Social and unsocial capital: A review essay of Robert Putnam's making democracy work

Politics and Society

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 45-55

  Levi, Margaret ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0030306692     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329296024001005     Document Type: Review

References (52)

1. Margaret Levi, "Making Democracy Work: A Review," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 3 (1993): 375-9.
2. Robert Putnam was the 1994 winner of the Gregory Luebert Prize in Comparative Politics presented by the Organized Section on Comparative Politics, American Political Science Association.
3. Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
4. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 111.
5. Ibid., 116.
6. Douglas C. North, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
7. Suzanne Berger argued forcefully for an alternative history in her discussion at a roundtable on the book at the American Political Science Meetings, New York, September 1994. Also, see Filippo Sabetti this issue.
8. See my discussion of the problems of using path dependence as a metaphor in Margaret Levi, "The New Economic Institutionalism in the Analysis of Revolutions" (paper presented at Workshop on Revolutions, SCASSS, August 1995).
9. Paul David, "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," American Economic Review 75, no. 2 (1985): 332-7; and W. Brian Arthur, "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events", The Economic Journal 99 (March 1989): 116-31.
10. Paul David, "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," American Economic Review 75, no. 2 (1985): 332-7; and W. Brian Arthur, "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events", The Economic Journal 99 (March 1989): 116-31.
11. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 170.
12. Ibid., 171.
13. Comments during the Roundtable on Trust, American Political Science Association Meetings, Chicago, September 1995.
14. Ibid., 171-4.
15. Ibid., 174.
16. Robert Sugden, The Economics of Rights, Co-operation, and Welfare (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
17. Margaret Levi, "Trusting the State" (paper presented at Russell Sage Foundation/Russell Sage Workshop on "Trust and Social Structure," Seattle, WA, September 1995).
18. Neil Pinney and John Scholz, "Can Cognitive Consistency Cure Collective Dilemmas? Self-Interest Versus Duty to Pay Taxes," working paper no. 28, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1992; John T. Scholz, "The Adaptive Compliance of Citizens: Tax Compliance as Contingent Consent" (Canberra, Australia: ANU, Administration, Compliance and Governability Working Paper No. 21, 1994).
19. Neil Pinney and John Scholz, "Can Cognitive Consistency Cure Collective Dilemmas? Self-Interest Versus Duty to Pay Taxes," working paper no. 28, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1992; John T. Scholz, "The Adaptive Compliance of Citizens: Tax Compliance as Contingent Consent" (Canberra, Australia: ANU, Administration, Compliance and Governability Working Paper No. 21, 1994).
20. John Orbell and Robyn M. Dawes, "A 'Cognitive Miser' Theory of Cooperators' Advantage," American Political Science Review 85, no. 2 (June 1991): 515-28; Idem, "Social Welfare, Cooperators' Advantage, and the Option of Not Playing the Game," American Sociological Review 58 (December 1993): 787-800.
21. John Orbell and Robyn M. Dawes, "A 'Cognitive Miser' Theory of Cooperators' Advantage," American Political Science Review 85, no. 2 (June 1991): 515-28; Idem, "Social Welfare, Cooperators' Advantage, and the Option of Not Playing the Game," American Sociological Review 58 (December 1993): 787-800.
22. There are several versions of this argument. See, e.g., Valerie Braithwaite, "Games of Engagement: Postures within the Regulatory Community," working paper no. 26, Administration, Compliance, & Governability Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1995; Avner Greif, "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal of Political Economy 102, no. 5 (1994): 912-50; and Toshio Yamagishi and Midori Yamagishi, "Trust and Commitment in the United States and Japan," Motivation and Emotion 18, no. 2 (1994): 129-66. While both Greif and Yamagishi and Yamagishi rely on incentives and sanctions to account for trust or what Yamagishi and Yamagishi label commitment, Braithwaite relies more on a sense of shared identity.
23. There are several versions of this argument. See, e.g., Valerie Braithwaite, "Games of Engagement: Postures within the Regulatory Community," working paper no. 26, Administration, Compliance, & Governability Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1995; Avner Greif, "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal of Political Economy 102, no. 5 (1994): 912-50; and Toshio Yamagishi and Midori Yamagishi, "Trust and Commitment in the United States and Japan," Motivation and Emotion 18, no. 2 (1994): 129-66. While both Greif and Yamagishi and Yamagishi rely on incentives and sanctions to account for trust or what Yamagishi and Yamagishi label commitment, Braithwaite relies more on a sense of shared identity.
24. There are several versions of this argument. See, e.g., Valerie Braithwaite, "Games of Engagement: Postures within the Regulatory Community," working paper no. 26, Administration, Compliance, & Governability Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1995; Avner Greif, "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal of Political Economy 102, no. 5 (1994): 912-50; and Toshio Yamagishi and Midori Yamagishi, "Trust and Commitment in the United States and Japan," Motivation and Emotion 18, no. 2 (1994): 129-66. While both Greif and Yamagishi and Yamagishi rely on incentives and sanctions to account for trust or what Yamagishi and Yamagishi label commitment, Braithwaite relies more on a sense of shared identity.
25. This is my argument in "Trusting the State". On non-state institutions, see Paul R. Milgrom, Douglas C. North, and Barry R. Weingast, "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics 1 (1990): 1-23.
26. There are numerous versions of this argument. Some rely on reputation, e.g., Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and Avner Greif, "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," Journal of Economic History 49, no. 4 (December 1989): 857-82. Others focus on encapsulated self-interest, e.g., Russell Hardin, comments at the New York University/Russell Sage Foundation Workshop on Trust, New York, February 1995.
27. There are numerous versions of this argument. Some rely on reputation, e.g., Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and Avner Greif, "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," Journal of Economic History 49, no. 4 (December 1989): 857-82. Others focus on encapsulated self-interest, e.g., Russell Hardin, comments at the New York University/Russell Sage Foundation Workshop on Trust, New York, February 1995.
28. There are numerous versions of this argument. Some rely on reputation, e.g., Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and Avner Greif, "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," Journal of Economic History 49, no. 4 (December 1989): 857-82. Others focus on encapsulated self-interest, e.g., Russell Hardin, comments at the New York University/Russell Sage Foundation Workshop on Trust, New York, February 1995.
29. Russell Hardin, "The Street Level Epistemology of Trust," Politics & Society 21, no. 4 (December 1993): 505-29.
30. David, "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," 36.
31. Stephen Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America (New York: MacMillan, 1993).
32. Ibid.
33. Russell Hardin, One for All. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
34. Although he discusses government actors in the empirical section (101-4), they pretty much disappear in the last chapter.
35. A similar line of argument is pursued by Sidney Tarrow, "Making Social Science Work across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work," American Political Science Review (forthcoming).
36. Robert Putnam, "The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life," The American Prospect 13 (Spring 1993): 35-42; and Robert Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," Journal of Democracy 6, no. 1 (January 1995): 65-78.
37. Robert Putnam, "The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life," The American Prospect 13 (Spring 1993): 35-42; and Robert Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," Journal of Democracy 6, no. 1 (January 1995): 65-78.
38. Fukuyama, Trust.
39. Robert Putnam, "Bowling Alone"; Robert Putnam, "Bowling Alone, Revisited," The Responsive Community (Spring 1995): 18-33.
40. Robert Putnam, "Bowling Alone"; Robert Putnam, "Bowling Alone, Revisited," The Responsive Community (Spring 1995): 18-33.
41. Yamagishi and Yamagishi, "Trust and Commitment in the United States and Japan."
42. See, e.g., Barry R. Weingast, "Constructing Trust The Political and Economic Roots of Ethnic and Regional Violence" (paper presented at the University of Maryland/National Science Foundation Conference on Institutions, College Park, MD, October 1994); Barry R. Weingast, Institutions and Political Commitment: A New Political Economy of the American Civil War Era (forthcoming).
43. See, e.g., Barry R. Weingast, "Constructing Trust The Political and Economic Roots of Ethnic and Regional Violence" (paper presented at the University of Maryland/National Science Foundation Conference on Institutions, College Park, MD, October 1994); Barry R. Weingast, Institutions and Political Commitment: A New Political Economy of the American Civil War Era (forthcoming).
44. Margaret Levi, The Contingencies of Consent (forthcoming).
45. Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981), 20.
46. Greif, "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society."
47. Putnam provides some corrective to this earlier position in "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America" (the Ithiel de Sola Pool Lecture, American Political Science Association Meetings, Chicago, September 1995).
48. Talk at the Annual World Bank Conference, Washington, DC, May 1995.
49. The Mafia is, of course, based on vertical interactions. It, however, relies on and produces distrust, not trust. See, especially, Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia.
50. Fareed Zakaria, "Bigger than the Family, Smaller than the State: Are Voluntary Groups What Make Countries Work?" New York Times, 13 August 1995, pp. 1, 25.
51. Elinor Ostrom, "Investing in Capital, Institutions, and Incentives," in Institutions and Economic Development, ed. Christopher Clague (forthcoming). Also, see Hardin, One for All.
52. Elinor Ostrom, "Investing in Capital, Institutions, and Incentives," in Institutions and Economic Development, ed. Christopher Clague (forthcoming). Also, see Hardin, One for All.