Characterizing the common prior assumption

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 106, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 316-355

  Halpern, Joseph Y ^a  

^a Department of Computer Science and School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036815905     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2002.2925     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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