Reputation and the control of pollution

Ecological Economics

Volumn 47, Issue 2-3, 2003, Pages 197-212

  Caplan, Arthur J ^a  

^a UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Pollution; Reputation; Self regulation; Sequential equilibrium

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; POLLUTION CONTROL; REGULATORY APPROACH; STRATEGIC APPROACH;

EID: 0346367131     PISSN: 09218009     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2003.07.012     Document Type: Article

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