Political business cycles and macroeconomic credibility: A survey

Public Choice

Volumn 92, Issue 3-4, 1997, Pages 407-427

  Price, Simon ^a  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0043044712     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1004937830968     Document Type: Review

References (112)

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