International environmental agreements: How the policy instrument affects equilibrium emissions and welfare

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 155, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 527-550

  Endres, Alfred ^a   Finus, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033247840     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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