Overcompliance and voluntary agreements

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 195-202

  Cavaliere, Alberto ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PAVIA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Environmental policy; Product quality; Repeated games; Reputation; Voluntary agreements

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PUBLIC POLICY; REGULATORY COMPLIANCE; STANDARDS;

BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM; ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION; ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; ENVIRONMENTAL REPUTATION; OVERCOMPLIANCE; VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS;

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;

CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOR; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; TRADE-ENVIRONMENT RELATIONS; VOLUNTARY APPROACH;

EID: 0034306647     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008322406871     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. An experiment in voluntary regulation: Participation in EPA's 33/50 program
2. Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud
3. The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting and with incomplete information
4. EPA's voluntary 33/50 program: Impact on toxic releases and economic performance of firms
5. The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance
6. Reputation and imperfect information
7. Information and consumer behaviour
8. Predation, monopolisation and antitrust
9. Voluntary environmental agreements: Good or bad news for environmental quality?
10. The chain store paradox