Towards a multicultural civil society: The role of social capital and democratic citizenship

Government and Opposition

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 221-242

  Lehning, Percy B ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0040350143     PISSN: 0017257X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.1998.tb00791.x     Document Type: Article

References (93)

1. This essay is based on a keynote paper, delivered at a conference on 'Governance in the Euro-Mediterranean Region', organized by the Dutch government in conjunction with the Dutch Presidency of the European Union, The Hague, The Netherlands, 17-18 March 1997.
2. These are the fundamental problems for which a framework of liberal constitutional democracy has to be developed, which can be accepted by all citizens who are to live within it. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, paperback edn, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996, p. xxvii; pp. 3-4.
3. These are the fundamental problems for which a framework of liberal constitutional democracy has to be developed, which can be accepted by all citizens who are to live within it. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, paperback edn, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996, p. xxvii; pp. 3-4.
4. See also A. B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 205; A. B. Seligman, 'The Fragile Ethical Vision of Civil Society', in B. S. Turner (ed.), Citizenship and Social Theory, London, Sage Publications, 1993, pp. 139-61; 158-9.
5. See also A. B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 205; A. B. Seligman, 'The Fragile Ethical Vision of Civil Society', in B. S. Turner (ed.), Citizenship and Social Theory, London, Sage Publications, 1993, pp. 139-61; 158-9.
6. See also A. B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 205; A. B. Seligman, 'The Fragile Ethical Vision of Civil Society', in B. S. Turner (ed.), Citizenship and Social Theory, London, Sage Publications, 1993, pp. 139-61; 158-9.
7. C. G. A. Bryant, 'Social Self-organization, Civility and Sociology: A Comment on Kumar's "Civil Society"', British Journal of Sociology, 44:3 (September 1993), pp. 397-410; 396. See also Bryant, 'Civil Nation, Civil Society, Civil Religion', in John A. Hall (ed.), Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, pp. 136-57; S. Giner, 'Civil Society and its Future', in Hall, ibid., pp. 301-25; 304; E. Shils, 'The Virtue of Civil Society', Government and Opposition, 26:1 (1991), pp. 3-20; 3. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, pp. 5-6.
8. C. G. A. Bryant, 'Social Self-organization, Civility and Sociology: A Comment on Kumar's "Civil Society"', British Journal of Sociology, 44:3 (September 1993), pp. 397-410; 396. See also Bryant, 'Civil Nation, Civil Society, Civil Religion', in John A. Hall (ed.), Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, pp. 136-57; S. Giner, 'Civil Society and its Future', in Hall, ibid., pp. 301-25; 304; E. Shils, 'The Virtue of Civil Society', Government and Opposition, 26:1 (1991), pp. 3-20; 3. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, pp. 5-6.
9. C. G. A. Bryant, 'Social Self-organization, Civility and Sociology: A Comment on Kumar's "Civil Society"', British Journal of Sociology, 44:3 (September 1993), pp. 397-410; 396. See also Bryant, 'Civil Nation, Civil Society, Civil Religion', in John A. Hall (ed.), Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, pp. 136-57; S. Giner, 'Civil Society and its Future', in Hall, ibid., pp. 301-25; 304; E. Shils, 'The Virtue of Civil Society', Government and Opposition, 26:1 (1991), pp. 3-20; 3. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, pp. 5-6.
10. C. G. A. Bryant, 'Social Self-organization, Civility and Sociology: A Comment on Kumar's "Civil Society"', British Journal of Sociology, 44:3 (September 1993), pp. 397-410; 396. See also Bryant, 'Civil Nation, Civil Society, Civil Religion', in John A. Hall (ed.), Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, pp. 136-57; S. Giner, 'Civil Society and its Future', in Hall, ibid., pp. 301-25; 304; E. Shils, 'The Virtue of Civil Society', Government and Opposition, 26:1 (1991), pp. 3-20; 3. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, pp. 5-6.
11. C. G. A. Bryant, 'Social Self-organization, Civility and Sociology: A Comment on Kumar's "Civil Society"', British Journal of Sociology, 44:3 (September 1993), pp. 397-410; 396. See also Bryant, 'Civil Nation, Civil Society, Civil Religion', in John A. Hall (ed.), Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, pp. 136-57; S. Giner, 'Civil Society and its Future', in Hall, ibid., pp. 301-25; 304; E. Shils, 'The Virtue of Civil Society', Government and Opposition, 26:1 (1991), pp. 3-20; 3. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, pp. 5-6.
12. C. G. A. Bryant, 'Social Self-organization, Civility and Sociology: A Comment on Kumar's "Civil Society"', British Journal of Sociology, 44:3 (September 1993), pp. 397-410; 396. See also Bryant, 'Civil Nation, Civil Society, Civil Religion', in John A. Hall (ed.), Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, pp. 136-57; S. Giner, 'Civil Society and its Future', in Hall, ibid., pp. 301-25; 304; E. Shils, 'The Virtue of Civil Society', Government and Opposition, 26:1 (1991), pp. 3-20; 3. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, pp. 5-6.
13. C. G. A. Bryant, 'Social Self-organization, Civility and Sociology: A Comment on Kumar's "Civil Society"', British Journal of Sociology, 44:3 (September 1993), pp. 397-410; 396. See also Bryant, 'Civil Nation, Civil Society, Civil Religion', in John A. Hall (ed.), Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, pp. 136-57; S. Giner, 'Civil Society and its Future', in Hall, ibid., pp. 301-25; 304; E. Shils, 'The Virtue of Civil Society', Government and Opposition, 26:1 (1991), pp. 3-20; 3. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, pp. 5-6.
14. C. G. A. Bryant, 'Social Self-organization, Civility and Sociology: A Comment on Kumar's "Civil Society"', British Journal of Sociology, 44:3 (September 1993), pp. 397-410; 396. See also Bryant, 'Civil Nation, Civil Society, Civil Religion', in John A. Hall (ed.), Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, pp. 136-57; S. Giner, 'Civil Society and its Future', in Hall, ibid., pp. 301-25; 304; E. Shils, 'The Virtue of Civil Society', Government and Opposition, 26:1 (1991), pp. 3-20; 3. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, pp. 5-6.
15. See for these and the following remarks on the idea of civil society especially: Benjamin Barber, 'An American Civic Forum: Civil Society Between Market Individualism and the Political Community', Social Philosophy and Policy, 13:1 (1996), pp. 269-83 and his Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World, New York, Ballantine Books, 1996, pp. 277-92.
16. See for these and the following remarks on the idea of civil society especially: Benjamin Barber, 'An American Civic Forum: Civil Society Between Market Individualism and the Political Community', Social Philosophy and Policy, 13:1 (1996), pp. 269-83 and his Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World, New York, Ballantine Books, 1996, pp. 277-92.
17. See M. Walzer, 'The Civil Society Argument', in R. Beiner (ed.), Theorizing Citizenship, Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 1995, pp. 153-74; 163.
18. See M. Walzer, 'The Civil Society Argument', in R. Beiner (ed.), Theorizing Citizenship, Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 1995, pp. 153-74; 163.
19. Giner, 'Civil Society', p. 306.
20. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 221-43.
21. A prime example of a contemporary liberal political theory is, of course, the one formulated by John Rawls, Political Liberalism.
22. R. Dahl, 'Federalism and the Democratic Process', in J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Liberal Democracy, New York and London, New York University Press, 1983, pp. 95-108; 107.
23. R. Dahl, 'Federalism and the Democratic Process', in J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Liberal Democracy, New York and London, New York University Press, 1983, pp. 95-108; 107.
24. Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996; pp. 121-7.
25. See Percy B. Lehning, 'Pluralism, Contractarianism and European Union', in Percy B. Lehning and A. Weale (eds), Citizenship, Democracy and Justice in the New Europe, London and New York, Routledge, 1997, pp. 107-24.
26. This is the consequence of the fact that political liberalism is not a comprehensive doctrine, and is sharply different from and rejects Enlightenment Liberalism, which is a comprehensive doctrine. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, op. cit., p. xl.
27. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 151, note 16.
28. See also J. Cohen, 'Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy', in S. Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting Boundaries of the Political, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 95-119.
29. A. Przeworski et al., Sustainable Democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 61.
30. See for this discussion of 'neutrality' and 'political liberalism', Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 190-200; 193.
31. See for this discussion of 'neutrality' and 'political liberalism', Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 190-200; 193.
32. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 195.
33. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 199. See also for this role of education the empirical study of N. H. Nie, J. Junn and K. Stehlik-Barry, Education and Democratic Citizenship in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1996.
34. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 199. See also for this role of education the empirical study of N. H. Nie, J. Junn and K. Stehlik-Barry, Education and Democratic Citizenship in America, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1996.
35. See also A. Galeotti, 'Citizenship and Equality: The Place for Toleration', Political Theory, 21:4 (1993), pp. 585-605; 598-600.
36. See also A. Galeotti, 'Citizenship and Equality: The Place for Toleration', Political Theory, 21:4 (1993), pp. 585-605; 598-600.
37. See also M. Levinson, 'Liberalism versus Democracy? Schooling Private Citizens in the Public Square', British Journal of Political Science, 27:3 (July 1997), pp. 333-60. This article analyses the policy of neutrality, represented by the American and French school systems. Both countries consciously establish the school as a public space by adopting a policy of public non-identification with private conceptions of the good. The general conclusion is that no single model, when the question is to balance all the demands set forth by political liberalism, is satisfactory. For political liberalism 'it means that its liberal and democratic commitments are possibly irreconcilable on a practical level, and therefore that the theory is subject to an irremediable internal tension'. (p. 359).
38. See also A. Gutmann, 'Introduction', in Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism and the 'Politics of Recognition', Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1992, pp. 3-24;
39. 11. According to Amy Gutmann, education policy in America, far from requiring neutrality, encourages local communities to shape schools partly in their particular image, so long as they do not violate basic rights, such as freedom of conscience or the separation of church and state.
40. See E. Callan, 'Political Liberalism and Political Education', The Review of Politics, 58:1 (Winter 1996), pp. 5-33; 25. Focusing on Rawls's political liberalism, and analysing the implications of Rawls's theory for political education, Callan argues that Rawls cannot uphold his claim that there is a difference between his 'political liberalism' and 'ethical liberalism'. In fact, according to Callan, Rawls's political liberalism is a partially comprehensive doctrine of ethical autonomy. See also Callan's Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, esp. ch. 2. (See for a similar argument that, because of the fact that Rawls's political liberalism takes autonomy to be of great importance, the theory should be seen as at least a partially comprehensive theory: R. Dagger, Civic Virtues, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 188-92.) Callan stipulates that this interpretation of Rawls's liberal political theory as being partially comprehensive is not to say that Rawls's educational agenda that entails the shared benefits of an autonomy-based political education, should not be endorsed, even at the cost of some ethical diversity. See for example, on the other hand, for a claim that the public interest in education is modest, W. Galston, 'Civic Education, in the Liberal State', in N. L. Rosenblum (ed.), Liberalism and Moral Life, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1989, pp. 89-101.
41. See E. Callan, 'Political Liberalism and Political Education', The Review of Politics, 58:1 (Winter 1996), pp. 5-33; 25. Focusing on Rawls's political liberalism, and analysing the implications of Rawls's theory for political education, Callan argues that Rawls cannot uphold his claim that there is a difference between his 'political liberalism' and 'ethical liberalism'. In fact, according to Callan, Rawls's political liberalism is a partially comprehensive doctrine of ethical autonomy. See also Callan's Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, esp. ch. 2. (See for a similar argument that, because of the fact that Rawls's political liberalism takes autonomy to be of great importance, the theory should be seen as at least a partially comprehensive theory: R. Dagger, Civic Virtues, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 188-92.) Callan stipulates that this interpretation of Rawls's liberal political theory as being partially comprehensive is not to say that Rawls's educational agenda that entails the shared benefits of an autonomy-based political education, should not be endorsed, even at the cost of some ethical diversity. See for example, on the other hand, for a claim that the public interest in education is modest, W. Galston, 'Civic Education, in the Liberal State', in N. L. Rosenblum (ed.), Liberalism and Moral Life, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1989, pp. 89-101.
42. See E. Callan, 'Political Liberalism and Political Education', The Review of Politics, 58:1 (Winter 1996), pp. 5-33; 25. Focusing on Rawls's political liberalism, and analysing the implications of Rawls's theory for political education, Callan argues that Rawls cannot uphold his claim that there is a difference between his 'political liberalism' and 'ethical liberalism'. In fact, according to Callan, Rawls's political liberalism is a partially comprehensive doctrine of ethical autonomy. See also Callan's Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, esp. ch. 2. (See for a similar argument that, because of the fact that Rawls's political liberalism takes autonomy to be of great importance, the theory should be seen as at least a partially comprehensive theory: R. Dagger, Civic Virtues, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 188-92.) Callan stipulates that this interpretation of Rawls's liberal political theory as being partially comprehensive is not to say that Rawls's educational agenda that entails the shared benefits of an autonomy-based political education, should not be endorsed, even at the cost of some ethical diversity. See for example, on the other hand, for a claim that the public interest in education is modest, W. Galston, 'Civic Education, in the Liberal State', in N. L. Rosenblum (ed.), Liberalism and Moral Life, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1989, pp. 89-101.
43. See E. Callan, 'Political Liberalism and Political Education', The Review of Politics, 58:1 (Winter 1996), pp. 5-33; 25. Focusing on Rawls's political liberalism, and analysing the implications of Rawls's theory for political education, Callan argues that Rawls cannot uphold his claim that there is a difference between his 'political liberalism' and 'ethical liberalism'. In fact, according to Callan, Rawls's political liberalism is a partially comprehensive doctrine of ethical autonomy. See also Callan's Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, esp. ch. 2. (See for a similar argument that, because of the fact that Rawls's political liberalism takes autonomy to be of great importance, the theory should be seen as at least a partially comprehensive theory: R. Dagger, Civic Virtues, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 188-92.) Callan stipulates that this interpretation of Rawls's liberal political theory as being partially comprehensive is not to say that Rawls's educational agenda that entails the shared benefits of an autonomy-based political education, should not be endorsed, even at the cost of some ethical diversity. See for example, on the other hand, for a claim that the public interest in education is modest, W. Galston, 'Civic Education, in the Liberal State', in N. L. Rosenblum (ed.), Liberalism and Moral Life, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1989, pp. 89-101.
44. See E. Callan, 'Political Liberalism and Political Education', The Review of Politics, 58:1 (Winter 1996), pp. 5-33; 25. Focusing on Rawls's political liberalism, and analysing the implications of Rawls's theory for political education, Callan argues that Rawls cannot uphold his claim that there is a difference between his 'political liberalism' and 'ethical liberalism'. In fact, according to Callan, Rawls's political liberalism is a partially comprehensive doctrine of ethical autonomy. See also Callan's Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, esp. ch. 2. (See for a similar argument that, because of the fact that Rawls's political liberalism takes autonomy to be of great importance, the theory should be seen as at least a partially comprehensive theory: R. Dagger, Civic Virtues, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 188-92.) Callan stipulates that this interpretation of Rawls's liberal political theory as being partially comprehensive is not to say that Rawls's educational agenda that entails the shared benefits of an autonomy-based political education, should not be endorsed, even at the cost of some ethical diversity. See for example, on the other hand, for a claim that the public interest in education is modest, W. Galston, 'Civic Education, in the Liberal State', in N. L. Rosenblum (ed.), Liberalism and Moral Life, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1989, pp. 89-101.
45. See C. Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', in Gutmann, Multiculturalism and the 'Politics of Recognition', pp. 25-73. Galeotti, 'Citizenship and Equality', p. 595.
46. See C. Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', in Gutmann, Multiculturalism and the 'Politics of Recognition', pp. 25-73. Galeotti, 'Citizenship and Equality', p. 595.
47. There are at least three forms of group-specific measures for accommodating national and ethnic differences: polyethnic rights (or 'recognition rights'), special group representation rights, and self-government rights. See for an extensive defence of this idea of group-differentiated rights: W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995. See also the collection of articles on the subject of rights of minority cultures in W. Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995. See, for the label 'recognition rights' and a more general discussion of Kymlicka's distinction between three kinds of group-differentiated rights, J. Carens, 'Liberalism and Culture', Constellations, 4:1 (1997), pp. 35-47. Kymlicka presently prefers the term 'accommodation rights': W. Kymlicka, 'Do We Need a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights? Reply to Carens, Young, Parekh and Frost', Constellations, 4:1 (April 1997), pp. 72-87; 73.
48. There are at least three forms of group-specific measures for accommodating national and ethnic differences: polyethnic rights (or 'recognition rights'), special group representation rights, and self-government rights. See for an extensive defence of this idea of group-differentiated rights: W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995. See also the collection of articles on the subject of rights of minority cultures in W. Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995. See, for the label 'recognition rights' and a more general discussion of Kymlicka's distinction between three kinds of group-differentiated rights, J. Carens, 'Liberalism and Culture', Constellations, 4:1 (1997), pp. 35-47. Kymlicka presently prefers the term 'accommodation rights': W. Kymlicka, 'Do We Need a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights? Reply to Carens, Young, Parekh and Frost', Constellations, 4:1 (April 1997), pp. 72-87; 73.
49. There are at least three forms of group-specific measures for accommodating national and ethnic differences: polyethnic rights (or 'recognition rights'), special group representation rights, and self-government rights. See for an extensive defence of this idea of group-differentiated rights: W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995. See also the collection of articles on the subject of rights of minority cultures in W. Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995. See, for the label 'recognition rights' and a more general discussion of Kymlicka's distinction between three kinds of group-differentiated rights, J. Carens, 'Liberalism and Culture', Constellations, 4:1 (1997), pp. 35-47. Kymlicka presently prefers the term 'accommodation rights': W. Kymlicka, 'Do We Need a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights? Reply to Carens, Young, Parekh and Frost', Constellations, 4:1 (April 1997), pp. 72-87; 73.
50. There are at least three forms of group-specific measures for accommodating national and ethnic differences: polyethnic rights (or 'recognition rights'), special group representation rights, and self-government rights. See for an extensive defence of this idea of group-differentiated rights: W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995. See also the collection of articles on the subject of rights of minority cultures in W. Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995. See, for the label 'recognition rights' and a more general discussion of Kymlicka's distinction between three kinds of group-differentiated rights, J. Carens, 'Liberalism and Culture', Constellations, 4:1 (1997), pp. 35-47. Kymlicka presently prefers the term 'accommodation rights': W. Kymlicka, 'Do We Need a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights? Reply to Carens, Young, Parekh and Frost', Constellations, 4:1 (April 1997), pp. 72-87; 73.
51. There are at least three forms of group-specific measures for accommodating national and ethnic differences: polyethnic rights (or 'recognition rights'), special group representation rights, and self-government rights. See for an extensive defence of this idea of group-differentiated rights: W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995. See also the collection of articles on the subject of rights of minority cultures in W. Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995. See, for the label 'recognition rights' and a more general discussion of Kymlicka's distinction between three kinds of group-differentiated rights, J. Carens, 'Liberalism and Culture', Constellations, 4:1 (1997), pp. 35-47. Kymlicka presently prefers the term 'accommodation rights': W. Kymlicka, 'Do We Need a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights? Reply to Carens, Young, Parekh and Frost', Constellations, 4:1 (April 1997), pp. 72-87; 73.
52. See Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 194.
53. The third form of group-differentiated rights, mentioned in note 24, the self-government rights, concern the delegation of power to national minorities, often through some form of federalism. It should be added, however, that it is not clear that those rights would support solidarity and cohesiveness in liberal society. They rather seem to open the door for separation and secession, and do not have an integrative function. See on these aspects of separation and secession also: W. Kymlicka, 'Is Federalism a Viable Alternative to Secession?', in Percy B. Lehning (ed.), Theories of Secession, London and New York, Routledge, 1998, pp. 111-50.
54. As Dallmayr has noted, none of these devices is free of problems or possible abuses; hence, all need to be carefully screened and calibrated to ensure the democratic character of multiculturalism. F. Dallmayr, 'Democracy and Multiculturalism', in S. Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 278-94; 289.
55. As Dallmayr has noted, none of these devices is free of problems or possible abuses; hence, all need to be carefully screened and calibrated to ensure the democratic character of multiculturalism. F. Dallmayr, 'Democracy and Multiculturalism', in S. Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 278-94; 289.
56. See for instance R. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1989.
57. Przeworski et al., Sustainable Democracy, p. 62. See for a review of the literature also L. Diamond, 'Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered', in G. Marks and L. Diamond (eds), Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honour of Seymour Lipset, Newbury Park, Sage Publications, 1992.
58. Przeworski et al., Sustainable Democracy, p. 62. See for a review of the literature also L. Diamond, 'Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered', in G. Marks and L. Diamond (eds), Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honour of Seymour Lipset, Newbury Park, Sage Publications, 1992.
59. See R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1993; Putnam, 'Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital', Journal of Democracy, 6:1 (1995), pp. 65-78; Putnam, 'Turning In, Turning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America', PS: Political Science and Politics, 28:4 (1995), pp. 664-83. Fukuyama links economic performance with trust: the 'art of association'. Trust cannot be delivered by the economic contract alone: there is a non-contractual element in all contracts. F. Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, New York, The Free Press, 1995. In these studies trust is seen as essentially a form of social solidarity.
60. See R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1993; Putnam, 'Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital', Journal of Democracy, 6:1 (1995), pp. 65-78; Putnam, 'Turning In, Turning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America', PS: Political Science and Politics, 28:4 (1995), pp. 664-83. Fukuyama links economic performance with trust: the 'art of association'. Trust cannot be delivered by the economic contract alone: there is a non-contractual element in all contracts. F. Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, New York, The Free Press, 1995. In these studies trust is seen as essentially a form of social solidarity.
61. See R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1993; Putnam, 'Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital', Journal of Democracy, 6:1 (1995), pp. 65-78; Putnam, 'Turning In, Turning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America', PS: Political Science and Politics, 28:4 (1995), pp. 664-83. Fukuyama links economic performance with trust: the 'art of association'. Trust cannot be delivered by the economic contract alone: there is a non-contractual element in all contracts. F. Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, New York, The Free Press, 1995. In these studies trust is seen as essentially a form of social solidarity.
62. See R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1993; Putnam, 'Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital', Journal of Democracy, 6:1 (1995), pp. 65-78; Putnam, 'Turning In, Turning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America', PS: Political Science and Politics, 28:4 (1995), pp. 664-83. Fukuyama links economic performance with trust: the 'art of association'. Trust cannot be delivered by the economic contract alone: there is a non-contractual element in all contracts. F. Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, New York, The Free Press, 1995. In these studies trust is seen as essentially a form of social solidarity.
63. See for an analysis of those 'habits of the heart', R. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart, Berkeley, Cal., University of California Press, 1985.
64. 'Oppositional' is not, of course, the same as 'adversary'. 'Oppositional' voluntary associations share the framework of the liberal democratic society. 'Adversary' voluntary associations do not.
65. See L. Diamond, 'Three Paradoxes of Democracy', in L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner (eds), The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins Press, 1993, pp. 95-107.
66. See Putnam, 'Bowling Alone'; 'Turning In, Turning Out'.
67. We follow with this description Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Putnam, in his turn, bases the concept of 'social capital' on Coleman. See J. S. Coleman, 'Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital', American Journal of Sociology, (Supplement), 94 (1988), pp. S95-S120.
68. We follow with this description Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Putnam, in his turn, bases the concept of 'social capital' on Coleman. See J. S. Coleman, 'Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital', American Journal of Sociology, (Supplement), 94 (1988), pp. S95-S120.
69. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, p. 194.
70. See S. Benhabib, Critique, Norm and Utopia, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 340-3.
71. One also could interpret this as the antagonism of communitarian political theorizing versus the theory of political liberalism. See for a recent communitarian perspective on these problems: A. Etzioni, The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society, New York, Basic Books, 1996.
72. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, p. 196. See also A. B. Seligman, The Problem of Trust, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1997, esp. ch. 3: 'Trust and Generalized Exchange', pp. 75-100.
73. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, p. 196. See also A. B. Seligman, The Problem of Trust, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1997, esp. ch. 3: 'Trust and Generalized Exchange', pp. 75-100.
74. According to Fukuyama, social capital 'is like a ratchet that is more easily turned in one direction than another; it can be dissipated by the actions of governments much more readily than those governments can build it up again'. (Fukuyama, Trust, p. 326.) Although indeed government policies can and do affect the level of social capital, the careful design of governmental institutions may be able to reverse the ratchet that Fukuyama believes has only driven social capital out. See M. Schneider, M. Mintrum and C. Roch, 'Institutional Arrangements and the Creation of Social Capital: The Effects of Public School Choice', American Political Science Review, 91:1 (1997), pp. 82-93; 91.
75. According to Fukuyama, social capital 'is like a ratchet that is more easily turned in one direction than another; it can be dissipated by the actions of governments much more readily than those governments can build it up again'. (Fukuyama, Trust, p. 326.) Although indeed government policies can and do affect the level of social capital, the careful design of governmental institutions may be able to reverse the ratchet that Fukuyama believes has only driven social capital out. See M. Schneider, M. Mintrum and C. Roch, 'Institutional Arrangements and the Creation of Social Capital: The Effects of Public School Choice', American Political Science Review, 91:1 (1997), pp. 82-93; 91.
76. According to Fukuyama, social capital 'is like a ratchet that is more easily turned in one direction than another; it can be dissipated by the actions of governments much more readily than those governments can build it up again'. (Fukuyama, Trust, p. 326.) Although indeed government policies can and do affect the level of social capital, the careful design of governmental institutions may be able to reverse the ratchet that Fukuyama believes has only driven social capital out. See M. Schneider, M. Mintrum and C. Roch, 'Institutional Arrangements and the Creation of Social Capital: The Effects of Public School Choice', American Political Science Review, 91:1 (1997), pp. 82-93; 91.
77. See for critique on Putnam's empirical conclusions: M. Levi, 'Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work', Politics and Society, 24:1 (1996), pp. 45-55;
78. P. Norris, 'Does Television Erode Social Capital? A Reply to Putnam', PS: Political Science and Politics, 29:3 (1996), pp. 474-80;
79. T. Skocpol, 'Unravelling From Above', The American Prospect, 25 (March-April) 1996, pp. 20-5;
80. S. Tarrow, 'Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work', American Political Science Review, 90:2 (1996), pp. 389-97.
81. Fukuyama, in discussing the debate on the empirical validity of Putnam's claim that American social capital has been declining, suggests an alternative method of estimating a nation's stock of social capital: measure the absence of social capital through traditional measures of social deviance, such as crime rates, family breakdown, drug use, litigation, suicide, tax evasion and the like. (F. Fukuyama, The End of Order, London, The Social Market Foundation, 1997.)
82. See for instance the critique of Theda Skocpol, 'Unravelling from Above', on Putnam's The Prosperous Community; Social Capital and Public Life', The American Prospect, 13 (Spring 1993), pp. 35-42.
83. See for instance the critique of Theda Skocpol, 'Unravelling from Above', on Putnam's The Prosperous Community; Social Capital and Public Life', The American Prospect, 13 (Spring 1993), pp. 35-42.
84. In fact we can say, following Skocpol, in 'Unravelling from Above', that it is wrong to imagine that popular voluntary associations and the welfare state are contradictory opposites: historically they have operated in close symbiosis. Voluntary civil federations have both pressed for the creation of public social programmes, and worked in partnership with government to administer and expand such programmes after they were established. Organized civil society, for instance in the United States and in the Netherlands, never flourished apart from active government and inclusive democratic politics.
85. In this perspective Michael Walzer sees as an antidote to a rampant individualism that is producing 'dissociated individuals', a task for state-sponsored association. In fact in the United States at least, he believes conditions have deteriorated to the extent that 'it makes sense to call the state to the rescue of civil society'. M. Walzer, 'Constitutional Rights and the Shape of Civil Society', in Robert E. Calvert (ed.), The Constitution of the People: Reflections on Citizens and Civil Society, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1991, pp. 113-26; 125. See also M. Walzer, On Toleration, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1997, pp. 111-12.
86. In this perspective Michael Walzer sees as an antidote to a rampant individualism that is producing 'dissociated individuals', a task for state-sponsored association. In fact in the United States at least, he believes conditions have deteriorated to the extent that 'it makes sense to call the state to the rescue of civil society'. M. Walzer, 'Constitutional Rights and the Shape of Civil Society', in Robert E. Calvert (ed.), The Constitution of the People: Reflections on Citizens and Civil Society, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1991, pp. 113-26; 125. See also M. Walzer, On Toleration, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1997, pp. 111-12.
87. In this perspective Michael Walzer sees as an antidote to a rampant individualism that is producing 'dissociated individuals', a task for state-sponsored association. In fact in the United States at least, he believes conditions have deteriorated to the extent that 'it makes sense to call the state to the rescue of civil society'. M. Walzer, 'Constitutional Rights and the Shape of Civil Society', in Robert E. Calvert (ed.), The Constitution of the People: Reflections on Citizens and Civil Society, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1991, pp. 113-26; 125. See also M. Walzer, On Toleration, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1997, pp. 111-12.
88. Putnam, for example, identifies education as having a strong relationship with his measure of civic engagement. Putnam, 'Turning In, Turning Out', p. 667. See also the study of Schneider, Mintrom and Roch, 'Institutional Arrangements and the Creation of Social Capital', for identifying the effects of institutional arrangements governing the delivery of education by local governments on the formation of social capital.
89. Putnam, for example, identifies education as having a strong relationship with his measure of civic engagement. Putnam, 'Turning In, Turning Out', p. 667. See also the study of Schneider, Mintrom and Roch, 'Institutional Arrangements and the Creation of Social Capital', for identifying the effects of institutional arrangements governing the delivery of education by local governments on the formation of social capital.
90. See also: R. Putnam, 'Robert Putnam Responds', The American Prospect, 25 (March-April 1996), pp. 26-8. According to Dahrendorf, 'both are needed, civil society and the state, but they each have their own raison d'être and their own autonomous reality'. R. Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, London, Chatto & Windus, 1990, p. 96.
91. See also: R. Putnam, 'Robert Putnam Responds', The American Prospect, 25 (March-April 1996), pp. 26-8. According to Dahrendorf, 'both are needed, civil society and the state, but they each have their own raison d'être and their own autonomous reality'. R. Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, London, Chatto & Windus, 1990, p. 96.
92. The aim would be progressively to equalize the power and, thereby, the capacity of men and women to act in the key realm of political and social life, in other words, to acquire full liberal democratic citizenship. D. Held, 'Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?', in David Held (ed.), Prospects for Democracy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1993, pp. 13-52; 24.
93. The aim would be progressively to equalize the power and, thereby, the capacity of men and women to act in the key realm of political and social life, in other words, to acquire full liberal democratic citizenship. D. Held, 'Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?', in David Held (ed.), Prospects for Democracy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1993, pp. 13-52; 24.