The logic of content effects in propositional reasoning: The case of conditional reasoning with a point of view

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 335-378

  Beller, Sieghard ^a   Spada, Hans ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242679443     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546780342000007     Document Type: Article

References (90)

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