Survey Article: Interpretation, Indeterminacy and Authority: Some Recent Controversies in the Philosophy of Law

Journal of Political Philosophy

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 470-498

  Stoljar, Natalie ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0345448061     PISSN: 09638016     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1046/j.1467-9760.2003.00186.x     Document Type: Review

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