Crime, coordination, and punishment: An economic analysis

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 23-46

  Jost, Peter J ^a  

^a Inst Org Theor 2 D 56179 V   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042232416     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(00)00039-9     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Andreano, R., & Siegfried, J. (1980, eds.). The economics of crime, New York: Wiley.
2. Becker G. Crime and punishment an economic approach . Journal of Political Economy. 76:1968;169-217.
3. Becker, G., & Landes, W. (1974, eds.). Essays in the economics of crime and punishment, New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
4. Benjamin, Y., & Maital, S. (1985). Optimal tax evasion and optimal tax evasion policy: Behavioral aspects. In W. Gaetner and A. Wenig (eds.): The economics of the shadow economy, Berlin: Springer.
5. Besanko D., Spulber D.F. Delegated law enforcement and noncooperative behavior. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 5:1989;25-52.
6. Boadway R., Marceau N., Marchand M. Time-consistent criminal sanctions. Public Finance. 1996;149-165.
7. Case, A., Katz, L. (1991). The company you keep: The effects of family and neighborhood on disadvantaged youth. NBER Working Paper No. 3705.
8. Chu C. Oscillatory vs. stationary enforcement of law. International Review of Law and Economics. 13:1993;303-315.
9. Ehrlicher I. Participation in illegitimate activities a theoretical and empirical investigation . Journal of Political Economy. 81:1973;521-565.
10. Farrell J., Saloner G. Standardization, compatibility, and innovation. Rand Journal of Economics. 16:1985;70-83.
11. Farrell, J., & Saloner, G. (1986). Installed base and compatibility: innovation, product preannouncements, and prediction, American Economic Review, 76, 940-955.
12. Garoupa N. The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement. Economic Inquiry. 38:(2):2000;278-288.
13. Gordon J.P. Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion. European Economic Review. 33:1989;797-805.
14. Heineke, J. (1978, ed). Economic models of criminal crime, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
15. Jost P.J. Monitoring, appeal, and investigation the enforcement and legal process . Journal of Regulatory Economics. 12:1997;127-146.
16. Katz M., Shapiro C. Network externalities, competition, and compatibility. American Economic Review. 75:1985;424-440.
17. Katz M., Shapiro C. Technology adoption in the presence of network externalities. Journal of Political Economy. 94:1986;822-841.
18. Kydland & Prescott (1977). Rules rather than discretion: the inconsistency of optimal plans. Journal of Political Economy, 85, 473-491.
19. Mookherjee, D., & Png, I. (1992). Monitoring vis-a-vis investigation in enforcement of law, American Economic Review, 82, 556-565.
20. Polinsky A., Shavell S. The economic theory of public enforcement of law. NBER Working Paper No. 1999;6993.
21. Pyle, D. (1983). The economics of crime and law enforcement, New York: St. Martin's.
22. Reinganum J., Wilde L. Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework. Journal of Public Economics. 26:1985;1-18.
23. Reinganum J., Wilde L. Equilibrium verification and reporting policies in a model of tax compliance. International Economic Review. 27:1986;739-760.
24. Sah R. Social osmosis and pattern of crime. Journal of Political Economy. 99:1991;1272-1296.
25. Schelling T. Micromotives and macrobehavior. 1978;Norton, New York.
26. Schlicht, E. (1985). The shadow economy and morals: a note. In W. Gaetner and A. Wenig (eds.): The Economics of the Shadow Economy, Berlin: Springer.
27. Shavell S. Specific versus general enforcement of law. Journal of Political Economy. 99:1991;1088-1108.
28. Shavell S. A note on marginal deterrence. International Review of Law and Economics. 12:1992;345-355.
29. Stigler G. The optimum enforcement of laws. Journal of Political Economy. 78:1970;526-536.
30. Van Huyck J., Battalio C., Beil R. Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty and coordination failure. American Economic Review. 80:1990;234-248.