Judgment Dissociation Theory: An Analysis of Differences in Causal, Counterfactual, and Covariational Reasoning

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

Volumn 132, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 419-434

  Mandel, David R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; DECISION MAKING; HUMAN; PSYCHOLOGIC TEST; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL; TASK PERFORMANCE;

ADULT; DECISION MAKING; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS; TASK PERFORMANCE AND ANALYSIS;

EID: 0042378775     PISSN: 00963445     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/0096-3445.132.3.419     Document Type: Article

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