The Role of Inferences in Sequential Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information: Some Experimental Evidence

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

Volumn 85, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 166-187

  Srivastava, Joydeep ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; game theory; asymmetric information; inferences; attribution.

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042406752     PISSN: 07495978     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/obhd.2000.2936     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. Binmore K. G., Osborne M. J., Rubinstein A. Noncooperative models of bargaining. Aumann R. J., Hart S. Handbook of game theory. 1:1992;179-225 Elsevier, Amsterdan.
2. Bolton G. E., Ockenfels A. ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. American Economic Review. 90:2000;166-193.
3. Camerer C. F. Behavioral game theory. Hogarth R. M. Insights in decision making: A tribute to Hillel J. Einhorn. 1990;311-336 Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicag.
4. Choi I., Nisbett R. E., Norenzayan A. Causal attribution across cultures: Variation and universality. Psychological Bulletin. 125:1999;47-63.
5. Cramton P. C. Strategic delay in bargaining with two-sided uncertainty. Review of Economic Studies. 59:1992;205-225.
6. Dorris, W, Gentry, G, &, Kelley, H. H. (, 1966, ). Unpublished raw data, University of California, Los Angeles.
7. Grossman S. J., Perry M. Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information. Journal of Economic Theory. 39:1986;120-154.
8. Gul F., Sonnenschein H. On delay in bargaining with one-sided uncertainty. Econometrica. 56:1988;601-612.
9. Guth W., Schmittberger R., Schwarz B. An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 3:1982;367-388.
10. Kelley H. H., Stahelski A. J. Social interaction basis of cooperators' and competitors' beliefs about others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 16:1970;66-91.
11. Kennan J., Wilson R. Bargaining with private information. Journal of Economic Literature. 31:1993;45-104.
12. Loewenstein G., Thompson L., Bazerman M. H. Social utility and decision making in interpersonal contexts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 57:1989;426-441.
13. Morris M. W., Larrick R. P., Su S. S. Misperceiving negotiation counterparts: When situationally determined bargaining behaviors are attributed to personality traits. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 77:1999;52-67.
14. Nisbett R. E., Ross L. Human inference strategies and shortcomings of social judgment. 1980;Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
15. Ochs J., Roth A. E. An experimental study of sequential bargaining. American Economic Review. 79:1989;355-384.
16. Prasnikar V., Roth A. E. Consideration of fairness and strategy: Experimental data from sequential games. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 107:1992;865-888.
17. Radner R., Schotter A. The sealed-bid mechanism: An experimental study. Journal of Economic Theory. 48:1989;179-220.
18. Rapoport A., Weg E., Felsenthal D. S. Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining. Theory and Decision. 28:1990;47-71.
19. Rapoport A., Erev I., Zwick R. Experimental study of buyer-seller negotiation with one-sided incomplete information and time discounting. Management Science. 41:1995;377-394.
20. Roth A. E. A note on risk aversion in a perfect equilibrium model of bargaining. Econometrica. 53:1985;207-211.
21. Roth A. E. Bargaining experiments. Kagel J., Roth A. E. Handbook of experimental economics. 1995;253-348 Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton.
22. Roth A. E., Malouf M. W. K. Game-theoretic models and the role of information in bargaining. Psychological Review. 86:1979;574-594.
23. Roth A. E., Murnighan J. K. The role of information in bargaining: An experimental study. Econometrica. 50:1982;1123-1142.
24. Rubinstein A. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica. 50:1982;97-109.
25. Rubinstein A. A bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences. Econometrica. 53:1985;1151-1172.
26. Schelling T. C. The strategy of conflict. 1963;Oxford Univ. Press, New York.
27. Spence M. Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 87:1973;355-374.
28. Srivastava J., Chakravarti D., Rapoport A. Price and margin negotiations in marketing channels: An experimental study of sequential bargaining under one-sided uncertainty and opportunity cost of delay. Marketing Science. 19:2000;163-184.
29. Straub P. G., Murnighan J. K. An experimental investigation of ultimatum games: Information, fairness, expectations, and lowest acceptable offers. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 27:1995;345-364.
30. Tietz R. Experimental economics: Ways to model bounded rational behavior. Tietz R., Albers W., Selten R. Bounded rational behavior in experimental games and markets. 1986;3-10 Springer-Verlag, Bielefeld.
31. Wilson R. Game-theoretic analyses of trading processes. Bewley T. F. Advances in economic theory. 1987;33-70 Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge.