The single-bid restriction on milk quota exchanges

European Review of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 193-215

  Bogetoft, Peter ^a   Nielsen, Kurt ^a   Olesen, Henrik Ballebye ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Auction design; Bidding strategy; Danish quota exchange; Multiple bid exchange; Two sided private value auction

Indexed keywords

EID: 0043235902     PISSN: 01651587     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/erae/30.2.193     Document Type: Review

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