Kant on the unity of theoretical and practical reason

Review of Metaphysics

Volumn 52, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 311-339

  Kleingeld, Pauline ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0039449545     PISSN: 00346632     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (130)

1. Critique of Practical Reason (hereafter "CPrR"), 5:121; see Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:391. All references to Kant are to the standard volume number and pagination of Kants Gesammelte Schriften. Ausgabe der königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Translations are my own.
2. Critique of Practical Reason (hereafter "CPrR"), 5:121; see Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:391. All references to Kant are to the standard volume number and pagination of Kants Gesammelte Schriften. Ausgabe der königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Translations are my own.
3. Critique of Practical Reason (hereafter "CPrR"), 5:121; see Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:391. All references to Kant are to the standard volume number and pagination of Kants Gesammelte Schriften. Ausgabe der königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Translations are my own.
4. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:391. Kant here speaks of "speculative" reason. For purposes of terminological clarity, I shall use the term "theoretical reason" throughout, although Kant uses both the terms theoretical reason and speculative reason (see for example, CPrR, 5:5, 50, 54-5, 89, and 119-121). He sometimes labels the use of speculative reason as a subset of the use of theoretical reason, but this distinction is not important for the purposes of this paper. See for example, Critique of Pure Reason (hereafter "CPR"), A805/B833 (references to the Critique of Pure Reason are to the pages of the first [A] and second [B] editions); with regard to theoretical versus speculative cognition, A633-5/B661-3.
5. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:391. Kant here speaks of "speculative" reason. For purposes of terminological clarity, I shall use the term "theoretical reason" throughout, although Kant uses both the terms theoretical reason and speculative reason (see for example, CPrR, 5:5, 50, 54-5, 89, and 119-121). He sometimes labels the use of speculative reason as a subset of the use of theoretical reason, but this distinction is not important for the purposes of this paper. See for example, Critique of Pure Reason (hereafter "CPR"), A805/B833 (references to the Critique of Pure Reason are to the pages of the first [A] and second [B] editions); with regard to theoretical versus speculative cognition, A633-5/B661-3.
6. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:391. Kant here speaks of "speculative" reason. For purposes of terminological clarity, I shall use the term "theoretical reason" throughout, although Kant uses both the terms theoretical reason and speculative reason (see for example, CPrR, 5:5, 50, 54-5, 89, and 119-121). He sometimes labels the use of speculative reason as a subset of the use of theoretical reason, but this distinction is not important for the purposes of this paper. See for example, Critique of Pure Reason (hereafter "CPR"), A805/B833 (references to the Critique of Pure Reason are to the pages of the first [A] and second [B] editions); with regard to theoretical versus speculative cognition, A633-5/B661-3.
7. CPrR, 5:91.
8. For example, CPR, A815-6/B843-4.
9. Paul Guyer, "The Unity of Reason: Pure Reason as Practical Reason in Kant's Early Conception of the Transcendental Dialectic," The Monist 72 (1989): 139-67. Guyer nonetheless speaks of Kant's doctrine of "the unity of reason," but not as the unity of theoretical and practical reason. Rather, he uses the phrase to refer to reason's "single domain of application" and its introduction of "a single special sort of unity into whatever it is to which it is appropriately applied" (139). This interpretation of the phrase also lies behind Guyer's recent claim that Kant states "his theory of the unity of reason as the culmination of a theory of reflective judgment." Paul Guyer, review of The Unity of Reason, by Susan Neiman, Philosophical Review 106 (1997): 292.
10. Paul Guyer, "The Unity of Reason: Pure Reason as Practical Reason in Kant's Early Conception of the Transcendental Dialectic," The Monist 72 (1989): 139-67. Guyer nonetheless speaks of Kant's doctrine of "the unity of reason," but not as the unity of theoretical and practical reason. Rather, he uses the phrase to refer to reason's "single domain of application" and its introduction of "a single special sort of unity into whatever it is to which it is appropriately applied" (139). This interpretation of the phrase also lies behind Guyer's recent claim that Kant states "his theory of the unity of reason as the culmination of a theory of reflective judgment." Paul Guyer, review of The Unity of Reason, by Susan Neiman, Philosophical Review 106 (1997): 292.
11. Paul Guyer, "The Unity of Reason: Pure Reason as Practical Reason in Kant's Early Conception of the Transcendental Dialectic," The Monist 72 (1989): 139-67. Guyer nonetheless speaks of Kant's doctrine of "the unity of reason," but not as the unity of theoretical and practical reason. Rather, he uses the phrase to refer to reason's "single domain of application" and its introduction of "a single special sort of unity into whatever it is to which it is appropriately applied" (139). This interpretation of the phrase also lies behind Guyer's recent claim that Kant states "his theory of the unity of reason as the culmination of a theory of reflective judgment." Paul Guyer, review of The Unity of Reason, by Susan Neiman, Philosophical Review 106 (1997): 292.
12. Most recently, see, Jürg Freudiger, "Kants Schlußstein: Wie die Teleologie die Einheit der Vernunft stiftet," Kant-Studien 87 (1996): 423-35. Eckart Förster has argued that the third critique contains Kant's attempt to show the "unifiability of theoretical and practical reason," in "Was darf ich hoffen? Zum Problem der Vereinbarkeit von theoretischer und praktischer Vernunft bei Immanuel Kant," Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 46 (1992): 170.
13. Most recently, see, Jürg Freudiger, "Kants Schlußstein: Wie die Teleologie die Einheit der Vernunft stiftet," Kant-Studien 87 (1996): 423-35. Eckart Förster has argued that the third critique contains Kant's attempt to show the "unifiability of theoretical and practical reason," in "Was darf ich hoffen? Zum Problem der Vereinbarkeit von theoretischer und praktischer Vernunft bei Immanuel Kant," Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 46 (1992): 170.
14. See Henry Allison, "The Gulf between Nature and Freedom and Nature's Guarantee of Perpetual Peace," in Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 37-8.
15. Susan Neiman, The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Klaus Konhardt, Die Einheit der Vernunft: Zum Verhältnis von theoretischer und praktischer Vernunft in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants (Königstein: Forum Academicum, 1979).
16. Susan Neiman, The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Klaus Konhardt, Die Einheit der Vernunft: Zum Verhältnis von theoretischer und praktischer Vernunft in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants (Königstein: Forum Academicum, 1979).
17. Konhardt, Die Einheit der Vernunft, 10.
18. Neiman, The Unity of Reason, most clearly, p. 128; Konhardt, Die Einheit der Vernunft, 11.
19. Neiman, The Unity of Reason, most clearly, p. 128; Konhardt, Die Einheit der Vernunft, 11.
20. CPR, A645/B673.
21. CPR, A645/B673.
22. See Konhardt, Die Einheit der Vernunft, ch. 1.
23. For example, CPR, A682-6/B710-4. leave aside the regulative ideas mentioned in the first part of the appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, which are based on the idea of a supreme intelligence; CPR, A642-68/B670-96.
24. For example, CPR, A682-6/B710-4. leave aside the regulative ideas mentioned in the first part of the appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, which are based on the idea of a supreme intelligence; CPR, A642-68/B670-96.
25. Kant is fond of pointing out that theoretical and practical reason employ the same three ideas (the ideas of the soul, of the world or freedom, and of God): see CPR, A329/B386; PrR, 5:5-12, and 134-8. There are notorious problems with this claim of Kant's as well as with the (unstable) roles he assigns to the three ideas, but since these problems are not directly relevant to the present topic, I leave them aside here.
26. Kant is fond of pointing out that theoretical and practical reason employ the same three ideas (the ideas of the soul, of the world or freedom, and of God): see CPR, A329/B386; PrR, 5:5-12, and 134-8. There are notorious problems with this claim of Kant's as well as with the (unstable) roles he assigns to the three ideas, but since these problems are not directly relevant to the present topic, I leave them aside here.
27. For example, CPR, A808/B836; Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:433.
28. For example, CPR, A808/B836; Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:433.
29. Neiman fails to recognize the importance of the concept of purposive-ness, but Konhardt brings it out well. See, Konhardt, Die Einheit der Vernunft, 150-82.
30. In his review of Neiman's book, Paul Guyer has recently made an analogous criticism regarding Neiman's discussion of the relationship between the realms of nature and freedom. See above, note 5.
31. CPR, 5:91, emphasis mine.
32. It might be suggested that when Kant says that theoretical and practical reason are two uses of one and the same faculty, he is merely claiming to know that this is so, whereas the admission that he must still achieve insight into this unity refers to further insight into the justification of the first claim. This attempt at reconciling the two statements, however, faces the problem that Kant cannot consistently claim the status of knowledge for the first claim as long as he cannot justify it.
33. Critique of Pure Reason, A299/B356; see also Critique of Judgment (hereafter "CJ"), 5:401.
34. Critique of Pure Reason, A299/B356; see also Critique of Judgment (hereafter "CJ"), 5:401.
35. Critique of Pure Reason, A329/B386.
36. Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 47. Allison notes the contradiction, too, but he does not discuss it: Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 245, 284 n. 28.
37. Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 47. Allison notes the contradiction, too, but he does not discuss it: Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 245, 284 n. 28.
38. CPrR, 5:121.
39. See CPR, A676/B704, and A686-7/B714-5. On the use of regulative ideas, see Thomas E. Wartenberg, "Reason and the Practice of Science," in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 228-48.
40. See CPR, A676/B704, and A686-7/B714-5. On the use of regulative ideas, see Thomas E. Wartenberg, "Reason and the Practice of Science," in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 228-48.
41. CPR, A676/B704. See also Kant's discussion of reason's "right of need" to "presuppose and assume as a subjective ground something that she is not allowed to claim to know through objective grounds," in "What is Orientation in Thinking?," 8:137.
42. CPR, A676/B704. See also Kant's discussion of reason's "right of need" to "presuppose and assume as a subjective ground something that she is not allowed to claim to know through objective grounds," in "What is Orientation in Thinking?," 8:137.
43. CPrR, 5:91.
44. CPR, A683/B711.
45. "Vernunfteinheit" here refers to the unity established by reason.
46. CPR, A648-9/B676-7.
47. In his analysis of the unity of the subject's cognitive powers, Dieter Henrich has argued that this unity has the status of a subjective principle. The reading of the unity of reason I present in this essay is compatible with Henrich's analysis, although he argues for it differently and discusses all cognitive powers, not merely reason. See "On the Unity of Subjectivity," trans. Günter Zöller, in Dieter Henrich, The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant's Philosophy, ed. Richard Velkley (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 26-33.
48. For example, CPR, A682-3/B710-1.
49. This point is also made, in a different context, by Paul Guyer, "The Systematic Order of Nature and the Systematic Union of Ends," in Vernunftbegriffe in der Moderne: Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongreß 1993, ed. Hans Friedrich Fulda and Rolf-Peter Horstmann (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1994), 206.
50. CPR, A649/B677.
51. CPrR, 5:121.
52. See CPR, A687-8/B715-6.
53. I discuss some of these issues, as well as Kant's quasi-hypostatizing descriptions of reason, in "The Conative Character of Reason in Kant's Philosophy," Journal of the History of Philosophy 36 (1998): 77-97.
54. CPrR, 5:121.
55. CPrR, 5:121.
56. CPrR, 5:121. The term "cognition" (Erkenntnis) should not be read in the sense of an empirical cognition, of course, but in the sense of a conceptual cognition as explained in Critique of Pure Reason, A320/B376-7.
57. CPrR, 5:121. The term "cognition" (Erkenntnis) should not be read in the sense of an empirical cognition, of course, but in the sense of a conceptual cognition as explained in Critique of Pure Reason, A320/B376-7.
58. CPR, A815/B843.
59. CPrR, 5:146.
60. See Neiman, The Unity of Reason, 48-62. This is what Kant claims, but it is by no means unproblematic. The precise relationship between reason and the understanding is the subject of much recent debate. See Michael Friedman, "Causal Laws and the Foundations of Natural Science," in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, 161-99; Henry Allison, Idealism and Freedom, 80-91; Paul Guyer, "The Systematic Order of Nature and the Systematic Union of Ends;"
61. See Neiman, The Unity of Reason, 48-62. This is what Kant claims, but it is by no means unproblematic. The precise relationship between reason and the understanding is the subject of much recent debate. See Michael Friedman, "Causal Laws and the Foundations of Natural Science," in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, 161-99; Henry Allison, Idealism and Freedom, 80-91; Paul Guyer, "The Systematic Order of Nature and the Systematic Union of Ends;"
62. See Neiman, The Unity of Reason, 48-62. This is what Kant claims, but it is by no means unproblematic. The precise relationship between reason and the understanding is the subject of much recent debate. See Michael Friedman, "Causal Laws and the Foundations of Natural Science," in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, 161-99; Henry Allison, Idealism and Freedom, 80-91; Paul Guyer, "The Systematic Order of Nature and the Systematic Union of Ends;"
63. See Neiman, The Unity of Reason, 48-62. This is what Kant claims, but it is by no means unproblematic. The precise relationship between reason and the understanding is the subject of much recent debate. See Michael Friedman, "Causal Laws and the Foundations of Natural Science," in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, 161-99; Henry Allison, Idealism and Freedom, 80-91; Paul Guyer, "The Systematic Order of Nature and the Systematic Union of Ends;"
64. Martin Bondeli, "Zu Kants Behauptung der Unentbehrlichkeit der Vernunftideen," Kant-Studien 87 (1996): 166-83.
65. CPR, A216/B263.
66. CPR, A650-1/B678-9, see also A653-4/B681-2.
67. CPR, A651/B679.
68. For a discussion of the transcendental illusion, see Michelle Grier, "Kant on the Illusion of a Systematic Unity of Knowledge," History of Philosophy Quarterly 14 (1997): 1-28.
69. CPR, A678/B706.
70. CPR, A670/B698.
71. The fact that there is continuity between the first and the third critiques in this regard is important for the purposes of this paper. I do not wish to suggest, however, that the third critique is simply a continuation of the first. Rudolf Makkreel has emphasized the discontinuity between the roles of theoretical reason and reflective judgment, in that the latter, but not the former, includes aesthetic judgment. Rudolf Makkreel, "Regulative and Reflective Uses of Purposiveness in Kant," Southern Journal of Philosophy 30, Supplement (1991): 49-63 and Imagination and Interpretation: The Hermeneutic Import of the "Critique of Judgment" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
72. The fact that there is continuity between the first and the third critiques in this regard is important for the purposes of this paper. I do not wish to suggest, however, that the third critique is simply a continuation of the first. Rudolf Makkreel has emphasized the discontinuity between the roles of theoretical reason and reflective judgment, in that the latter, but not the former, includes aesthetic judgment. Rudolf Makkreel, "Regulative and Reflective Uses of Purposiveness in Kant," Southern Journal of Philosophy 30, Supplement (1991): 49-63 and Imagination and Interpretation: The Hermeneutic Import of the "Critique of Judgment" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
73. CJ, 5:180-1.
74. CJ, 5:181-86.
75. CPR, A686-7/B714-5. On teleology in the Critique of Pure Reason, see J. D. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1970), 25-42, and Klaus Düsing, Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff, 2nd rev. ed. (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1986), 38-50.
76. CPR, A686-7/B714-5. On teleology in the Critique of Pure Reason, see J. D. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1970), 25-42, and Klaus Düsing, Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff, 2nd rev. ed. (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1986), 38-50.
77. CPR, A686-7/B714-5. On teleology in the Critique of Pure Reason, see J. D. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1970), 25-42, and Klaus Düsing, Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff, 2nd rev. ed. (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1986), 38-50.
78. CPR, A688/B716.
79. CPR, A691/B719. Kant claims that one can make many discoveries with the help of the teleological principle. In contrast to the Critique of Judgment, however, Kant does not yet distinguish here between external and internal purposiveness. He applies the teleological principle to the shape of the earth, to mountains and seas, as well as to organisms; CPR, A687-8/B715-6.
80. CPR, A691/B719. Kant claims that one can make many discoveries with the help of the teleological principle. In contrast to the Critique of Judgment, however, Kant does not yet distinguish here between external and internal purposiveness. He applies the teleological principle to the shape of the earth, to mountains and seas, as well as to organisms; CPR, A687-8/B715-6.
81. He develops the argument in the second part of the "Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic," but because nothing in the first part indicates that a systematic unity in terms of mechanical-causal laws is insufficient, the introduction of teleology comes unexpectedly. It is no surprise that it has eluded many commentators.
82. Again, the fact that there is continuity in this particular regard should not be taken to suggest that the differences between the two critiques are negligible. Importantly, the very justification of teleological judgment changes from the first critique to the third. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant justifies the teleological view of nature by appealing to reason's interest in systematic unity, and he immediately applies the teleological principle to all of nature. In the Critique of Judgment, by contrast, he first justifies the use of teleological judgments in the case of organisms, and subsequently broadens their scope of application.
83. CJ, 5:427, 429.
84. CJ, 5:435-6.
85. CJ, 5:431, 435. Nature cannot be oriented toward making humans moral, of course, since morality can be the result only of a free decision by individual agents. On this issue, see Allison, "The Gulf between Nature and Freedom," 47.
86. CJ, 5:431, 435. Nature cannot be oriented toward making humans moral, of course, since morality can be the result only of a free decision by individual agents. On this issue, see Allison, "The Gulf between Nature and Freedom," 47.
87. See CJ, 5:431, 432.
88. CJ, 5:433-4.
89. "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View," 8:17-18, 29.
90. "Idea for a Universal History," 8:25; see also 30.
91. "Idea for a Universal History," 8:19-21. On the idea of moral development and its compatibility with Kant's moral philosophy, see my "Kant, History, and the Idea of Moral Development," History of Philosophy Quarterly 16 (1999): 59-80.
92. "Idea for a Universal History," 8:19-21. On the idea of moral development and its compatibility with Kant's moral philosophy, see my "Kant, History, and the Idea of Moral Development," History of Philosophy Quarterly 16 (1999): 59-80.
93. CPR, A807-19/B835-47.
94. See Paul Guyer, "The Unity of Reason," and "The Systematic Order of Nature and the Systematic Union of Ends," and Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 81-104.
95. CPR, A808-9/B836-7.
96. CPR, A808/B836; see A815/B843.
97. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals 4:433.
98. Many problems plague Kant's account of the moral world. One difficulty is that Kant works with two notions of the highest good. In the passages quoted he speaks of it as a moral world of virtuous beings who produce their own and each other's happiness. In different passages in the same work, he defines it as happiness in proportion to virtue in an individual. Regardless of which of these conceptions of the highest good he discusses, Kant needs the assumption that nature and morality are brought into harmony by a highest intelligence.
99. CPR, A808/B836. On this notion of the actualization of the moral world, see Richard L. Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason: On the Moral Foundation of Kant's Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), ch. 5.
100. CPR, A808/B836. On this notion of the actualization of the moral world, see Richard L. Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason: On the Moral Foundation of Kant's Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), ch. 5.
101. CPR, A815/B843.
102. On Kant's doctrine of moral faith, see Allen W. Wood, Kant's Moral Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970). On Kant's precritical conception of the harmony of the laws of nature and of morality, see Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason, ch. 4, esp. pp. 89-95.
103. On Kant's doctrine of moral faith, see Allen W. Wood, Kant's Moral Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970). On Kant's precritical conception of the harmony of the laws of nature and of morality, see Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason, ch. 4, esp. pp. 89-95.
104. CPR, A815/B843.
105. CPrR, 5:145.
106. CJ, 5:478-9.
107. CJ, 5:479,
108. emphasis mine. Although it confirms the moral proof, the possibility of regarding nature teleologically does not itself suffice to justify the assumption of the existence of God, and hence it cannot replace the moral proof; CJ, 5:479.
109. 79 CJ, secs. 67, 82-1
110. CJ, 5:432-4.
111. "Idea for a Universal History," 8:30.
112. CPR, A698/B726;
113. see "What is Orientation in Thinking?," 8:139.
114. Henry E. Allison, Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 19.
115. CPrR, 5:121.
116. On the primacy of practical reason, see also Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 95-113
117. and Frederick Rauscher, "Kant's Two Priorities of Practical Reason," British Journal of the History of Philosophy 6 (1998): 397-419 .
118. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:436, note; see "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy," 8:182-3.
119. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:436, note; see "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy," 8:182-3.
120. Of course, it should be kept in mind that the epistemic status of this view is that of a regulative idea in one case, and of a practical postulate in the other.
121. CJ, 5:175-6.
122. CJ, 5:176.
123. CJ, 5:196.
124. See notes 6 and 9 above.
125. Kant does not discuss what, if anything, is left of theoretical reason and its three ideas. He occasionally seems to presuppose its continued existence (for example, at CJ, 5:342, and 401), but he does not provide a revised account of its function.
126. CJ, 5:198; see also 20:245-46.
127. CJ, 5:195-8.
128. CJ, 5:195.
129. Kant's reorganization of the cognitive faculties may have been motivated more by his discovery of an a priori principle that could ground his aesthetic theory, and less by a dissatisfaction with his own previous theory of the unity of reason. In that case, the newly prominent faculty of judgment introduces a problem for Kant by unsettling his previous doctrine of the unity of reason. I shall not investigate these deeper motives here, however, as the main argument of this paper does not depend on the motives for the change in Kant's view.
130. I would like to thank Joel Anderson, Thad Metz, Fred Rauscher, Fred Rush, and Allen Wood for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.