Harvesting altruism in open-source software development

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications

Volumn 118, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 381-416

  Haruvy, E ^a   Prasad, A ^a   Sethi, S P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Altruism; Open source; Optimal control; Pricing

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; MOTIVATION; OPEN SYSTEMS; SOFTWARE DESIGN;

% REDUCTIONS; ALTRUISM; CLOSED SOURCE; HIGH-QUALITY SOFTWARE; OPEN-SOURCE; OPEN-SOURCE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT; OPEN-SOURCE SOFTWARES; OPTIMAL CONTROLS; OPTIMAL PRICING; SOFTWARE FIRMS;

OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE;

EID: 0041876223     PISSN: 00223239     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1025455523489     Document Type: Conference Paper

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