Insurance fraud and optimal claims settlement strategies

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 45, Issue 2 I, 2002, Pages 469-507

  Crocker, Keith J ^a   Tennyson, Sharon ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042670058     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/340394     Document Type: Review

References (32)

1. Abrahamse, Allan F., and Carroll, Stephen J. "The Frequency of Excess Claims for Automobile Personal Injuries." In Automobile Insurance: Road Safety, New Drivers, Risks, Insurance Fraud and Regulation, edited by Georges Dionne and Claire Laberge-Nadeau, pp. 131-50. Boston, Mass.: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999.
2. Automobile Insurers Rating Bureau of Massachusetts. Automobile Insurance Bodily Injury Fraud Study. Boston: Automobile Insurers Rating Bureau of Massachusetts, 1990.
3. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information." Rand Journal of Economics 15 (1984): 404-15.
4. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. "Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer," Journal of Legal Studies 17 (1988): 437-50.
5. Blackmon, B. Glenn, and Zeckhauser, Richard. "Mispriced Equity: Regulated Rates for Auto Insurance in Massachusetts." American Economic Review 81 (1991): 65-69.
6. Bond, Eric W., and Cracker, Keith J. "Hardball and the Soft Touch: The Economics of Optimal Insurance Contracts with Costly State Verification and Endogenous Monitoring Costs." Journal of Public Economics 63 (1997): 239-64.
7. Butler, Richard J. "Lost Injury Days: Moral Hazard Differences between Tort and Workers' Compensation." Journal of Risk and Insurance 63 (1996): 405-33.
8. Butler, Richard J., and Worrall, John D. "Claims Reporting and Risk Bearing Moral Hazard in Workers' Compensation." Journal of Risk and Insurance 58 (1991): 191-204.
9. Cooter, Robert D., and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution." Journal of Economic Literature 27 (1989): 1067-97.
10. Crocker, Keith J., and Morgan, John. "Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts." Journal of Political Economy 106 (1998): 355-75.
11. Crocker, Keith J., and Tennyson, Sharon. "Costly State Falsification or Verification? Theory and Evidence from Bodily Injury Liability Claims." In Automobile Insurance: Road Safety, New Drivers, Risks, Insurance Fraud and Regulation, edited by Georges Dionne and Clarie Laberge-Nabeau, pp. 119-30. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 1999.
12. Cummins, J. David, and Tennyson, Sharon. "Controlling Automobile Insurance Costs." Journal of Economic Perspectives 6 (1992): 95-115.
13. Cummins, J. David, and Tennyson, Sharon. "Moral Hazard in Insurance Claiming: Evidence from Automobile Insurance." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 12 (1996): 29-50.
14. Derrig, Richard A., and Zicko, Valerie A. "Prosecution Outcomes 1991 through 1999." Boston: Insurance Fraud Bureau of Massachusetts, 2000.
15. Dionne, Georges, and St-Michel, Pierre. "Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard." Review of Economics and Statistics 73 (1991): 236-44.
16. Farber, Henry S., and White, Michelle J. "Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the Litigation Process." Rand Journal of Economics 22 (1991): 199-217.
17. Hammitt, James K. Automobile Accident Compensation. Vol. 2. Payments by Auto Insurers. Santa Monica, Calif.: Institute for Civil Justice, Rand Corporation, 1985.
18. Insurance Research Council. Trends in Auto Injury Claims. 2d ed. Malvern, Penn.: Insurance Research Council, February 1995.
19. Kaplow, Louis. "Optimal Insurance Contracts When Establishing the Amount of Losses Is Costly." Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory 19 (1994): 139-52.
20. Kessler, Daniel. "Fault, Settlement and Negligence Law." Rand Journal of Economics 26 (1995): 296-313.
21. Kornblum, Guy O. "The Current State of Bad Faith and Punitive Damage Litigation in the United States." Tort and Insurance Law Journal 23 (1998): 812-48.
22. Lankford, Kimberly. "What If the Company Won't Pay?" Kiplinger's Personal Finance Magazine, June 1, 1999, pp. 70-78.
23. Mealey's Litigation Report: Insurance Bad Faith. King of Prussia, Penn.: Mealey Publications, 2001.
24. Meyer, Bruce D., Viscusi, W. Kip, and Durbin, David L. "Workers' Compensation and Injury Duration: Evidence from a Natural Experiment." American Economic Review 85 (1995): 322-40.
25. Mooney, Sean, and Salvatore, Jeanne. Insurance Fraud Project: Report on Research. New York: Insurance Information Institute, 1990.
26. Myerson, Roger B. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem." Econometrica 47 (1979): 61-74.
27. Rosenberg, David, and Shavell, Steven. "A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value." International Review of Law and Economics 5 (1985): 3-14.
28. Sykes, Alan O. "'Bad Faith' Breach of Contract by First-Party Insurers." Journal of Legal Studies 25 (1996): 405-44.
29. Syverud, Kent D. "The Duty to Settle." Virginia Law Review 76 (1990): 1113-1209.
30. Townsend, Robert M. "Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification." Journal of Economic Theory 21 (1979): 265-93.
31. Weisberg, Herbert I., and Derrig, Richard A. "Fraud and Automobile Insurance: A Report on Bodily Injury Claims in Massachusetts." Journal of Insurance Regulation 10 (1991): 497-541.
32. Weisberg, Herbert I., and Derrig, Richard A. "Modelling the Payment of General Damages for Massachusetts Automobile Bodily Injury Liability Claims." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Risk and Insurance Association, San Diego, Calif., 1991.