A Model for the 'War Against Terrorism'? Military Intervention in Northern Ireland and the 1970 Falls Curfew

Journal of Law and Society

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 341-375

  Campbell, Colm ^a   Connolly, Ita ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ULSTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0242596292     PISSN: 0263323X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-6478.00261     Document Type: Review

References (133)

1. See, for instance, 'Britain to Brief US on Experience with IRA' Daily Telegraph, 8 November 2001, and 'Britain Shares its Lessons of Terrorism' Washington Times, 14 February 2002.
2. See, for instance, 'Britain to Brief US on Experience with IRA' Daily Telegraph, 8 November 2001, and 'Britain Shares its Lessons of Terrorism' Washington Times, 14 February 2002.
3. See N. Katyal and L. Tribe, 'Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals' (2002) 111 Yale Law J. 1259; C. Evans, 'Terrorism on Trial: The President's Constitutional Authority to Order the Prosecution of Suspected Terrorists by Military Commission' (2002) 51 Duke Law J. 1831; J. Fitzpatrick, 'Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism' (2002) 96 Am. J. of International Law 345; H. Hongju Koh, 'The Case Against Military Commissions' (2002) 96 Am. J. of International Law 337; D.A. Mundis, "The Use of Military Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts' (2002) 96 Am. J. of International Law 320.
4. See N. Katyal and L. Tribe, 'Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals' (2002) 111 Yale Law J. 1259; C. Evans, 'Terrorism on Trial: The President's Constitutional Authority to Order the Prosecution of Suspected Terrorists by Military Commission' (2002) 51 Duke Law J. 1831; J. Fitzpatrick, 'Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism' (2002) 96 Am. J. of International Law 345; H. Hongju Koh, 'The Case Against Military Commissions' (2002) 96 Am. J. of International Law 337; D.A. Mundis, "The Use of Military Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts' (2002) 96 Am. J. of International Law 320.
5. See N. Katyal and L. Tribe, 'Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals' (2002) 111 Yale Law J. 1259; C. Evans, 'Terrorism on Trial: The President's Constitutional Authority to Order the Prosecution of Suspected Terrorists by Military Commission' (2002) 51 Duke Law J. 1831; J. Fitzpatrick, 'Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism' (2002) 96 Am. J. of International Law 345; H. Hongju Koh, 'The Case Against Military Commissions' (2002) 96 Am. J. of International Law 337; D.A. Mundis, "The Use of Military Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts' (2002) 96 Am. J. of International Law 320.
6. See N. Katyal and L. Tribe, 'Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals' (2002) 111 Yale Law J. 1259; C. Evans, 'Terrorism on Trial: The President's Constitutional Authority to Order the Prosecution of Suspected Terrorists by Military Commission' (2002) 51 Duke Law J. 1831; J. Fitzpatrick, 'Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism' (2002) 96 Am. J. of International Law 345; H. Hongju Koh, 'The Case Against Military Commissions' (2002) 96 Am. J. of International Law 337; D.A. Mundis, "The Use of Military Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts' (2002) 96 Am. J. of International Law 320.
7. See N. Katyal and L. Tribe, 'Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals' (2002) 111 Yale Law J. 1259; C. Evans, 'Terrorism on Trial: The President's Constitutional Authority to Order the Prosecution of Suspected Terrorists by Military Commission' (2002) 51 Duke Law J. 1831; J. Fitzpatrick, 'Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism' (2002) 96 Am. J. of International Law 345; H. Hongju Koh, 'The Case Against Military Commissions' (2002) 96 Am. J. of International Law 337; D.A. Mundis, "The Use of Military Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts' (2002) 96 Am. J. of International Law 320.
8. 'Iraqi Civilians Killed at Checkpoints' Guardian, 1 April 2003. 'US Military Chiefs Express Regret Over Civilian Deaths' New York Times, 2 April 2003.
9. 'Iraqi Civilians Killed at Checkpoints' Guardian, 1 April 2003. 'US Military Chiefs Express Regret Over Civilian Deaths' New York Times, 2 April 2003.
10. 'Lawyers Split Over Right to Use Force' Daily Telegraph, 11 March 2003. M. Happold, 'The Legal Case for War with Iraq' Guardian, 13 March 2003. 'Attorney General: War is Legal' Guardian, 17 March 2003.
11. 'Lawyers Split Over Right to Use Force' Daily Telegraph, 11 March 2003. M. Happold, 'The Legal Case for War with Iraq' Guardian, 13 March 2003. 'Attorney General: War is Legal' Guardian, 17 March 2003.
12. 'Lawyers Split Over Right to Use Force' Daily Telegraph, 11 March 2003. M. Happold, 'The Legal Case for War with Iraq' Guardian, 13 March 2003. 'Attorney General: War is Legal' Guardian, 17 March 2003.
13. 'US "will adhere" to Geneva Convention' Daily Telegraph, 2 April 2003. 'Occupation of Iraq Illegal, Blair told' The Guardian, 22 May 2003. 'Blair Denies Occupation is Illegal' Daily Telegraph, 23 May 2003.
14. 'US "will adhere" to Geneva Convention' Daily Telegraph, 2 April 2003. 'Occupation of Iraq Illegal, Blair told' The Guardian, 22 May 2003. 'Blair Denies Occupation is Illegal' Daily Telegraph, 23 May 2003.
15. 'US "will adhere" to Geneva Convention' Daily Telegraph, 2 April 2003. 'Occupation of Iraq Illegal, Blair told' The Guardian, 22 May 2003. 'Blair Denies Occupation is Illegal' Daily Telegraph, 23 May 2003.
16. 'Blair promises "brighter and better" Iraq' Guardian, 19 March 2003. 'The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort... Then we will leave, and we will leave behind a free Iraq. ' Extract from a speech given by George W. Bush aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, 2 May 2003.
17. For military-based accounts see D. Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984 (1985) 36-9, and D. Barzilay, The British Army in Ulster Vol. 1 (1977) 11-16. For a swingeing critique of Army behaviour, see S. Ó Fearghail, Law(?) and Orders: The Belfast 'Curfew' of 3-5 July 1970 (1970). On deaths during the curfew, see University of Ulster's authoritative CAIN website 〈http://cain.ulst.ac.uk〉, last visited 9 July 2003, and D. McKittrick, S. Kelters, B. Feeney, and C. Thornton, Lost Lives (1999) 52-5.
18. For military-based accounts see D. Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984 (1985) 36-9, and D. Barzilay, The British Army in Ulster Vol. 1 (1977) 11-16. For a swingeing critique of Army behaviour, see S. Ó Fearghail, Law(?) and Orders: The Belfast 'Curfew' of 3-5 July 1970 (1970). On deaths during the curfew, see University of Ulster's authoritative CAIN website 〈http://cain.ulst.ac.uk〉, last visited 9 July 2003, and D. McKittrick, S. Kelters, B. Feeney, and C. Thornton, Lost Lives (1999) 52-5.
19. For military-based accounts see D. Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984 (1985) 36-9, and D. Barzilay, The British Army in Ulster Vol. 1 (1977) 11-16. For a swingeing critique of Army behaviour, see S. Ó Fearghail, Law(?) and Orders: The Belfast 'Curfew' of 3-5 July 1970 (1970). On deaths during the curfew, see University of Ulster's authoritative CAIN website 〈http://cain.ulst.ac.uk〉, last visited 9 July 2003, and D. McKittrick, S. Kelters, B. Feeney, and C. Thornton, Lost Lives (1999) 52-5.
20. For military-based accounts see D. Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984 (1985) 36-9, and D. Barzilay, The British Army in Ulster Vol. 1 (1977) 11-16. For a swingeing critique of Army behaviour, see S. Ó Fearghail, Law(?) and Orders: The Belfast 'Curfew' of 3-5 July 1970 (1970). On deaths during the curfew, see University of Ulster's authoritative CAIN website 〈http://cain.ulst.ac.uk〉, last visited 9 July 2003, and D. McKittrick, S. Kelters, B. Feeney, and C. Thornton, Lost Lives (1999) 52-5.
21. For military-based accounts see D. Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984 (1985) 36-9, and D. Barzilay, The British Army in Ulster Vol. 1 (1977) 11-16. For a swingeing critique of Army behaviour, see S. Ó Fearghail, Law(?) and Orders: The Belfast 'Curfew' of 3-5 July 1970 (1970). On deaths during the curfew, see University of Ulster's authoritative CAIN website 〈http://cain.ulst.ac.uk〉, last visited 9 July 2003, and D. McKittrick, S. Kelters, B. Feeney, and C. Thornton, Lost Lives (1999) 52-5.
22. See S. Greer, 'Military Intervention in Civil Disturbances: The Legal Basis Reconsidered' (1983) Public Law 573, and A.W.B. Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire (2001) 58-90.
23. See S. Greer, 'Military Intervention in Civil Disturbances: The Legal Basis Reconsidered' (1983) Public Law 573, and A.W.B. Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire (2001) 58-90.
24. For non-legal accounts see n. 7 above. An incisive but limited account of the importance of the curfew can be found in C. Palley, 'The Evolution, Disintegration and Possible Reconstruction of the Northern Ireland Constitution'(1972) 1 Anglo-American Law Rev. 368, at 412-14.
25. 'Gen. Freeland's Curfew Order Was Right, Rules City Magistrate' Belfast Telegraph, 8 September 1970.
26. See K. Boyle, T. Hadden, and P. Hillyard, Law and State: The Case of Northern Ireland (1975); K. Boyle, T. Hadden, and P. Hillyard, Ten Years on in Northern Ireland: The Legal Control of Political Violence (1980); and D. Walsh, The Use and Abuse of Emergency Legislation in Northern Ireland (1983). On the Diplock courts see, also, G. Hogan and C. Walker, Political Violence and the Law in Ireland (1989) 101-37 and Lord Diplock, 'Report of the Commission to Consider Legal Procedures to Deal with Terrorist Activities in Northern Ireland' (1972; Cmnd. 5185) (the Diplock report).
27. See K. Boyle, T. Hadden, and P. Hillyard, Law and State: The Case of Northern Ireland (1975); K. Boyle, T. Hadden, and P. Hillyard, Ten Years on in Northern Ireland: The Legal Control of Political Violence (1980); and D. Walsh, The Use and Abuse of Emergency Legislation in Northern Ireland (1983). On the Diplock courts see, also, G. Hogan and C. Walker, Political Violence and the Law in Ireland (1989) 101-37 and Lord Diplock, 'Report of the Commission to Consider Legal Procedures to Deal with Terrorist Activities in Northern Ireland' (1972; Cmnd. 5185) (the Diplock report).
28. See K. Boyle, T. Hadden, and P. Hillyard, Law and State: The Case of Northern Ireland (1975); K. Boyle, T. Hadden, and P. Hillyard, Ten Years on in Northern Ireland: The Legal Control of Political Violence (1980); and D. Walsh, The Use and Abuse of Emergency Legislation in Northern Ireland (1983). On the Diplock courts see, also, G. Hogan and C. Walker, Political Violence and the Law in Ireland (1989) 101-37 and Lord Diplock, 'Report of the Commission to Consider Legal Procedures to Deal with Terrorist Activities in Northern Ireland' (1972; Cmnd. 5185) (the Diplock report).
29. See K. Boyle, T. Hadden, and P. Hillyard, Law and State: The Case of Northern Ireland (1975); K. Boyle, T. Hadden, and P. Hillyard, Ten Years on in Northern Ireland: The Legal Control of Political Violence (1980); and D. Walsh, The Use and Abuse of Emergency Legislation in Northern Ireland (1983). On the Diplock courts see, also, G. Hogan and C. Walker, Political Violence and the Law in Ireland (1989) 101-37 and Lord Diplock, 'Report of the Commission to Consider Legal Procedures to Deal with Terrorist Activities in Northern Ireland' (1972; Cmnd. 5185) (the Diplock report).
30. See K. Boyle, T. Hadden, and P. Hillyard, Law and State: The Case of Northern Ireland (1975); K. Boyle, T. Hadden, and P. Hillyard, Ten Years on in Northern Ireland: The Legal Control of Political Violence (1980); and D. Walsh, The Use and Abuse of Emergency Legislation in Northern Ireland (1983). On the Diplock courts see, also, G. Hogan and C. Walker, Political Violence and the Law in Ireland (1989) 101-37 and Lord Diplock, 'Report of the Commission to Consider Legal Procedures to Deal with Terrorist Activities in Northern Ireland' (1972; Cmnd. 5185) (the Diplock report).
31. The files are located at the Public Record Office Northern Ireland (PRONI), file refs: BELF/1/1/2/231/1, BELF/1/1/2/231/16, BELF/1/1/2/231/17, BELF/1/1/2/232/1, BELF/1/1/2/232/18, BELF/1/1/2/232/31, BELF/1/1/2/233/12, BELF/1/1/2/233/13, BELF/1/1/2/233/24, BELF/1/1/2/233/28, BELF/1/1/2/233/29, BELF/1/1/2/233/31, BELF/1/1/2/233/32, BELF/1/1/2/233/33, BELF/1/1/2/233/34, BELF/1/1/2/233/35, BELF/1/1/2/233/36, BELF/1/1/2/233/37, and BELF/1/172/233/39.
32. A devolved government under the Government of Ireland Act 1920 ruled Northern Ireland from 1921 to 1972. It is often referred to as the 'Stormont Government' because of the geographical location of the devolved Northern Ireland institutions. See P. Buckland, The Factory of Grievances: Devolved Government in Northern Ireland (1979).
33. See, generally, R. Teitel, Transitional Justice (2000). On the specifics of the Northern Ireland situation, see C. Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (2000) and C. Campbell, F. Ni Aoláin, and C. Harvey, 'The Frontiers of Legal Analysis: Reframing the Transition in Northern Ireland' (2003) 66 Modern Law Rev. 317.
34. See, generally, R. Teitel, Transitional Justice (2000). On the specifics of the Northern Ireland situation, see C. Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (2000) and C. Campbell, F. Ni Aoláin, and C. Harvey, 'The Frontiers of Legal Analysis: Reframing the Transition in Northern Ireland' (2003) 66 Modern Law Rev. 317.
35. See, generally, R. Teitel, Transitional Justice (2000). On the specifics of the Northern Ireland situation, see C. Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (2000) and C. Campbell, F. Ni Aoláin, and C. Harvey, 'The Frontiers of Legal Analysis: Reframing the Transition in Northern Ireland' (2003) 66 Modern Law Rev. 317.
36. The denial is examined further below.
37. See J. Fitzpatrick, The International System for Protecting Rights During States of Emergency (1994) and J. Oraá, Human Rights in States of Emergency in International Law (1992).
38. See J. Fitzpatrick, The International System for Protecting Rights During States of Emergency (1994) and J. Oraá, Human Rights in States of Emergency in International Law (1992).
39. For an argument along these lines, see J.E. Finn, Constitutions in Crisis: Political Violence and the Rule of Law (1991).
40. Schlesinger, while acknowledging that emergency government was an 'extra-ordinary resort to raw political power, necessary but not lawful', nevertheless envisaged this action as one taken by the democratically elected president, not an autogenous military one. See A.M. Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency (1974) 16.
41. See O. Gross, 'Chaos and Rules: Should All Responses to Violent Crises Be Constitutional?' (2003) 112 Yale Law J. 1011. The consequences of a retreat from legality during emergency are explored further below.
42. This is a separate issue from the legitimate delegation of powers by the democratic government during the emergency. Even the 'dictator' model of emergency government from the Roman republic as analysed by Carl Friedrich envisaged that the appointment of the (temporary) dictator take place 'according to precise constitutional forms'. See C.J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (1950) 574, quoted in Finn, op. cit., n. 17, p. 16.
43. This is a separate issue from the legitimate delegation of powers by the democratic government during the emergency. Even the 'dictator' model of emergency government from the Roman republic as analysed by Carl Friedrich envisaged that the appointment of the (temporary) dictator take place 'according to precise constitutional forms'. See C.J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (1950) 574, quoted in Finn, op. cit., n. 17, p. 16.
44. See A. Babington, Miltary Intervention in Britain: From the Gordon Riots to the Gibraltar Incident (1990) 242, and Greer, op. cit., n. 8.
45. See A. Babington, Miltary Intervention in Britain: From the Gordon Riots to the Gibraltar Incident (1990) 242, and Greer, op. cit., n. 8.
46. For military-based explorations of some of these issues see F. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping (1971); R. Clutterbuck, Protest and the Urban Guerrilla (1973); R. Evelegh, Peacekeeping in a Democratic Society, the Lessons of Northern Ireland (1978); and M. Addison, Violent Politics: Strategies of Internal Conflict (2002) 244.
47. For military-based explorations of some of these issues see F. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping (1971); R. Clutterbuck, Protest and the Urban Guerrilla (1973); R. Evelegh, Peacekeeping in a Democratic Society, the Lessons of Northern Ireland (1978); and M. Addison, Violent Politics: Strategies of Internal Conflict (2002) 244.
48. For military-based explorations of some of these issues see F. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping (1971); R. Clutterbuck, Protest and the Urban Guerrilla (1973); R. Evelegh, Peacekeeping in a Democratic Society, the Lessons of Northern Ireland (1978); and M. Addison, Violent Politics: Strategies of Internal Conflict (2002) 244.
49. For military-based explorations of some of these issues see F. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping (1971); R. Clutterbuck, Protest and the Urban Guerrilla (1973); R. Evelegh, Peacekeeping in a Democratic Society, the Lessons of Northern Ireland (1978); and M. Addison, Violent Politics: Strategies of Internal Conflict (2002) 244.
50. For a discussion of this point in a Northern Ireland context, see K. McEvoy and B. Gormally, ' "Seeing" is Believing: Positivist Terrorology, Peacemaking Criminology and the Northern Ireland Peace Process' (1997) 8 Critical Crim. 9.
51. Boyle et al., op. cit. (1980), n. 11, p. 93. See, also, K. McEvoy, Paramilitary Imprisonment in Northern Ireland: Resistance Management and Release (2001) 137.
52. Boyle et al., op. cit. (1980), n. 11, p. 93. See, also, K. McEvoy, Paramilitary Imprisonment in Northern Ireland: Resistance Management and Release (2001) 137.
53. For a discussion of Weber's view of formal rationality in the context of legal responses to United States race riots, see I. Balbus, The Dialectic of Legal Repression: Black Rebels Before the American Courts (1977) 3.
54. id., p. 3. For an exploration of Balbus's theories in a Northern Ireland context, see P. Hillyard and K. Boyle, 'The Diplock Court Strategy: Some Reflections on Law and the Politics of Law' in Power, Conflict and Inequality, eds. M. Kelly, L. O'Dowd, J. Wickham (1982).
55. id., p. 3. For an exploration of Balbus's theories in a Northern Ireland context, see P. Hillyard and K. Boyle, 'The Diplock Court Strategy: Some Reflections on Law and the Politics of Law' in Power, Conflict and Inequality, eds. M. Kelly, L. O'Dowd, J. Wickham (1982).
56. For a discussion of the resistant quality of law in the Northern Ireland context, see K. McEvoy, 'Law, Struggle, and Political Transformation in Northern Ireland' (2000) 27 J. of Law and Society 542. More generally, see R. Abel, Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle Against Apartheid 1980-1994 (1995); D. Dyzenhaus, Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: South African Law in the Perspective of Legal Philosophy (1991); and O. Kirchheimer, Political Justice (1961).
57. For a discussion of the resistant quality of law in the Northern Ireland context, see K. McEvoy, 'Law, Struggle, and Political Transformation in Northern Ireland' (2000) 27 J. of Law and Society 542. More generally, see R. Abel, Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle Against Apartheid 1980-1994 (1995); D. Dyzenhaus, Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: South African Law in the Perspective of Legal Philosophy (1991); and O. Kirchheimer, Political Justice (1961).
58. For a discussion of the resistant quality of law in the Northern Ireland context, see K. McEvoy, 'Law, Struggle, and Political Transformation in Northern Ireland' (2000) 27 J. of Law and Society 542. More generally, see R. Abel, Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle Against Apartheid 1980-1994 (1995); D. Dyzenhaus, Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: South African Law in the Perspective of Legal Philosophy (1991); and O. Kirchheimer, Political Justice (1961).
59. For a discussion of the resistant quality of law in the Northern Ireland context, see K. McEvoy, 'Law, Struggle, and Political Transformation in Northern Ireland' (2000) 27 J. of Law and Society 542. More generally, see R. Abel, Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle Against Apartheid 1980-1994 (1995); D. Dyzenhaus, Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: South African Law in the Perspective of Legal Philosophy (1991); and O. Kirchheimer, Political Justice (1961).
60. For a fuller discussion of the points raised under this heading, see Greer, op. cit., n. 8; Simpson, op. cit., n. 8, pp. 58-64, and C. Campbell, Emergency Law in Ireland, 1918-1925 (1994) 123-48.
61. For a fuller discussion of the points raised under this heading, see Greer, op. cit., n. 8; Simpson, op. cit., n. 8, pp. 58-64, and C. Campbell, Emergency Law in Ireland, 1918-1925 (1994) 123-48.
62. For a fuller discussion of the points raised under this heading, see Greer, op. cit., n. 8; Simpson, op. cit., n. 8, pp. 58-64, and C. Campbell, Emergency Law in Ireland, 1918-1925 (1994) 123-48.
63. Evelegh, op. cit. n. 22, p. 8.
64. AG v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd. [1920] A.C. 508, followed in Ireland in Egan v. Macready [1921] 1 I.R. 265.
65. A. V. Dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885) 295-6.
66. Manual of Military Law (1969) 502.
67. Violence and Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969, Report of a Tribunal of Inquiry (1972; Cmnd. 566; chair, Mr Justice Scarman) para. 20.1 (the Scarman report).
68. MOD Signal Message Form, MOD(Army) [from CGS] to NORIRELAND [to GOC], 6 December 1968, DEFE 24/882 PRONI.
69. Attorney-General to Secretary of State for Defence, 13 December 1968, DEFE 24/882, PRO Kew.
70. 'Military Aid to the Civil Power in Northern Ireland', Chief of the Defence Staff to Secretary of State, 9 December 1968, DEFE 24/882 PRO Kew.
71. 'Military Aid to the Civil Authority in Northern Ireland', Attorney-General to Secretary of State for Defence, 13 December 1968, DEFE 24/882 PRO Kew.
72. i b i d.
73. DEFE 24/882 PRO Kew, op. cit., n. 36.
74. i b i d.
75. Scarman, op. cit., n. 33, para. 20.1.
76. See Greer, op, cit., n. 8, pp. 587-8, and Scarman, id., paras. 24.1-24.3.
77. See Greer, op, cit., n. 8, pp. 587-8, and Scarman, id., paras. 24.1-24.3.
78. See 'Northern. Ireland, Text of a Communiqué and Declaration issued after a meeting Held at 10 Downing Street on 19 August 1969' (1969; Cmnd 4154).
79. Conclusions of a Meeting of the Joint Security Committee, 28 June 1970, DEFE 13/730 PRO Kew.
80. i b i d.
81. Cabinet Conclusions 28 June 1970, CAB4/1530 PRONI.
82. 803 H.C. Debs., col. 329 (6 July 1970).
83. DEFE 25/273 PRO Kew.
84. i b i d.
85. See Hamill, op. cit., n. 7, p. 38. An account by the GOC showing awareness shortly after that the area was Official IRA-dominated can be found at DEFE 25/273 PRO Kew. On the IRA generally, see R. English, Armed Struggle: A History of the IRA (2003).
86. See Hamill, op. cit., n. 7, p. 38. An account by the GOC showing awareness shortly after that the area was Official IRA-dominated can be found at DEFE 25/273 PRO Kew. On the IRA generally, see R. English, Armed Struggle: A History of the IRA (2003).
87. See Hamill, id., p. 37.
88. L.K. Donohue, Counter-terrorist Law and Emergency Powers in the United Kingdom, 1922-2000 (2001) 63.
89. Simpson, op. cit., n. 8, p. 898.
90. See P. Taylor, Brits: the War Against the IRA (2001) 30-2, 50.
91. Authors' emphasis.
92. Conclusions of a Meeting of the Joint Security Committee, 4 July 1970, DEFE 13/730 PRO Kew.
93. i b i d.
94. DEFE 25/273 Kew.
95. Cabinet conclusions 7 July 1970, CAB4/1532 PRONI.
96. Cabinet conclusions 29 June 1970, CAB 128/47, PRO Kew, and cabinet conclusions 7 July 1970, CAB 128/47, PRO Kew.
97. Cabinet conclusions 29 June 1970, CAB 128/47, PRO Kew, and cabinet conclusions 7 July 1970, CAB 128/47, PRO Kew.
98. The Ministerial Committee on Northern Ireland was established by Ted Heath on taking office in 1970. See P. Hennessy, The Prime Minister - The Office and Its Holders Since 1945 (2001) 347.
99. MOD Signal Message Form, from MOD UK Army to HQ Norireland 14 July 1970, DEFE 25/273, Johnston to PS/Minister for Defence 15 July 1970, DEFE 25/273, and MOD Signal Message Form, from MOD (Army) To Noireland 15 July 1970, PRO Kew.
100. This view is supported in Hamill, op. cit., n. 7, p. 37, and Barzilay, op. cit., n. 7, p. 14.
101. This view is supported in Hamill, op. cit., n. 7, p. 37, and Barzilay, op. cit., n. 7, p. 14.
102. Thus the journalist Tony Geraghty escaped conviction because he could show he was arrested outside the strict curfew area. See 'Newsman in Curfew Case Cleared' Irish News, 28 July 1970.
103. On the ending of the curfew see Taylor, op. cit., n. 54, p. 50, and S. Pickering, Women, Policing and Resistance in Norther Ireland (2002) 74.
104. On the ending of the curfew see Taylor, op. cit., n. 54, p. 50, and S. Pickering, Women, Policing and Resistance in Norther Ireland (2002) 74.
105. 'Northern Ireland Meeting Between Home Secretary and Defence Secretary, July 1970, DEFE 25/273, PRO Kew.
106. Boyle, op. cit. (1975), n. 11, p. 43.
107. It was not always possible to determine precisely when age was assessed, hence the figures here should be regarded only as being accurate to within a few months.
108. Boyle, op. cit. (1975), n. 11, table 3.2, p. 23.
109. id., p. 46.
110. Ireland v. UK 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 207.
111. CCDC, op. cit., n. 7, p. 16.
112. Walsh, op. cit., n. 11, p. 84.
113. See Diplock, op. cit., n. 11, paras. 73-92 and R v. Flynn & Leonard [1972] May N.I.J.B. 112, 131.
114. See Diplock, op. cit., n. 11, paras. 73-92 and R v. Flynn & Leonard [1972] May N.I.J.B. 112, 131.
115. Some details can be found with Cabinet conclusions 5 February 1970, CAB4/1500 PRONI.
116. s. 7(1) provides that 'Any person who (a) assaults, resists or impedes any constable in the execution of his duty or any person acting in aid of such constable ... shall be guilty of an offence'. See 'Newsman in Curfew Case Cleared' Irish News, 28 July 1970.
117. The intricacies of the legislation meant that some offences (involving ammunition and certain types of firearm) were charged under 'explosives legislation', even though they would ordinarily be considered as firearms offences (and are so considered in this study).
118. Walsh, op. cit., n. 11, p. 17.
119. id., p. 84.
120. See Boyle et al., op. cit. (1975), n. 11, p. 63.
121. id., p. 60.
122. Who Was Who 1971-1980 (1981) 279-80.
123. A.P. Hockaday to PS/S of S, 2 August 1971, CJ4/56 PRO Kew, and UK Rep NI to Home Office, CJ4/56 PRO Kew.
124. Attorney General for Northern Ireland's Reference (No. 1 of 1975) [1977] A.C. 105. See, generally, F. Ní Aoláin, The Politics of Force: Conflict Management and State Violence in Northern Ireland (2000).
125. Attorney General for Northern Ireland's Reference (No. 1 of 1975) [1977] A.C. 105. See, generally, F. Ní Aoláin, The Politics of Force: Conflict Management and State Violence in Northern Ireland (2000).
126. AG v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd. [1920] A.C. 508, followed in Ireland in Egan v. Macready [1921] 1 I.R. 265. See Campbell, op. cit., n. 28, pp. 115, 140-7. Prerogative powers though have a curious resilience: see R. v. Sec. of State for the Home Department, ex parte Northumbria Police Authority [1988] 2 W.L.R. 590, and Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All E.R. 935.
127. AG v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd. [1920] A.C. 508, followed in Ireland in Egan v. Macready [1921] 1 I.R. 265. See Campbell, op. cit., n. 28, pp. 115, 140-7. Prerogative powers though have a curious resilience: see R. v. Sec. of State for the Home Department, ex parte Northumbria Police Authority [1988] 2 W.L.R. 590, and Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All E.R. 935.
128. AG v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd. [1920] A.C. 508, followed in Ireland in Egan v. Macready [1921] 1 I.R. 265. See Campbell, op. cit., n. 28, pp. 115, 140-7. Prerogative powers though have a curious resilience: see R. v. Sec. of State for the Home Department, ex parte Northumbria Police Authority [1988] 2 W.L.R. 590, and Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All E.R. 935.
129. AG v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd. [1920] A.C. 508, followed in Ireland in Egan v. Macready [1921] 1 I.R. 265. See Campbell, op. cit., n. 28, pp. 115, 140-7. Prerogative powers though have a curious resilience: see R. v. Sec. of State for the Home Department, ex parte Northumbria Police Authority [1988] 2 W.L.R. 590, and Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All E.R. 935.
130. See Simson, op. cit., n. 8. Also see, generally, C. Townshend, Britain's Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century (1986).
131. See Simson, op. cit., n. 8. Also see, generally, C. Townshend, Britain's Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century (1986).
132. In 2003 it was claimed that an Army intelligence unit had allowed one of its Agents ('Stakeknife') within the IRA to kill with impunity. This aspect of military operations was not subordinated to the police; indeed some of those killed may have been police agents. See 'Stakeknife Revelations Hurt IRA and Army' Guardian, 17 May 2003.
133. The CCDC report (op. cit., n. 7), for instance, displayed considerable contusion as to the legal basis of the curfew, locating its condemnation in a discussion of the 'Riot Act', seemingly unaware that the Act in question had been repealed.