Political instability and economic growth: UK time series evidence

Scottish Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 48, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 383-399

  Asteriou, Dimitrios ^a   Price, Simon ^a  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC GROWTH; POLITICAL INSTABILITY; TIME SERIES; UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS;

UNITED KINGDOM;

EID: 0041319323     PISSN: 00369292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9485.00205     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. ALESINA, A. and PEROTTI, R. (1996). Income distribution, political instability and investment. European Economic Review, 40, pp. 1203-28.
2. ALESINA, A., OZLER, S., ROUBINI, N., and SWAGEL, P. (1996). Political instability and economic growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 1, pp. 189-211.
3. ALOGOSKOUFIS, G. S., LOCKWOOD, B. and PHILIPPOPOULOS, A. (1992). Wage inflation, electoral uncertainty and the exchange rate regime: theory and UK evidence. Economic Journal, 102, pp. 1370-94.
4. BARRO, R. J. (1991). Economic growth in a cross-section of countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, pp. 407-43.
5. BARRO, R. J. (1996). Democracy and growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 1, pp. 1-27.
6. BITTLINGMAYER, G. (1998). Output, stock volatility, and political uncertainty in a natural experiment: Germany, 1880-1940. Journal of Finance, 53, pp. 2243-57.
7. BLEANEY, M. F. (1994). Political uncertainty and private investment in South Africa. South African Journal of Economics, 62, pp. 188-97.
8. BOLLERSLEV, T. (1986). Generalized autoregressive heteroskedasticity. Journal of Econometrics, 31, pp. 307-27.
9. BRUNETTI, A. (1998). Policy volatility and economic growth: a comparative empirical analysis. European Journal of Political Economy, 14, pp. 35-52.
10. BUSSIERE, M. and MULDER, C. (1999). Political instability and economic vulnerability. IMF Working Paper, No. 9946.
11. CALVO, G. and DRAZEN, A. (1997). Uncertain duration of reform: dynamic implications. NBER Working Paper 5925.
12. CHEN, B. and FENG, Y. (1996). Some political determinants of economic growth: theory and empirical implications. European Journal of Political Economy, 12, pp. 609-27.
13. CLARK, E. (1997). Valuing political risk. Journal of International Money and Finance, 16, pp. 477-90.
14. CUKIERMAN, A., EDWARDS, S. and TABELLINI, G. (1992). Seignorage and political instability. American Economic Review, 82, pp. 537-55.
15. DARBY, J., LI, C. and MUSCATELLI, A. (1998). Political uncertainty, public expenditure and growth. University of Glasgow, Discussion Papers in Economics, No. 9822.
16. DEVEREUX, M. and WEN, J. (1996). Political uncertainty, capital taxation and growth. Mimeo. University of British Columbia.
17. DIXIT, A. and PINDYCK, R. S. (1994). Investment Under Uncertainty. Princeton University Press.
18. DRIVER, C. and MORETON, D. (1992). Investment, Expectations and Uncertainty. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
19. EASTERLY, W. and REBELO, S. (1993). Fiscal policy and economic growth: an empirical investigation. Journal of Monetary Economics, 32, 3, pp. 417-57.
20. ENDERS, W. (1995). Applied Econometric Time Series. New York: Wiley.
21. ENGLE, R. F. (1982). Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity with estimates of the variance of United Kingdom inflation. Econometrica, 50, pp. 987-1007.
22. ENGLE, R. F., LILIEN, D. and ROBINS, R. (1987). Estimating time varying risk premia in the term structure: the ARCH-M model. Econometrica, 55, pp. 391-407.
23. FIELDING, D. (1997). Aggregate investment In South Africa: a model with implications for political reform. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 59, pp. 346-69.
24. GEMMILL, G. (1992). Political risk and market efficiency: tests based in British stock and options markets in the 1987 election. Journal of Banking and Finance, 16, pp. 211-32.
25. GROFMAN, B. and VAN ROOZENDAAL, P. (1997). Review article: modelling cabinet durability and termination. British Journal of Political Science, 27, pp. 419-51.
26. GUPTA, D. (1990). The Economics of Political Violence. New York: Praeger.
27. HARTMAN, R. (1972). Factor demand with output price uncertainty. American Economic Review, 66, pp. 675-81.
28. HAUSMAN, J. (1975). Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica, 46, pp. 1251-71.
29. HIBBS, D. (1973). Mass Political Violence: A Cross-Sectional Analysis. New York: Wiley.
30. KNACK, S. and KEEFER, P. (1995). Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures. Economics and Politics, 7, 3, pp. 207-27.
31. KOUTSOÝIANNIS, A. (1977). Theory of Econometrics, 2nd ed. The Macmillan Press Ltd.
32. LEVINE, R. and ZERVOS, S. (1996). Stock market development and long-run growth. The World Bank Economic Review, 10, 2, pp. 323-39.
33. MURPHY, K., SLEIFER, A. and VISHNY, R. (1991). The allocation of talent: implications for growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, pp. 503-30.
34. NANNESTAD, P. and PALDAM, M. (1994). The VP-function: a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years. Public Choice, 79, pp. 213-45.
35. OLSON, M. (1982). The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities. New Haven: Yale University Press.
36. OZLER, S. and TABELLINI, G. (1991). External debt and political instability. Working Paper, National Bureau of Economic Research.
37. PERSSON, T. and TABELLINI, G. (1999). Political economics and macroeconomic policy. In J. Taylor and M. Woodford (eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
38. PINDYCK, R. and RUBINFELD, D. (1981). Econometric Models and Economic Forecasts. New York, McGraw-Hill.
39. PRICE, S. (1996). Aggregate uncertainty, investment and asymmetric adjustment in the UK manufacturing sector. Applied Economics, 28, pp. 1369-79.
40. PRICE, S. (1997). Political business cycles and macroeconomic credibility: a survey. Public Choice, 92, pp. 407-27.
41. PRICE, S. and SANDERS, D. (1993). Modelling government popularity in post war Britain: a methodological example. American Journal of Political Science, 37, pp. 317-34.
42. PRICE, S. and SANDERS, D. (1994). Economic competence, rational expectations and government popularity in postwar Britain. Manchester School, 62, pp. 296-312.
43. ROUBINI, N. (1991). Economic and political determinants of budget deficits in developing countries. Journal of International Money and Finance, 10, pp. 549-72.
44. SLEIFER, A. and VISHNY, R. (1993). Corruption. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, pp. 599-618.
45. SVENSSON, J. (1993). Investment, property rights and political instability: theory and evidence. European Economic Review, 43, pp. 1317-41.
46. TABELINI, G. and ALESINA, A. (1990). Voting on the budget deficit. American Economic Review, 80, 1, pp. 37-49.
47. THEIL, H. (1971). Principles of Econometrics. New York: Wiley.