Efficient mechanisms for multiple public goods

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 88, Issue 3-4, 2004, Pages 629-644

  Mutuswami, Suresh ^a   Winter, Eyal ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

^b EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

^c HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Mechanism design; Public goods; Shapley value

Indexed keywords

EID: 0344628486     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00218-9     Document Type: Article

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