Incentives and optimal size of local jurisdictions

European Economic Review

Volumn 40, Issue 1 SPEC. ISS., 1996, Pages 19-41

  Gilbert, Guy ^a   Picard, Pierre ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS OUEST NANTERRE LA DÉFENSE   (France)

^b CEPREMAP   (France)

Author keywords

Central government; Local jurisdiction; Optimal territorial decentralization; Public goods

Indexed keywords

LOCAL GOVERNMENT; LOCAL PARTICIPATION; MODELLING APPROACH; TERRITORIAL DECENTRALISATION;

EID: 0029837562     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0014-2921(94)00037-9     Document Type: Article

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