On the geography of conventions

Economic Theory

Volumn 22, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 863-873

  Blume, Andreas ^a   Temzelides, Ted ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

Equilibrium selection; Evolutionary dynamics; Restricted mobility

Indexed keywords

EID: 0142230455     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0350-3     Document Type: Article

References (14)

1. Anwar A.W.: When does immigration facilitate efficiency. Manuscript (1996)
2. Bhaskar, V., Vega-Redondo F.: Migration and the evolution of conventions. Manuscript (1996)
3. Dieckmann, T.: The evolution of conventions with mobile players. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 38, 93-111 (1999)
4. Ellison, G.: Learning, local interaction, and coordination. Econometrica 61, 1047-1071 (1993)
5. Ellison, G.: Basins of attraction, long run equilibria, and the speed of step-by-step evolution. Review of Economic Studies 67 (1), 17-45 (2000)
6. Ely, J.: Local conventions. Manuscript (1996)
7. Freidlin M. I., Wentzell A. D.: Random perturbations of dynamical systems. New York: Springer 1984
8. Fudenberg D., Levine O.K.: The theory of learning in games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1998
9. Larson, N.: Match choice and ghettoization in evolutionary games. Manuscript (2000)
10. Kandori, M., Mailath, G., Rob, R.: Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica 61, 29-56 (1993)
11. Oechsler, J.: Decentralization and the coordination problem. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 32, 119-139 (1997)
12. Young, P. H.: The evolution of conventions. Econometrica 61, 57-84 (1993)
13. Young, P. H.: Conventional contracts. Review of Economic Studies 65, 773-792 (1998)
14. Young, P. H.: Individual strategy and social structure. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1998