Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 70, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 325-342

  Benchekroun, Hassan ^a   Van Long, Ngo ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL   (Canada)

^b MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Dynamic games; H41; Incentive; L51; Oligopoly; Pollution; Q25; Taxation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009993416     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00038-3     Document Type: Article

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