Bid shading and risk aversion in multi-unit auctions with many bidders

Economics Letters

Volumn 56, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 195-200

  Nautz, D ^a   Wolfstetter, E ^b  

^a Inst f Stat u Ökonometrie   (Germany)

^b Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie   (Germany)

Author keywords

Optimal price taking bidding Multi unit auctions Risk aversion Continuous random stop out price Bid shading D44

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031287123     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(97)81900-3     Document Type: Article

References (7)

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4. Nautz D. Optimal bidding in multi-unit auctions with many bidders. Economics Letters. 48:1995;301-306.
5. Nautz, D., 1997. How auctions reveal information - a case study on German repo rates. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, forthcoming.
6. Scott J., Wolf C. The efficient diversification of bids in Treasury bill auctions. Review of Economics and Statistics. 60:1979;280-287.
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