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to Dependency Theory," in Toward a Political Economy of Development, ed. Robert Bates (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 142-75; Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Frederic C. Deyo, ed., The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Chalmers Johnson, "Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan," ibid., 136-64; Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman, eds., Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Richard Whitley, Business Systems in East Asia: Firms, Markets, and Society (London: Sage, 1992); and Richard Whitley, "Dominant Forms of Economic Organization in Market Economies," Organization Studies 15, no. 2 (1994): 153-82.
16. Alice H. Amsden, "Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to Dependency Theory," in Toward a Political Economy of Development, ed. Robert Bates (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 142-75; Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Frederic C. Deyo, ed., The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Chalmers Johnson, "Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan," ibid., 136-64; Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman, eds., Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Richard Whitley, Business Systems in East Asia: Firms, Markets, and Society (London: Sage, 1992); and Richard Whitley, "Dominant Forms of Economic Organization in Market Economies," Organization Studies 15, no. 2 (1994): 153-82.
17. Alice H. Amsden, "Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to Dependency Theory," in Toward a Political Economy of Development, ed. Robert Bates (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 142-75; Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Frederic C. Deyo, ed., The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Chalmers Johnson, "Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan," ibid., 136-64; Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman, eds., Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Richard Whitley, Business Systems in East Asia: Firms, Markets, and Society (London: Sage, 1992); and Richard Whitley, "Dominant Forms of Economic Organization in Market Economies," Organization Studies 15, no. 2 (1994): 153-82.
18. For Max Weber's classical arguments for the cultural origins of capitalism and a lack of such cultural and institutional characteristics in China, see Max Weber, The Religion of China (New York: Free Press, 1951) and The Protestant Ethic and the Capitalist Spirit (London: Allen and Unwin, 1930). For the efforts in establishing sociocultural models of East Asian development, see Peter Berger, The Capitalist Revolution: Fifty Propositions about Prosperity, Equity and Liberty (London: Wildwood, 1987); Peter Berger and Hsin-huang Hsiao, eds., The Search of an East Asian Development Model (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988); Nicole Woolsey Biggart, "Explaining Asian Economic Organization: Towards a Weberian Institutional Perspective," in Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton, The Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism, 3-32; Gary Hamilton and Kao Cheng Shu, "Max Weber and the Analysis of the East Asian Industrialization," International Sociology 2, no. 3 (1987): 289-300; S. Gordon Redding, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990); and Tu Wei-ming, ed., The Confucian Dimensions of Industrial East Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
19. For Max Weber's classical arguments for the cultural origins of capitalism and a lack of such cultural and institutional characteristics in China, see Max Weber, The Religion of China (New York: Free Press, 1951) and The Protestant Ethic and the Capitalist Spirit (London: Allen and Unwin, 1930). For the efforts in establishing sociocultural models of East Asian development, see Peter Berger, The Capitalist Revolution: Fifty Propositions about Prosperity, Equity and Liberty (London: Wildwood, 1987); Peter Berger and Hsin-huang Hsiao, eds., The Search of an East Asian Development Model (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988); Nicole Woolsey Biggart, "Explaining Asian Economic Organization: Towards a Weberian Institutional Perspective," in Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton, The Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism, 3-32; Gary Hamilton and Kao Cheng Shu, "Max Weber and the Analysis of the East Asian Industrialization," International Sociology 2, no. 3 (1987): 289-300; S. Gordon Redding, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990); and Tu Wei-ming, ed., The Confucian Dimensions of Industrial East Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
20. For Max Weber's classical arguments for the cultural origins of capitalism and a lack of such cultural and institutional characteristics in China, see Max Weber, The Religion of China (New York: Free Press, 1951) and The Protestant Ethic and the Capitalist Spirit (London: Allen and Unwin, 1930). For the efforts in establishing sociocultural models of East Asian development, see Peter Berger, The Capitalist Revolution: Fifty Propositions about Prosperity, Equity and Liberty (London: Wildwood, 1987); Peter Berger and Hsin-huang Hsiao, eds., The Search of an East Asian Development Model (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988); Nicole Woolsey Biggart, "Explaining Asian Economic Organization: Towards a Weberian Institutional Perspective," in Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton, The Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism, 3-32; Gary Hamilton and Kao Cheng Shu, "Max Weber and the Analysis of the East Asian Industrialization," International Sociology 2, no. 3 (1987): 289-300; S. Gordon Redding, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990); and Tu Wei-ming, ed., The Confucian Dimensions of Industrial East Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
21. For Max Weber's classical arguments for the cultural origins of capitalism and a lack of such cultural and institutional characteristics in China, see Max Weber, The Religion of China (New York: Free Press, 1951) and The Protestant Ethic and the Capitalist Spirit (London: Allen and Unwin, 1930). For the efforts in establishing sociocultural models of East Asian development, see Peter Berger, The Capitalist Revolution: Fifty Propositions about Prosperity, Equity and Liberty (London: Wildwood, 1987); Peter Berger and Hsin-huang Hsiao, eds., The Search of an East Asian Development Model (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988); Nicole Woolsey Biggart, "Explaining Asian Economic Organization: Towards a Weberian Institutional Perspective," in Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton, The Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism, 3-32; Gary Hamilton and Kao Cheng Shu, "Max Weber and the Analysis of the East Asian Industrialization," International Sociology 2, no. 3 (1987): 289-300; S. Gordon Redding, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990); and Tu Wei-ming, ed., The Confucian Dimensions of Industrial East Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
22. For Max Weber's classical arguments for the cultural origins of capitalism and a lack of such cultural and institutional characteristics in China, see Max Weber, The Religion of China (New York: Free Press, 1951) and The Protestant Ethic and the Capitalist Spirit (London: Allen and Unwin, 1930). For the efforts in establishing sociocultural models of East Asian development, see Peter Berger, The Capitalist Revolution: Fifty Propositions about Prosperity, Equity and Liberty (London: Wildwood, 1987); Peter Berger and Hsin-huang Hsiao, eds., The Search of an East Asian Development Model (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988); Nicole Woolsey Biggart, "Explaining Asian Economic Organization: Towards a Weberian Institutional Perspective," in Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton, The Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism, 3-32; Gary Hamilton and Kao Cheng Shu, "Max Weber and the Analysis of the East Asian Industrialization," International Sociology 2, no. 3 (1987): 289-300; S. Gordon Redding, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990); and Tu Wei-ming, ed., The Confucian Dimensions of Industrial East Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
23. For Max Weber's classical arguments for the cultural origins of capitalism and a lack of such cultural and institutional characteristics in China, see Max Weber, The Religion of China (New York: Free Press, 1951) and The Protestant Ethic and the Capitalist Spirit (London: Allen and Unwin, 1930). For the efforts in establishing sociocultural models of East Asian development, see Peter Berger, The Capitalist Revolution: Fifty Propositions about Prosperity, Equity and Liberty (London: Wildwood, 1987); Peter Berger and Hsin-huang Hsiao, eds., The Search of an East Asian Development Model (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988); Nicole Woolsey Biggart, "Explaining Asian Economic Organization: Towards a Weberian Institutional Perspective," in Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton, The Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism, 3-32; Gary Hamilton and Kao Cheng Shu, "Max Weber and the Analysis of the East Asian Industrialization," International Sociology 2, no. 3 (1987): 289-300; S. Gordon Redding, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990); and Tu Wei-ming, ed., The Confucian Dimensions of Industrial East Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
24. For Max Weber's classical arguments for the cultural origins of capitalism and a lack of such cultural and institutional characteristics in China, see Max Weber, The Religion of China (New York: Free Press, 1951) and The Protestant Ethic and the Capitalist Spirit (London: Allen and Unwin, 1930). For the efforts in establishing sociocultural models of East Asian development, see Peter Berger, The Capitalist Revolution: Fifty Propositions about Prosperity, Equity and Liberty (London: Wildwood, 1987); Peter Berger and Hsin-huang Hsiao, eds., The Search of an East Asian Development Model (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988); Nicole Woolsey Biggart, "Explaining Asian Economic Organization: Towards a Weberian Institutional Perspective," in Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton, The Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism, 3-32; Gary Hamilton and Kao Cheng Shu, "Max Weber and the Analysis of the East Asian Industrialization," International Sociology 2, no. 3 (1987): 289-300; S. Gordon Redding, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990); and Tu Wei-ming, ed., The Confucian Dimensions of Industrial East Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
25. For Max Weber's classical arguments for the cultural origins of capitalism and a lack of such cultural and institutional characteristics in China, see Max Weber, The Religion of China (New York: Free Press, 1951) and The Protestant Ethic and the Capitalist Spirit (London: Allen and Unwin, 1930). For the efforts in establishing sociocultural models of East Asian development, see Peter Berger, The Capitalist Revolution: Fifty Propositions about Prosperity, Equity and Liberty (London: Wildwood, 1987); Peter Berger and Hsin-huang Hsiao, eds., The Search of an East Asian Development Model (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988); Nicole Woolsey Biggart, "Explaining Asian Economic Organization: Towards a Weberian Institutional Perspective," in Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton, The Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism, 3-32; Gary Hamilton and Kao Cheng Shu, "Max Weber and the Analysis of the East Asian Industrialization," International Sociology 2, no. 3 (1987): 289-300; S. Gordon Redding, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990); and Tu Wei-ming, ed., The Confucian Dimensions of Industrial East Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
26. Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and Networks in Taiwan's Economic Development," in Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan, ed. Edward Winckler and Susan Greenhalgh (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1988), 224-45; Hamilton and Kao, "The Institutional Foundations of Chinese Business" ; and Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton, The Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism.
27. Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and Networks in Taiwan's Economic Development," in Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan, ed. Edward Winckler and Susan Greenhalgh (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1988), 224-45; Hamilton and Kao, "The Institutional Foundations of Chinese Business" ; and Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton, The Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism.
28. Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and Networks in Taiwan's Economic Development," in Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan, ed. Edward Winckler and Susan Greenhalgh (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1988), 224-45; Hamilton and Kao, "The Institutional Foundations of Chinese Business" ; and Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton, The Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism.
29. See, for example: Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988); Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); Ambrose King, "Kuan-hsi and Network Building: A Sociological Interpretation," Daedalus 120, no. 2 (1991): 63-84; Smart, "Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi" ; Mayfair Yang, "The Gift Economy and State Power in China," Comparative Studies in Society and History 31 (1989): 25-54; Mayfair Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Wank, "The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism"; and Yunxiang Yan, "The Culture of Guanxi in a North China Village," The China Journal, no. 35 (January 1996): 1-25. Whyte has examined the changing views on the Chinese family in regard to economic development. See Martin King Whyte, "The Social Roots of China's Economic Development," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 999- 1019 and "The Chinese Family and Economic Development: Obstacle or Engine?" Economic Development and Cultural Change 44, no. 1 (October 1996): 1-30. Note that it is beyond the author's ability to cite the enormous literature on Chinese culture and history. It suffices to say that the instrumental perspective ofguanxi represents an intellectual reaction to the treatment of Chinese culture and Confucian tradition as "shackles" of modernization, an approach adopted by many of the prior generations of Chinese scholars and writers.
30. See, for example: Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988); Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); Ambrose King, "Kuan-hsi and Network Building: A Sociological Interpretation," Daedalus 120, no. 2 (1991): 63-84; Smart, "Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi" ; Mayfair Yang, "The Gift Economy and State Power in China," Comparative Studies in Society and History 31 (1989): 25-54; Mayfair Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Wank, "The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism"; and Yunxiang Yan, "The Culture of Guanxi in a North China Village," The China Journal, no. 35 (January 1996): 1-25. Whyte has examined the changing views on the Chinese family in regard to economic development. See Martin King Whyte, "The Social Roots of China's Economic Development," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 999- 1019 and "The Chinese Family and Economic Development: Obstacle or Engine?" Economic Development and Cultural Change 44, no. 1 (October 1996): 1-30. Note that it is beyond the author's ability to cite the enormous literature on Chinese culture and history. It suffices to say that the instrumental perspective ofguanxi represents an intellectual reaction to the treatment of Chinese culture and Confucian tradition as "shackles" of modernization, an approach adopted by many of the prior generations of Chinese scholars and writers.
31. See, for example: Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988); Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); Ambrose King, "Kuan-hsi and Network Building: A Sociological Interpretation," Daedalus 120, no. 2 (1991): 63-84; Smart, "Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi" ; Mayfair Yang, "The Gift Economy and State Power in China," Comparative Studies in Society and History 31 (1989): 25-54; Mayfair Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Wank, "The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism"; and Yunxiang Yan, "The Culture of Guanxi in a North China Village," The China Journal, no. 35 (January 1996): 1-25. Whyte has examined the changing views on the Chinese family in regard to economic development. See Martin King Whyte, "The Social Roots of China's Economic Development," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 999- 1019 and "The Chinese Family and Economic Development: Obstacle or Engine?" Economic Development and Cultural Change 44, no. 1 (October 1996): 1-30. Note that it is beyond the author's ability to cite the enormous literature on Chinese culture and history. It suffices to say that the instrumental perspective ofguanxi represents an intellectual reaction to the treatment of Chinese culture and Confucian tradition as "shackles" of modernization, an approach adopted by many of the prior generations of Chinese scholars and writers.
32. See, for example: Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988); Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); Ambrose King, "Kuan-hsi and Network Building: A Sociological Interpretation," Daedalus 120, no. 2 (1991): 63-84; Smart, "Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi" ; Mayfair Yang, "The Gift Economy and State Power in China," Comparative Studies in Society and History 31 (1989): 25-54; Mayfair Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Wank, "The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism"; and Yunxiang Yan, "The Culture of Guanxi in a North China Village," The China Journal, no. 35 (January 1996): 1-25. Whyte has examined the changing views on the Chinese family in regard to economic development. See Martin King Whyte, "The Social Roots of China's Economic Development," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 999- 1019 and "The Chinese Family and Economic Development: Obstacle or Engine?" Economic Development and Cultural Change 44, no. 1 (October 1996): 1-30. Note that it is beyond the author's ability to cite the enormous literature on Chinese culture and history. It suffices to say that the instrumental perspective ofguanxi represents an intellectual reaction to the treatment of Chinese culture and Confucian tradition as "shackles" of modernization, an approach adopted by many of the prior generations of Chinese scholars and writers.
33. See, for example: Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988); Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); Ambrose King, "Kuan-hsi and Network Building: A Sociological Interpretation," Daedalus 120, no. 2 (1991): 63-84; Smart, "Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi" ; Mayfair Yang, "The Gift Economy and State Power in China," Comparative Studies in Society and History 31 (1989): 25-54; Mayfair Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Wank, "The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism"; and Yunxiang Yan, "The Culture of Guanxi in a North China Village," The China Journal, no. 35 (January 1996): 1-25. Whyte has examined the changing views on the Chinese family in regard to economic development. See Martin King Whyte, "The Social Roots of China's Economic Development," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 999- 1019 and "The Chinese Family and Economic Development: Obstacle or Engine?" Economic Development and Cultural Change 44, no. 1 (October 1996): 1-30. Note that it is beyond the author's ability to cite the enormous literature on Chinese culture and history. It suffices to say that the instrumental perspective ofguanxi represents an intellectual reaction to the treatment of Chinese culture and Confucian tradition as "shackles" of modernization, an approach adopted by many of the prior generations of Chinese scholars and writers.
34. See, for example: Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988); Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); Ambrose King, "Kuan-hsi and Network Building: A Sociological Interpretation," Daedalus 120, no. 2 (1991): 63-84; Smart, "Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi" ; Mayfair Yang, "The Gift Economy and State Power in China," Comparative Studies in Society and History 31 (1989): 25-54; Mayfair Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Wank, "The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism"; and Yunxiang Yan, "The Culture of Guanxi in a North China Village," The China Journal, no. 35 (January 1996): 1-25. Whyte has examined the changing views on the Chinese family in regard to economic development. See Martin King Whyte, "The Social Roots of China's Economic Development," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 999- 1019 and "The Chinese Family and Economic Development: Obstacle or Engine?" Economic Development and Cultural Change 44, no. 1 (October 1996): 1-30. Note that it is beyond the author's ability to cite the enormous literature on Chinese culture and history. It suffices to say that the instrumental perspective ofguanxi represents an intellectual reaction to the treatment of Chinese culture and Confucian tradition as "shackles" of modernization, an approach adopted by many of the prior generations of Chinese scholars and writers.
35. See, for example: Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988); Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); Ambrose King, "Kuan-hsi and Network Building: A Sociological Interpretation," Daedalus 120, no. 2 (1991): 63-84; Smart, "Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi" ; Mayfair Yang, "The Gift Economy and State Power in China," Comparative Studies in Society and History 31 (1989): 25-54; Mayfair Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Wank, "The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism"; and Yunxiang Yan, "The Culture of Guanxi in a North China Village," The China Journal, no. 35 (January 1996): 1-25. Whyte has examined the changing views on the Chinese family in regard to economic development. See Martin King Whyte, "The Social Roots of China's Economic Development," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 999- 1019 and "The Chinese Family and Economic Development: Obstacle or Engine?" Economic Development and Cultural Change 44, no. 1 (October 1996): 1-30. Note that it is beyond the author's ability to cite the enormous literature on Chinese culture and history. It suffices to say that the instrumental perspective ofguanxi represents an intellectual reaction to the treatment of Chinese culture and Confucian tradition as "shackles" of modernization, an approach adopted by many of the prior generations of Chinese scholars and writers.
36. See, for example: Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988); Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); Ambrose King, "Kuan-hsi and Network Building: A Sociological Interpretation," Daedalus 120, no. 2 (1991): 63-84; Smart, "Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi" ; Mayfair Yang, "The Gift Economy and State Power in China," Comparative Studies in Society and History 31 (1989): 25-54; Mayfair Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Wank, "The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism"; and Yunxiang Yan, "The Culture of Guanxi in a North China Village," The China Journal, no. 35 (January 1996): 1-25. Whyte has examined the changing views on the Chinese family in regard to economic development. See Martin King Whyte, "The Social Roots of China's Economic Development," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 999- 1019 and "The Chinese Family and Economic Development: Obstacle or Engine?" Economic Development and Cultural Change 44, no. 1 (October 1996): 1-30. Note that it is beyond the author's ability to cite the enormous literature on Chinese culture and history. It suffices to say that the instrumental perspective ofguanxi represents an intellectual reaction to the treatment of Chinese culture and Confucian tradition as "shackles" of modernization, an approach adopted by many of the prior generations of Chinese scholars and writers.
37. See, for example: Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988); Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); Ambrose King, "Kuan-hsi and Network Building: A Sociological Interpretation," Daedalus 120, no. 2 (1991): 63-84; Smart, "Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi" ; Mayfair Yang, "The Gift Economy and State Power in China," Comparative Studies in Society and History 31 (1989): 25-54; Mayfair Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Wank, "The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism"; and Yunxiang Yan, "The Culture of Guanxi in a North China Village," The China Journal, no. 35 (January 1996): 1-25. Whyte has examined the changing views on the Chinese family in regard to economic development. See Martin King Whyte, "The Social Roots of China's Economic Development," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 999-1019 and "The Chinese Family and Economic Development: Obstacle or Engine?" Economic Development and Cultural Change 44, no. 1 (October 1996): 1-30. Note that it is beyond the author's ability to cite the enormous literature on Chinese culture and history. It suffices to say that the instrumental perspective ofguanxi represents an intellectual reaction to the treatment of Chinese culture and Confucian tradition as "shackles" of modernization, an approach adopted by many of the prior generations of Chinese scholars and writers.
38. See, for example: Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988); Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); Ambrose King, "Kuan-hsi and Network Building: A Sociological Interpretation," Daedalus 120, no. 2 (1991): 63-84; Smart, "Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi" ; Mayfair Yang, "The Gift Economy and State Power in China," Comparative Studies in Society and History 31 (1989): 25-54; Mayfair Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Wank, "The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism"; and Yunxiang Yan, "The Culture of Guanxi in a North China Village," The China Journal, no. 35 (January 1996): 1-25. Whyte has examined the changing views on the Chinese family in regard to economic development. See Martin King Whyte, "The Social Roots of China's Economic Development," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 999- 1019 and "The Chinese Family and Economic Development: Obstacle or Engine?" Economic Development and Cultural Change 44, no. 1 (October 1996): 1-30. Note that it is beyond the author's ability to cite the enormous literature on Chinese culture and history. It suffices to say that the instrumental perspective ofguanxi represents an intellectual reaction to the treatment of Chinese culture and Confucian tradition as "shackles" of modernization, an approach adopted by many of the prior generations of Chinese scholars and writers.
39. Peter M. Blau, Danching Ruan, and Monica Ardelt, "Interpersonal Choice and Networks in China," Social Forces 69 (1991): 1037-62.
40. Barry Wilkinson, "Culture, Institutions, and Business in East Asia," Organization Studies 17, no. 3 (1996): 421-47.
41. Frederic C. Deyo, Beneath the Miracle: Labor Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
42. See Bruce J. Dickson, "What Explains Chinese Political Behavior? The Debate over Structure and Culture," Comparative Politics 25, no. 1 (October 1992): 103-18, for a review of the debate over culture and structure in the explanation of Chinese behavior.
43. Michael Yahuda, "The Foreign Relations of Greater China," The China Quarterly, no. 136 (December 1993): 688.
44. Whyte, "The Chinese Family and Economic Development," 17-18.
45. For general statements of structural explanation, see Brian Barry, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1970); Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); and Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
46. For general statements of structural explanation, see Brian Barry, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1970); Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); and Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
47. For general statements of structural explanation, see Brian Barry, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1970); Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); and Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
48. For a definition of thin rational choice theory, see Michael Taylor, "Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action," in Rationality and Revolution, ed. Michael Taylor (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 63-97. For a broader debate of cultural versus structural/institutional perspective, see Thomas A. Koelble, "The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology," Comparative Politics 27, no. 2 (January 1995): 231-44; William H. Sewell, Jr., "Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 1 (July 1992): 1-29; Michael Taylor, "Structure, Culture, and Action in the Explanation of Social Change," Politics and Society 17, no. 2 (1989): 115-62; and Richard Whittington, "Putting Giddens into Action: Social Systems and Managerial Agency," Journal of Management Studies 29, no. 6 (1992): 693-712.
49. For a definition of thin rational choice theory, see Michael Taylor, "Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action," in Rationality and Revolution, ed. Michael Taylor (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 63-97. For a broader debate of cultural versus structural/institutional perspective, see Thomas A. Koelble, "The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology," Comparative Politics 27, no. 2 (January 1995): 231-44; William H. Sewell, Jr., "Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 1 (July 1992): 1-29; Michael Taylor, "Structure, Culture, and Action in the Explanation of Social Change," Politics and Society 17, no. 2 (1989): 115-62; and Richard Whittington, "Putting Giddens into Action: Social Systems and Managerial Agency," Journal of Management Studies 29, no. 6 (1992): 693-712.
50. For a definition of thin rational choice theory, see Michael Taylor, "Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action," in Rationality and Revolution, ed. Michael Taylor (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 63-97. For a broader debate of cultural versus structural/institutional perspective, see Thomas A. Koelble, "The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology," Comparative Politics 27, no. 2 (January 1995): 231-44; William H. Sewell, Jr., "Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 1 (July 1992): 1-29; Michael Taylor, "Structure, Culture, and Action in the Explanation of Social Change," Politics and Society 17, no. 2 (1989): 115-62; and Richard Whittington, "Putting Giddens into Action: Social Systems and Managerial Agency," Journal of Management Studies 29, no. 6 (1992): 693-712.
51. For a definition of thin rational choice theory, see Michael Taylor, "Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action," in Rationality and Revolution, ed. Michael Taylor (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 63-97. For a broader debate of cultural versus structural/institutional perspective, see Thomas A. Koelble, "The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology," Comparative Politics 27, no. 2 (January 1995): 231-44; William H. Sewell, Jr., "Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 1 (July 1992): 1-29; Michael Taylor, "Structure, Culture, and Action in the Explanation of Social Change," Politics and Society 17, no. 2 (1989): 115-62; and Richard Whittington, "Putting Giddens into Action: Social Systems and Managerial Agency," Journal of Management Studies 29, no. 6 (1992): 693-712.
52. For a definition of thin rational choice theory, see Michael Taylor, "Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action," in Rationality and Revolution, ed. Michael Taylor (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 63-97. For a broader debate of cultural versus structural/institutional perspective, see Thomas A. Koelble, "The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology," Comparative Politics 27, no. 2 (January 1995): 231-44; William H. Sewell, Jr., "Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 1 (July 1992): 1-29; Michael Taylor, "Structure, Culture, and Action in the Explanation of Social Change," Politics and Society 17, no. 2 (1989): 115-62; and Richard Whittington, "Putting Giddens into Action: Social Systems and Managerial Agency," Journal of Management Studies 29, no. 6 (1992): 693-712.
53. Andrew J. Nathan, "Is Chinese Culture Distinctive? - A Review Article," Journal of Asian Studies 52, no. 4 (1993): 923-36.
54. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre, 30, quoted in Nathan, "Is Chinese Culture Distinctive?" 933.
55. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre, 30, quoted in Nathan, "Is Chinese Culture Distinctive?" 933.
56. Nathan, "Is Chinese Culture Distinctive?" 928.
57. Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 179.
58. Ibid., 26-27.
59. This has been argued in several empirical findings. See Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets, for different meaning of guanxi in Mao's era and in Deng's reform; and Yan, "The Culture of Guanxi in a North China Village," proposed that guanxi in the countryside functions dissimilarly than in the urban areas.
60. This has been argued in several empirical findings. See Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets, for different meaning of guanxi in Mao's era and in Deng's reform; and Yan, "The Culture of Guanxi in a North China Village," proposed that guanxi in the countryside functions dissimilarly than in the urban areas.
61. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 95.
62. In this sense, culture functions like a "tool kit" for a social actor. See Anne Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," American Sociological Review 51 (1986): 273-86.
63. Cf. Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets.
64. Yan, "The Culture of Guanxi in a North China Village," 4.
65. An end-game situation, like in a one-shot game, tends to encourage noncooperation and defection because there will be no more expected interaction in the future. In contrast, repeated games tend to induce cooperation. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
66. Failure to fulfill an obligation usually signals a withdrawal from a social relationship.
67. Cf. Marcel Mauss, The Gift (New York: Norton, 1967). Note that Mauss assumed a "misrecognition" of instrumental motivation involved in gift exchange. Smart has a parallel argument in Smart, "Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi," 395-97.
68. Cf. Marcel Mauss, The Gift (New York: Norton, 1967). Note that Mauss assumed a "misrecognition" of instrumental motivation involved in gift exchange. Smart has a parallel argument in Smart, "Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi," 395-97.
69. If the transaction is not made in cash, the seller of goods at least has to secure some kind of certificate or claim of the equivalent value in return.
70. If one knows what specific good is desired in return for gift-giving, this form of exchange is bribery. Cf. Yang, "The Gift Economy and State Power in China."
71. This is evident when compared with commodity exchange. A credit purchase involves a clear and measurable debt to the merchant. In favor exchange, however, this is not the case. As Peter Blau argued: "Social exchange entails unspecified obligation. There is no contract, and there is no exact price." See Peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1986 [1964]), 315.
72. Smart, "Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi," 393.
73. This phenomenon was pointed out by Mark Granovetter: "Ties discussed in this paper are assumed to be positive and symmetric; a comprehensive theory might require discussion of negative and/or asymmetric ties." See Mark Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (1973): 1361 n. 2.
74. For a case study in kin employment in relation to unexpected problems in such network employment, see Josephine Smart and Alan Smart, "Obligation and Control: Employment of Kin in Capitalist Labour Management in China," Critique of Anthropology 13, no. 1 (1993): 7-31.
75. See Janos Kornai, Economics of Shortage (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1980), for the concept of shortage economy.
76. Gary M. Anderson and Peter J. Boettke, "Perestroika and Public Choice: The Economies of Autocratic Succession in Rent-Seeking Society," Public Choice 75, no. 1 (1993): 101-18; Andras Nagy, "Institutions and the Transition to a Market Economy," in The Emergence of Market Economies in Eastern Europe, ed. Christopher Clague and Gorden C. Rausser (Cambridge, Mass.:
77. Gary M. Anderson and Peter J. Boettke, "Perestroika and Public Choice: The Economies of Autocratic Succession in Rent-Seeking Society," Public Choice 75, no. 1 (1993): 101- 18; Andras Nagy, "Institutions and the Transition to a Market Economy," in The Emergence of Market Economies in Eastern Europe, ed. Christopher Clague and Gorden C. Rausser (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1992), 301-7.
78. For the case of the Soviet Union, see Helene C. D'Encausse, Confiscated Power: How Soviet Russia Really Works (New York: Harper & Row, 1980) and M. Voslensky, Nomenklatura (New York: Doubleday, 1984). For the general problems of rent-seeking, see Anne O. Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review 64, no. 3 (June 1974): 399-458; Richard Posner, "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy 83 (August 1975): 807-27; James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent- Seeking Society (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1980); Gordon Tullock, "Rent-Seeking as a Negative-Sum Game," ibid., 16-37; Gordon Tullock, "The Costs of Special Privilege," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 195-211; and Robert D. Tollison, "Rent-Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos 35, no. 4 (1982): 575-602. Note that I adopt a broad definition of rent-seeking, including revenue-seeking activities through government regulation, tariffs, quota, and contracting. Cf. Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 13. These activities are also named "directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (DUP)." See David C. Colander, ed., Neoclassical Political Economy: The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984).
79. For the case of the Soviet Union, see Helene C. D'Encausse, Confiscated Power: How Soviet Russia Really Works (New York: Harper & Row, 1980) and M. Voslensky, Nomenklatura (New York: Doubleday, 1984). For the general problems of rent-seeking, see Anne O. Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review 64, no. 3 (June 1974): 399-458; Richard Posner, "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy 83 (August 1975): 807-27; James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent- Seeking Society (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1980); Gordon Tullock, "Rent-Seeking as a Negative-Sum Game," ibid., 16-37; Gordon Tullock, "The Costs of Special Privilege," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 195-211; and Robert D. Tollison, "Rent-Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos 35, no. 4 (1982): 575-602. Note that I adopt a broad definition of rent-seeking, including revenue-seeking activities through government regulation, tariffs, quota, and contracting. Cf. Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 13. These activities are also named "directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (DUP)." See David C. Colander, ed., Neoclassical Political Economy: The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984).
80. For the case of the Soviet Union, see Helene C. D'Encausse, Confiscated Power: How Soviet Russia Really Works (New York: Harper & Row, 1980) and M. Voslensky, Nomenklatura (New York: Doubleday, 1984). For the general problems of rent-seeking, see Anne O. Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review 64, no. 3 (June 1974): 399-458; Richard Posner, "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy 83 (August 1975): 807-27; James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent- Seeking Society (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1980); Gordon Tullock, "Rent-Seeking as a Negative-Sum Game," ibid., 16-37; Gordon Tullock, "The Costs of Special Privilege," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 195-211; and Robert D. Tollison, "Rent-Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos 35, no. 4 (1982): 575-602. Note that I adopt a broad definition of rent-seeking, including revenue-seeking activities through government regulation, tariffs, quota, and contracting. Cf. Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 13. These activities are also named "directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (DUP)." See David C. Colander, ed., Neoclassical Political Economy: The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984).
81. For the case of the Soviet Union, see Helene C. D'Encausse, Confiscated Power: How Soviet Russia Really Works (New York: Harper & Row, 1980) and M. Voslensky, Nomenklatura (New York: Doubleday, 1984). For the general problems of rent-seeking, see Anne O. Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review 64, no. 3 (June 1974): 399-458; Richard Posner, "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy 83 (August 1975): 807-27; James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent- Seeking Society (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1980); Gordon Tullock, "Rent-Seeking as a Negative-Sum Game," ibid., 16-37; Gordon Tullock, "The Costs of Special Privilege," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 195-211; and Robert D. Tollison, "Rent-Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos 35, no. 4 (1982): 575-602. Note that I adopt a broad definition of rent-seeking, including revenue-seeking activities through government regulation, tariffs, quota, and contracting. Cf. Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 13. These activities are also named "directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (DUP)." See David C. Colander, ed., Neoclassical Political Economy: The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984).
82. For the case of the Soviet Union, see Helene C. D'Encausse, Confiscated Power: How Soviet Russia Really Works (New York: Harper & Row, 1980) and M. Voslensky, Nomenklatura (New York: Doubleday, 1984). For the general problems of rent-seeking, see Anne O. Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review 64, no. 3 (June 1974): 399-458; Richard Posner, "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy 83 (August 1975): 807-27; James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1980); Gordon Tullock, "Rent-Seeking as a Negative-Sum Game," ibid., 16-37; Gordon Tullock, "The Costs of Special Privilege," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 195-211; and Robert D. Tollison, "Rent-Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos 35, no. 4 (1982): 575-602. Note that I adopt a broad definition of rent-seeking, including revenue-seeking activities through government regulation, tariffs, quota, and contracting. Cf. Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 13. These activities are also named "directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (DUP)." See David C. Colander, ed., Neoclassical Political Economy: The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984).
83. For the case of the Soviet Union, see Helene C. D'Encausse, Confiscated Power: How Soviet Russia Really Works (New York: Harper & Row, 1980) and M. Voslensky, Nomenklatura (New York: Doubleday, 1984). For the general problems of rent-seeking, see Anne O. Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review 64, no. 3 (June 1974): 399-458; Richard Posner, "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy 83 (August 1975): 807-27; James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent- Seeking Society (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1980); Gordon Tullock, "Rent-Seeking as a Negative-Sum Game," ibid., 16-37; Gordon Tullock, "The Costs of Special Privilege," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 195-211; and Robert D. Tollison, "Rent-Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos 35, no. 4 (1982): 575-602. Note that I adopt a broad definition of rent-seeking, including revenue-seeking activities through government regulation, tariffs, quota, and contracting. Cf. Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 13. These activities are also named "directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (DUP)." See David C. Colander, ed., Neoclassical Political Economy: The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984).
84. For the case of the Soviet Union, see Helene C. D'Encausse, Confiscated Power: How Soviet Russia Really Works (New York: Harper & Row, 1980) and M. Voslensky, Nomenklatura (New York: Doubleday, 1984). For the general problems of rent-seeking, see Anne O. Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review 64, no. 3 (June 1974): 399-458; Richard Posner, "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy 83 (August 1975): 807-27; James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent- Seeking Society (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1980); Gordon Tullock, "Rent-Seeking as a Negative-Sum Game," ibid., 16-37; Gordon Tullock, "The Costs of Special Privilege," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 195-211; and Robert D. Tollison, "Rent-Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos 35, no. 4 (1982): 575-602. Note that I adopt a broad definition of rent-seeking, including revenue-seeking activities through government regulation, tariffs, quota, and contracting. Cf. Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 13. These activities are also named "directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (DUP)." See David C. Colander, ed., Neoclassical Political Economy: The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984).
85. For the case of the Soviet Union, see Helene C. D'Encausse, Confiscated Power: How Soviet Russia Really Works (New York: Harper & Row, 1980) and M. Voslensky, Nomenklatura (New York: Doubleday, 1984). For the general problems of rent-seeking, see Anne O. Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review 64, no. 3 (June 1974): 399-458; Richard Posner, "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy 83 (August 1975): 807-27; James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent- Seeking Society (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1980); Gordon Tullock, "Rent-Seeking as a Negative-Sum Game," ibid., 16-37; Gordon Tullock, "The Costs of Special Privilege," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 195-211; and Robert D. Tollison, "Rent-Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos 35, no. 4 (1982): 575-602. Note that I adopt a broad definition of rent-seeking, including revenue-seeking activities through government regulation, tariffs, quota, and contracting. Cf. Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 13. These activities are also named "directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (DUP)." See David C. Colander, ed., Neoclassical Political Economy: The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984).
86. For the case of the Soviet Union, see Helene C. D'Encausse, Confiscated Power: How Soviet Russia Really Works (New York: Harper & Row, 1980) and M. Voslensky, Nomenklatura (New York: Doubleday, 1984). For the general problems of rent-seeking, see Anne O. Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review 64, no. 3 (June 1974): 399-458; Richard Posner, "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy 83 (August 1975): 807-27; James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent- Seeking Society (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1980); Gordon Tullock, "Rent-Seeking as a Negative-Sum Game," ibid., 16-37; Gordon Tullock, "The Costs of Special Privilege," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 195-211; and Robert D. Tollison, "Rent-Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos 35, no. 4 (1982): 575-602. Note that I adopt a broad definition of rent-seeking, including revenue-seeking activities through government regulation, tariffs, quota, and contracting. Cf. Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 13. These activities are also named "directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (DUP)." See David C. Colander, ed., Neoclassical Political Economy: The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984).
87. For the case of the Soviet Union, see Helene C. D'Encausse, Confiscated Power: How Soviet Russia Really Works (New York: Harper & Row, 1980) and M. Voslensky, Nomenklatura (New York: Doubleday, 1984). For the general problems of rent-seeking, see Anne O. Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review 64, no. 3 (June 1974): 399-458; Richard Posner, "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy 83 (August 1975): 807-27; James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent- Seeking Society (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1980); Gordon Tullock, "Rent-Seeking as a Negative-Sum Game," ibid., 16-37; Gordon Tullock, "The Costs of Special Privilege," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 195-211; and Robert D. Tollison, "Rent-Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos 35, no. 4 (1982): 575-602. Note that I adopt a broad definition of rent-seeking, including revenue-seeking activities through government regulation, tariffs, quota, and contracting. Cf. Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 13. These activities are also named "directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (DUP)." See David C. Colander, ed., Neoclassical Political Economy: The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984).
88. Susan L. Shirk, '"Playing to the Provinces': Deng Xiaoping's Political Strategy of Economic Reform," Studies in Comparative Communism 23, no. 3/4 (1990): 227-58.
89. For the characteristics of Chinese economic reform, cf. Nicholas R. Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China: 1978-1990 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: China's Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Carl Riskin, "Neither Plan nor Market: Mao's Political Economy," in New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution, ed. William A. Joseph, Christine P.W. Wong, and David Zweig (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 133-52. For political aspects of reform strategy, see Steven M. Goldstein, "China in Transition: The Political Foundations of Incremental Reform," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 1105-31; and Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
90. For the characteristics of Chinese economic reform, cf. Nicholas R. Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China: 1978-1990 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: China's Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Carl Riskin, "Neither Plan nor Market: Mao's Political Economy," in New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution, ed. William A. Joseph, Christine P.W. Wong, and David Zweig (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 133-52. For political aspects of reform strategy, see Steven M. Goldstein, "China in Transition: The Political Foundations of Incremental Reform," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 1105-31; and Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
91. For the characteristics of Chinese economic reform, cf. Nicholas R. Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China: 1978-1990 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: China's Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Carl Riskin, "Neither Plan nor Market: Mao's Political Economy," in New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution, ed. William A. Joseph, Christine P.W. Wong, and David Zweig (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 133-52. For political aspects of reform strategy, see Steven M. Goldstein, "China in Transition: The Political Foundations of Incremental Reform," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 1105-31; and Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
92. For the characteristics of Chinese economic reform, cf. Nicholas R. Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China: 1978-1990 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: China's Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Carl Riskin, "Neither Plan nor Market: Mao's Political Economy," in New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution, ed. William A. Joseph, Christine P.W. Wong, and David Zweig (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 133-52. For political aspects of reform strategy, see Steven M. Goldstein, "China in Transition: The Political Foundations of Incremental Reform," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 1105-31; and Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
93. For the characteristics of Chinese economic reform, cf. Nicholas R. Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China: 1978-1990 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: China's Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Carl Riskin, "Neither Plan nor Market: Mao's Political Economy," in New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution, ed. William A. Joseph, Christine P.W. Wong, and David Zweig (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 133-52. For political aspects of reform strategy, see Steven M. Goldstein, "China in Transition: The Political Foundations of Incremental Reform," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 1105-31; and Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
94. By "local property rights regime," this author refers to a system of formal and informal rules within a local jurisdiction that regulates the general assignment of property rights, ownership, and fiscal relationships. This definition also implies that there is more than a unitary local regime in China. Instead, diverse local regimes exist in response to each region's factor endowment and previous institutional arrangements. For the concept of property rights, cf. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, "The Property Right Paradigm," Journal of Economic History 33 (1973): 16-27; Horald Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review 57 (1967): 347-59; and Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For the role of local government in promoting rural economic development, cf. Nan Lin, "Local Market Socialism: Local Corporatism in Action," Theory and Society 24 (1995): 301-54; Jean C. Oi, "Fiscal Reform and Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China," World Politics 45, no. 1 (October 1992): 99-126; and Jean C. Oi, "The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 1132-49.
95. By "local property rights regime," this author refers to a system of formal and informal rules within a local jurisdiction that regulates the general assignment of property rights, ownership, and fiscal relationships. This definition also implies that there is more than a unitary local regime in China. Instead, diverse local regimes exist in response to each region's factor endowment and previous institutional arrangements. For the concept of property rights, cf. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, "The Property Right Paradigm," Journal of Economic History 33 (1973): 16-27; Horald Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review 57 (1967): 347-59; and Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For the role of local government in promoting rural economic development, cf. Nan Lin, "Local Market Socialism: Local Corporatism in Action," Theory and Society 24 (1995): 301-54; Jean C. Oi, "Fiscal Reform and Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China," World Politics 45, no. 1 (October 1992): 99-126; and Jean C. Oi, "The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 1132-49.
96. By "local property rights regime," this author refers to a system of formal and informal rules within a local jurisdiction that regulates the general assignment of property rights, ownership, and fiscal relationships. This definition also implies that there is more than a unitary local regime in China. Instead, diverse local regimes exist in response to each region's factor endowment and previous institutional arrangements. For the concept of property rights, cf. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, "The Property Right Paradigm," Journal of Economic History 33 (1973): 16-27; Horald Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review 57 (1967): 347-59; and Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For the role of local government in promoting rural economic development, cf. Nan Lin, "Local Market Socialism: Local Corporatism in Action," Theory and Society 24 (1995): 301-54; Jean C. Oi, "Fiscal Reform and Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China," World Politics 45, no. 1 (October 1992): 99-126; and Jean C. Oi, "The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 1132-49.
97. By "local property rights regime," this author refers to a system of formal and informal rules within a local jurisdiction that regulates the general assignment of property rights, ownership, and fiscal relationships. This definition also implies that there is more than a unitary local regime in China. Instead, diverse local regimes exist in response to each region's factor endowment and previous institutional arrangements. For the concept of property rights, cf. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, "The Property Right Paradigm," Journal of Economic History 33 (1973): 16-27; Horald Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review 57 (1967): 347-59; and Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For the role of local government in promoting rural economic development, cf. Nan Lin, "Local Market Socialism: Local Corporatism in Action," Theory and Society 24 (1995): 301-54; Jean C. Oi, "Fiscal Reform and Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China," World Politics 45, no. 1 (October 1992): 99-126; and Jean C. Oi, "The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 1132-49.
98. By "local property rights regime," this author refers to a system of formal and informal rules within a local jurisdiction that regulates the general assignment of property rights, ownership, and fiscal relationships. This definition also implies that there is more than a unitary local regime in China. Instead, diverse local regimes exist in response to each region's factor endowment and previous institutional arrangements. For the concept of property rights, cf. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, "The Property Right Paradigm," Journal of Economic History 33 (1973): 16-27; Horald Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review 57 (1967): 347-59; and Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For the role of local government in promoting rural economic development, cf. Nan Lin, "Local Market Socialism: Local Corporatism in Action," Theory and Society 24 (1995): 301-54; Jean C. Oi, "Fiscal Reform and Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China," World Politics 45, no. 1 (October 1992): 99-126; and Jean C. Oi, "The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 1132-49.
99. By "local property rights regime," this author refers to a system of formal and informal rules within a local jurisdiction that regulates the general assignment of property rights, ownership, and fiscal relationships. This definition also implies that there is more than a unitary local regime in China. Instead, diverse local regimes exist in response to each region's factor endowment and previous institutional arrangements. For the concept of property rights, cf. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, "The Property Right Paradigm," Journal of Economic History 33 (1973): 16-27; Horald Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review 57 (1967): 347-59; and Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For the role of local government in promoting rural economic development, cf. Nan Lin, "Local Market Socialism: Local Corporatism in Action," Theory and Society 24 (1995): 301-54; Jean C. Oi, "Fiscal Reform and Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China," World Politics 45, no. 1 (October 1992): 99-126; and Jean C. Oi, "The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy," The China Quarterly, no. 144 (December 1995): 1132-49.
100. See Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions, 278. Also see Douglass C. North, "Three Approaches to the Study of Institutions," in Colander, Neoclassical Political Economy, 33-40, for an insightful synthesis of the two approaches of rent-seeking and property rights.
101. See Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions, 278. Also see Douglass C. North, "Three Approaches to the Study of Institutions," in Colander, Neoclassical Political Economy, 33-40, for an insightful synthesis of the two approaches of rent-seeking and property rights.
102. Supposing that a special privilege has a price, a "shadow price" so to speak, reasonable is to assume that the returns the official receives from his buyer of privilege would be always lower than its "market value" if such a privilege market existed.
103. Mayfair Yang, in Gifts, Favors, and Banquets, made a distinction between use-value and exchange-value of guanxi. She argued that exchange-value has prevailed over use-value in the reform era.
104. The primary ties here refer to those that originate in families, kinship, classmates, etc. For a discussion of behavioral assumptions of economic theory, see North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, 20-26.
105. Interview in Guangdong, summer 1995.
106. The term "transpose" is redefined from William Sewell's "transposability," which is in turn taken from Pierre Bourdieu's "transposable." See Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1977). "The verb 'transpose' implies a concrete application of a rule to a new case, but in such a way that the rule will have subtle different forms in each of its applications." See Sewell, "Theory of Structure," 17.
107. The term "transpose" is redefined from William Sewell's "transposability," which is in turn taken from Pierre Bourdieu's "transposable." See Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1977). "The verb 'transpose' implies a concrete application of a rule to a new case, but in such a way that the rule will have subtle different forms in each of its applications." See Sewell, "Theory of Structure," 17.
108. It is assumed that other overseas Chinese who come from a well-established liberal democracy would not be able to play the guanxi game as adroitly as the Taiwanese.
109. Below I draw heavily on my prior case study: Wu Jieh-min, "Strange Bedfellows: Dynamics of Government-Business Relations between Chinese Local Authorities and Taiwanese Investors," Journal of Contemporary China 6, no. 15(1997): 319-46.
110. During the period 1986-94, a total of twenty thousand companies with a capital of US$20 billion had moved from Taiwan to China. For the trends of Taiwan's investment in China, see Tse-kang Leng, The Taiwan-China Connection: Democracy and Development across the Taiwan Straits (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996); and Chen Xiangming, "Taiwan Investments in China and Southeast Asia: Go West, But Also Go South," Asian Survey 36, no. 5 (May 1996): 447-67.
111. During the period 1986-94, a total of twenty thousand companies with a capital of US$20 billion had moved from Taiwan to China. For the trends of Taiwan's investment in China, see Tse-kang Leng, The Taiwan-China Connection: Democracy and Development across the Taiwan Straits (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996); and Chen Xiangming, "Taiwan Investments in China and Southeast Asia: Go West, But Also Go South," Asian Survey 36, no. 5 (May 1996): 447-67.
112. Take Xizhu, for example: the city realized US$2.3 billion processing fees from 1979 to 1994. Precisely calculating the differences in exchange rates earned by local units over time is difficult due to the complicated foreign exchange retention formula at different stages for different units and the changing official prices of the renminbi. Instead, we can roughly estimate the figure for the city in 1992, two years before the end of the multiple rate. Xizhu received a total remittance of US$390 million. The difference in the two rates was about 0.28 yuan per dollar. Then the local units should have gathered 109 million yuan. By comparison, the government budgetary revenues in the same year were 560 million yuan. This clearly shows the importance of processing fees for local financial income in the region.
113. In some places, the term "head tax" also referred to the management fees charged by labor bureaus since the fees were also collected based on the number of workers.
114. Shao Mingjun, Zhongguo tequ shuiwu gailun (An introduction to the taxation in special economic zones in China) (Beijing: Zhongguo jingji chubanshe, 1992), 550.
115. Many of the joint ventures were in fact "fictive joint ventures" as described above.
116. Zhongguo shibao (China Times) (Taipei), July 25, 1995.
117. Shijie ribao (World Journal), December 30, 1996.
118. Interview in Guangdong, winter 1994. 58 For an influential but controversial argument regarding a declining Chinese central state and the need to reverse the trend, see Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, "Wang Shaoguang Proposal" (A Report on China's State Capacity), Chinese Economic Studies 28, nos. 3 and 4 (1996).
119. Interview in Guangdong, summer 1995.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid.