Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 292-310

  Forges, Françoise ^a   Minelli, Enrico ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE CERGY PONTOISE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRESCIA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Communication equilibrium; Nash equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038905683     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0670     Document Type: Article

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