Vagueness, counterfactual intentions, and legal interpretation

Legal Theory

Volumn 7, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 447-465

  Stoljar, Natalie ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0345138423     PISSN: 13523252     EISSN: 14698048     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s1352325201704089     Document Type: Article

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